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Preface
Origins
This book has four central roots. The first is a little monograph by the Polish
model theorist Marian Przełe˛cki, The Logic of Empirical Theories (1969), whose
central concepts I presented at a seminar at the University of Hamburg in the
winter term of 2000. At that time, I thought of them simply as providing a neat
formalism, but it turned out that these concept were extremely well-adapted to
the philosophical problems that I encountered.
The second root is a hunch I had about six years ago while at the University
of Western Ontario; based on the abstract of an article by Lewis (1988b) to which
I did not have full access at that time, it seemed to me that one of the criteria of
empirical significance he suggests might be equivalent to one given by Przełe˛cki
(1974a). I decided to compare these and other criteria of empirical significance. In
a stroke of luck, the hunch turned out to be correct (see claim 6.13 on page 236),
and a host of other criteria turned out to be equivalent or closely related to each
other as well.
The third root springs from my personal predilection for analyzing problems
with the help of predicate logic, one element of Przełe˛cki’s formalism. It was the
source of some dismay that my results would often be dismissed as being based on
“the syntactic view on scientific theories”, the discredited approach to philosophy
of science by the logical empiricists. That I was interested in criteria of empirical
significance—the logical empiricists’ hobby horse and one of the main reasons for
logical empiricism’s descent into infamy—did not improve matters. Thus I was
more or less forced to defend the use of predicate logic in the philosophy of science.
I started out with the intent to avoid the mistakes of the logical empiricists, and
the first and most obvious step was not to restrict predicate logic to first order.
It was (and more or less still is) common knowledge in philosophy that this
restriction is central to logical empiricism. As stated in the Philosophical Lexicon
(Steglich-Petersen 2008):
hempel, adj. (only in the idiom hempel-minded) Said of one who
insists on recasting the problem in the first order logic.
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I was baffled to discover that at no point did the logical empiricists actually demand
that theories be formalized in first order logic (for an example of Hempel not
being hempel-minded, see page 105). Thus I began to attempt to identify the
logical empiricists’ real positions on formal methods in philosophy of science,
which turned out to be rather defensible. What is more, it became clear that many
later developments were either anticipated by the logical empiricists or can find a
natural home in their approach.
The fourth root is my reflection on my own philosophical methodology. At
one point I realized that when trying to pin down a concept, I would first try to
find out what I want to use it for, and then develop a concept that does that.1 For
example, when thinking about free will and responsibility, I would look at the
concepts’ purported roles in ethics, and try to develop new concepts that would
fulfill these roles as much as possible. I was not too surprised when this method
turned out to be already described by Carnap as ‘explication’ (I am rather sure that
I had read about Carnap’s methodology earlier, and then just forgotten about it for
a while). Looking closer at Carnap’s elucidations, I was struck by the prominent
role that he assigns to empirical results in the formation of concepts, without,
though, declaring concept formation an empirical endeavor. This observation
was the basis for my conviction that philosophy can be empirically informed
without thereby making synthetic claims, which luckily became a central topic in
philosophy with the rise of experimental philosophy.
The structure of this book came about by presenting these topics in reverse
chronological order (with the exception of Przełe˛cki’s formalism): I would first
argue for explication as a philosophical methodology and outline Przełe˛cki’s
formalism, then defend the logical empiricists’ approach to philosophy of science,
and finally analyze criteria of empirical significance. Possible applications for the
criteria came up naturally when thinking about their relations, so these would
form the final part of the book.
Ideals
Since this book is both a defense and an application of artificial language philoso-
phy, I will not try to defend my conceptual suggestions by reference to ordinary
language use, language intuitions, or intuitions about the way the world really is.
For what it is worth, my intuitions are realistic: I think of electrons as little hard
spheres and of numbers as platonic objects.2 However, I know that my intuition
about electrons is inconsistent with quantum mechanics, which provides me with
all my information about electrons, and I know of no reason to treat my intuitions
about numbers with more respect. This has all been better expressed by Creath
1I am somewhat embarrassed to admit that this was indeed more of a realization than a conscious
decision.
2Specifically, objects with a specific geometric shape that are added by fitting into each other.
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(1991, 349):
If we are not to give up our pretensions to have reasonable beliefs,
something must be added to observation and inference which provides
the requisite justification. But what? A classical answer to this goes
back to Kant and Descartes and beyond them to the Greeks and
has dominated serious philosophers down to and including Frege
and (sometimes) Russell. That answer can be given in a single word:
‘in- tuition’. On this view we have direct metaphysical insight into
a domain of truths independent of ourselves. This is how we know
the axioms of arithmetic, geometry, logic, and so on as well as how
we know the true essences of things and any other necessary truth
that we think we know. This doctrine of intuition, however, is a
scandal. Intuitions notoriously differ, and there is no plausible way
of resolving these differences. For that matter there is no plausible
account of why intuitions should be right even where intuitions agree.
[ . . . ] I can well appreciate that [the need to justify our beliefs], in the
absence of an alternative, would drive someone to appeal to intuition.
That, however, must not hide the fact that such an appeal is an act of
desperation.
Accordingly, I do not think of the definitions that I give for, e. g., ‘abstraction’,
‘B -determinacy’, or ‘confirmation’ as attempts to capture my intuition or that
of anyone else. Hence if the definition turns out to be inadequate, either because
it fails to be a definition on technical grounds or it does not meet some other
condition of adequacy, I cannot reply that even if the definition is inadequate,
the underlying intuition is sound (this, of course, still allows one to search for a
similar but better definition). In general, I do not consider an appeal to intuitions
a sufficient defense. In §9.3, for example, I argue that Elliott Sober’s definition
of ‘testability’ renders intelligent design testable under specific circumstances.
More than once, the reply to this argument has been that in the circumstances
that I consider, “one would not say that” intelligent design has been tested, and
thus intelligent design remains untestable. But this claim is unacceptable, since
testability is not a clear enough concept to decide the cases under consideration,
and accordingly the testability of intelligent design cannot be decided by reference
to intuition. Other terms whose use as primitives I have avoided are ‘explanation’,
‘causation’, and ‘natural kind’, since I consider none of them to be clear enough
to solve the problems under discussion here. Accordingly, inference to the best
explanation plays no role in my arguments.3
Relatedly, I will also refrain from endowing perfectly well-defined concepts
implicitly with additional features. In one especially puzzling response to my
3The following rule of thumb has served me well: Whenever a philosopher uses ‘explanation’,
‘causation’, or ‘natural kind’ as a primitive term, hold on to your wallet.
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discussion of Sober’s criterion, for example, intelligent design was claimed to be
untestable and Sober’s definition was defended as adequate because under the
circumstances that I discuss, one would not say that intelligent design was being
tested. Sober’s intuition was silently being augmented by intuition, which, it
seems to me, renders the definition itself pointless. I will accordingly also not
silently augment the formalism of higher order logic with non-formal restrictions.
For instance, I will assume that ∃x(x = x)  ∃X1X2(X1 6= X2), where X1 and
X2 are predicate variables. This might seem to be a trivial point, but in fact
has considerable implications for philosophical methodology (see page 51), the
foundations of philosophy of science (see page 168), and structural realism (see
page 389).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The interlocking main goals of this book are, first, a defense of artificial language
philosophy; second, an analysis of criteria of empirical significance on the basis of
artificial language philosophy; and third, an application of the criteria of empirical
significance to different problems in philosophy. As it will turn out, one such
application is the analysis and improvement of the formalism of artificial language
philosophy itself.
1.1 Overview
Part I is a defense of an artificial language methodology in philosophy and a
historical and systematic defense of the logical empiricists’ application of an
artificial language methodology to scientific theories. These defenses provide a
justification for the presumptions of a host of criteria of empirical significance,
which I will analyze, compare, and develop in part II. On the basis of this analysis,
in part III I will use a variety of criteria to evaluate the scientific status of intelligent
design, and further discuss confirmation, reduction, and concept formation.
I. Foundations
Foundations of philosophy
As a foundation, I argue in §2.4 and §2.6 that artificial language philosophy (also
called ‘ideal language philosophy’) has advantages over the competing methodolo-
gies of philosophy based on intuitions (§2.1), ordinary language philosophy (§2.2),
experimental philosophy, and naturalized philosophy (§2.5). Artificial language
philosophy relies on language choice to solve philosophical problems; the choice
of language determines which sentences are analytically true, but itself has no
factual implications, and thus the results of artificial language philosophy are
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analytic. Although the choice of a language can involve the choice of a logic, it is
sufficient for my purposes to assume a fixed logic and a fixed basic vocabulary, and
to assume that only the meaning postulates for the terms of an auxiliary vocabu-
lary can be chosen. In this case, language choice amounts to concept formation.
I discuss the semantics of concept formation as developed by Przełe˛cki (1969,
§§4–6) in §2.8, and argue that artificial language philosophy is methodologically
naturalistic, in that the sciences rely extensively on language choice as well (§2.10).
Because of this, artificial language philosophy justifies many observed fruitful
interactions between the sciences and philosophy of science (§2.11). Artificial
language philosophy furthermore allows for the reinterpretation and productive
use of results from the other five mentioned philosophical methodologies (§2.7).
As an example of artificial language philosophy in use, I explicate the concepts of
abstraction and idealization (§2.12).
Foundations of philosophy of science
The Received View on scientific theories by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl is an
application of artificial language philosophy to scientific theories. The heavy
criticisms that led to its downfall, I argue, rest on false assumptions. Specifically,
the Received View does not rely on exhaustive axiomatizations (§3.4) in first order
logic (§3.3) and in fact has often relied on the same formalization of scientific
theories as its critics (§3.5). The Received View also does not oversimplify the
actual relation between theories and observations, nor does it introduce needless
complexities in this respect (§3.6). It is also not hostile towards the use of models
in science (§3.7). Furthermore, the Received View has not failed in its attempt
to make the notion of a theory more precise, because it is not intended to do so.
Rather, first, it is intended as a generalizable framework in which one can explicate
specific theories (§3.8.2). Second, explication differs from precisification (§3.8.1).
Apart from this historical defense, I argue that syntactic approaches in gen-
eral are as powerful as competing semantic ones (§4.1). The Received View in
particular can capture and generalize van Fraassen’s notions of a theory and of
empirical adequacy (§4.2). It can furthermore capture the core notions of the
partial structures approach in two different ways (§4.3).
II. Relations
Criteria of empirical significance are meant to distinguish between the sentences
or terms that are connected to empirical claims or states and those that are not.
Such criteria can be divided into criteria for the empirical significance of sentences
and criteria for the empirical significance of terms. Along another dimension, one
can distinguish between deductive criteria, which assume deductive inferences,
and analogously, probabilistic criteria.
I show how all major deductive criteria for sentences are equivalent to falsifia-
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bility (§6.2), verifiability (§6.3), their disjunction (§6.6), or supervenience (§6.5).
Based on these equivalences, I provide comparative criteria of empirical signif-
icance (§6.7.1), provide a very general notion of empirical claim and empirical
fact (§6.8.1), and develop a notion of supplementary assumptions that avoids the
problems of Ayer’s criterion and its successors (§6.8.2). I further show that the
major deductive criteria for terms are equivalent or similar to explicit definability,
supervenience of terms (§7.2), reducibility (§7.3), or a criterion suggested inde-
pendently by William Rozeboom and by Carnap (§7.4). Based on these results,
I generalize some of these criteria to criteria for sets of terms (§7.5). I argue that
those criteria for terms that provide something other than a mere means of refor-
mulating criteria for sentences cannot be used to identify empirically significant
sentences at all. However, some criteria for sets of terms can be used to distinguish
theoretical concepts from mathematical ones (§7.6). I further show that Sober’s
(probabilistic) criterion of testability is inadequate according to his own conditions
of adequacy and argue instead for two different criteria: the relevance criterion
of probabilistic significance, which is the probabilistic analogue of falsifiability,
and the Bayesian criterion, the analogue of the disjunction of falsifiability and
verifiability (§8).
III. Applications
I apply the results of parts I and II to four distinct areas. In a straightforward
application of deductive and probabilistic criteria for sentences, I analyze the
structure of the theory of intelligent design (ID) and show that, in its most plausible
formulations, ID is neither falsifiable nor probabilistically relevant. This result
suggests that ID is not a science (§9).
Through the relation between probabilistic criteria of empirical significance
and the notion of testability, the failure of likelihoodism to provide a criterion
of empirical significance leads to a criticism of likelihoodism as an explication of
confirmation. Analogously, the success of the relevance criterion and the Bayesian
criterion of empirical significance suggests the relevance criterion of confirmation
and, respectively, Bayesianism itself (§10). Furthermore, the deductive criteria for
sentences and some criteria for terms can be used in the explication of different
notions of reduction (§11). Finally, the criteria of empirical significance themselves
can be used to analyze, generalize, and improve upon the formalism of artificial
language philosophy. I map out such a development and apply some of the results
to a question of concept formation in two ethical theories (§12).
1.2 Conventions
Newly introduced terms will be identified by italics when they are defined or
assigned some weaker meaning postulates. I will use “quotation marks” to identify
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quotations, and ‘single quotation marks’ to identify names of words and phrases.
In all quotes, I will silently change double quotation marks to single quotation
marks whenever a word is mentioned. Scare quotes are accordingly always double
quotes. ðCornersñ identify quasi-quotations, names of words and phrases in which
variables may be substituted (so that ‘¬A’ is an instance of ð¬σñ). When there
is little danger of confusion, I will often suppress quotation and quasi-quotation
marks and thus use symbols autonymously. A concept is the intension of a term,
so that a definition or some weaker set of meaning postulates for a term (e. g.,
‘cause’) determines the concept itself (e. g., cause).
Whenever I discuss a well-defined language like predicate logic, a term is any
non-logical relation, function, or constant symbol of a language. While this goes
against the typical terminology in logic, it is in line with the standard terminology
in philosophy of science, where one speaks of ‘observational terms’, ‘basic terms’,
‘definition in terms of’, ‘terminology’, etc.
As logical constant symbols, I will use λ for generalized predicates (proposi-
tional functions), ι for definite descriptions, and ‘∧’, ‘∨’, ‘→’, ‘↔’, ‘∀’, ‘∃’ as usual;
in quotes, I will silently change logical notation accordingly. I will change set
theoretic notation from ‘(’, ‘)’, ‘⊂’, and ‘⊃’ to ‘⊂’, ‘⊃’, ‘⊆’, and ‘⊇’, respectively.
Quantifiers and operators are always assumed to have minimal scope. To reduce
the number of parentheses, I will assume that ‘¬’ binds more strongly than ‘∨’ and
‘∧’, which binds more strongly than ‘↔’ and ‘→’. Unless stated otherwise, I will
in the following assume a vocabulary V of mi -place relation symbols Pi , n j -place
function symbols F j , and constant symbols ck . The function and relation symbols
can be of any order. {mi}i∈I , {n j } j∈J , and the respective types of the individual
relation, function, and constant symbols are collectively called their similarity
type.
For model theoretic matters, I will rely on the standard notation as used by
Chang and Keisler (1990, §1.3) and, more loosely, by Hodges (1993, §§1.2–1.3).
Specifically, a structure A is a pair 〈A,I 〉 consisting of a domain A and a function
I from V to relations, functions, and constants on A of their respective types.
Hence Pi is mapped to an mi -ary relation, F j to an n j -ary function, and ck to a
constant on A. Sometimes I use indexed sets of structuresMi instead of A,B, etc.
A will always be the domain |A| ofA, B = |B| etc. IfA= 〈A,I 〉, I write PAi instead
ofI (Pi ), and analogously for functions and constants. PBi is the relation inB that
corresponds to relation PAi in A, and analogously for functions and constants. In
displayed form, I write a structure A as 〈A, PA1 , . . . , PAs , FA1 , . . . , FAt , cA1 , . . . , cAu 〉 or,
for possibly infinite index sets, 〈A, PAi , FAj , cAk 〉i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K . If it is necessary to give
the vocabulary of the structure explicitly, I will write


A, 〈P1, PA1 〉, . . . , 〈Ps , PAs 〉,〈F1, FA1 〉, . . . , 〈Ft , FAt 〉, 〈c1, cA1 〉, . . . , 〈cu , cAu 〉

, even though that is far from graceful.
If two structures A and B are isomorphic (Hodges 1993, 5), I will sometimes
write this as ‘A'B’. Sometimes, it will be convenient to identify the vocabulary
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of a structure in the structure’s name by a subscript. A structure in a vocabulary
I , for example, may be identified by AI .
I will sometimes use ‘x¯’ as a string of the appropriate length and thus let,
e. g., ‘Pi x¯’ stand for ‘Pi x1 . . . xni ’. Sometimes, ‘x¯’ will also stand for a tuple of
the appropriate length, so that, e. g., ‘x¯ ∈ PAi ’ stands for ‘〈x1, . . . xni 〉 ∈ PAi ’. ‘x¯−s ’
with s ≤ ni stands for the string ‘x1 . . . xs−1xs+1 . . . xni ’ or, respectively, the tuple
‘〈x1, . . . , xs−1, xs+1, . . . , xni 〉’.
When two or more phrases are separated by slashes (‘/’) in definitions, claims,
or proofs, each phrase leads to a new sentence. If in close proximity there are
multiple instances of n phrases separated by slashes, choosing uniformly the i th
phrase (i ≤ n) each time leads to a new sentence. Phrases in parentheses can
be uniformly left out of the definition, claim, or proof, again leading to a new
sentence. For example, ‘I am (sometimes) hungry/tired and thirsty/disheveled’
is, when occurring in a definition, equivalent to ‘I am sometimes hungry and
thirsty and I am sometimes tired and disheveled and I am hungry and thirsty and
I am tired and disheveled’. In some cases, phrases in parentheses can be uniformly
substituted for the phrase preceding the parenthesis, so that, for example, ‘I am
always (sometimes) hungry/tired and thirsty/disheveled when I am traveling (at
home)’ is equivalent to ‘I am always hungry/tired and thirsty/disheveled when I
am traveling and I am sometimes hungry/tired and thirsty/disheveled when I am
at home.’ The different use of parentheses will be clear from the grammar of the
sentence.
I will use ‘inference’ to refer to any rule that allows one to go from one
statement to another. As usual, ‘deduction’ refers to syntactic inference (‘`’), and
‘entailment’ to semantic inference (‘’). ‘Σ  Λ’ stands for ‘Σ  Λ and Λ  Σ ’.
For functions f and g , ‘ f ◦ g ’ stands for the concatenation of f and g , that is, for
all x, f ◦ g (x) = f (g (x)).
The years given in the references for quotations are to the original texts, with
the bibliography containing a reference to the translation used, to which the
page numbers refer.1 I do not explicitly identify my own translations, but give
the original text in a footnote; in that case the bibliography does not contain a
reference to a translation.
1This avoids the use of rather arbitrary and historically misleading references like ‘Carnap (1998)’
and of cumbersome double numbers like ‘Carnap (1928/1998)’, although having the year refer to a
different publication than the page numbers is admittedly awkward as well.
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Part I
Foundations

Chapter 2
Artificial language philosophy
In the 20th century, the methods of traditional philosophy came under scrutiny
by proponents of linguistic philosophy. Linguistic philosophy is partitioned into
ordinary and artificial language philosophy.1 According to the former, philosophi-
cal problems are best solved or dissolved by investigating the ordinary language
we presently use (Rorty 1967a, §2; Kauppinen 2007). According to the latter,
philosophical problems are best solved or dissolved by the development of new
languages and concepts, and by the regimentation of existing languages and con-
cepts (Rorty 1967a, §2), which has also been called their “improvement” (Carnap
1963c, §19), “reform” (Maxwell and Feigl 1961), or “explication” (Carnap 1950b,
§§2–5).2
According to linguistic philosophy, language analysis or reform alone are
sufficient to either provide solutions to philosophical problems, or avoid the
problems completely. At first sight, this is an implausible position, for the answers
to many questions traditionally considered philosophical quite obviously need
more than language reform or analysis. For example, it seems that whether the
1Parts of this chapter have been published under the title “Ideal language philosophy and experi-
ments on intuitions” (Lutz 2009). I thank an anonymous referee for Studia Philosophica Estonica for
helpful comments. Other parts have been presented at Herman Philipse’s Dutch Research Seminar in
Analytic Philosophy at Utrecht University, the Future of Philosophy of Science conference at Tilburg
University, The Netherlands, April 16, 2010 under the title “Ideal language philosophy of science” and
have been published under the title “Artificial language philosophy of science” (Lutz 2011a). I thank
the audience and two anonymous referees for the European Journal for Philosophy of Science for helpful
comments.
2Rorty (1967a) popularized the term ‘ideal language philosophy’, but as Matteo Collodel, Eric
Schliesser, and an anonymous referee for the European Journal for Philosophy of Science have pointed
out, the name suggests the existence of a unique ideal language. The term’s originator, Bergmann (1949,
439), similarly assumed that there can be one ideal language for all contexts. Since expositors (e. g.
Rorty 1967a, Lutz 2009) have applied the term to the works of Carnap and philosophers of a similar
inclination, while Carnap (1963c, 938) himself spoke of the construction of “artificial languages”, the
term ‘artificial language philosophy’ seems more apt.
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world is deterministic should depend on what the world is like and thus be
informed by our theories of the world, and the existence of exactly one god will
be more or less plausible depending on alternative theories meant to account for
empirical phenomena.
To be plausible, the position of linguistic philosophy has to be understood to
pertain to philosophy’s contribution to the solution of problems. To the extent that
empirical investigation alone suffices for solving a problem, philosophy does not
have a role to play. Philosophy’s role is to solve or dissolve what is left of a problem
when its empirical components (those questions that can be answered by empirical
research) are excluded. As the extensive use and discussion of empirical results
within logical empiricism (arguably the main application of artificial language
philosophy) suggest, this position is neither in competition with empirical science,
nor does it render empirical science irrelevant for philosophical questions (see
Carnap 1934a, §72). It just divides the labor between empirical and linguistic work,
the latter being the domain of philosophy. As Carnap (1934a, foreword) puts it,
equating linguistic work with logical analysis (cf. Carus 2007, 256–259):
In our “Vienna Circle” [ . . . ] the conviction has grown, and is steadily
increasing, that metaphysics can make no claim to possessing a scien-
tific character. That part of the work of philosophers which may be
held to be scientific in its nature—excluding the empirical questions
which can be referred to empirical science—consists of logical analysis.
Linguistic philosophy can be seen as a reaction to what I will call, for lack
of a better term, ‘traditional philosophy’. In the paradigmatic case, traditional
philosophy shares with empirical research the aim of arriving at truths about
the world, but without direct recourse to empirical methods (cf. Cohnitz and
Häggqvist 2009, 9). As an illustration, consider a point made by Williamson
(2007, §2.1) in defense of traditional philosophy. He argues that “Was Mars always
either dry or not dry?” is a question about Mars and is philosophical because
the vague word ‘dry’ occurs crucially. Therefore philosophical questions are not
always about language. A lot hinges here on the concept of aboutness, but quite
simply, a positive answer to the question plausibly entails the existence of Mars.
Whether there is such a thing is an empirical question and thus clearly cannot be
answered by language analysis or reform alone. The question may therefore seem
like a counterexample to the position of linguistic philosophy. But in linguistic
philosophy not every traditional philosophical question as a whole is considered
a philosophical problem: According to linguistic philosophy, the philosophical
problem of the original question about Mars is the problem that, first, must be
solved in order to answer the question, and second, cannot be solved by empirical
research. If Mars does not exist or if it was always dry, there is no philosophical
problem, because the original question can be answered on empirical grounds.
But if Mars first was not dry and then gradually became dry, the philosophical
problem of the original question is whether or under what conditions something
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that is first ϕ and then gradually becomes not ϕ is during the whole process ϕ
or not ϕ. In traditional philosophy, one might use intuition as a guide for better
understanding the nature of dryness to answer this question, but it is far from
clear that this is the only option. Since the problem is non-empirical, it may also
just be a problem of language.3
Apart from this division of labor between the empirical sciences and philos-
ophy, linguistic philosophy goes one step further and claims that non-empirical
problems are always problems of language, that is, they cannot be solved in any
other way but by language analysis or reform (and thus, for example, the use
of intuitions about the nature of dryness is not an option). Specifically, accord-
ing to ordinary language philosophy, in Williamson’s question about Mars the
philosophical problem can only be solved by analyzing the use of the terms ‘or’
and ‘not’ in connection with vague terms; if the rules governing their use turn
out to be too imprecise to answer the question, there is no fact of the matter.
According to artificial language philosophy, the use of the terms ‘or’ and ‘not’ can
be stipulated so that Williamson’s question is answered in the positive or negative,
or the problem can be avoided altogether. This could be achieved by developing
a language without the vague term ‘dry’, and instead with terms to describe the
amount of water on a planet. Let me call problems that cannot be solved, questions
that cannot be answered, and statements that cannot be confirmed by empirical or
linguistic means or a combination thereof ‘trans-empirical’.4 Linguistic philosophy
then claims that trans-empirical problems cannot be solved at all. That so far no
trans-empirical question has been answered to almost everyone’s satisfaction is
seen as evidence for this (see Rorty 1967a, §1).
In large part as a reaction to artificial language philosophy, Quine (1969a)
suggested to naturalize epistemology (and in fact all of philosophy that consists of
the explication of concepts). Naturalized philosophy is more widely accepted as a
philosophical methodology than both kinds of linguistic philosophy, but not as
easily circumscribed. Roughly, it is the position that philosophical problems are
best solved or dissolved through empirical research (Giere 1985; Feldman 2008,
§2). A naturalized approach to the problem of the dryness of Mars might involve
an empirical investigation into the neurological, psychological, or sociological
phenomena connected to the use of the concept dry. In this abstract description,
naturalized philosophy is a close kin to experimental philosophy, which uses exper-
imental methods to investigate intuitions relevant for philosophical analysis. An
experimental approach may consist, for example, in polling a selection of people
about their use of the term ‘dry’.
3This treatment of the example was developed in the reading group of the Theoretical Philosophy
Unit at Utrecht University in the winter term of 2008/2009, in particular by Harmen Ghijsen and
Jesper Tijmstra.
4In the old debate about linguistic philosophy, these problems, questions, and statements were
often called ‘metaphysical’ (see the Carnap quote above) or ‘speculative’, but the first term is often
used differently in current philosophical discussions, and the second seems unnecessarily pejorative.
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There are other methodologies than ordinary language, artificial language,
traditional, naturalized, and experimental philosophy. Although the methodolo-
gies are also not mutually exclusive, they diverge in important ways. It would
be surprising if all of them led to the same results (i. e., solutions or dissolutions
of problems in ways that are satisfactory within the respective methodology). It
thus becomes important to determine which, if any, of these methodologies are
correct.
In defense of experimental philosophy, Knobe (2007) suggests that linguistic
philosophy is too restricted in its topics, and the philosophically interesting ques-
tions should be answered with the aid of experimental philosophy. In defense of
traditional philosophy, Williamson (2007) argues for a metaphysics based on coun-
terfactual reasoning that leaves linguistic philosophy behind. Ordinary language
philosophy has been defended by Kauppinen (2007), who argues that intuitions
about ordinary language are best elucidated without recourse to experiment. Pro-
ponents of artificial language philosophy, however, are conspicuously absent in
the current debate about philosophical method. This may be because “logical em-
piricism [has lost] its status as a philosophical project to be pursued” (Richardson
2007, 346), and since artificial language philosophy was mainly applied within
logical empiricism, it, too, has lost this status (Kuipers 2007, §1).
The neglect of artificial language philosophy in the current debate on intuitions
and experimental philosophy is an oversight because, first, the old debates between
traditional, ordinary, and artificial language philosophy and between artificial
and naturalized philosophy were never conclusively decided. Artificial language
philosophy is therefore as much a contender now as it ever was.
Second, in the current debate, the philosophical relevance of experimental
philosophy is sometimes challenged through an analogical consideration that, on
further thought, supports artificial language philosophy (if it supports anything at
all, given that it is only an analogy). Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007, 129) describe
the consideration in the following way:
Upon first hearing of experimental philosophy, many philosophers
conclude from the start that empirical data concerning folk intuitions
are irrelevant to philosophical debates because the folk intuitions
themselves are irrelevant to such debates. After all, scientists and math-
ematicians tend not to worry about whether their theories settle with
the intuitions of lay-persons. Why should philosophers be any dif-
ferent? On this view, even if our own “expert” intuitions correctly
come into play when we’re doing philosophy, the untutored and un-
informed intuitions of the “person on the street” have no similar role
to play.
Under the assumption that “so-called intuitions are simply judgments (or dis-
positions to judgment)” (Williamson 2007, 3), Williamson (2007, 191) gives an
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elaboration of this consideration:
Much of the evidence for cross-cultural variation in judgments on
thought experiments concerns verdicts by people without philosoph-
ical training. Yet philosophy students have to learn how to apply
general concepts to specific examples with careful attention to the
relevant subtleties, just as law students have to learn how to analyze
hypothetical cases.
In jurisprudence it may be even easier to note than in natural science or mathemat-
ics that the concepts the experts apply are not those of ordinary language (cf. Carus
2007, 275). The concepts are highly refined and have been developed in science or
jurisprudence itself, sometimes but not always with a basis in ordinary language. It
is this kind of concept that is applied in artificial language philosophy. Therefore,
this consideration is no defense of ordinary language philosophy against criticisms
relying on experiments, but it may be a defense of artificial language philosophy.
There are many discussions about philosophical methodology (e. g., William-
son 2007, Papineau 2009b), some of which even take into account artificial lan-
guage philosophy (Rorty 1967b). But, arguably, no conclusive defense or criticism
has been established about any of the five divergent methodologies. In such a case, a
cumulative strategy is often pursued: The individual advantages and disadvantages
of each methodology are compared and weighed. For instance, a methodology
that yields more results than another in a specific domain has a clear advantage.
In the domain of philosophy, naturalized philosophy has been charged with a
complete lack of results (cf. Kim 1988), putting it at an immediate disadvantage
in any such comparison. Williamson’s analogy amounts to the same charge with
respect to experimental philosophy. Rorty (1967a, 3) discusses the argument that
both ordinary and artificial language philosophy have yielded more philosophical
results than traditional philosophy, and Carnap (1963c, 939–940) and Maxwell
and Feigl (1961, 491–492) argue that artificial language philosophy has yielded
more philosophical results than ordinary language philosophy. The following
discussion of the status of philosophical results and the relation of science and
philosophy of science according to artificial language philosophy suggest another
advantage of artificial language philosophy: The methodology leads to results in
the domain of meta-philosophy (rather than philosophy) that are not obvious for
the other methods.
Those meta-philosophical results are that, first, artificial language philosophy
interacts fruitfully with the sciences (which is not obvious for ordinary language
and traditional philosophy), and second, it answers philosophical questions (which
is not obvious for naturalized and experimental philosophy). Furthermore, I will
argue that results from experimental philosophy support artificial language phi-
losophy, and that artificial language philosophy is methodologically naturalistic.
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2.1 An outline of traditional philosophy
Traditional philosophy can be considered an investigation of facts about the world.
However, a straightforward empirical investigation of, say, hydrochloric acid
differs from the philosophical investigation of causation in that hydrochloric acid
has a specific density, decomposes at a specific temperature, and generally has
properties that can be determined with a certain degree of confidence through
measurements and, ultimately, through observations of the outcomes of these
measurements. Accordingly, there are experimental ways to determine whether
an unknown substance is hydrochloric acid. On the other hand, there is no
measurement to determine how causation connects to explanation, and there is
no experimental way of determining whether a specific situation or process is an
instance of explanation or causation.5
In traditional philosophy, intuition is often the analogue of experiments and
observations (cf. Sosa 2007, 105). Papineau (2009b, 14), for example, states that
Gettier appealed to the intuition that a belief whose truth is accidental
relative to its method of justification is not knowledge; Kripke ap-
pealed to the intuition that something that is not the causal origin of a
name is not its bearer; and so on. On my account, all these intuitions
are synthetic claims about the relevant kind of scenario.
In other words, these intuitions are about the world. But there are many meanings
of ‘intuition’; for example, Feigl (1958, 2) distinguishes seven of them, where
[t]he common core in the many connotations of ‘intuition’ is, of
course, immediacy. Intuition has thus been contrasted, traditionally
and quite generally, with indirect, mediate, relational, or inferential
knowledge. Intuition is often identified with direct insight or imme-
diate apprehension.
Since Feigl is mainly interested in trans-empirical claims, his discussion focuses on
the justifiability of “mystical or trans-empirical intuition”, where “the target or
object of the intuition is claimed to be something that is absolutely beyond the
reach of ordinary experience and reasoning, something which cannot be checked
empirically” (Feigl 1958, 6). Note the distinction between an intuition and its
target, the target being the statement for which the intuition is purported evidence.
Using intuitions to answer trans-empirical questions goes beyond what is accepted
in linguistic philosophy, and such trans-empirical intuitions must be distinguished
5Of course, once the philosophical investigation of, say, causation has resulted in a clear definition
(e. g., in the form of a causal search algorithm or via the concept of mark transmission), the definition
can be applied to determine whether a situation or process is an instance of causation. I thank Jan
Sprenger for asking about the status of causal search algorithms.
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from another kind of intuition that Feigl (1958, 6) calls, for lack of a better word,
‘hunch’:
We can define the “hunch”, then, as “a product of learning from past
experience, which learning is not made explicit at the moment of the
use of judgment”.
If one has a hunch, one follows an empirical rule of which one is not aware.
Hunches are therefore unproblematic, but must not be confused with trans-
empirical intuitions, because unlike the target of a hunch, the target of a trans-
empirical intuition cannot be tested empirically (Feigl 1958, 6–7). In general, “[i]f
‘intuition’ in one of its many senses designates a way of knowing, it need not, and
indeed does not, designate such a way in some of the other senses” (Feigl 1958, 1).
If traditional philosophy were to rely on hunches, it would be amenable to
empirical test. However, according to Papineau (2009b, 18) it relies on trans-
empirical intuitions:
If my judgemental procedures decide who is a knower by assuming,
inter alia, that accidentally true believers are not knowers, then clearly
there isn’t any question of my meeting up with a case where I judge
such an accidentally true believer to be a knower after all. Again,
if my judgemental procedures decide what thing bears some name
by noting the causal origin of the use of the name, then I’m not
going to come across cases where I judge that some name is borne by
something other than its causal origin. But this impossibility of direct
falsification does not mean that the relevant general assumptions are
analytic. They may yet have a substantial synthetic content [ . . . ].
For both Papineau (2009b, §IV) and Williamson (2007, §6), thought experiments
are a core method in traditional philosophy. But while Papineau considers thought
experiments to elicit intuitive judgments, Williamson does not distinguish this
type of judgment and judgments simpliciter. Williamson (2007, 3) holds that “so-
called intuitions are simply judgments (or dispositions to judgment)”, but thereby
brushes over the important distinction between judgments that can be supported
by explicit argument or observation and those that cannot be, or at least not
completely. Judgments that do not have sufficient support are intuitive, and are
used analogously to observations. This is actually demonstrated in a brief overview
given by Williamson (2007, §7.2) of other philosophers’ positions on intuition, in
which intuitions are always used as premises (rather than conclusions).
It is clear that intuitions in individual thought experiments about, say, the
presence or absence of causation or explanation cannot entail a general rule about
the relation of causation and explanation. Such a rule has to be either postulated
like a scientific hypothesis, or gathered from more general intuitions about the
relation itself. The general rule can then be tested against the intuitions in the
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individual thought experiments, and in the case of inconsistency, the intuitions
about either the general rule or the thought experiments have to be modified.
This method of testing and revision may be repeated and may eventually lead to a
reflective equilibrium, where the intuitions about the general rule and the thought
experiments agree (Daniels 2008, §1). Testing these intuitions for consistency is a
matter of rigorous derivation,6 which is used in every philosophical methodology
here discussed. How an inconsistency is resolved, however, will rely crucially on
the intuitions themselves.
An obvious problem for the use of trans-empirical intuitions is that it is not
clear why their targets should be true. One could argue for the truth of the targets
of intuitions that are shared among many people with an inference to the best
explanation. Against this, Feigl (1958, 12–13) points out that intuitions can be
treated by empirical psychology just like other mental states. It might then be
possible to account for the occurrence of shared intuitions, that is, to explain why
different people have intuitions with the same targets without having to assume
their truth.
This line of research into the source of intuitions is taken up by Hare (1975,
§I), who rhetorically asks: “[H]ow do we know whether what we feel inclined
to say [about some example of a moral conflict] has any secure ground? May we
not feel inclined to say it just because of the way we were brought up to think?”
For Hare, our intuitions may simply be the result of our upbringing, and will
differ accordingly. Given the lack of consensus on trans-empirical questions and
Feigl’s hope of explaining trans-empirical intuitions without assuming the truth
of their targets, it seems that language analysis or reform may be the only means of
rationally solving problems that cannot be answered empirically (see also Bohnert
1963, 410).
2.2 An outline of ordinary language philosophy
Ordinary language philosophy claims that trans-empirical problems only occur
when language is not used in ordinary ways; therefore the analysis of ordinary
language is enough to solve philosophical problems (Rorty 1967a, 12).7 Hare (1975,
§III) gives an example of this when he rejects the use of the term ‘person’ in the
discussion of the problem of abortion, because
‘person’ [ . . . ] is not a fully determinate concept[.] It is no use looking
more closely at the fetus to satisfy ourselves that it is really a person
6Like in mathematics, a rigorous derivation need not be completely formalized. Of central impor-
tance is that it does not rely on unarticulated assumptions.
7According to Williamson (2007, 13–14), the linguistic turn towards language has been largely
superseded by a conceptual turn towards the concepts of thought. While I will discuss only ordinary
language philosophy, this discussion is also applicable to methodologies that are based on analyses of
the concepts of thought.
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[ . . . ]; we already have all the information that we need about the
fetus. [ . . . ]
To say that the fetus is (or is not) a person gives by itself no moral
reason for or against killing it; it merely incapsulates any reasons we
may have for including the fetus within a certain category of creatures
that it is, or is not, wrong to kill (i. e. persons or nonpersons). The
word ‘person’ is doing no work here (other than that of bemusing us).
Hare claims that because the concept of a person is vague, and specifically not
determinate in the case of a fetus, one should avoid the question of whether a
fetus is a person altogether. Trying to answer it in order to solve the problem of
abortion would be to use language in a non-ordinary way, and would therefore
only introduce trans-empirical problems because neither language nor empirical
science can decide the personhood question. If Hare now solves the problem of
abortion in some other way, he thereby dissolves the problem of the personhood of
the fetus. Similarly, one might argue that ‘not’ and ‘or’ are too vague to determine
whether ‘Mars was always dry or not dry’ is true. In this case, however, it may be
that nothing further hinges on the answer (since the question was only introduced
to make a philosophical point), and thus the problem may already be dissolved.
In traditional philosophy, intuitions are taken to provide information about
the world, for example about the dryness of Mars; in the terminology of Fedyk
(2009, §4), they are interpreted as world-directed. In ordinary language philosophy,
on the other hand, the same intuitions are interpreted as providing information
about the language in which the world is described; they are interpreted as meaning-
directed. If ordinary language philosophy relies on the actual language use of some
group, or the actual linguistic intuitions of some group, then one difference
between traditional and ordinary language philosophy is straightforward: The
claims of traditional philosophy are about unobservable states of the world, while
the claims of ordinary language philosophy are about observable states (in the
case of actual language use) or states that can be empirically determined with some
certainty (in the case of linguistic intuitions).
Like the reliance on intuitions in thought experiments in traditional philoso-
phy, the exclusive reliance on actual language use, that is, individual speech acts,
cannot establish general rules about language use. Such general rules may be either
stipulated like any other empirical theory or gathered from intuitions about the
general rules themselves. Once spelled out explicitly, the general rules may be
incompatible with individual speech acts. As in the case of traditional philosophy,
such inconsistencies can be established through rigorous derivation. If the method
of reflective equilibrium is used to resolve inconsistencies by excluding certain
instances of language use or certain general rules, then ordinary language philoso-
phy has a normative component (Carnap 1939, §4). In this case, any intuitions
about how language should be used are trans-empirical, and the discussion in §2.1
applies.
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2.3 An outline of artificial language philosophy
Like ordinary language philosophy, artificial language philosophy considers philo-
sophical problems to be problems of language. Unlike ordinary language philoso-
phy, however, artificial language philosophy contends that philosophical problems
are best solved or dissolved by the conventional prescription of a new language,
not by the analysis of actual language use. For there are so many vague concepts in
ordinary language that many philosophical problems cannot be solved in ordinary
language at all. Other problems with ordinary language include the ambiguity of
words even in ordinary contexts, and the possible embedding of false beliefs in
the rules of ordinary language, as Maxwell and Feigl (1961, 496) argue. When ap-
plied to philosophical questions, these problems worsen, and so artificial language
philosophers claim that philosophical problems are best solved by the develop-
ment of new languages. Such a new language must be clear enough that an answer
to the original question can be rigorously derived (thus leading to a solution
of the problem), or be such that the problem cannot be formulated in the first
place (amounting to its dissolution) (Bergmann 1957, 326). An artificial language
philosopher may even suggest language reforms for contexts in which there are no
problems, either because the resulting language has some pragmatic advantage like
greater simplicity or precision, or because this change helps to avoid problems in
other contexts (Maxwell and Feigl 1961, 491).
2.3.1 Language choice
In principle, there is no restriction on the choice of language. As Carnap (1934a,
§17) states in his “Principle of Tolerance”, even the logic of a language is conven-
tional.8 For what follows, however, it will suffice to rely on a very simple case of
language choice. I will assume that in addressing the philosophical problems at
hand, the logic of the language is taken as fixed, and there is some setB of basic
terms (B -terms) whose application is taken as unproblematic. It may be taken as
unproblematic because the terms apply more or less immediately to observations
(cf. Chang 2005), but more generally, the basic terms simply refer to concepts
that are not themselves under investigation (Reichenbach 1951, 49; cf. Lewis 1970,
428). The choice of a language then amounts to concept formation, that is, the
choice of meaning postulates for the terms not inB , which are the auxiliary terms
(A -terms) with the corresponding set ‘A ’.
A can contain terms for pre-theoretically understood concepts whose expli-
cation is intended to solve or dissolve the problems at hand. Carnap (1962, §2)
describes this process:
The task of explication consists in transforming a given more or
less inexact concept into an exact one or, rather, in replacing the
8Carnap (1928a, §107) held this view of the conventionality of logic somewhat earlier.
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first by the second. We call the given concept (or the term used
for it) the explicandum, and the exact concept proposed to take the
place of the first (or the term proposed for it) the explicatum. The
explicandum may belong to everyday language or to a previous stage
in the development of scientific language.
Finding an exact explicatum for an inexact explicandum is not a straightforward
matter. The first step is to describe the explicandum as precisely as possible. This
description forms the basis for the explication itself, which Carnap (1962, §3)
describes as follows:
If a concept is given as explicandum, the task consists in finding
another concept as its explicatum which fulfils the following require-
ments to a sufficient degree.
1. The explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum in such a way
that, in most cases in which the explicandum has so far been
used, the explicatum can be used; however, close similarity is
not required, and considerable differences are permitted.
2. The characterization of the explicatum, that is, the rules of its
use (for instance, in the form of a definition), is to be given in
an exact form, so as to introduce the explicatum into a well-
connected system of scientific concepts.
3. The explicatum is to be a fruitful concept, that is, useful for the
formulation of many universal statements (empirical laws in the
case of a nonlogical concept, logical theorems in the case of a
logical concept).
4. The explicatum should be as simple as possible; this means as
simple as the more important requirements (1), (2), and (3) per-
mit.
The difference between artificial and ordinary language philosophy is clear: Ac-
cording to artificial language philosophy, the analysis of a concept carried out in
ordinary language philosophy is only the preliminary step needed for an expli-
cation in Carnap’s sense. This explication may result not only in a more precise
concept, but also in a concept that conflicts with clear cases of the explicandum.
As Carnap (1962, §3) notes, “one might perhaps think that the explicatum should
be as close to or as similar with the explicandum as the latter’s vagueness permits”,
but he claims that “this requirement would be too strong” because of requirement
(3). That the requirement of fruitfulness sometimes leads to conflicts between
an explicatum and clear cases of its explicandum can be seen from “the actual
procedure of scientists”, for example in zoology’s explication of ‘fish’: “The presci-
entific term ‘fish’ was meant in about the sense of ‘animal living in water’”, while
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the zoologists’ explicatum means “animals which live in water, are cold-blooded
vertebrates, and have gills throughout life” (Carnap 1962, §3). Oftentimes, one
must explicate several terms at once, because only then are the resulting explicata
fruitful.
The explicata also have to fulfill conditions of adequacy (cf. Tarski 1944, §4),
which identify what problems the newly formed concepts should solve or dissolve,
and in what contexts they should be applicable. The contexts are suggested by the
pre-theoretic uses of the explicanda (Kuipers 2007, §2), and thus can be used to
determine when explicata are similar enough to their explicanda.9 The terms ‘dry’
and ‘wet’, for instance, may be replaced by the explicatum ‘aridity’, defined as ‘the
ratio of the volume of water on the surface and the surface area’. Depending on
the intended application, claims involving the dryness of Mars can then often be
more precisely expressed by claims involving the aridity of Mars. In this example,
‘ratio’, ‘volume’, ‘water’, etc. are assumed to be inB , but each of these terms can
be inA in other contexts. In general, since the bipartition of terms intoB and
A is context dependent, a term P explicated in one context with the help of a
term Q could in another context be used to explicate Q.
This is different from circular definitions, in which Q occurs essentially in the
definiens of P and vice versa in the same context; an example is the interventionist
definition of causation (Woodward 2008, §7). If both terms are in B , circular
definitions are unproblematic, since both of the terms are clear and the two
definitions just follow from the terms’ precise meanings. If one term is inB and
the other inA , the interpretation of theB -term determines the interpretation
of theA -term. If both terms are inA , circular definitions amount to postulates
for the two terms, which determine the terms’ interpretations only insofar as
they connect the terms toB -terms (see §2.8.2). The terms may also be somewhat
interpreted but vague, so that the two definitions amount to additional meaning
postulates that precisify one or both terms. I will discuss vague terms and circular
definitions in §2.8.3.
A can also contain terms for entirely new concepts, which do not act as
explicata. One may, for example, introduce concepts like mark transmission or
lawlike generalization simply because they solve some problems in philosophy,
not because there are corresponding explicanda. In this case, the conditions of
adequacy can be chosen freely and may, for instance, amount to a list of problems
that the new concepts should solve. Since explicata are new concepts as well, there
is, in a sense, a continuum between the explication of terms and the development
of wholly new concepts. Luckily, nothing hinges on the status of a new concept
as an explicatum. It is only important that it fulfills the conditions of adequacy
9Therefore, if preserving a specific previous use of the explicanda by the explicata is deemed
expedient, this has to be made explicit in the conditions of adequacy. This avoids the implication of
Carnap’s similarity demand that more than half of current uses must be captured, which suggests that
there is something sacred about the current usage of a term, and has justly been criticized by Laudan
(1986, 120).
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and is fruitful.
The choice of the conditions of adequacy is ultimately pragmatic because it
depends on the problems that the concepts are meant to solve. The conditions
should be precise enough, however, to determine reliably whether they are fulfilled
by the concepts. Of two sets of concepts that fulfill all of the conditions, the more
fruitful is to be preferred, where Carnap judges fruitfulness by the number of
results one can establish about the concepts, to which Kemeny (1963, 76) adds
the number of new research questions that they suggest. This evaluation itself is,
of course, deeply pragmatic, since neither every result nor every new research
question should count equally.
Since the auxiliary terms are taken to be problematic, their interpretation is
determined solely by the meaning of the basic terms, empirical results about the
extensions of the basic terms, and the setΠ of meaning postulates. The meaning
postulates have been chosen to be true in the process of concept formation. For
it to be possible to choose Π to be true, Π must be analytic (that is, devoid of
empirical import). This identification of analyticity with conventionality finds
its strongest expression in Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance, in which logic—the
paradigmatic example of analyticity—is taken to be conventional.
2.3.2 Solving and dissolving problems
There are now three methods of determining the truth or falsity of a sentence ϕ
involving auxiliary terms. All of them rely on rigorous derivation, thereby sharing
a core aspect with traditional and ordinary language philosophy. In the first
method, the analytic truth (or falsity) of ϕ is derived from the meaning postulates
Π . If this is impossible, it may still be possible to determine empirically that ϕ is
true (or false), given the meaning of the basic terms. Finally, if neither method is
applicable, new meaning postulates for the terms in ϕ must be developed so that
one of the first two methods becomes applicable. This third method thus involves
concept formation, making the truth or falsity of ϕ a matter of convention. Since
the derivations rely on the meaning postulates and the logic, which have to be
chosen by convention, ϕ can be true (or false) for only two reasons: language
convention (which determines the meaning of the basic terms and the meaning
postulates) or empirical research (which determines empirical results phrased in
basic terms). If philosophy does not engage in empirical research, this means
that all philosophical results are analytic, consisting of language conventions or
rigorous derivations that rely on them. Note that rigorous derivations can be
important for language choice, since they can reveal otherwise hidden features of
a language.
The difference between the first two methods and the last method of deter-
mining the status of ϕ illustrates the distinction between “internal” and “external”
questions introduced by Carnap (1950a, §2). The internal questions are those
that rely on a chosen language (in Carnap’s terms, a “linguistic framework”), that
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is, a chosen logic and a chosen set of meaning postulates. Within this language,
the investigation of the status of ϕ is objective. For, whether ϕ is true or false
depends solely on the state of the world and on the language, which is fixed.10 The
third method, that of concept formation, provides a means of answering external
questions. Here, the truth or falsity of ϕ is not determined objectively, but rather
by convention, and a claim about the status of ϕ cannot be right or wrong, but
only more or less practical. There is, in this sense, no fact of the matter.
The situation is different if one discovers an inconsistency in a set of postulates
(say, for some specific concept). In this case, one cannot add more postulates,
but must rather remove some until the postulates become consistent and the
B -sentences true. Of course, one may add new postulates as well. Conversely,
one may remove some postulates even if there is no inconsistency, simply because
the resulting concepts are more fruitful.
The dissolution of problems always involves the removal of postulates Θ.
In Hare’s case, dissolving the problem of the personhood of the fetus involves
the removal of the postulates for person. More importantly, the dissolution of a
problem requires the introduction of postulates Ξ for new terms that avoid the
original problems. If the postulates Θ have not been shown to be false, Ξ should
be at least as expressive asΘ with respect toB .Ξ should also be at least as fruitful
as Θ, although this, of course, is much harder to determine.
Since both solving and dissolving problems can involve the removal and the
addition of postulates, there is no clear cut distinction between the two endeavors.
As in the case of the continuum between the explication of old terms and the
introduction of completely new concepts, nothing philosophically important
hinges on the distinction. It is just important that—whether through solution or
dissolution—the problem has been resolved.
2.4 The old debate within linguistic philosophy
It has frequently been pointed out by proponents of ordinary and artificial lan-
guage philosophy that the distinction between their two approaches is only a
matter of degree (see for example Carnap 1955, §1, 1963c, §19, Hare 1960, 158,
and Kemeny 1963, 71, 74), for one because the preliminary step of an explication
consists in describing the natural language concept. Rorty (1967b, 12) puts it this
way: “As has often been (somewhat crudely, but fairly accurately) said, the only
difference between Ideal Language Philosophers and Natural Language Philoso-
phers is a disagreement about which language is Ideal”. Still, each side considers
its own approach to be more appropriate for solving philosophical problems,
as the discussions collected by Rorty (1967b), the criticism of artificial language
philosophy by Strawson (1963), and the response by Carnap (1963c, §19) make
10Within a given language, the main tenets of realism would therefore seem true (I thank an
anonymous referee for the European Journal of Philosophy of Science for this point).
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clear.
The central charge by Strawson (1963, 504–505) is that artificial language
philosophy’s “claim to clarify will seem empty, unless the results achieved have
some bearing on the typical philosophical problems and difficulties which arise
concerning the concepts to be clarified”. Bergmann (1949) counters this kind of
criticism, arguing that these problems arising in ordinary language use need not
be solved in the first place, but can be avoided without loss. For, the goal of an
artificial language is precisely to express and analyze empirical claims without
leading to such problems. The artificial language can use explicata rather than
the explicanda of ordinary language philosophy, and if some statement in the
artificial language helps to answer a question phrased in ordinary language, say,
because the explicata involved are sufficiently close to their explicanda, this is nice
but not necessary. A supporting position is taken up by Bohnert (1963, §II) and
arguably Neurath (1932, 206), who argue that an artificial language does not need
to be translated into ordinary language to be understood, because it can be learned
by itself like a natural language (cf. Carnap 1963c, 938–939). Rorty (1967b, 16)
notes the possible pragmatic response that a philosophical approach can only be
considered viable insofar as it leads to results, and so far, ordinary language has
not shown itself to be very helpful for solving philosophical problems (see also
Maxwell and Feigl 1961, 491–492).
In a critique of ordinary language philosophy, Maxwell and Feigl (1961, 490–
491, emphasis removed) point out that “[a] large portion of philosophical prob-
lems arise from consideration of unusual cases”, and they see “absolutely no reason
to believe that examination of ordinary use in the ‘paradigm’, normal cases can
provide us with definitive rules for ‘proper’ use in the unusual and novel cases”. In
other words, Strawson’s insistence on the use of ordinary language in order to clar-
ify philosophical problems may be exactly why there is continuing disagreement.
Maxwell and Feigl (1961, 491) state further that the “consideration of atypical
cases often points up possible inadequacies and may suggest improvements in
our conceptualization of the ‘normal’ cases”. This clearly marks the move from
ordinary to artificial language philosophy: If a concept is, for example, too vague
to be applied in atypical but philosophically interesting cases, this necessitates its
explication, which may lead to a concept that is applied differently even in typical
cases.
Mates (1958) discusses ordinary language philosophy from a point of view
that will be particularly useful in what follows: He treats the apparently factual
statements about ordinary language that the proponents of ordinary language
philosophy make like any other empirical hypotheses, and accordingly asks how
such statements could be tested. First, Mates (1958, 165) considers the claim that
the average adult has already amassed such a tremendous amount of
empirical information about the use of his native language, that he can
depend upon his own intuition or memory and need not undertake a
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laborious questioning of other people, even when he is dealing with
the tricky terms which are central in philosophical problems. Such a
assertion is itself an empirical hypothesis, of a sort which used to be
invoked in favor of armchair psychology, and it is not born out by
the facts.
Mates goes on to state that many authors are not even reliable when it comes
to their own linguistic behavior, and after noting a disagreement between Ryle
and Austin about the use of ‘voluntary’, concludes: “If agreement about usage
cannot be reached within so restricted a sample as the class of Oxford Professors
of Philosophy, what are the prospects when the sample is enlarged?”
Mates then suggests that there are essentially two empirical methods for deter-
mining the meaning and use of a word, which he calls extensional and intensional.
The extensional method consists in observing a certain number of applications of
a word and finding out what these applications have in common. Mates saw this
method used almost exclusively in the ordinary language philosophy of his time,
and laments the neglect of the intensional method. In the intensional method,
the subjects are asked how they use or what they mean by a given word, and, “in
Socratic fashion”, are subsequently presented with apparent counterexamples and
borderline cases, then are asked to revise their initial response, and so on, until a
fairly stable account is reached (Mates 1958, 165–166). However, Mates observes
that there is no guarantee these two methods will yield the same results, and the
only way to solve this problem may be to make do with the different meanings of
words that result from each method.
Furthermore, Mates argues, both methods have internal difficulties. In the
extensional method, it is unclear which occurrences of a word are under consid-
eration, and what the relevant features are of any object to which the word is
applied. Since any set of objects will have infinitely many things in common, it is,
for example, not obvious when a word has more than one meaning. Two words
might also, just by happenstance, apply to the same objects in the domain under
investigation (Mates 1958, 167–168). The problem with the intensional method is
that “it does not seem possible to differentiate in a practical way between finding
out what someone means by a word, and influencing his linguistic behavior rela-
tive to that word” (Mates 1958, 169–170). Mates suggests we test this by trying to
devise “Socratic questionnaires” that make the definitions from different subjects
converge, and others that make them diverge. If it is possible to construct the
latter, the Socratic method cannot be considered a reliable means of finding out
the meanings of words (Mates 1958, 171, n. 11).
This doubt about the reliability of the intensional method is also voiced by
Maxwell and Feigl (1961, 489), who “know of no decision procedure for classifying
each particular case [as one of finding out or of influencing], and [ . . . ] strongly
suspect that many cases of putative ordinary-usage analysis are, in fact, disguised
reformations”. Accordingly, artificial language philosophy cannot be dismissed
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on the grounds that a change of language introduces insurmountable problems,
because the intensional, Socratic method of ordinary language philosophy may
very well lead to as much of a change of meaning as the process of explication.
The difference between artificial and ordinary language philosophy then would
be mainly that, while explication is done with very specific, explicitly stated goals
in mind, it is not clear how or why the change of language is effected in the
intensional method of ordinary language philosophy.
But even though artificial language philosophers are doubtful of the possibility
of solving philosophical problems through ordinary language analysis, there is no
doubt that the ordinary use of terms can be determined in some cases and that the
construction of an artificial language can be inspired by ordinary language. Like
Mates, artificial language philosophers consider claims about ordinary language
to be empirical hypotheses. Carnap (1963c, §15.C), for example, states when
discussing an article of his on meaning and synonymy in natural languages:
“The sentence S1 is analytic in language L for person X ” [ . . . ] is an
empirical hypothesis which can be tested by observations of the speak-
ing behavior of X . If anyone is still sceptical about this possibility,
I should like to refer him to a recent book by Arne Naess, which
shows by numerous examples how hypotheses about the synonymy
of expressions can be tested by empirical procedures.
The book, which Carnap identifies in a footnote, is Interpretation and Preciseness: A
Contribution to the Theory of Communication (Naess 1953). It is an empirical study
of natural language, much as demanded by Mates. In his own article on meaning
and synonymy, Carnap (1955, §1) notes how such a study of natural language
(which he calls “pragmatics”) may be useful for the logician’s development of an
artificial language (which he calls “semantics”):
If he wishes to find out an efficient form for a language system to
be used, say, in a branch of empirical science, he might find fruitful
suggestions by a study of the natural development of the language of
scientists and even of the everyday language. Many of the concepts
used today in pure semantics were indeed suggested by corresponding
pragmatical concepts which had been used for natural languages by
philosophers or linguists, though usually without exact definitions.
Those semantical concepts were, in a sense, intended as explicata for
the corresponding pragmatical concepts.
Carnap then goes on to describe an experimental procedure for determining the
meaning of terms.
So the empirical study of ordinary language use can be of much value for
artificial language philosophers. They do object, however, to the claim that the
results of such empirical research can show their constructed artificial languages
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wrong. As Popper (1963, 201, n. 44) recalls, Naess began his research for an earlier
book, “Truth” as Conceived by those who are not Professional Philosophers (1938),
“in the hope to refute Tarski” (that is, Tarski’s explication of ‘truth’). Carnap (1948,
29, §7) replies that
Arne Ness [sic] has expressed some doubts about the assertion [that
Tarski’s explication is in agreement with the ordinary use of the word
‘true’], based on systematic questioning of people. At any rate, this
question is of a pragmatical (historical, psychological) nature and
has not much bearing on the questions of the method and result of
semantics.
Carnap’s opinion is shared by Popper (1963, 213, n. 64), who describes the reply
as “a just dismissal of the relevance of Arne Ness’ questionnaire method”. This
makes sense, given that an explication is not meant to capture ordinary language
use.
In general, artificial language philosophers see the analysis of ordinary language
as a straightforwardly empirical endeavor whose results are complementary to
their own. The empirical results can serve as a starting point for explication or
as inspiration for the construction of an artificial language, and in this respect,
artificial language philosophy can profit from the analysis of ordinary language.
But results from this analysis will not contradict those from artificial language
philosophy, because artificial languages need not capture every feature of ordinary
language. As Maxwell and Feigl (1961, 491) put it, “ordinary language is (often)
the first word—but, quite often, this is all that it can do”.
2.5 An outline of experimental and naturalized phi-
losophy
There are a multitude of interpretations of ‘naturalized philosophy’ and ‘natu-
ralism’ (Papineau 2009a, Feldman 2008), but for the sequel, it will be convenient
to distinguish between replacement naturalism, the position that philosophical
questions are best answered by science, cooperative naturalism, the position that
empirical results are essential or useful for making progress in addressing philo-
sophical questions, and substantive naturalism, the position that all philosophical
facts are natural facts (Feldman 2008).11 The first two kinds of naturalism are
instances of methodological naturalism, the position that “philosophy and science
[are] engaged in essentially the same enterprise, pursuing similar ends and using
similar methods”, and the last kind can also be called ontological naturalism (Pa-
pineau 2009a). Since I am interested here in philosophical methodologies, I will
11This is a generalization of Feldman’s exposition, who only defines the different kinds of naturalism
for epistemology.
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focus on the two kinds of methodological naturalism.
Papineau’s definition of methodological naturalism is ambiguous between the
claim that good philosophy is engaged in the same enterprise as science and the
claim that philosophy as currently practiced is so engaged. I will criticize Papineau’s
argument for the latter claim in §2.9. For now, I will consider methodological
naturalism as interpreted by the former claim.
Quine (1969b) has given a highly influential argument for replacement natural-
ism, which he develops in the context of epistemology as a reaction to Carnap’s
method of explication, or, as it is also called, “rational reconstruction”. He distin-
guishes between the “doctrinal side” of traditional epistemology (the attempt to
justify all knowledge from sense experience) and its “conceptual side” (the attempt
to explain all our concepts in sensory terms) (Quine 1969b, 71–74) and presents
Carnap’s work Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Carnap 1928a) as the most success-
ful but still failed attempt at completing the conceptual side of epistemology by
defining all concepts in sensory terms. Quine (1969b, 75) identifies the concepts
that Carnap (1928a) introduces as explicata, and wonders about the relevance of
explication:
But why all this creative reconstruction, all this make-believe? The
stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has
had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why
not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle for
psychology?
Since this is a rhetorical question, Quine then proceeds to outline how psychol-
ogy should replace epistemology. Of course, the question could be asked of any
explication of a concept, not only epistemic ones. Therefore this line of reasoning
leads to a naturalization of all of philosophy, not only epistemology.
However, given the preceding discussion, the answer to Quine’s rhetorical
question is clear: Explication cannot be replaced by psychology because the goal
of explication is not to find out about the actual concepts that humans have (the
explicanda), but rather to find explicata that are better than the actual concepts. A
naturalized philosophy as described by Quine, and indeed any naturalized philos-
ophy that only determines which concepts humans have, would only provide the
first step of artificial language philosophy.
Naturalized philosophy could be considered a replacement for ordinary lan-
guage philosophy, however, since ordinary language philosophy ostensibly aims
at determining the concepts that people actually have. To the extent that these
concepts are revealed by people’s judgments about trans-empirical matters, natu-
ralized philosophy has a close connection to experimental philosophy, “whose
participants use the methods of experimental psychology to probe the way people
make judgments that bear on debates in philosophy” (Nadelhoffer and Nahmias
2007, 123). In fact, Weinberg and Crowley (2009, 227) categorize the possible
relations between science and philosophy that make experimental philosophy
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possible into a replacement thesis, according to which science and philosophy offer
competing explanations, and a continuity thesis, according to which “science and
philosophy constitute generally overlapping areas of inquiry”. In the first case,
a proponent of experimental philosophy would assume replacement naturalism,
and in the second case cooperative naturalism.12
In an overview of experimental philosophy, Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007,
§2) identify its three strains of research: experimental restrictionism, experimental
analysis, and experimental descriptivism, which can roughly be described as deter-
mining that people’s intuitions differ, how they differ, and why they differ in the
way they do. In the context of replacement naturalism, experimental descriptivism
(Nadelhoffer and Nahmias 2007, 127, footnote removed) amounts to Quine’s
specific kind of naturalized philosophy, and it is
important to try to determine how [ . . . ] intuitions are generated.
[They] explore human psychology by testing how various manipula-
tions to scenarios influence the intuitions people express. One goal
of this project is to better understand the nature of the underlying
psychological processes and cognitive mechanisms that produce our
intuitions and explore the relevance of this research to philosophical
questions.
The goal of these investigations is the evaluation of philosophical theories about
these concepts. The main goal of experimental restrictionists (Nadelhoffer and
Nahmias 2007, 128, footnote removed), on the other hand,
is to show that some of the methods and techniques that philosophers
working in the analytic tradition have taken for granted are threatened
by the gathering empirical evidence concerning both the diversity
and the unreliability of folk intuitions. More specifically, they argue
that if our intuitions about a particular topic vary cross-culturally
or socio-economically and we don’t have independent grounds for
privileging our own intuitions to those of others, these particular
intuitions will be insufficient for philosophical theory building.
Some intuitions may turn out to be cross-culturally invariant, however, and these
provide the basis for experimental analysis, whose
primary goal is to explore in a controlled and systematic manner
what intuitions ordinary people tend to express and examine their
relevance to philosophical debates. Hence, [experimental analysts]
aim to test philosophers’ claims that their positions align with com-
mon sense and to challenge those claims that are not supported by
12This commonality in categorization is unsurprising given that Weinberg and Crowley (2009, 227)
follow the categorization of Kornblith (1994) for naturalized epistemology.
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the evidence. On this view, philosophical theories that most closely
accord with and account for ordinary beliefs and practices should
enjoy “squatters’ rights” until they are shown to be defective for other
reasons. In this respect, [experimental analysts] essentially agree with
many traditional philosophers [ . . . ].
Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007, 126, footnote removed) here include the pro-
ponents of both traditional and of ordinary language philosophy in the class
of “traditional philosophers”. These traditional philosophers thus differ from
experimental analysts only in that they rely on their own hunches to determine
which trans-empirical intuitions are widely shared.
Taking into account Feigl’s distinction between an intuition and its target, it
is, strictly speaking, not the trans-empirical intuition that features in a traditional
philosophical argument, but a description of its target or, following the termi-
nology by Fedyk (2009, §2), the propositional content of the intuition. When
intuitions are considered as psychological phenomena, it is of interest how their
occurrence can be established (Feigl 1958, 8–11). If the intuitions under exam-
ination belong to a specific class of people (e. g., some group of philosophers,
ordinary people, or scientists), then the best method of determining the content
of those intuitions seems to be statistical. The relevant intuitions may also be
those that a specific class of people would have, if presented with some class of
facts, considerations, or examples.13 Then the best and probably only method of
determining the intuitions’ content is empirical psychology, which could establish
that people in fact usually develop these intuitions. Some parts of traditional
philosophy therefore may have to be naturalized.
Ordinary language philosophers who rely on their own intuitions to deter-
mine the language use or linguistic intuitions of others also rely on hunches in
Feigl’s sense. Of course, whether these hunches are accurate is itself an empirical
question, and eventually, the truth of their propositional content has to be estab-
lished empirically (Feigl 1958, 6–7; Mates 1958, 165; Nadelhoffer and Nahmias
2007, 129; Sytsma 2010, §1). This also holds for intuitions about the language use
or linguistic intuitions that people would have if presented with some class of
facts, considerations, or examples.14 Some parts of ordinary language philosophy
therefore have to be naturalized (Mates 1958).15 Experimental analysis does not
only have to be applied to intuitions about concepts in ordinary language, of
course. Stotz (2009), for example, provides a short overview of research on the
concepts used in biology.
Experimental philosophy does not have to be pursued solely in the context of
13This may be what Williamson (2007, 191, 216) has in mind when he speaks of philosophical
judgments that require “philosophical training” leading to specific “skills”.
14This may be what Kauppinen (2007, §5) has in mind when he claims that “(philosophical) dialogue
and reflection” lead to a convergence of linguistic intuitions.
15Arguably, this naturalization leads to experimental philosophy (see §2.6 and Sytsma 2010, §§1–3).
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replacement naturalism. As Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007, 126–127) put it:
In addition to reporting the results of their studies, experimental
philosophers also explore background issues such as the nature and
sources of intuitions, the role that they should play in philosophy,
how best to explore them, and what responses are available to theo-
rists whose views do not settle with folk intuitions. [Some] work in
experimental philosophy [ . . . ] has included and inspired numerous
arguments about how and why the data are significant to [the respec-
tive philosophical debates] and how best to interpret the data in light
of various philosophical theories.
These discussions are not decided by experiments, and experimental philosophy
pursued in this vein thus assumes cooperative naturalism.
2.6 The new debate about intuitions and experi-
ments
I am going to argue in the following that some results of experimental philosophy,
if correct, support linguistic philosophy, some support artificial over ordinary lan-
guage philosophy, and some provide a friendly starting point for artificial language
philosophy. In the old debate about and within linguistic philosophy, experimen-
tal philosophy thus strengthens the position of artificial language philosophy. As
suggested by the analogy between technical terms in philosophy, the sciences, and
jurisprudence (page 12), I will then argue that artificial language philosophy can be
pursued almost completely independently of experimental research on intuitions.
As a historical aside, I will also show how many of the arguments in the old
debate apply to the current debate about the role of intuitions and experimental
results in philosophy. Specifically, I claim that the arguments by artificial language
philosophers support experimental philosophy.
Since the discussion by Feigl (1958), the use of intuition has had a remarkable
renaissance in philosophy. Hintikka (1999) spells out how Chomsky was perceived
to have based his approach to linguistics on the intuitions of the linguist and how
his success contributed to an increased use of intuition in philosophy. Symons
(2008) describes how G. E. Moore’s conception of common sense, embraced by
ordinary language philosophers, became a tool in Kripke’s trans-empirical phi-
losophy, and hence far removed from the original idea of ordinary language as
a restriction on trans-empirical claims. This jumbled heritage of contemporary
applications of intuition has led to two distinct forms of use. Sometimes, an intu-
ition is considered to be a judgment of common sense, and sometimes, intuition
has an evidential role analogous to that of perception because of its immediacy (cf.
Feigl 1958).
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Although the historical connections between trans-empirical and ordinary
language philosophy and the contemporary uses of intuition are fascinating, they
will not be my main focus in this section. Rather, I aim to show that conceptually,
experimental and artificial language philosophy are complementary in two very
distinct ways. First, the assumptions of each approach are supported by the other:
Artificial language philosophers, in their critiques of trans-empirical philosophy
and of non-empirical approaches to ordinary language, provide arguments in favor
of experimental philosophy. The results of experimental philosophy support the
empirical premises of the artificial language philosophers’ critiques. Second, the
two approaches are independent in their application in the sense that the results
of one approach cannot prove or disprove the results of the other.
Experimental restrictionism provides a confirmation of Mates’s hypothesis
that the disagreement over ordinary language use among Oxford professors of
philosophy is only one case of a wider disagreement in the general population.
When intuitions lead to differing moral judgments, experimental restrictionism
is very much in line with Hare’s contention that there is no reason to assume
our intuitions will agree in difficult moral situations. Therefore, experimental
restrictionism is a problem for the common sense conception of intuition, and this
holds whether intuitions disagree on linguistic (and therefore empirical) matters,
or on non-linguistic matters (be they empirical or trans-empirical). It also presents
a prima facie problem with the use of intuition in analogy to perception, because
when there is disagreement between intuitions, at least some of these intuitions
must be wrong, and sometimes they might all be. Analogously to perception,
then, the more that experimental philosophy restricts the domain of agreement
between intuitions, the less useful intuitions are as evidence for their targets.
Experimental analysis adds to experimental restrictionism, because its results
suggest that intuitions depend on social status and cultural background. These
dependencies are a concretization of Hare’s rather general suggestion that our
intuitions are a result of our upbringing.
Liao (2008) has pointed out that the results of experimental analysis have
shown some intuitions to be robust. Recalling Maxwell and Feigl’s (1961) objection
to ordinary language philosophy, one can see that for Liao’s point to be a defense
of the methods of ordinary language philosophy, he must further show that the
robust intuitions are also philosophically relevant, do not embody factually false
assumptions, and do not involve concepts that should be reformed for other
reasons. However, even then, this would not defend the wide applicability of
common sense intuitions as evidence for trans-empirical claims, that is, it would
not undermine linguistic philosophy itself. For, trans-empirical intuitions cannot
simply be assumed to be evidence for their targets, and whether they are evidence
cannot be tested independently. As discussed earlier, shared intuitions might justify
the belief in their targets by an inference to the best explanation, but as Feigl notes,
such an argument would be weakened by the existence of other explanations for
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shared intuitions. Experimental descriptivism aims at providing such an alternative
explanation: Since experimental descriptivism relies only on empirical claims, it
would, if successful, provide an explanation of shared intuitions that does not rely
on the truth of their trans-empirical targets.
Experimental descriptivism hence may eventually come to support linguistic
over non-linguistic philosophy by explaining shared trans-empirical intuitions.
Experimental analysis and experimental restrictionism support those arguments
against trans-empirical and ordinary language philosophy that are based on the
systematic disagreement of people’s intuitions.
Of course, trans-empirical and ordinary language philosophy have both been
defended against criticisms from experimental philosophy. In defense of trans-
empirical philosophy, Sosa (2007, 101) proposes an account of intuitions that
gives them an evidential status analogous to perception (though he disavows the
perceptual model of intuition), applicable to any kind of statement. He bases
his analogy between intuition and perception on competence: On his proposal,
“to intuit that p is to be attracted to assent simply through entertaining that
representational content. The intuition is rational if and only if it derives from
competence, and the content is explicitly modal”. There is “no very deep reason
[for the restriction to modal propositions]. It’s just that it seems the proper
domain for philosophical uses of intuition”. An intuition is thus the (possibly
irrational) inclination to agree with a proposition. The rationality of an intuition,
that is, the justification for believing its target to be true, stems from competence.
Referring to Sosa’s conception of intuition, Symons (2008, 87–88) argues that
competence can be established by empirical research: “[T]he lasting significance of
experimental philosophy is not that it undermines appeals to consensus, but that
it opens a fertile field of inquiry into our commonsense or intuitive capacities”.
Specifically, “determining the boundaries of our competence is the most fruitful
task that lies ahead for experimental philosophy”.
The important question then is the source of the competence claim, and
here Feigl’s distinction between trans-empirical intuitions and hunches becomes
important. For hunches, competence can be established by empirically testing the
statement for which the hunch is supposed to be evidence. Claiming competence
then amounts to claiming a correlation between the occurrence of a hunch and the
truth of its target. It is this correlation that can be the object of empirical study,
and thus of experimental philosophy. Experiments on hunches have demonstrated
systematic mistakes among children, laypersons, and experts, as Nadelhoffer and
Nahmias (2007, 125, 129) point out, and optical illusions cause systematic mistakes
in the case of perception, so competence cannot simply be assumed. Therefore,
even if there is a successful analogical argument from competence in the case of
hunches or perceptions to competence in the case of trans-empirical intuitions,
the latter suffer, according to the analogy, from systematic mistakes as well.
Since trans-empirical intuitions cannot be tested like hunches or perceptions,
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competence claims are outside the realm of experimental philosophy and empirical
research in general, and have to be established in some other way. This needs to be
done in order to show that trans-empirical intuitions are indeed evidence for their
targets in the same way perceptions are, and that therefore linguistic philosophy
is mistaken. If competence claims cannot be established, there may also be no
other justification to prefer one person’s intuitions over another’s. Without such
a justification, empirical restrictionism’s results cannot be rendered irrelevant
by considering only the preferred intuitions. Further justifications pending, the
results of experimental philosophy therefore support linguistic philosophy and
pose a problem for trans-empirical philosophy.
In a critique of experimental philosophy, Kauppinen (2007) argues that ordi-
nary language philosophy can only be pursued by what Mates calls the intensional
method, and claims that experimental philosophy is in principle restricted to the
extensional method. The latter claim is decisively criticized by Nadelhoffer and
Nahmias (2007), who raise the possibility of devising the Socratic questionnaires
that Mates suggests for the intensional method. Kauppinen’s criticism hence loses
its force against experimental philosophy. It is still noteworthy, though, that with
this claim Kauppinen moves away from the historical practice of overly relying
on the extensional method, which was lamented by Mates, to the other extreme
of excluding it completely.
Kauppinen further argues that the intensional method can be expected to
yield converging results because people can communicate. However, as Mates has
pointed out, this argument does not establish that people use words with the same
meaning they would settle on via the intensional method. Whether there is such
a convergence of meaning is very much an empirical question, to be tested, for
example, by the method Mates proposes. And even then, that agreement exists in
some cases does not imply agreement in the difficult ones, as Maxwell and Feigl
have noted. In their reply to Kauppinen, Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007, 144,
n. 36) state as much.
Concluding his critique, Kauppinen (2007, 110) claims that “assessing the truth
of intuition claims can remain a relatively armchair business [ . . . ]. We are entitled
to have confidence in such reflection, since we take a lot of real-life experience of
using concepts to the armchair with us”. That is, the intensional method can be
replaced by recourse to the investigator’s intuitions about the use of her native
language. The argument is rejected by Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007, 129) once
again with Mates’s point that Kauppinen’s claim is an empirical one that must be
tested.
Without having established the possibility for the ordinary language philoso-
pher to rely on her intuitions alone, Kauppinen is forced to accept Mates’s in-
tensional method as the only viable one. Therefore, Mates’s worry about this
method becomes acute: It is not clear how to distinguish between finding out and
influencing what someone takes a word’s meaning to be. Kauppinen (2007, §5.1)
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himself notes that one is “never free of the danger of leading the witness in the
direction favored by the questioner”, but does not suggest a way to avoid this
influence. As detailed above, Maxwell and Feigl turn this into an argument for
artificial language philosophy by suggesting that there is no such way, while Mates
at least thinks that one can test this empirically.
In their argument for artificial language philosophy, Maxwell and Feigl go
beyond simply arguing that in the intensional method, ordinary language philoso-
phy cannot help but reform language. They hold that it should reform language,
because ordinary language may not be good enough to solve or dissolve philosoph-
ical problems. Philosophical language must contain explicata, not explicanda. It is
this reliance on explicata, and constructed languages more generally, that ensures
the independence of artificial language philosophy from folk intuition, just as the
analogical consideration mentioned in the beginning suggests. Underlying the
analogy is a general statement that holds for natural sciences, mathematics, and ju-
risprudence, as well as for artificial language philosophy: They apply constructed
languages, and many of their concepts are explicata for the explicanda of ordinary
language. Even if a word occurs in both constructed and ordinary language, it
will therefore typically have different meanings in each. For this reason, Carnap
and Popper can dismiss Naess’s experiments on ordinary language as irrelevant to
Tarski’s explication of ‘true’, and artificial language philosophy can be pursued
largely independently of the results of contemporary experimental philosophy.
This dismissal of folk intuitions does not simply shift the authority to the ex-
perts’ intuitions, though. Their intuitions about the application of an explicatum
can be checked by using the rules for an explicatum’s use, which must be laid
down precisely. This was already remarked upon very early by Carnap (1967a,
§100) in a discussion of the rational reconstruction of concepts in philosophy and
the sciences:
The fact that the synthesis of cognition, namely, the object formation
and the recognition of, or classification into, species, takes place intu-
itively, has the advantage of ease, speed, and obviousness. But intuitive
recognition (e. g., of a plant) can become useful for further scientific
work only because it is possible to give, in addition, the indicators (of
the particular species of plant), to compare them with the perception
and thus to give a rational justification of intuition.
Experts’ intuitions about how an explicandum should be explicated can be checked
against Carnap’s requirements for explication, and in principle, anyone may
suggest and use a new explicatum according to expedience, as long as this new
concept is clearly distinguished from existing ones.
Experimental philosophy is not useless for artificial language philosophy, how-
ever. To the extent that experimental restrictionism establishes actual disagreement
in the application of concepts, it identifies areas where an explication is clearly
needed, and experimental analysis can help by identifying an explicandum as a
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starting point for such an explication. In general, experiments on ordinary lan-
guage can bear all the fruits for artificial language philosophers that Carnap (1955)
lists in the quotation in section 2.4. Experimental philosophy is relevant for ordi-
nary language philosophy, and to the extent that ordinary language philosophy is
relevant for artificial language philosophy, so is experimental philosophy.
Artificial language philosophy can be challenged, of course. Kauppinen (2007,
96) and Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007, 130) cut to the core of the debate between
ordinary and artificial language philosophy when they echo the claim by Strawson
(1963) that artificial language philosophy does not solve the right problems if it
does not capture the concepts of ordinary language. However, first, the preceding
discussion shows that even ordinary language philosophy may not capture ordi-
nary language, and second, the responses by Bergmann (1949) and Maxwell and
Feigl (1961) to Strawson’s argument in the old debate within linguistic philosophy
show that this may not be a problem in the first place. At this point, I do not
want to claim that Kauppinen, Nadelhoffer, Nahmias, and Strawson are wrong.
But I do want to claim that Nadelhoffer, Nahmias, and Kauppinen are jumping
to conclusions, given that the discussion between ordinary and artificial language
philosophy starts, but does not end, with Strawson’s criticism. In the next section,
I will claim that they are wrong.
2.7 Philosophical methodologies according to arti-
ficial language philosophy
Like artificial language philosophy, naturalized and experimental philosophy have
also been charged with changing the subject—that they do not, in fact, address
philosophical problems at all (cf. Kim 1988). That naturalized methodologies can-
not by themselves solve philosophical problems is also suggested by the possibility
of using them as a proper part of traditional and ordinary language philosophy. I
now want to argue that artificial language philosophy can be defended against this
charge.
A straightforward defense of artificial language philosophy would require a
precise definition of ‘philosophical problem’ and ‘solution to a philosophical prob-
lem’. Since neither term has, so far, been defined to general satisfaction, I only aim
to show that artificial language philosophy succeeds in capturing many philoso-
phers’ posited solutions to philosophical problems, that is, it captures much of
philosophical practice. In particular, I will argue that artificial language philoso-
phy can capture many of the applications of the five philosophical methodologies
described.
Artificial language philosophy trivially captures its own applications. And as
the old discussion within linguistic philosophy (§2.4) has shown, there is a general
consensus that the results of ordinary language philosophy can be a starting point
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for the choice of a language, and there are good reasons to assume that exclusive
reliance on actual language use would make for an inordinately weak philosophical
methodology. Especially the arguments by Maxwell and Feigl (1961) suggest that
in many cases in which ordinary language philosophy leads to clarifications, it does
so by regimenting the language. Because of this normative part, ordinary language
philosophy therefore threatens to collapse into artificial language philosophy.
The practices of traditional philosophy can be captured in artificial language
philosophy by interpreting alleged discoveries of facts as inventions of new con-
cepts or whole new languages. In the terminology of Carnap (1934b, 13–17, 19),
this means switching from the “material” or “connotative mode of expression” to
the “formal mode of expression”. When intuitions are used as evidence, they are
interpreted as meaning-directed rather than world-directed, and their successive
development in the method of reflective equilibrium is interpreted as a method of
explication (cf. Kuipers 2007, xiv). However, while traditional philosophy faces
the challenge of justifying its claims as discoveries, and thus of explaining how
philosophers gain cognitive access to those facts that are the subjects of these claims
(e. g., the targets of the philosophers’ intuitions), artificial language philosophy
can simply justify them as pragmatic language choices.
Indeed, the descriptions of the methods of traditional philosophy by its practi-
tioners sometimes already read like descriptions of artificial language philosophy.
Reviewing a critique of traditional metaphysics by Ladyman and Ross (2007), Dorr
(2010) describes a tentative consensus among metaphysicians about methodology:
It is not enough simply to announce that Xs are more fundamental
than Ys: if I want to defend this claim, I am supposed, at a minimum,
to (i) introduce a language in which I can talk about Xs without even
seeming to talk about Ys; and (ii) make some kind of adequacy claim
about this language, e. g., that it can express all the genuine facts that
we can express using Y-talk, or that all the Y-facts supervene on the
facts stateable in the language. For example, if I want to maintain
that spacetime is less fundamental than the spatiotemporal relations
between bodies, I must describe a language for characterizing these
relations, and explain how it can adequately capture, e. g., claims
about the global topological structure of spacetime.
Furthermore, Dorr states that one “earn[s] the right” to consider a philosophical
problem “dissolved [ . . . ] by describing a fundamental language within which no
corresponding questions can be formulated”. If the “genuine facts that we can
express using Y-talk” are taken to determine the contexts in which the X-language
should be applicable, Dorr essentially describes the conditions of adequacy on
an artificial language as discussed in §2.3.1. Dorr (2010) also emphasizes the
importance of language choice:
The whole approach [by Ladyman and Ross (2007)] reflects an exag-
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gerated sense of the importance of argument in metaphysics, and a
corresponding underestimation of the difficulty of merely crafting a
view coherent and explicit enough for arguments to get any grip.
From the perspective of artificial language philosophy, this crafting of a “coherent
and explicit” view is nothing but the search for a language in which philosophical
problems can be solved by rigorous derivation.
The practices of naturalized philosophy are hard to circumscribe because
naturalized philosophy itself is hard to circumscribe, but to the extent that it
complements traditional and ordinary language philosophy, that is, in the context
of replacement naturalism, artificial language philosophy can capture its prac-
tices as well. And to the extent that naturalized philosophy relies on empirical
results rather than establishes them, it is engaged in language choice and rigorous
derivation. When it thereby addresses philosophical problems, it is pursued in the
context of cooperative naturalism, and naturalized philosophy is then artificial lan-
guage philosophy. For the same reason the non-experimental part of experimental
philosophy, which assumes cooperative naturalism, is artificial language philoso-
phy. The one aspect of naturalized philosophy that artificial language philosophy
cannot accommodate is empirical research into a non-linguistic phenomenon. For
instance, a philosopher who determines the angles of a triangle of light rays over
great distances does not describe an explicandum or engage in language choice
or rigorous derivation. Such research, however, is often charged with not being
philosophy at all.
As an illustration of the reinterpretation of philosophical practice in artificial
language philosophy, consider Sosa’s response (Sosa 2007, 104) to the claim by
Nichols and Knobe (2007) that the usage of ‘responsible’ in ordinary language is
inconsistent due to a performance error:
[T]here is an alternative explanation that will cast no affect-involving
doubt on the intuitions in play. This other possibility came to mind
on reading their paper, and was soon confirmed in the article on moral
responsibility in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, where we
are told that at least two different senses of ‘moral responsibility’ have
emerged: the attributability sense, and the accountability sense.[ . . . ]
So, here again, quite possibly the striking divergence reported
above is explicable mainly if not entirely through verbal divergence.
For Sosa (2007, 100), the “use of intuitions in philosophy should not be tied
exclusively to conceptual analysis. [ . . . ] Some such questions concern an ethical
or epistemic subject matter, and not just our corresponding concepts”. This is
presumably how he interprets the “emergence” of two kinds of responsibility:
They both exist, but are referred to with the same word, leading to “verbal
divergence”.
Sosa probably refers to the fall 2004 edition of the Stanford Encyclopedia of
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Philosophy, in which Eshleman (2004, §2.2) writes that
at least some disagreements about the most plausible overall theory
of responsibility might be based on a failure to distinguish between
different aspects of the concept of responsibility, or perhaps several
distinguishable but related concepts of responsibility.
Broadly speaking, a distinction has been drawn between responsi-
bility understood as attributability and responsibility as accountabil-
ity.
Eshleman’s formulation differs from Sosa’s paraphrase in that Eshleman consid-
ers the disagreements to stem from confusion over “distinguishable but related
concepts of responsibility”. In other words, there are pre-existing concepts (not
pre-existing kinds) that get confused, and an analysis of the concepts of ordinary
language would resolve the inconsistency. Regarding such a line of reasoning,
Maxwell and Feigl (1961, 489) note that there is little reason to think that the
two concepts allegedly being confused are somehow already present in ordinary
thinking. Certainly, the ordinary user of the term ‘responsibility’ is not aware of
them—otherwise there would be no confusion. And if the ordinary user were to
agree with the distinction between the two concepts, Maxwell and Feigl argue,
this agreement would amount to a change of language.
According to artificial language philosophy, then, the introduction of the
distinction between responsibility as attributability and responsibility as account-
ability into the philosophical discourse is a conventional change of language—it is
not the discovery of a fact about the world or the meaning of the term ‘responsi-
bility’.
∗ ∗ ∗
I have argued above that in the context of cooperative naturalism, the non-
empirical part of experimental philosophy is artificial language philosophy. But
the ‘is’ here refers to the membership relation, not identity. Artificial language
philosophy encompasses more than the non-empirical part of experimental phi-
losophy because, as described in §2.3.1, it is empirically informed by experimental
results in general, not experimental results about people’s intuitions. In direct
contradiction to this position, the difference between experimental philosophy
and empirically informed philosophy is sometimes only or mainly attributed to
the conduction of experiments by the philosophers themselves. In a critique of
experimental philosophy, Sosa (2007, 100) puts it this way:
Mining the sciences is not in itself novel, of course. [ . . . ] Just think
of how 20th-century physics bears on the philosophy of space and
time, or split-brain phenomena on issues of personal identity, to take
just two examples. Perhaps the novelty is rather that experimental
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philosophers do not so much borrow from the scientists as that they
become scientists. This they do by designing and running experiments
aimed to throw light on philosophically interesting issues.
In a defense of experimental philosophy, Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007, 124)
come to the same result:
[W]hat distinguishes experimental philosophers from not only
similarly-minded naturalistic and empirically informed philosophers
but also from experimental psychologists? Though the boundary here
is blurry, the primary difference is that experimental philosophers
actually run their own studies to get at the data they need and then
show why these data are philosophically interesting.
If Sosa, Nadelhoffer, and Nahmias were right, every article in empirically
informed philosophy (that is, artificial language philosophy) could be transformed
into an article in experimental philosophy if only the philosophers themselves
conducted the experiments that form the basis of their analyses. Considering that,
say, philosophy of physics relies on results from, for example, particle accelerators,
this consideration throws the difference between experimental and artificial lan-
guage philosophy into sharp relief. Experimental philosophy (at least as currently
practiced) restricts its experiments to people’s language use, language intuitions,
and trans-empirical intuitions. Artificial language philosophy, on the other hand,
can rely on any kind of experimental results to suggest new concepts, and assigns
no special value to people’s actual usage and intuitions.
There is thus a difference between cooperatively understood experimental
philosophy and artificial language philosophy that goes beyond who gathers the
data. It consists in what kind of data are gathered and what they are used for.
Experimental philosophy takes as data the actual use of concepts and contributes
empirical generalizations about them; this holds even if experimental philosophers
discuss the relations of philosophical theories about some concept on the one
hand and people’s intuitions about that concept on the other. Artificial language
philosophy in general takes any data whatsoever, and contributes concepts that
structure them well. For instance, when investigating the wave function or gene
concepts, relevant data are experimental results for electrons or DNA, not scientists’
or laymen’s use of the words ‘wave function’ or ‘gene’.
2.8 Formal semantics for concept formation
So far, I have developed and defended artificial language philosophy without
relying on a specific semantics. The arguments in the rest of this chapter and much
of the rest of this book rely on the formal semantics presented next. The semantics
assumes a first or higher order predicate logic, which will be convenient; for
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one, the logic and its standard semantics are fairly simple and well understood. It
furthermore relates in a straightforward way to classical mathematics. Finally, all
of the criteria of empirical significance that I will discuss assume classical predicate
logic, which to a certain extent forces my hand—any other logic would have to
contain predicate logic at least as a special case. As already pointed out in §2.3.1,
when the logic of a language is fixed, language choice becomes concept formation.
This will keep things comparably simple.
2.8.1 Basic terms
Carnap (1939, §24) provides a general outline of the semantics for a language bipar-
titioned into basic and auxiliary terms that I will discuss in chapter 3. Przełe˛cki
(1969, ch. 5–6) gives what can be seen as an elaboration of Carnap’s account in
formal semantics, and much of what follows will rely on a slight generalization of
Przełe˛cki’s account. Because the basic terms are unproblematic, Przełe˛cki can as-
sume that their meaning determines a set MB of possibleB -structures. 16 On pain
of triviality, MB cannot contain allB -structures (Przełe˛cki 1969, ch. 4), and thus
may lead to a set of meaning postulatesΠB for the basic terms, whereΠB is the
set ofB -sentences that are true in everyMB ∈MB .17 Here and in the following,
I will assume that the closure of MB under isomorphism is the class of all models
ofΠB ; the motivation for this assumption is that the role of MB consists only in
distinguishing between isomorphic structures. If two non-isomorphic structures
have to be distinguished, this is either achieved on the level of the language or not
at all. Following the terminology of Fine (1975, §3), one can give
Definition 2.1. A setΣ of sentences is supertrue/superfalse in a set A of structures
if and only if Σ is true/false in every A ∈A.
A set of sentences is true in a single structure A if and only if all of its elements
are true in A according to the standard definition (Hodges 1993, 12–13; Leivant
1994, §3.1).18 A set of sentences is false in A if and only if it is not true in A. Here
and in the following, a definition for sets of sentences holds for a single sentence if
and only if it holds for the sentence’s singleton set.
Przełe˛cki (1969, 20–21) suggests that supertruth should be a sufficient condi-
tion for truth in A, and superfalsity a sufficient condition for falsity in A. I will
also assume the converse, so that truth in A is supertruth in A, and falsity in A
is superfalsity in A. Thus ΠB is the set of sentences that are true in MB . If the
16For mnemonic purposes, ‘MB ’ could stand for ‘meaning of theB -terms’.
17Carnap (1952) describes how to treat meaning postulates for basic terms on a syntactic level,
Przełe˛cki (1969, §10.II) gives a method for introducing meaning postulates for basic terms, and Kyburg
(1990) discusses a method for choosing between different sets of meaning postulates for basic terms in
probabilistic theories.
18For higher order logic, I will usually assume Tarski semantics, not Henkin semantics (Leivant
1994, §5.4). I will discuss the implications of this assumption in §4.1.1 and §4.1.3.
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truth value of aB -sentence β differs for different possible structures in MB , its
truth value can only be determined by restricting MB through empirical research
to a proper subset NB ⊂MB of intendedB -structures.19
Przełe˛cki (1969, 42) assumes that in general |MB |=
M′B  for allMB ,M′B ∈
MB , but I will not make this assumption. For one, this restriction will usually not
be necessary for my purposes, and so there is no need to curtail the expressiveness
of the formalism. Furthermore, it requires some contortions in the application
of the formalism to typical situations in the sciences and even in everyday life.
A theory about chickens, for example, may be phrased so that it applies only
to individual flocks, not all of them at once. One could, of course, quantify
over all flocks, but this does not seem necessary. Furthermore, one may want to
apply an already interpreted theory to a new domain (flocks of geese, say), and
it would be convenient if this did not require the modification of the semantics
for any of the previous applications. Finally, assuming different domains seems
to allow one to formalize the actual applications of theories much more directly.
For a theory will typically be applied to only one small part of the world (say,
fifteen flocks of chickens), even though it is meant to hold for a much bigger
part (all flocks of chickens). All of these considerations are only considerations of
convenience, however. It does not seem to be impossible in principle to formalize
the applications of theories by way of a single domain (cf. Przełe˛cki 1974c, 103).
2.8.2 Auxiliary terms
The meaning postulatesΠ for the whole language V contain the meaning postu-
lates ΠB for theB -terms. To arrive at a formal definition, let A|B refer to the
reduct of A to B , that is, the structure that results from eliminating the inter-
pretations of all A -terms from A. For a B -structure AB , a structure B with
B|B =AB is called an expansion of AB (Hodges 1993, 9).
For it to be possible to choose the analytic sentencesΠ to be true, it must be
possible to expand every structure of MB to a model ofΠ . Otherwise, empirical
research could show that there is no model ofΠ that respects the meaning of the
B -terms; that is,Π could be empirically false. The expansions of MB to models
ofΠ then are the possible V -structures M. Structures of subsets for V are possible
only if they are reducts of a possible V -structure:
Definition 2.2. A V -structure A is possible (A ∈ M) if and only if A  Π and
A|B ∈MB . A structure is possible if and only if it can be expanded to someM ∈M.
Now the following holds:
19NB is called M∗O by Przełe˛cki (1969, 42), and MB comes closest to what Przełe˛cki (1969, 43) calls
‘the characterization of M∗O ’. I thank Antje Rumberg and Tom Sterkenburg for helpful discussions on
this point. As a mnemonic, one might think of MB as requiring one (empirical/alphabetical) step to
NB .
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Claim 2.1. A structure can be expanded to a model ofΠ if and only if it is isomorphic
to a possible structure.
Proof. ‘⇐’: Trivial
‘⇒’: Assume that A can be expanded to a modelB ofΠ . The reductB|B is a
model ofΠB , and thus, by assumption, there is an isomorphism f fromB|B to
some CB ∈MB . Then f is also an isomorphism from A to a structure that can
be expanded to the model C ofΠ with C|B =BB ∈MB .
Therefore M, just as MB , only distinguishes between isomorphic structures,
and the closure of the class of possible structures under isomorphism is the class
of all structures that can be expanded to a model ofΠ . For sentences, one can give
Definition 2.3. A set Σ of V -sentences is possible if and only if Σ is true in some
possible structure. Σ is analytically true/analytically false if and only if Σ is true/
false in M. Σ is analytically determined if and only if it is true in M or false in
M. Σ is analytically contingent if and only if it is not analytically determined. Σ
analytically entails Λ if and only if Λ is true in all possible structures in whichΣ is
true.
I will sometimes call an analytically true set of sentences simply ‘analytic’.
Definition 2.3 leads to
Claim 2.2. A set Σ of V -sentences is possible if and only if Σ ∪Π has a model. Σ
is analytic if and only if Π Σ . All and only sets of sentences incompatible with Π
are analytically false; all and only analytically true sets and analytically false sets are
analytically determined. Σ analytically entails Λ if and only if Σ ∪Π Λ.
Proof. From claim 2.1 because the truth/falsity of a sentence is invariant under
isomorphisms between structures.
Π is thus sufficient to determine which V -sentences can, cannot, or must
be true within the chosen language and for questions of analyticity and analytic
entailment, so that MB and M will not play a major role in the formal analyses in
the following. Put somewhat counterintuitively, analyticity is a syntactic, not a
semantic, notion.
In general, a set of postulates for auxiliary terms may be such that not every
possibleB -structure can be expanded to a model of the postulates. The postulates
thus restrict MB , and hence are not completely analytic. The demarcation criteria
for science are a good example of this in philosophy. Such postulates for the term
‘science’, S, are sometimes given by a set Θ of one sufficient and one necessary
condition,Θ  {∀x[ϕ(x)→ S x],∀x[S x→ψ(x)]}, which entails theB -sentence
∀x[ϕ(x) → ψ(x)] (see §9.6). An example from physics is Ohm’s law, which
contains an analytic component—the meaning postulates for the auxiliary terms
‘voltage’ and ‘internal resistance’—and an empirical component that establishes a
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relation between the basic terms ‘resistance’ and ‘current intensity’ (Simon 1970,
§§2–3). ForΠB =∅ and a single postulate σ(B¯ , A¯) that contains the basic terms
B¯ and auxiliary terms A¯,20 Carnap (1958, §4) proposes identifying its empirical
component with its Ramsey sentence
RB (σ) := ∃X¯σ
 
B¯ , X¯

, (2.1)
which results from σ by existentially generalizing on allA -terms in σ . Ramsey
sentences have some easily established properties:
Claim 2.3. For aB -sentence β, a V -sentence σ , and a set J ⊆A of terms, the
following holds:
RB (β)  β (2.2a)
RB
 
RB (σ)
  RB (σ) (2.2b)
RB
 
RB∪J (σ)
  RB (σ) (2.2c)
Proof. Formula (2.2a) holds because β contains no A -terms. Formula (2.2b)
follows because RB (σ) is aB -sentence. Formula (2.2c) holds because existential
quantifiers commute.
For finite sets Σ of sentences, I will sometimes write RB (Σ) instead of
RB (
∧
Σ). RB (Σ) entails the same B -sentences as Σ (Rozeboom 1962, 291–
293),21 which makes the choice of the Ramsey sentence as the synthetic component
plausible. Note that the Ramsey sentence may increase the order of the theory.
Specifically, a first order theory with auxiliary predicate or function symbols has
a second order Ramsey sentence. IfB -sentences can be of any order, RB (σ) is
aB -sentence. Carnap further suggests identifying the analytic component of σ
with what is now called the ‘Carnap sentence’
CB (σ)  RB (σ)→ σ , (2.3)
where, as for the Ramsey sentence, I will sometimes suppress the conjunction for
finite sets of sentences.
In the example of the demarcation criteria, RB (Θ) = ∃X
 ∀x[ϕ(x)→X x]∧
∀x[X x → ψ(x)]  ∀x[ϕ(x) → ψ(x)]. I will argue in §12.1 that the Carnap
sentence is just the weakest of a number of possible meaning postulates corre-
sponding to a set of postulates. For the example of Θ, Π = {∀x[ϕ(x)∧ψ(x)→
S x],∀x[S x→ψ(x)]} is another possibility (Przełe˛cki and Wójcicki 1969, 391; cf.
Przełe˛cki 1969, §7.III).
20In general, if I refer to a set Θ of sentences by ðΘ(B1, . . . ,Bm ,A1, . . . ,An)ñ or ðΘ(B¯ , A¯)ñ, I will
assume that B1, . . . ,Bm ∈B and A1, . . . ,An ∈A are the only terms that occur in Θ.
21Hence, unless Σ is empirically false, NB ⊆ {A |A ∈MB and A  RB (Σ)}.
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The set N of the intended V -structures that interpret all terms (V =B ∪A )
contains all and only those models of the meaning postulates Π that expand
the structures in NB to V ; that is, N =

A
 A|B ∈ NB and A  Π	. More
generally, a structure is intended if and only if it can be expanded to an intended
V -structure. If Π is a singleton set containing the Carnap sentence of some
set Σ of postulates, the meaning postulates restrict the interpretation of the
A -terms only if the postulates’ Ramsey sentence RB (Σ) is true. The Carnap
sentence thus formalizes the assumption that the meaning postulates are motivated
by the empirical implications of the postulates in Σ and have no relevance for
the interpretation ofA -terms if the postulates turn out to be empirically false.
In other words, while empirical results can show the postulates but not the
meaning postulates to be false, they can show the meaning postulates to be useless.
The stronger meaning postulates accordingly formalize the assumption that the
meaning postulates are motivated by the empirical implications of the postulates,
but may be applicable even if the postulates turn out to be false. Which assumption
is correct will depend on the postulates and the context, as Przełe˛cki and Wójcicki
(1969, 386) note (cf. Przełe˛cki 1969, 76).
It is now possible to distinguish clearly between analytic and synthetic com-
ponents of the language: MB , ΠB , and Π are purely analytic, and since they
determine M, M is purely analytic as well. The restriction from MB to NB is
purely synthetic, since it relies only on empirical information. The restriction of
M to N, on the other hand, relies on both NB andΠ , and is thus neither purely
analytic nor purely synthetic (while of course it is determined by the purely
synthetic restriction from MB to NB and the purely analyticΠ). An analytically
contingent setΣ of sentences may thus turn out to be empirically true (if it is true
in the intended structures N) or empirically false (if it is false in N).
2.8.3 Vague terms
Even in the case of exhaustive empirical information, NB may not be a singleton
set since the basic terms may be vague (Przełe˛cki 1969, §5). Vague basic terms
pose a particular problem for the bipartition of the language in artificial language
philosophy, which is again very easily spelled out with the help of a formalism
developed by Przełe˛cki (1976). The denotation of a relation symbol Pi that is
vague over some domain A tripartitions the product domain Ami into a set P+i of
definite instances (the positive extension of Pi ), a set P
−
i of definite non-instances
(the negative extension), and a set of borderline cases of Pi , which I will call P
◦
i
(the neutral extension). The denotation of a function symbol F j that is vague over
A does not assign a single element b ∈ A to an n j -tuple (a1, . . . ,an j ) ∈ An j , but
rather a set F +◦j (a1, . . . ,an j ) = B ⊆A (Przełe˛cki 1976, 375).22 B can be seen as the
22This is a slight generalization of Przełe˛cki’s account, who assumes that B is an interval of reals,
which would therefore have to be in A.
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set of possible values of the function named by F j for the arguments a1, . . . ,an j ,
and I will refer to the set

(a1, . . . ,an j , b ) | a1, . . . ,an j ∈A, b ∈ F +◦j (a1, . . . ,an j )
	
as
the non-negative extension F +◦j of F j .
23 If F +◦j (a1, . . . ,an j ) is a singleton set, I will
say that F j has a positive extension for (a1, . . . ,an j ). Treating constant symbols as
0-place function symbols, this means that the denotation of a constant symbol ck
that is vague over A is a set c+◦
k
⊆A.
Przełe˛cki (1976, 376) notes that for a function symbol F j , F
+◦
j may contain
unintended functions. For example, unless F j has a positive extension over the
whole domain, F +◦j contains discontinuous functions, which may go against
the intended denotation of F j . Przełe˛cki therefore allows the denotation of a
function symbol F j to be further determined by a set of “additional conditions”
W (F j ), which all intended structures have to fulfill as well. Similarly to Przełe˛cki’s
additional conditions are what Fine (1975, 124) calls ‘penumbral connections’,
sentences that have to be true in all intended structures. However, Fine assumes
that these connections are given in the object language, not in the metalanguage
determining the denotations, and he does not restrict the penumbral connections
to functions only. I will follow Fine in both respects, allowing a set W (Pi , F j ,
ck )i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K of penumbral connections for all terms in the object language.
The denotations of the vague terms over A and the penumbral connections
now determine a set of intended structures:
Definition 2.4. Let the terms {Pi , F j , ck}i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K be vague over domain A with
positive, negative, and non-negative extensions {P+i , P−i , F +◦j , c+◦k }i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K , and
penumbral connections W (Pi , F j , ck )i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K . Then the terms’ vagueness set A
for A contains all and only models A for which
|A|= A, (2.4)
A W (Pi , F j , ck )i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K , (2.5)
P+i ⊆ PAi ⊆Ami − P−i for all i ∈ I , (2.6)
FAj ⊆ F +◦j for all j ∈ J , and (2.7)
cAk ∈ c+◦k for all k ∈K . (2.8)
The elements of the vagueness set are the precisifications of the terms’ interpre-
tations given the penumbral connections. In the following, I will always assume
that the vagueness set for terms and penumbral connections is never empty, that
is, the penumbral connections are not in conflict with the positive, negative, and
non-negative extensions of the terms. Furthermore, I will assume that the penum-
bral connections are only used to exclude those structures from vagueness sets
23F +◦j is the union of a vague relation symbol’s positive and neutral extension.
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that cannot be excluded with the help of positive, negative, and non-negative
extensions. This entails that for any vagueness set A over domain A for terms with
{P+i , P−i , F +◦j , c+◦k }i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K and W (Pi , F j , ck )i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K ,
P+i =
⋂¦
PAi
A ∈A© , (2.9)
P−i =
⋂¦
Ami+1− PAi
A ∈A© , (2.10)
F +◦j =
⋃n
FAj
A ∈Ao , and (2.11)
c+◦
k
=
⋃¦
cAk
A ∈A© (2.12)
for all i ∈ I , j ∈ J , k ∈ K . Truth in A is defined as supertruth, falsity as superfal-
sity.24
As mentioned in connection with circular definitions (§2.3.1), two vague terms
can be used to make each other more precise. For assume that for domain {1,2,3},
P+1 = {2}, P−1 = {3}, P+2 = {2}, and P−2 = {1}. Then the postulate ∀x(P1x↔ P2x)
defines P1 in terms of P2 and vice versa, and gives both terms the perfectly precise
interpretation P+1 = P
+
2 = {2} and P−1 = P−2 = {1,3}.
That NB , the set of intendedB -structures, may not be a singleton set has
clear philosophical implications. According to Hare, for example, the concept
of a person, when ‘person’ is taken to be inB ,25 is such that the sentence ‘The
fetus is a person’ is neither true nor false in NB . In this example NB is not a
singleton set even up to isomorphism, and hence someB -sentences cannot be
decided empirically. The decision of whether to treat the fetus as a person is thus a
choice of language, and the sentence becomes analytically true or analytically false
accordingly.
For most applications in the following, it will be important that NB is at least
precise up to isomorphism, so that any restriction on MB by a set of V -sentences
is indeed an empirical claim (and does not just make theB -terms more precise by
restricting NB further). For this reason, it will sometimes be necessary to design a
basic vocabulary that is precise in this sense. I will give examples of such design
procedures in §2.10.2 and §4.3.3.
2.9 Papineau against artificial language philosophy
Papineau (2009a, §2.1) argues that philosophy, like science, is about the world,
and thus naturalistic (cf. Papineau 2009b, 3). There are no differences between
the “aims and methods” of philosophy and science, but only in the specific topics.
24Note that with this semantic conception of vagueness, ‘Mars was always dry or not dry’ is true.
Other semantic conceptions are possible (cf. Przełe˛cki 1969, 18–21). Such a language choice would
take place in the metalanguage. (See also §3, n. 3.)
25NB is thus taken to be determined by empirical results and actual usage.
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Typically, philosophical theories are very general (e. g. theories of “spatiotemporal
continuants, universals and identity”), and
unlikely ever to be decided between by some simple experiment,
which is no doubt one reason that philosophers do not normally seek
out new empirical data. Even so, the naturalist will insist, such theo-
ries are still synthetic theories about the natural world, answerable in
the last instance to the tribunal of empirical data.
Not all philosophical questions are of great generality. Think of
topics like weakness of will, the importance of originality in art,
or the semantics of fiction. What seems to identify these as philo-
sophical issues is that our thinking is in some kind of theoretical
tangle, supporting different lines of thought that lead to conflicting
conclusions. Progress requires an unravelling of premises, including
perhaps an unearthing of implicit assumptions that we didn’t realise
we had, and a search for alternative positions that don’t generate fur-
ther contradictions. Here too empirical data are clearly not going to
be crucial in deciding theoretical questions—often we have all the data
we could want, but can’t find a good way of accommodating them.
Still, methodological naturalists will urge, this doesn’t mean that co-
gent empirical theories are not the aim of philosophy. An empirical
theory unravelled from a tangle is still an empirical theory, even if no
new data went into its construction.
The reply of the artificial language philosopher to this argument is straightforward:
How to speak about continuants, universals, and identity is a trans-empirical ques-
tion, and its answer is thus a matter of choice; it cannot be decided by empirical
research. And if the unraveling of a theoretical tangle in an empirical theory
indeed cannot be decided by any further empirical information, then it, too, is
trans-empirical. That of course does not mean that the theory in which the tangle
occurred does not have an empirical component. It just means that the problem
could be solved without changing the Ramsey sentence of the theory.
But Papineau (2009b, 9) has a counter to this reply. Using as an example a
theory T with one auxiliary term F , he argues that only the Ramsey sentence,
which cannot be changed by language choice, is philosophically interesting:
From the perspective of this approach to concepts, the original theory
T (F ) can be decomposed into the analytic Carnap sentence and the
synthetic “Ramsey sentence” of the theory—∃ΦT (Φ). The Ramsey
sentence expresses the substantial commitments of the theory—there
is an entity which . . . —while the Carnap sentence expresses the defi-
nitional commitment to dubbing that entity ‘F ’.
According to Papineau, if the Ramsey sentence of a theory is not changed, the
purported solution of some theoretical tangle can at best consist in the renaming
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of concepts. But no tangle has ever been solved by renaming alone. For the Ramsey
sentence of a theory states which auxiliary concepts there are, and the Carnap
sentence only assigns them labels. Thus the Carnap sentence is very uninteresting
(Papineau 2009b, 10):
[T]he natural assumption is surely that it is the synthetic Ramsey
sentences that matter to philosophy, not the analytic Carnap sen-
tences. What makes philosophers interested in investigating further
is the pretheoretical supposition that there are entities fitting such-
and-such specifications, not just the hypothetical specification that
if there were such entities, then they would count as free actions, or
intentional states, or whatever.
But Papineau’s argument for the irrelevance of the Carnap sentence fails even on
technical grounds. For the Carnap sentence in his example has the form
∃ΦT (Φ)→ T (F ) , (2.13)
that is, the variable ‘Φ’ in the antecedent is bound by the existential quantifiers,
and thus the ‘F ’ in ‘T (F )’ cannot refer back to ‘Φ’. This becomes obvious when
looking at the open formula T (Φ)→ T (F ), for it is not generally the case that
Φ and F have the same reference: F is interpreted by some structure A, but Φ is
interpreted by a variable assignment ν. For example, if T (F ) is the sentence F b ,
with b ∈ B and F ∈ A , then ∃ΦΦb is true in A with A = {1,2}, bA = 1, and
FA = {1,2}, because A, ν  Φb for ν(Φ) = {1}. But FA 6= ν(Φ).
Papineau probably does not have the Ramsey and Carnap sentences in mind
after all, for he introduces the above discussion with the claim that “it is open to us
to regard the concept F as having its reference fixed via the description ‘the Φ such
that T (Φ)’. That is, F can be understood as referring to the unique Φ that satisfies
the assumptions in T , if there is such a thing, and to fail of reference otherwise”
(Papineau 2009b, 8). As Papineau (2009a, §2.3) states in a similar discussion, “the
Ramsey sentence corresponding to T (F ) is ‘∃!Φ(T (Φ))’”. But this is puzzling,
because Papineau (2009b, 9) also claims that the “original theory framed using
the concept F is [ . . . ] equivalent to the conjunction of the Ramsey and Carnap
sentences”, which is generally false if the Ramsey sentence is defined in Papineau’s
way.
Take Papineau’s own example of a “simple theory of pain”, which is “consti-
tuted by the two claims that (a) bodily damage typically causes pains, and (b) pains
typically cause attempts to avoid further damage” (Papineau 2009b, 4). Simplifying
even more by ignoring the ‘typically’ and expressing causation by a conditional,
one gets
T (P )  ∀x(D x→ P x)∧∀x(P x→Ax) , (2.14)
with D, P , and A standing for ‘is damaged’, ‘feels pain’, and ‘shows avoidance
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behavior’, respectively, andA = {P}. Then
∀x(D x→Ax)  ∀x(D x→D x)∧∀x(D x→Ax) (2.15a)
 ∃Y [∀x(D x→ Y x)∧∀x(Y x→Ax)] (2.15b)
 RB (T ) (2.15c)
and accordingly
CB (T )  ∀x(D x→Ax)→∀x(D x→ P x)∧∀x(P x→Ax) . (2.16)
It is easy to see that, indeed, RB (T )∧CB (T )  T . On the other hand,
∃!Y T (Y )  ∃Y  T (Y )∧∀Z[T (Z)→ Z = Y ] (2.17)
 ∃Y  ∀x(D x→ Y x)∧∀x(Y x→Ax)
∧ [∀x(D x→D x)∧∀x(D x→Ax)→D = Y ]
∧ [∀x(D x→Ax)∧∀x(Ax→Ax)→A= Y ] (2.18)
 ∃Y (D = Y ∧A= Y ) (2.19)
 ∀x(D x↔Ax) , (2.20)
which is not entailed by T . Hence ∃!Y T (Y )∧CB (T ) is strictly stronger than T .
In fact, Papineau has silently switched from the Ramsey sentence to something
akin to the Ramsey-Lewis sentence, which led to the inconsistency. Lewis (1970)
introduces this sentence to allow for the explicit definition of all auxiliary terms.
To achieve this, Lewis (1970, 429) first assumes that all auxiliary terms are constant
symbols, by which he claims that no “generality is lost, since names can purport
to name entities of any kind: individuals, species, states, properties, substances,
magnitudes, classes, relations, or what not.” Thus all auxiliary terms can be
reformulated as names since, as Lewis (1970, 429) states,B
provides the needed copulas:
has the property
is in the state at time
has to degree
and the like.
Lewis (1970, 430) further assumes a logic in which constant names and definite
descriptions without denotations in the domain refer to the same object. This
object is not in the domain and thus lies outside of the scope of the normal
quantifiers. Therefore identities between denotationless constant names or definite
descriptions are true. On this basis, Lewis identifies the auxiliary terms with
definite descriptions. That is, for each auxiliary term ai ,
ai = ιyi ∃y¯−i∀x¯[T (x¯)↔ y¯ = x¯] . (2.21)
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Because of Lewis’s choice of logic, these equations can still be true even if the
definite descriptions occurring within them do not have a unique reference in
the domain. For then the definite descriptions refer to an object that is not in
the domain, to which the theoretical terms have to refer as well. As is proper for
definitions, the equations “do not imply any [B]-sentences except logical truths”
(Lewis 1970, 438).
However, Lewis’s definitions are based on the downright frivolous assumption
that a theory T entails explicit definitions for all of its auxiliary terms, for T
entails the equations (2.21) only if T also entails (Lewis 1970, 439)
∃x¯∀y¯[T (y¯)↔ y¯ = x¯]  ∃!x¯ T (x¯) , (2.22)
which is almost Papineau’s notion of the Ramsey sentence, except that it does not
involve higher order quantifiers and relies on a rewritten theory.26
Lewis (1970, 432–434) assumes that scientific theories are meant to entail
the unique realization of their auxiliary terms. This is at least doubtful for Pap-
ineau’s simple theory of pain, unless he indeed meant that everyone in pain shows
avoidance behavior and everyone who shows avoidance behavior is in pain. Real
scientific theories do not provide any evidence for Lewis’s assumption either—at
least if the auxiliary terms are introduced by the theories themselves, so that the
only postulates in which the auxiliary terms occur are those of the theory. For
instance, Simon (1970, §2) shows in his analysis of Ohm’s law that ‘voltage’ and
‘internal resistance’ can only be explicitly defined by ‘resistance’ and ‘current in-
tensity’ if there are at least two electric circuits. Under Lewis’s assumption, Ohm’s
law therefore entails that there are at least two electric circuits. Simon (1947, 901)
also lays out that in Newtonian particle mechanics, the component forces cannot
be explicitly defined when a system contains more than four particles. Under
Lewis’s assumption, Newtonian mechanics thus entails that there are at most four
particles. The list could go on.27
Thus Papineau’s argument for the irrelevance of the Carnap sentence is not
sound, because it relies on the false assumption that allA -terms can be defined
inB -terms. What is more, Papineau’s argument fails even under the implausible
assumption that all auxiliary terms can be explicitly defined, for the simple reason
that ∃X T (X )→ T (F ) can be false in models of ∃X T (X )—in fact, it can only be
26When the theoretical terms are uniquely realized, the logic on which Lewis relies does not differ
from normal predicate logic.
27Considering the prominent role of the Ramsey-Lewis sentence in recent philosophical discourse
(cf. Kim 2006, 152–154), it is somewhat puzzling, almost frustrating, to see the assumptions that were
considered fatal for logical empiricism—the reliance on first order logic (see §3.3) and the explicit
definability of auxiliary terms (see §3.1)—embraced so nonchalantly once logical empiricism had been
abandoned (cf. Bohnert 1971a). While always implicit in the Ramsey-Lewis sentence, the assumption
of first order logic is explicit, for example, in the discussion by Papineau (1996, §3), even though
Papineau (1996, n. 4) considers it “arguable” that the quantification over some theoretical terms is
“better represented as second order”. The assumption of explicit definability is expressly endorsed by
Whittle (2008, 60), for example.
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false in those. Perhaps more importantly, some models of ∃X T (X )→ T (F ) are
not even structures of the right type for ∃X T (X )→ T (F ), since they may have
no interpretation for F .
These are no idle technical considerations; rather, they are the technical guise of
the philosophical point that empirical results do not determine new concepts. Con-
sider an elaboration of the pain example, with m kinds of damage {Di}1≤i≤m ⊆B ,
n kinds of avoidance behavior {Aj }1≤ j≤n ⊆B , and the empirical observations
∀x
 ∨
1≤i≤m
Di x→
∨
1≤ j≤n
Aj x

. (2.23)
The question is now what auxiliary concepts should be introduced. One could, for
example, group all of the different kinds of pain and different kinds of avoidance
behavior together, which would lead to
∀x
 ∨
1≤i≤m
Di x↔D x

∧∀x
 ∨
1≤ j≤n
Aj x↔Ax

∧∀x(D x→Ax) . (2.24)
But one might also consider this too restrictive, since other kinds of damage or
avoidance behavior could be discovered. To allow for this, one could use
∀x
 ∨
1≤i≤m
Di x→D x

∧∀x

Ax→ ∨
1≤ j≤n
Aj x

∧∀x(D x→Ax) .28 (2.25)
Or one could directly introduce pain as an intermediary between the different
kinds of damage and avoidance behavior:∧
1≤i≤m
∀x(Di x→ P x)∧
∨
1≤ j≤n
∀x(P x→Aj x) . (2.26)
As a final example, the previous two approaches could be combined, which would
lead to Papineau’s simple theory of pain:
∀x
 ∨
1≤i≤m
Di x→D x

∧∀x

Ax→ ∨
1≤ j≤n
Aj x

∧∀x(D x→ P x)∧∀x(P x→Ax) . (2.27)
Similar to the proof of (2.15a), the Ramsey sentences of all of these theories can
be shown to be equivalent to the original empirical claim (2.23). Since the newly
introduced concepts in these theories differ, the Carnap sentence cannot just be a
28Note that D and A cannot be explicitly defined inB , so Lewis and Papineau’s assumption to the
contrary is false in this case.
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device for labeling concepts. Incidentally, treating the Di as instances of D or as
sufficient conditions for P may make the empirical claim (2.23) psychologically
easier to understand, apply, or simply remember the theory, which provides a
pragmatic justification for the introduction of auxiliary terms.
The step from a theory to the conjunction of the theory’s Ramsey and Carnap
sentences is an equivalence transformation. Thus it is not obvious why equiva-
lence transformations of the Ramsey sentence should be disallowed. But such
equivalence transformations can make the existentially quantified variables of
the Ramsey sentence disappear, for example in the case of the Ramsey sentence
of the simple pain theory (2.15a). Conversely, one could introduce additional
existentially quantified variables, say ∃Y1 . . .Yk[∀x(D x→ Y1)∧
∧k−1
i=1 ∀x(Yi x→
Yi+1x)∧∀x(Yk x → Ax), which in Papineau’s misinterpretation of the Ramsey
sentence would amount to different kinds of pain that beget each other, and finally
lead to avoidance behavior.
These different options are all possible because the Ramsey sentence, unlike
the Carnap sentence, does not introduce new concepts. And for this reason, the
Carnap sentence is conceptually interesting, even though it does not have empirical
content.
2.10 Language choice in the sciences
If you wish to learn from the theoretical physicist anything about the methods which
he uses, I would give you the following piece of advice: Don’t listen to his words,
examine his achievements. For to the discoverer in that field, the constructions of his
imagination appear so necessary and so natural that he is apt to treat them not as the
creations of his thoughts but as given realities.
(Einstein 1934, 163)
[In Carnap’s Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, designata] are admitted not only
for concrete terms but also, in some cases at least, for abstract symbols and expressions.
[ . . . ] The reviewer would prefer a still more liberal admission of abstract designata, not
on any realistic ground, but on the basis that this is the most intelligible and useful way
of arranging the matter—it would apparently be meaningless to ask whether abstract
terms really have designata, but it is rather a matter of taste or convenience whether
abstract designata shall be postulated.
(Church 1939, 822)
Since artificial language philosophy is a type of linguistic philosophy, it is often
considered a quintessential armchair philosophy, and thus anathema to naturalism.
Quine suggested the naturalization of epistemology specifically as an alternative to
artificial language philosophy, but I will argue that artificial language philosophy
is already naturalized, although not in Quine’s sense of the word. Specifically,
artificial language philosophy is “methodologically naturalistic” (Papineau 2009a,
§2), that is, it relies exclusively on methodologies that are prominent in the
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(natural) sciences.29
One motivation for methodological naturalism stems from the perceived
gap between the number of results in the sciences and in philosophy. Science has
achieved staggering successes in this respect, from enduring insights into the nature
of the cosmos to conveniences like digitized music to cancer treatments. Philo-
sophical insights, on the other hand, seem comparably fleeting (being disputed
by the next generation of philosophers or even immediate colleagues), seldom
convenient, and even less often a matter of life and death.30 The hope is that by
relying on a naturalistic methodology, philosophy can achieve similar successes as
the sciences, or at least improve a little.
Previous arguments for methodological naturalism were based on the assump-
tion that scientific claims are synthetic, and a naturalized philosophy therefore
has to make synthetic claims as well. Papineau’s argument (in part discussed in
§2.9), for example, aims to show that philosophy as currently practiced leads
to synthetic claims about the world. And experimental philosophy is obviously
making empirical claims about intuitions or linguistic behavior. I will argue that
these approaches to the naturalization of philosophy are trying to mimic exactly
the wrong component of science. Rather than trying to arrive at empirical results
in philosophy, philosophers should learn from the conceptual work done in the
sciences. Just like philosophers, scientists can find themselves in conceptual tangles,
and it seems that scientists are generally good at unraveling such problems. It is
my aim in this section to show that, like philosophy, science relies on an artificial
language methodology.
The motivation behind artificial language methodology was to mimic concept
formation in the sciences. For example, Carnap’s discussion of explication very
often relies on examples from the sciences. Indeed, “[p]hilosophers, scientists,
and mathematicians make explications very frequently” (Carnap 1962, §3), which
Hempel (1952, 664) also points out:
Explication is not restricted to logical and mathematical concepts
[ . . . ]. Thus, e. g., the notions of purposiveness and of adaptive be-
havior, whose vagueness has fostered much obscure or inconclusive
argumentation about the specific characteristics of biological phenom-
ena, have become the objects of systematic explicatory efforts. [ . . . ]
Similarly, the controversy over whether a satisfactory definition of
personality is attainable in purely psychological terms or requires
reference to a cultural setting centers around the question whether
a sound explicatory or predictive theory of personality is possible
29This section has been presented under the title “Armchair Philosophy Naturalized” at the con-
ference Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis at the Universität Salzburg, Austria,
September 9, 2011. I thank the audience for helpful discussions.
30What counts as death may of course be a philosophical question. But this would be a matter of
‘life’ and ‘death’, or life and death.
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without the use of sociocultural parameters; thus, the problem is one
of explication.
Accordingly, science is teeming with explicata, such as ‘temperature’ explicating
‘warm’ (Carnap 1950a, §4; Hempel 1952, §10), and completely new terms like
‘phlogiston’, ‘oxygen’, ‘gene’, and ‘hydrochloric acid’, which were introduced to
account for phenomena described in basic terms like ‘breathing’, ‘fire’, ‘child’, and
‘dissolving’. I will show that this view of scientific methodology is correct using
examples from empirical research and conceptual arguments.
2.10.1 Empirical arguments
Empirical investigations of scientific methodology have been done with increasing
empirical rigor, and the most recent studies support the claim that science relies
on an artificial language methodology, Chang (2004), for example, has given his
investigation of the formation of the temperature concept the title Inventing
Temperature, and concludes on the basis of his investigation (Chang 2004, 206–
208):
The first thing we need to do is lose the habit of thinking in terms of
simple correctness. It is very tempting to think that the ultimate basis
on which to judge the validity of an operationalization should be
whether measurements made on its basis yield values that correspond
to the real values. But what are “the real values”? Why do we assume
that unoperationalized abstract concepts, in themselves, possess any
concrete values at all? [ . . . ] An unoperationalized abstract concept
does not correspond to anything definite in the realm of physical
operations, which is where values of physical quantities belong. [ . . . ]
Once an operationalization is made, the abstract concept possesses
values in concrete situations. But we need to keep in mind that those
values are products of the operationalization in question, not inde-
pendent standards against which we can judge the correctness of the
operationalization itself.
Thus there is no thing or property called ‘temperature’ in the world that is being
found out. Rather, scientists develop, and in effect choose their concepts.
In the previously mentioned overview of biological concept formation, Stotz
(2009, §3, footnote and reference removed) states that she and her colleagues
have come to appreciate that conceptual change in science is rationally
motivated by what scientists are trying to achieve, by their accumu-
lated experience of how to achieve it, and by changes in what they are
trying to achieve. Empirical science is a powerhouse of conceptual
innovation because scientists use and reuse their terminology in a
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truly “exuberant” way. The gene concept is a case in point: despite its
ever-changing definition, the gene remains on the laboratory bench
after a whole century because it has proved a flexible tool. This only
makes sense if we think of concepts as tools of research, as ways of
classifying the experience shaped by experimentalists to meet their
specific needs. Necessarily these tools get reshaped as the scientists’
needs change.
In other words, scientists choose their concepts according to the concepts’ ex-
pedience. And specifically in biology, Stotz (2009, §4) comes to the following
conclusion:
It is simply that the molecular gene concept is not a good tool for
some kinds of research. The instrumental, Mendelian gene remains
the best tool in fields like medical genetics and population genetics. So
while a particular scientific concept reflects the scientific knowledge
at a point in time, this alone cannot explain the parallel use of several
different concepts. For a full understanding of that phenomenon
we need to see scientific concepts as tools for research, as much as
glassware, microscopes or scales.
Thus there are good reasons to believe that some sciences, at least, rely on
an artificial language methodology. Justus (2011, abstract) explicitly makes this
connection. On the basis of a case study of the concept of ecological stability, he
argues that Carnap’s theory of explication describes “how concepts should be
characterized”.
2.10.2 Conceptual arguments
Conceptual arguments also rely implicitly on empirical assumptions about scien-
tific methodology. In the cases that I present, however, the empirical assumptions
are not mine. I will only draw conclusions from others’ conceptualizations of
science.
There are, of course, explicit defenses of artificial language methodology in
general and in the sciences in particular. I have already discussed some arguments
in §2.4 and presented some more arguments in §2.6. A more general argument
rests on the assumption of semantic empiricism, the view that the only possibility
of assigning meaning to terms is through observation or with the help of terms
that have themselves been assigned meaning through observation.31 Within se-
mantic empiricism, then, non-observational terms are always auxiliary, since their
interpretation depends on the introduction of meaning postulates. On the other
hand, observational terms may be basic or auxiliary, since semantic empiricism
31Note that in ‘semantic empiricism’, the term ‘empiricism’ suggests observations, while my use of
‘empirical’ only refers to statements or states of affairs that can be decided uncontroversially.
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does not entail that observations are sufficient to determine the meaning of terms.
Rozeboom (1962) gives an elaborate defense of semantic empiricism and thus the
claim that non-observational terms can only be given meaning through language
choice. If semantic empiricism is true, it is clear that the sciences, like philosophy,
have no other way to determine non-observational concepts than to choose them.
Carnap (1966, 187–188) goes beyond semantic empiricism and argues that any
new concept of the scientific language must be chosen, whether it is observational
or not. Thus concept formation in the sciences proceeds in the same way as in
artificial language philosophy:
A working physicist is constantly coming upon methodological ques-
tions. What sort of concepts should he use? What rules govern these
concepts? By what logical method can he define his concepts? How
can he put his concepts together into statements and the statements
into a logically connected system or theory? All these questions he
must answer as a philosopher of science; clearly, they cannot be an-
swered by empirical procedures.
Unfortunately, Carnap leaves the categorical statement of the last half sentence
without proof. But even so, it can be seen as a shifting of the burden of proof:
To defend the position that science discovers rather than invents concepts like
temperature and gene, one has to provide (and justify) an empirical procedure for
deciding whether a concept is correct.
Other assumptions about the sciences lead only indirectly to an artificial lan-
guage methodology. In his argument for naturalized epistemology, Quine (1969b,
81–82) concludes that “one has no choice but to be an empiricist so far as one’s
theory of linguistic meaning is concerned”. He argues for the conventionality of
language choice in the context of his argument for the indeterminacy of transla-
tion:
[T]he linguist will end up with unequivocal translations of every-
thing; but only by making many arbitrary choices [ . . . ]. By this I
mean that different choices would still have made everything come
out right that is susceptible in principle to any kind of check.
With this claim of language choice being insusceptible to any kind of check,
Quine asserts what I will call epistemic empiricism, the position that the justi-
fication of a factual claim can only rely on observation. Epistemic empiricism
provides pragmatic support for semantic empiricism, for even if words could
non-conventionally apply to unobservable things or properties, whether they
in fact do apply in a specific case must rely on observation. Without semantic
empiricism, epistemic empiricism renders the truth of non-observation statements
unknowable in principle due to lack of justification. Thus at a minimum, Quine’s
view entails that for all practical purposes, all non-observational terms are auxil-
iary. Arguably, however, Quine’s position entails full-blown artificial language
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philosophy, since Quine (1951, 41) explicitly embraces conventionalism:
As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of
science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the
light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported
into the situation as convenient intermediaries—not by definition
in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable,
epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. [ . . . ] Both sorts of entities
enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical ob-
jects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more
efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable
structure into the flux of experience.
Quine does not assert that there is a fixed set of observational terms with their
associated concepts. Rather, how experiences are described may depend on the
conceptual scheme.
In his constructive empiricism, van Fraassen (1980, §1.3) argues that non-
observable objects are inaccessible to science, and thus science has to make do
with empirical adequacy (see §4.2.1). The result is that there is no scientific means
of determining the applicability or non-applicability of terms to unobservable
objects. As far as these objects are concerned, science has to rely on convention.
Thus the statements of both philosophy and the sciences, whenever they go
beyond observation, are conventions about language use, and there is no other
methodology that can achieve rational, intersubjective agreement.
Similarly, Sober (1990, 404) states that according to his position of contrastive
empiricism, “science is not in the business of discriminating between empirically
equivalent hypotheses”, where Sober considers theories empirically equivalent if
they assign the same probabilities to all observation statements (see §8.2). There-
fore, in particular the decision between two empirically equivalent theories with
different concepts is a matter of choice.
My final example is Andreas (2010, 538), who develops a semantics for scientific
theories that is holistic, and claims that
it is rather misleading to construe relative holism as relying on the
analytic-synthetic distinction. This becomes evident in light of the
present account of semantic holism. In this account, only sentences
qualifying as postulates are assumed to determine the meaning of
theoretical terms. And the distinction between postulates and other
theoretical sentences must clearly not be equated with the analytic-
synthetic distinction. Analyticity is therefore no requirement for a
sentence to determine the meaning of nonlogical symbols.
Since postulates can have both analytic and synthetic components, analyticity is
clearly no requirement for determining the meaning of terms. The interesting
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question is whether it is possible to distinguish between the analytic and syn-
thetic component of postulates. I will now show that Andreas’s account can be
captured completely in the account of concept formation given in §2.3, and thus
allows for the introduction of an analytic-synthetic distinction and the notion of
conventional concept formation developed above.
Andreas (2010, 529–532) relies on a bipartition of the vocabulary into observa-
tional terms O and theoretical terms T , and assumes a single intended O -structure
AO .32 He demands only that the O -terms are primitively interpreted and explicitly
bases his semantics on Carnap’s view on the interpretation of scientific terms.
Thus both technically and in spirit, his O -terms do not have to be connected
directly to experience, but rather only have to be somehow uncontroversial. An-
dreas (2010, 532) further assumes that there is a set D of unobservable objects,
which are not in A= |AO |. MOD(Θ) is the set of models of the postulates Θ, and
EXT(AO ,V , D) the set of expansions to V of the extensions of AO to D . In other
words, EXT(AO ,V , D) is the set of all structuresB with domain A∪D that have
AO as a relativized reduct,B|AO =AO . It is a standard notion in model theory (cf.
Hodges 1993, §5.1).33 This allows (Andreas 2010, 533, my formulations)
Definition 2.5.
S :=
MOD(Θ)∩EXT(AO ,V , D) if MOD(Θ)∩EXT(AO ,V , D) 6=∅
EXT(AO ,V , D) if MOD(Θ)∩EXT(AO ,V , D) =∅
(2.28)
Considering S as a vagueness set, Andreas thus assumes that for all O -terms,
the (tuples of) elements of A are in their positive or negative extensions, while all
(tuples with) elements of D are in their neutral extensions. In other words, the
O -terms are completely precise over A and completely vague over D .
Definition 2.6. The truth values τ(ϕ) of V -sentences are defined as follows:
1. τ(ϕ) := T if and only ifB  ϕ for everyB ∈ S.
2. τ(ϕ) := F if and only ifB 6 ϕ for everyB ∈ S.
3. τ(ϕ) is indeterminate if and only ifB  ϕ for someB ∈ S andB 6 ϕ for
someB ∈ S.
AO combines empirical and conceptual information, namely the interpreta-
tion of the O -terms given the way our world happens to be. Andreas allows for
32See §2.8.1.
33Hodges (1993, 202–203) defines relativized reducts as those substructures of a reduct that have the
extension of some one-place predicate as their domain. I use a slight generalization.
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any extension of AO to D, and thus, like Przełe˛cki (see §3.9), assumes that O -
terms are completely vague for unobservable objects. This differs from Carnap’s
assumption that O -terms do not apply to unobservable objects (see §3.6.2). To
connect Andreas’s account directly with Carnap’s, one thus needs to introduce
new observational terms as follows: Let the term O∗ be interpreted by A. Then
the new, starred terms are conditionally defined by34
Π∗ :={∀x¯[O∗x1 ∧ · · · ∧O∗xmi → (Pi x¯↔ P ∗i x¯)] | i ∈ I }
∪ {∀x¯[O∗x1 ∧ · · · ∧O∗xn j → (F j x¯ = F ∗j x¯)] | j ∈ J } .
(2.29)
With AO and D , one can furthermore define a new structure
AB =


A∪D , 〈O∗,A〉, 〈P ∗1 , PAO1 〉, . . . , 〈P ∗s , PAOs 〉,
〈F ∗1 , FAO1 〉, . . . , 〈F ∗t , FAOt 〉, 〈c1, cAO1 〉, . . . , 〈cu , cAOu 〉

. (2.30)
AB differs from AO in the symbols naming the relations and functions (which
are starred in AB and not starred in AO ), by interpreting the one-place O∗ by
A and by including D in its domain. It is then straightforward to show that for
every AB∪O Π∗ with domain A∪D, the relativized reduct AB∪O |AO =AO if
and only if AB∪O |B =AB .
NB = {AB} is a set of intendedB -structures that interprets all observational
terms precisely (see §2.8.1). The vague O -terms and the theoretical terms then
make up the auxiliary termsA ,A = O ∪T . The set N of intended structures
for V =B ∪A (see §2.8.2) is then given by those expansions of the intendedB -
structures that are models of the meaning postulatesΠ . The full set of postulates is
Π∗∪Θ, and thus the Carnap sentence CB
 
Π∗∪Θ is analytic, which assumes that
Θ andΠ∗ are finite or at least finitely axiomatizable. However, sinceΠ∗ is chosen
to be analytic as well, the full set of meaning postulates isΠ∗ ∪{CB
 
Π∗ ∪Θ}.35
By phrasing Andreas’s account in Carnap’s terms, a straightforward relation
between S and N can be established with the help of
Lemma 2.4. AB  RB (Θ) if and only if AB has an expansion to a model of Θ.
Proof. Let Θ† be the result of substituting eachA -term in Θ by a corresponding
variable.
‘⇒’: Since AB  RB (Θ), there is a relation Vi for every relation symbol Pi inA , a function G j for every function symbol F j inA , and a constant dk for every
34As Andreas’s reference to Beth’s theorem shows (Andreas 2010, 531), he intends his formalism
for first order model theory. For higher order O -terms, the definition would have to be generalized
accordingly.
35Hence, ifΠ∗ ∪Θ is considered one theory, the full set of meaning postulates is stronger than the
Carnap sentence. I discuss the relation of the Carnap sentence to meaning postulates in general in
§12.1.
59
2 Artificial language philosophy Criteria of Empirical Significance
constant symbol ck inA such that {Vi ,G j , dk} satisfies Θ† in A. Define C so that
PCi = Vi for each Vi , F
C
j = G j for each G j , c
C
k = dk for every dk , and C|B = A.
Induction on the complexity of Θ shows that C Θ.
‘⇐’: Induction shows that {PCi , F Cj , cCk } satisfies Θ† in A, so that A 
∃i Xi∃ j Y j∃k xkΘ†.
Note that the proof also works in higher order logic. In Tarski semantics,
lemma 2.4 provides a connection between the model theory of a logic of order n
and the quantification of order n + 1. It will be used again and again in the rest of
this book.
Since there are noB -terms in Andreas’s account, define N|A := {A|A |A ∈
N}. Then the following holds:
Claim 2.5. LetB ,A , NB , and Π be defined as above. Then N|A = S.
Proof. First, note that for any Θ and C  Π∗, C  Π∗ ∪Θ and C|B = AB iff
C|A  Θ and C|AO = AO (∗), since C|B = AB iff C|AB = AO . Conversely, for
any Θ and DA , DA  Θ and DA |AO = AO iff there is a C with C  Π∗ ∪Θ,
C|B =AB , and C|A =DA (∗∗), sinceDA |AO =AO iff every expansion toB in
whichΠ∗ is true is such that its reduct toB equals AB .
Now, C ∈N iff C|B =AB and C 
∧
Π∗∧CB
 
Π∗∪Θ. This holds iff C|B =
AB , C Π∗, and either C Π∗ ∪Θ or (by lemma 2.4) there is no D Π∗ ∪Θ
with D|B = C|B . Because of (∗), this holds iff either C|AO = AO , C  Π∗, and
(by ∗∗) there is no D  Θ with D|AO = AO , or C|AB = AB and C  Θ. This
is the case iff C|A ∈ EXT(AO ,V , D) and MOD(Θ) ∩ EXT(AO ,V , D) = ∅ or
C|A ∈MOD(Θ)∩EXT(AO ,V , D) (and thus MOD(Θ)∩EXT(AO ,V , D) 6=∅).
This holds iff C|A ∈ S.
Corollary 2.6. Let B , A , NB , and Π be defined as above. Then for every A -
sentence ϕ,
1. τ(ϕ) = T if and only if ϕ is true in N.
2. τ(ϕ) = F if and only if ϕ is false in N.
3. τ(ϕ) is indeterminate if and only if ϕ is neither true nor false in N.
Proof. From claim 2.5 and definition 2.6, since ϕ is true/false in N iff ϕ is true/
false in N|A .
Corollary 2.6 shows that Andreas’s semantics, like the other philosophical
positions discussed, allows for a distinction between the empirically accessible
synthetic component of scientific theories and the analytic component. The
analytic component in this case is Π = Π∗ ∪ {CB
 
Π∗ ∪Θ}, where Π∗ had to
be introduced to ensure that every B -sentence makes an empirical assertion,
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rather than just reducing vagueness by introducing new conventions about the
interpretations of Andreas’s O -terms. The synthetic component of the theory is
RB
 
Π∗ ∪Θ.
In conclusion, Quine argues that the choice of language cannot be restricted
with the help of an empirical check, van Fraassen argues that there is no epistemic
access to the applicability of terms to unobservables, Sober argues that science does
not discriminate between empirically equivalent theories, and Andreas implicitly
introduces a set Π that can be chosen to be true without the possibility of an
empirical check. In all these cases, then, scientific theories have an empirical
component and a conventional component. How extensive this conventional
component is can be inferred from an argument due to William Demopoulos.
2.10.3 Demopoulos against artificial language science
Papineau argues, in effect, that the Ramsey sentence of a set of postulates Θ is
so strong that there is nothing left for the Carnap sentence to do besides the
labeling of concepts, and in particular, there is no relevant conceptual work to be
done. Demopoulos (2003, 2007, 2008) on the other hand argues that the Ramsey
sentence, withB as the set of observational terms, is too weak even to capture
the synthetic content of a theory.
In his first argument, Demopoulos (2003, 387) constructs an interpretation of
Θ’sA -terms given a single intended structureNB . Given that Θ is consistent, Θ
has a model A, and he assumes that A has the same cardinality as N without “any
significant loss of generality or philosophical interest”. Demopoulos (2003, 387,
my notation) continues:
It is therefore possible to extend the partial interpretation [NB ] to the
theoretical vocabulary of Θ by letting each predicate of its theoretical
vocabulary denote the image in N of its interpretation inA under any
one–one correspondence between A and N .36 For example, suppose
T is a binary theoretical relation of Θ. Then the interpretation TN
of T inN is defined as the image under ϕ, ϕ one–one from A on to N ,
of its interpretation TA in A. Since by construction 〈a, b 〉 is in TA if
and only if 〈ϕa,ϕb 〉 is in TN, ϕ is an isomorphism; and therefore, if
A is a model of Θ, so isN.
This is false:37 Choose Θ = {∀xy(O xy ↔ T xy)}, A = {a, b} and OA = TA =
{〈a, b 〉}. Then A  Θ. Choose further the B -structure NB with N = {1,2},
36Here and in the following, the original text does not distinguish between a structure and its
domain (referring, for example, to the “the image in N of its interpretation in A under any one–
one correspondence between A and N”). The distinction in my notation thus has to be taken as an
interpretation of the quote.
37Wagner (2009) was the first to criticize Demopoulos’s proof, although the following argument
differs from his.
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ONB = {〈1,1〉}. ThenN withN|B =NB and TN = {〈ϕa,ϕb 〉} is not a model
ofΘ under any bijection ϕ : A−→N (let alone all bijections). ϕ is an isomorphism
from A|A to N|A , but not from A to N. Of course, if NB was not fixed and
the bijection ϕ could be used to define not only the auxiliary terms but all terms
(and thusN), the proof would work. But this would also go against the point of a
partial interpretation, for it would mean that the vocabulary is not interpreted at
all.
Demopoulos (2003, 387–388, my notation) goes on to criticize the Carnap
sentence, since it entails that Θ is true whenever Θ’s Ramsey sentence is true:
Call the interpretation of Θ’sA -vocabulary inN that we have just
described ‘NA ’ [:=N|A ]. Any theory of knowledge and reference
that is incapable of distinguishing truth from truth under NA is
committed to the implication thatΘ is true ifΘ is true underNA . But
modulo our assumption about cardinality, that Θ is true underNA
is a matter of model theory.NA is arbitrary; the construction which
employs it is clearly unacceptable, since it trivializes the question
whether Θ is true. [ . . . ] By equating truth with truth under NA
we rob our knowledge of the truth of our theoretical claims of its a
posteriori character: modulo a single assumption about cardinality,
the theoretical statements of an empirically adequate theory come
out true as a matter of metalogic.
Given the problem with Demopoulos’s construction ofNA , the criticism is too
strong. The last quoted sentence states that if a theory is empirically adequate
(that is, it entails only trueB -sentences), then it is true. The claim that NA is
arbitrary, however, is only true ifNB is arbitrary as well, and that is not the case.
In the counterexample given, TNA = TN is fixed completely by NB and the
explicit definition of T by O given in Θ.
In his other arguments against the Carnap sentence, (Demopoulos 2008, 376–
377; Demopoulos 2011, 186–18738) starts from a technical observation in first
order logic (cf. Shoenfield 1967, §5, ex. 9.a; Tuomela 1973, theorem III.3): All
B -sentences entailed byΘ are true inNB if and only if there is an expansionN of
an elementary extension ofNB such thatN Θ, where an elementary extension
ofNB is an extension ofNB such that every tuple of from |NB | that satisfies aB -formula β inNB also satisfies β in the extension (Hodges 1993, 54). Together
with lemma 2.4, this means that if all basic sentences entailed by Θ are true in
NB , RB (Θ) is true in an extension ofNB . (If the basic sentences are assumed to
be of higher order, this result is trivial, for then RB (Θ) itself is a basic sentence
entailed by Θ.)39
38I thank F. A. Muller for pointing me to this article.
39In this argument, Demopoulos (2011, 187) also mentions an arbitrary mapping function (like ϕ in
the previous argument), but restricts it to the objects in |N| − |NB |. Thus the arbitrariness ofNA is
restricted to objects that are newly introduced by the elementary extension.
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Demopoulos’s conceptual point is the following (Demopoulos 2008, 377): If
the Carnap sentence of Θ is taken to be a meaning postulate, then the truth of Θ
follows analytically from the truth of the basic sentences entailed by Θ—modulo
a cardinality assumption (and in higher order logic without this assumption).
This is correct. However, Demopoulos (2008, 381) further argues that the Carnap
sentence
is incapable of accurately representing the truth of theoretical claims
because it takes their truth to collapse into satisfiability in a suffi-
ciently large domain. This is hardly what we take the truth of theo-
retical claims to consist in, since we characteristically—and rightly—
distinguish them from those of pure mathematics. A reconstruction
which fails to acknowledge this, is not merely odd, it misses what is
arguably one of the chief desiderata of an adequate philosophy of the
exact sciences.
This conclusion is again too strong, for mathematical claims typically differ
significantly from theoretical claims according to the Carnap sentence. For one,
the truth of mathematical claims does not depend on the truth of any empirical
claims, while the truth of theoretical claims does. Extending the above example,
define Θ′ :=Θ∪{∃xy T xy}. Then CB (Θ′)  ∃xy O xy→Θ′, so that the truth of
any theoretical claim of Θ′ depends on theB -sentence ∃xy O xy being true. This
is in stark contrast to mathematical claims.40 Furthermore, as the original example
already shows,A -terms can differ significantly from mathematical terms in that
they may be explicitly definable inB -terms. Finally, note that Demopoulos starts
from the bare intuition that there must be something more substantial to scientific
theories than only their empirical implications and their conventions. But this
stance only contradicts the basic idea of semantic empiricism, without providing
an argument.
Since Demopoulos’s argument fails to show anything wrong with taking
RB (Θ) as the empirical content ofΘ, his results can be turned around: They show
how much in a theory is a matter of convention. Possibly modulo a cardinality
assumption, the conceptual apparatus of a theory can be chosen at will, as long as
theB -sentences come out true.
∗ ∗ ∗
In conclusion, then, both artificial language philosophy and science rely on an
artificial language methodology, at least for non-observational terms. For observa-
tional terms, Carnap’s shifting of the burden of proof remains: If there is a term
that has to be used in a specific way, such that other uses are incorrect (not in the
40Indeed, I will discuss in §12 a result by Winnie (1970) according to which mathematical sentences,
assuming they are phrased entirely inA -terms, can never be entailed by a Carnap sentence.
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sense of going against convention, but somehow in contradiction with the way
the world is), then there should be some way of testing this.
This conclusion provides a new perspective on the preceding discussions.
Whenever science is used to solve philosophical (that is, non-empirical) problems,
it has to rely on language choice like artificial language philosophy. In this way,
the application of science to solve philosophical problems escapes Kim’s criticism
that a naturalized epistemology loses the normative component of traditional
epistemology. According to Kim, epistemology determines what, for instance,
justification should be, while, say, psychology only determines how people think
about justification. But when relying on an artificial language methodology, sci-
entists, like philosophers, can develop a new concept called ‘justification’ that is
fruitful in their research. And since this new concept is suggested, its development
has a normative component.
2.11 The relation between science and artificial lan-
guage philosophy of science
That traditional or ordinary language philosophy, partially naturalized or not,
leads to fruitful interactions between science and philosophy of science is far
from certain. It is, for example, not obvious how insights into the use of a term
in ordinary language relate to scientific insights. And while the methodology
of ordinary language philosophy can be applied to scientific language to reveal
inconsistent usage (Philipse 2009, §3), it cannot resolve inconsistencies without
threatening to collapse into artificial language philosophy. Traditional philosophy
has to establish its own access to facts about the world, besides the scientific route.
Williamson (2007, §§6, 8) and Papineau (2009b, §IV) consider thought experiments
and ultimately intuitions to provide this access, but they both rely on contentious
claims about the workings of the human mind. In the following, I will argue that in
contradistinction, the relation between science and artificial language philosophy
of science is unstrained.
According to the proponents of artificial language philosophy, science very
often engages in language choice in the same way that philosophy does. Therefore
it is of interest to establish the scientific language more precisely. Here the method-
ology of ordinary language philosophy can be very helpful, except that it has to be
applied to scientific rather than ordinary language. To avoid exclusive reliance on
linguistic hunches, scientists’ actual usage of scientific concepts can be determined
empirically (cf. Stotz et al. 2004). In this way, the application of the methodology
of ordinary language philosophy would help to fulfill what Reichenbach (1938, 3)
calls the “descriptive task of epistemology”, the search for the rules of scientific
language that capture the language intuitions of the scientists. As Waters (2004,
§3) argues, however, even this descriptive task goes beyond pure observation, for
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actual usage is often too vague or inconsistent to establish proper rules.
Reichenbach (1938, §1) identifies two additional tasks of epistemology. One is
the “critical task”, the identification and evaluation of inferences. In the terminol-
ogy of artificial language philosophy, this amounts to rigorous derivation. Next is
the “advisory task”, the proposal of concepts for use in the sciences. As Waters
(2004, §§5–6) lays out, Reichenbach sees scientists as the final arbiters of language
choice, but such a restriction is not inherent in artificial language philosophy in
general. For not all philosophers have the same goals as the scientists on whose re-
search they rely. In principle, concepts suggested by scientists and by philosophers
are on a par.
In a helpful overview, Hansson (2008a) describes several ways in which philos-
ophy has been found to relate to scientific disciplines. However, his description
conveys only sociological observations about the behavior of philosophers and
scientists—even if the observations could be explained on psychological grounds,
a justification of the observed relations has to rely on some feature of philosophy
itself. I will argue that the relations are justified and clarified by the relation of
science and philosophy outlined above.
New empirical results provide material for philosophical investigation.
Hansson (2008a, 477) describes a host of influences of scientific disciplines on
philosophical work, but his examples mix concept formation, rigorous derivation,
and empirical results. With respect to the empirical results, Hansson notes the
influence of quantum mechanics and evolutionary biology on philosophy, the
influence of psychology and neuroscience on the philosophy of mind, and the
influence of linguistics on the philosophy of language. These examples show that
some philosophical concepts (in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of language,
etc.) are chosen to accommodate empirical results, and thus have to change to
remain relevant and fruitful in the light of new results. This is a trivial implication
of the way in which languages are chosen in philosophy as well as the sciences.
New rigorous derivations provide material for philosophical investigation.
Hansson (2008a, 477) states that results in game and decision theory have pro-
vided moral philosophy with new problems for ethical analysis. Such results are
established by rigorous derivations based on the language. Because they are not
empirical, they can also fall within the domain of philosophy, or they can suggest
new language choices in philosophy, for example by revealing previously hidden
relations between concepts.
New concepts provide material for philosophical investigation. Hansson
(2008a, 477) further notes that game and decision theory have also provided new
formulations of old problems in moral philosophy. While moral philosophy is
outside the scope of this article, it seems clear that, to use Hansson’s examples,
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psychology, neurosciences, linguistics, quantum mechanics, and biology have all
engaged in concept formation. Carnap (1966, 187–189) automatically considers
such conceptual work philosophical because it does not involve asserting or testing
observational claims. But even with a more restrictive view of philosophy, some
philosophical concepts rely on scientific ones (by way of conditions of adequacy,
for example), and therefore must be updated whenever there are changes in the
scientific concepts. Furthermore, completely new scientific concepts provide
new ways for philosophical concepts to be fruitful. Since scientific concepts can
also be introduced and changed because of new empirical results, the relation
between scientific and philosophical language choice provides yet another way for
philosophical concepts to change in light of empirical results.
Methods and issues of philosophy are taken up by other sciences. According
to Hansson (2008a, 477), some issues and methods of philosophy have been taken
up within other disciplines, for example the investigation of structures of concepts
and thought processes in computer science. Since concept formation and rigorous
derivation occur in both philosophy and the sciences, it is unsurprising that
science can join philosophy in these tasks. The particular proximity of computer
science to philosophical research may stem from the computer scientists’ need for
new languages that capture the structure of concepts and thought processes. But
close connections have also formed in the case of formal logic and mathematics,
and also in the empirical sciences (the explication of ‘measurement’ in quantum
mechanics being an excellent example).
Philosophy is part of the community of interdependent disciplines. Hans-
son (2008a, §3) notes the growing number of interdisciplinary endeavors and
concludes on historical grounds that philosophy is part of the “community of
interdependent disciplines”. Successful philosophical investigations into natural or
social phenomena, he claims, have always relied on results from other disciplines
(such as the reliance of the philosophy of space and time on relativity theory).
Given the discussion so far, the interdisciplinary nature of philosophical re-
search seems clear, following from both the conditions of adequacy and the
demand that philosophical concepts be fruitful. The large role of language choice
in the sciences is probably most evident in space-time physics, for relativity theory
not only predicts new empirical phenomena, but also suggests a new language to
accommodate old phenomena in a different way. Philosophers of space and time
have had to evaluate this suggestion, and indeed have accepted the superiority of
the new language in many contexts.
Problems answered experimentally or accurately become non-philosophical.
Hansson (2008a, 476–477) also reviews the claim that many philosophical topics
move into a dedicated field of science once clear answers are at hand. He gives the
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example of psychology, which parted from philosophy after the introduction of
experiments.
The term ‘parted’ is a somewhat problematic term in this connection, since
according to Hansson himself, cooperation between empirical science and philos-
ophy is both possible and fruitful. To rephrase the point, it has become possible to
pursue experimental psychology without relying on philosophical considerations,
or better, without the need to develop new concepts.
Since accuracy in the rules for the application of a term is one desideratum
of an explication, it is unsurprising that fulfillment of this desideratum often
marks the end of philosophical work. Furthermore, empirical research involving
auxiliary terms is only possible if there are meaning postulates to connect the
auxiliary and basic terms. The split between philosophy and (some areas of)
psychology can therefore be seen as the result of the development of a precise
language to establish such connections. Of course, once experimental research is
pursued, the language can still be modified on the basis of the experimental results.
Since a language can be so precise that it allows for rigorous derivations, Hansson’s
point also applies, for example, to the parting of some areas of mathematics and
symbolic logic from philosophy.41
The autonomy of applied philosophy. According to Hansson (2008a, §8), the
philosophy of science is not an application of epistemology in the way that
applied mathematics is an application of pure mathematics. Rather, philosophers
of science develop their own theories which are related to—but not derivable
from—epistemology.
Hansson’s point becomes obvious when considering that epistemology is
usually more general than philosophy of science, in that it aims to explicate terms
such as ‘belief’, ‘justification’, etc. (and, more generally, form concepts) for as
many contexts as possible. Philosophy of science, on the other hand, explicates
concepts within the context of scientific theories and scientific practice. Given the
different domains, it is to be expected that the explicata differ: Not all contexts
that are relevant in epistemology are relevant in the philosophy of science, and
some contexts that are very important in the philosophy of science only play a
minor role in general epistemology.
Contrary to Hansson’s suggestion, there is an analogy between the philosophy
of science and applied mathematics, namely when new mathematical concepts are
developed for a specific application. A famous example is Dirac’s “δ-function”,
which in fact cannot be treated as a function and led to the development of the
theory of distributions. The perception of a disanalogy between the philosophy
of science and applied mathematics may rest on a failure to distinguish between
41This is not a historical point: Ancient Greek geometry was already precise enough to be pursued
without the need for concept formation, but it was still at least to a great extent pursued in connection
with philosophy.
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rigorous derivations and concept formation. If some concepts apply to a great
variety of contexts, then any derivations that involve only these concepts will
apply to each of these contexts as well. On the other hand, there is no reason to
assume that the concept most fruitful for a great variety of contexts is also the
most fruitful for each specific one.
Philosophical truths are not eternal. Hansson (2008a, §6) suggests that many
philosophers see their discipline as independent of empirical, synthetic results,
which have no relevance in the philosopher’s realm of eternal, analytic truths.
But, Hansson contends, Quine (1963) has shown that there is no uncontroversial
line between analytic and synthetic statements, and philosophers who ignore
empirical results (e. g., relativity theory) to arrive at claims that are “analytically
true” (e. g., about time) are often just “demonstrably wrong”.
It is understandable that Hansson considers the analytic-synthetic distinction
to be a problem for the connection between empirical science and philosophy,
since analytically true sentences cannot be demonstrably wrong if such a demon-
stration would be empirical. This is because the very definition of an analytic
truth (as discussed here) is that it has no empirical import. Thus the thorough cri-
tiques by Mates (1951), Martin (1952), Kemeny (1963), Creath (1991), Stein (1992),
George (2000), and Loomis (2006) of Quine’s attack on the analytic-synthetic dis-
tinction may seem to pose a problem for Hansson as well. However, the relevance
of empirical results for philosophical work can be established without question-
ing the distinction. As my discussion of the analytic component of postulates
in general has shown, meaning postulates are often chosen to be true because of
empirical assumptions, and in the case of the Carnap sentence, empirical results
are the final arbiter about the relevance of the meaning postulates (see §2.8.2).
In other words, analytic truths cannot be demonstrably wrong, but they can be
demonstrably irrelevant.
One might reinterpret Hansson’s claim to state that a language chosen without
reliance on empirical results is very unlikely to accommodate them better than a
language that was chosen with these results in mind. This claim is almost trivially
true and suggests that those philosophers who, for instance, do not consider relativ-
ity theory when explicating ‘time’ do not intend their explicatum to accommodate
all the empirical results that relativity theory is meant to accommodate.
Philosophy of or with a discipline. With respect to philosophical endeavors
related to the sciences, Hansson (2008a, §7) distinguishes between the philosophy
of science and philosophy with science. He states that philosophers of economics,
for example, use the “tools of philosophy” to investigate how economists reason,
so that philosophers relate to economists very much like social scientists to
their objects of study. Philosophy with economics, on the other hand, consists
of research conducted in collaboration with economists (for example, on the
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development of new representations of human beliefs, preferences, and norms).
Clearly, philosophers and scientists can work together when developing the
same concepts and rigorously deriving results involving them. This is Hansson’s
idea of “philosophy with the sciences”, and it is to be expected in areas where the
foundational concepts have not yet been developed fully, for then the construction
of new representations is a major element of research, and rigorous derivations
and empirical research cannot yet be pursued independently. Of course, it is also
possible to suggest improvements of concepts that have already been explicated in
the sciences and used with much success. Such improvements are more likely to
occur when dealing with problems that are not at the center of scientific research
and thus may not have carried much weight in previous explications.
There is some unclarity in Hansson’s description of “philosophy of science”,
for he does not specify “the tools of philosophy”. But, given his comparison of
philosophy of science to social science, Hansson probably has the naturalizable,
non-normative part of ordinary language philosophy in mind, as its application
would lead to descriptions of the rules of language use in the sciences.
∗ ∗ ∗
A closer look at the “tools” of artificial language philosophy, i. e. rigorous deriva-
tions and language choice, clarifies the possibilities for a “philosophy of science” in
Hansson’s terminology, and also reveals several relations between science and phi-
losophy of science that are missing from Hansson’s list. Within artificial language
philosophy, Hansson’s philosophy of science is probably best captured as the
explication of concepts that are not explicated in the sciences themselves but still
used in those contexts, including such general scientific concepts as explanation
and probability. These concepts may not connect very well to others, and indeed
may be confusing in certain contexts. For example, according to the fine-tuning
problem in physics, on the commonly used scales, the range of values under
which the universal constants of physics allow life to exist are small. Therefore
the existence of life is very improbable, and thus life is in need of an explanation
(cf. Ratzsch 2009, §4.1). However, the actual usage of ‘explanation’, ‘probability’,
and ‘scale’ in the sciences probably does not allow for these inferences. The first
step towards solving this problem is an explication of the three terms, and this
explication would fall within the domain of philosophy.42 If the explicata still do
not allow for these inferences, the explication of the terms is also the last step.
An example of a discipline-specific scientific concept that, once introduced,
has been explicated more extensively in philosophy than in the respective science
itself is the notion of gene (cf. Waters 1994). In this case, however, Hansson’s
distinction between philosophy of and with science becomes very blurry indeed.
The explication of such a concept is farther removed from Hansson’s philosophy
with science when the explication’s goals are different from those in the scientific
42Note that it may be necessary to explicate the concepts differently for different scientific domains.
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discipline, leading to different conditions of adequacy and evaluations of fruit-
fulness. One instance of this is the explication of an initially discipline-specific
concept for simultaneous use in other disciplines. Life, for example, is compara-
bly well-explicated within biology, but not for simultaneous use in robotics. A
philosophical inquiry into the implications of artificial life may therefore have
to develop its own explicatum. Life may also have to be explicated differently
when used in ethical theories, and thus some scientific concepts may need to
be explicated for simultaneous use in a non-scientific domain. Waters (2004, §6)
discusses the conditions of adequacy for such interdisciplinary explications in
depth. Interdisciplinary explications are also desirable if the same term is already
used for two slightly different concepts in two different fields, which can lead to
fruitful interactions in some circumstances, but also abject confusion in others.
‘Information’ is a paradigmatic example.
Finally, there are concepts that are not used in the sciences at all, but whose
explications must take scientific results into account. Personal identity or free will
may not occur (centrally) in the scientific literature, but for many contexts, their
explications will have to take into account scientific results about, for example,
the functioning of the brain and the predictability of individual behavior.
2.12 An application: Idealization and abstraction
The preceding discussion has been fairly general. In this section, I explicate the
notions of ‘idealization’ and ‘abstraction’, which will also be applied in the remain-
der of the book.43 Since the concept of entailment in predicate logic will occur in
the definientia of the explicata, the language in which the explication takes place
is the metalanguage of predicate logic. The cost of formalizing this metalanguage
would far exceed the benefits for the example, and thus I will rely on an informal
version of the formal semantics presented in §2.8. For instance, I will formalize
neither the conditions of adequacy, nor the eventual definitions of ‘idealization’
and ‘abstraction’.
2.12.1 Preliminaries
There are many suggested elucidations of ‘idealization’ and ‘abstraction’, but
most have been developed solely with the goal of capturing the actual usage of
these terms in scientific discourse (cf. Jones 2005). Thus few of the elucidations
are explications in the classical sense. Even fewer of the elucidations have been
developed to be inferentially relevant—that is, to distinguish between valid and
invalid inferences—and thus to relate to questions of justification. Of course,
43Parts of this section have been presented under the title “Justifying idealization by abstraction”
at the SOPHA 2009, Université de Genève, Switzerland, September 4, 2009. I thank the audience for
helpful discussions.
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matters of justification have been discussed in connection with abstraction and
idealization, but only using the terms, not as a guide to explicating them. I will
develop explications of ‘idealization’ and ‘abstraction’ that are connected to the
concept of inference in a simple way. My starting points will be generally accepted
uses of the two terms, but whenever individual uses are vague, incompatible, or
unhelpful, I will choose those that are inferentially relevant.
I will assume that ‘abstraction’ and ‘idealization’ denote relations between
descriptions, that is, sets of sentences in a vocabulary V . Since descriptions do
not have to be true, this allows me to be silent about questions of realism or
antirealism. Being so noncommittal befits an explication because it should yield
an explicatum that, like any meaning postulate, gives meanings to terms without
being creative; in other words, the explicatum should not entail statements about
any terms other than the ones being explicated (though it may suggest specific
explications of other terms).
Idealizations are widely accepted to be special kinds of distortions, and ab-
stractions are sometimes seen as special kinds of omissions. Therefore, I will first
give uncontentious explications of ‘distortion’ and ‘omission’ and analyze their
relationship. These explications then suggest explicata for ‘idealization’ and ‘ab-
straction’ that are applicable to the theory of measurement and questions about
the role of mathematics in the natural sciences.
2.12.2 Distortion and omission
To distort a description Θ is to give a description∆ that is incompatible with Θ.
Incompatibility is always relative to a system of inference. For example, ‘This
passport is red’ is logically but not analytically compatible with ‘This passport is
blue’, given the meanings of ‘blue’ and ‘red’. ‘This passport is red’ is analytically
compatible with ‘This is a US passport’, but incompatible given my knowledge
that US passports are blue. In order to capture these different systems of inference,
I will assume in the following that an inference is a logical entailment (‘’) given
some fixed set of background assumptionsΛ. Analytic inference has been described
by Carnap (1952) using meaning postulates as background assumptions. By the
usual definition of incompatibility, a description∆ distorts a description Θ if and
only if Θ∪∆∪Λ ⊥, where ‘⊥’ is some inconsistent sentence. If Θ∪Λ  ϕ and
∆∪Λ  ¬ϕ, I will call ϕ a consequence of Θ that is distorted by∆ given Λ.
An equally simple explication can be given for ‘omission’: A description Ω
omits from a description Θ if and only if Θ∪Λ Ω and Ω ∪Λ 6Θ. In the usual
logical parlance, Θ is, given the background assumptions, stronger than Ω. If
Θ∪Λ  ϕ, Ω ∪Λ 6 ϕ, and Ω omits from Θ, I will say that Ω omits ϕ from Θ. As
long as Θ∪Λ is consistent, no omission Ω is a distortion (and thus no distortion
an omission), for otherwise Θ∪Λ Ω and Θ∪Λ Θ∪Λ∪Ω ⊥.
While there are often pragmatic reasons against omitting anything from a de-
scription, there is also a reason for it: The omitting description Ω of a description
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Figure 2.1: A particle with energy E in an irregular potential well.
Θ is more robust than the description Θ itself, because, given the background
assumptions, there are more circumstances in which Ω is true than Θ. If, for
example, Θ has consequences that may be or may become false, a description that
omits these consequences from Θ is more likely to be and to stay true. But in
cases where the possibly false consequences are important (e. g. they describe a
phenomenon of interest), omitting these consequences is not an option.
The robustness that results from an omission can be used to justify a distortion.
Not every consequence of a distortion ∆ is incompatible with a description Θ,
that is, there is some description Ω that can be inferred from∆ and from Θ. Since
∆ and Θ are incompatible, neither can be inferred from Ω, and thus Ω omits
from both. Now, if the initial description Θ is true, then its distortion∆ is false.
And since Ω follows from Θ, Ω is true, and thus, is a true description that can
be inferred from the false description ∆. If Θ’s consequences of interest can be
inferred from Ω, then∆ only distorts the unimportant consequences of Θ. In this
sense, Ω justifies∆.
This relation between distortion and omission is hardly surprising, but it
deserves notice because it is a common technique of justification in both the
sciences and philosophy. Take, as an example, the four principles of biomedical
ethics suggested by Beauchamp and Childress (2008): respect for autonomy, non-
maleficence, beneficence, and justice. The authors infer these positions from two
different ethical systems, deontological ethics and utilitarianism. Having estab-
lished these principles, they infer derivative rules from them (veracity, privacy,
confidentiality, and fidelity). The four principles omit from each of the underlying
ethical systems, and hence are more robust than both. Clearly, utilitarianism is
a distortion of deontological ethics, and vice versa. Assuming Beauchamp and
Childress’s inferences are correct, the four principles form a common omitting
description. The arguments for the derivative rules can now proceed from the
four principles, and those consequences of deontological ethics and utilitarianism
that the four principles omit are unimportant for these arguments.
A more precise example can be found in physics, where it is common to employ
distortions to simplify calculations. Take a quantum mechanical particle with
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Figure 2.2: A particle with energy E in a rectangular potential well.
energy E in a one-dimensional potential well (V (x)> E for all |x|> xc, V (x)≤ E
for all |x| ≤ xc). The well may have an irregular shape, making calculations
of the wave function difficult (figure 2.1). A rectangular distortion of the well
(V ′(x) = c1 > E for all |x| > xc, V ′(x) = c2 < E for all |x| ≤ xc, figure 2.2)
simplifies the calculations greatly, but it is not obvious what the calculation
actually shows—after all, the real well is irregular, not rectangular. In this situation,
the best strategy is to find a description that omits both from the description of the
irregular well and from the description of the rectangular well. Both descriptions
are of a well, that is, a system in which only one interval ([−xc, xc]) is classically
accessible to the particle. And this is already enough to use the stationary part
of the Schrödinger equation, ψ′′(x)/ψ(x) = 2m[V (x)− E]/ħh2, which in this
case is assumed to be in the background assumptions Λ, to infer that the wave
function bends towards the x-axis (i. e., is convex) in the classically accessible
interval and away from it (i. e., is concave) in the classically inaccessible areas
(figure 2.3). From this, one can infer that the wave function never oscillates in
the classically forbidden areas, but can oscillate in the allowed interval (Schwabl
1995, §3.6). This pattern of the wave function can be correctly inferred from either
description of the well, because both the initial description and its distortion have
a common omitting description. If one is interested in the pattern, the omitting
description justifies the distortion because it allows the intended inference, that of
the description of the pattern.
It is also of note that the description of the pattern can be inferred without
using a limit procedure. Batterman (2002) has argued that distortions reached by
limit procedures play a central role in inferring descriptions of general, robust pat-
terns in phenomena. However, the quantum well gives an example of an extremely
general, robust pattern whose description can be inferred from an omitting descrip-
tion without such a limit procedure. The above analysis suggests that distortions,
with or without a limit procedure, do not justify their consequences—what matters
is the existence of a description that omits the distorted consequences.
Of course, limit procedures may help in finding an omitting description, and
this also holds for distortions in general (cf. Redhead 1980, §5.i). Furthermore,
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Figure 2.3: Possible shapes of the wave function for a particle with energy E in any potential well.
distortions may be used because the relevant omission is often unknown, so that
distortions will be made in the hopes of not distorting any of the description’s
important consequences. If a variety of different distortions have a common
omission, this can be a good inductive reason to believe the omission to be true
(Redhead 1980, §5.iii). Therefore, distortions are an often expedient or even
practically indispensable method for describing phenomena.
2.12.3 Idealization and abstraction
Since an idealization is commonly accepted to be a kind of distortion (Nowak
2000; O’Neill 1988; Batterman 2002; M. Jones 2005; N. Jones 2008), it is useful to
determine what kind of distortion an idealization should be. Unfortunately, the
notion of abstraction is far less clear, and many of the individual explications are
incompatible (for an overview, see M. Jones 2005, introduction). However, it, too,
can be usefully related to distortion and omission.
To start with, there are at least three pre-analytic notions of abstraction. N.
Jones (2008), for example, discusses the claim that abstractions are nothing but
idealizations. The claim may seem apt when looking at the functional dependen-
cies between physical quantities: If, say, the frequency ν = f (l , w) of a pendulum
depends on the length of its string l and the amount of friction w, then intuitively,
it seems that abstracting from the friction amounts to making the idealization
ν = f ′(l ). In what follows, however, I will not identify abstraction with idealiza-
tion because there are many cases in which they are distinct, and more importantly,
because there are alternative explications of the terms that distinguish between
them and are inferentially relevant. Carnap (1939, §24) uses a second notion of
abstraction when he states:
We find among the concepts of physics [ . . . ] differences of abstract-
ness. Some are more elementary than others, in the sense that we can
apply them in concrete cases on the basis of observations in a more
direct way than others.
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Here, the farther removed a concept is from observation, the more abstract it is;
statements are more abstract, the more abstract concepts they use.44 This notion
of abstraction is also not the one I wish to explicate because it is not clear how
this distinction can be inferentially relevant.
In the same monograph, Carnap (1939, §2) uses another notion of abstraction
when he discusses the components of a theory of language:
[Pragmatics] take[s] into considerations the first component, whether
it be alone or in combination with the other components. [Semantic]
inquiries are made in abstraction from the speaker and deal only with
the expressions of the language and their relations to their designata.
[ . . . ] [Syntax] abstract[s] even from the designata and restrict[s]
the investigation to formal properties [ . . . ] of the expressions and
relations among them.
In this notion, an abstraction is a kind of omission, as is also assumed by Nowak
(2000), O’Neill (1988), and Jones (2005). Carnap’s use of the term further suggests
the kind of omission. Syntax abstracts by omitting all and only those consequences
of a description that are not about the expressions of a language. Analogously,
semantics omits all and only those consequences that are not about expressions or
designata. This is the notion of abstraction that I will explicate, for it will turn
out that it can lead to an inferentially relevant explicatum.
First, let those consequences of a description Θ whose terms are from a subset
S ⊆ V of the vocabulary be the S -consequences Θ|S of Θ (Θ|S := {σ | Θ 
σ and σ is a S -sentence}). Then call a description A an abstraction of a description
Θ in terms of S (in S -terms) if and only if A omits all and only those sentences
that cannot be inferred from Θ’s S -consequences, that is, if and only if A∪Λ  
Θ|S ∪Λ. It is sometimes more convenient to specify the terms that are not in S ,
and in these cases, one can speak of abstracting from ûS := V −S .
Since inferences and omissions are relative to background knowledge, an
abstraction can contain or consist entirely of terms that do not occur in the
original description, if these terms occur in the background assumptions. In
the quantum well example, this change of terminology occurs when the well is
described in terms of classically accessible and inaccessible areas. The abstraction
allows one to infer the description of the wave function that is of interest, namely
that it is convex in accessible areas and concave in inaccessible ones.
If abstractions are supposed to justify idealizations in the way that omissions
justify distortions, the explication of ‘idealization’ is now straightforward, because
a description and its idealization should have a common abstraction. This suggests
the following: If a description I idealizes a description Θ in the vocabulary ûS ,
then it distorts only those consequences of Θ that contain terms of ûS . In other
44Arguably, this meaning of ‘abstract’ is a comparative version of the epistemological interpretation
of abstract objects (cf. Rosen 2009).
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words, Θ∪ I ∪Λ ⊥ and I |S ∪Λ  Θ|S ∪Λ.
I do not suggest that this necessary criterion for idealization be taken as
sufficient, because idealizations are typically assumed to be better than the original
descriptions (e. g. by being mathematically more tractable). But this concession to
the current use of the term does not hamper the use of abstraction in justifying
idealization, because any idealization in the vocabulary ûS must leave all S -
consequences unchanged, and thus any abstraction from ûS omits the distorted
consequences.
Abstractions can play a more important role in justifying idealizations than
omissions can play in justifying distortions, because the relation between omis-
sion and distortion can easily be trivialized. Any two descriptions with the same
(possibly tautological) consequence have that consequence as a common omitting
description. In the interesting cases, there is a stronger common omitting descrip-
tion (e. g. the quantum well) that allows the inference of the description of interest
(e. g. the oscillations of the wave function). The relation between idealization and
abstraction is not in as much danger of trivialization because an idealization in
ûS does not distort any consequence of the original description in S . When the
description of interest can be given in S (which must therefore be non-empty),
this ensures that the idealization is justified, because it has a non-tautological
abstraction in S -terms from which the description can be inferred.
Since inferences and therefore omissions are relative to background knowledge,
an abstraction can contain or be entirely made up of terms that do not occur in
the original description. Of course, these new terms do occur in the background
assumptions, for example in definitions of the terms of the original description.
This change of terminology occurs in the four principles of Beauchamp and
Childress (2008). The utilitarian description of a situation contains a description
of the situation in non-moral terms and in terms of its utility. It does not contain
a reference to autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, or justice. The description
of the same situation with the help of the four principles does not contain a
reference to utility, because it abstracts from it. Of course, the four principles
have consequences in terms of utility, but these consequences are omissions from
utilitarianism.
∗ ∗ ∗
There are many methods of omitting from a description beyond abstracting from
some subvocabulary. An especially important one consists, to put the matter
very vaguely, in adding ‘approximately’ in front of a set of sentences Θ. This
can be formalized semantically by moving from the actual structure M  Θ to
a vagueness set M withM ∈M, so thatM is a precisification of M. This means
making the interpretation of the terms in Θ vague by moving to multiple models
instead of one and employing the subvaluationist account of truth.
Syntactically, an approximation means moving from Θ to Θ′ ≈ Θ, where
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the latter expression is empty until ‘≈’ is defined. There are many ways to do
so; in probably the simplest case, Θ contains a quantified identity statement
∀x f x = g x, and Θ′ contains in its stead an approximation statement as known
from mathematics, say, that | f (x)− g (x)| < " for all or almost all x in some
interval and for some positive ". Of course, this approximation statement would
have to be appropriately formalized. I discuss another possibility for arriving at a
definition in 11.4.
2.12.4 Connections to other accounts
S is typically not chosen arbitrarily, because it should be possible to describe
the important consequences of the original description in S -terms. In that sense,
the terms in ûS are unimportant, and the S -terms may refer to what Nowak
(2000, §2) calls “essential factors”. It is also plausible that an “abstractions”, as
described by Cartwright (1989, ch. 5), is (in the terminology suggested here)
an idealization in which the S -terms refer to the causal factors of a situation.
The explications suggested here may therefore help to clarify these two earlier
approaches to idealization and abstraction.
The explicata for ‘abstraction’ and ‘idealization’ are easily related to the for-
malism of Ramsey sentences. RS (Θ) entails just those consequences of Θ that
contain only terms from S . Thus, if Λ and the descriptions Θ and Θ′ are finite,
and {RS (Θ∪Λ)} ∪Λ  {RS (Θ′ ∪Λ)} ∪Λ, then Θ′ is an idealization of Θ if and
only if the two descriptions are incompatible. Furthermore, RS (Θ ∪ Λ) is an
abstraction ofΘ in terms ofS . IfS contains all and only basic terms, RS (Θ∪Λ)
can be taken as the empirical content of Θ ∪Λ; this shows very clearly that the
explicatum for ‘abstract’ suggested here does not explicate the notion of being
far removed from observation, and thus can connect usefully to the theory of
measurement.
Measurement and meaningful sentences
According to Suppes (1959, 131),
[a]n empirical hypothesis, or any statement in fact, which uses nu-
merical quantities is empirically meaningful only if its truth value
is invariant under the appropriate transformations of the numerical
quantities involved.
A numerical quantity (measurement) is represented as a function from physical
objects to numbers; an appropriate transformation leads only from one adequate
function to another (Suppes 1959, 132). An adequate function must fulfill con-
ditions specific to the measurement it represents. Suppes (1959, 135) states the
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conditions for a function m representing mass measurement as
Λ := {∀x∀y [(P x ∧ P y)→ (x ­ y↔ mx ≤ my)],
∀x∀y [(P x ∧ P y)→ (m(x ∗ y) = mx + my)]} ,
where ‘­’ stands for ‘is at most as heavy as’, ‘∗’ stands for physical combination,
and P represents physical objects. Suppes (1959, 135) notes that “the functional
composition of any similarity transformation ϕ with the function m yields a
function ϕ ◦ m which also satisfies” Λ. Therefore, Suppes (1959, 138) suggests
that a formula S is empirically meaningful “if and only if S is satisfied in a model
M [ . . . ] when and only when it is satisfied in every model [ . . . ] related to M
by a similarity transformation.” This definition relies on similarity conditions
only because they lead from one model of Λ to another such model, so more
generally, any transformation mapping all the functions that adequately represent
the measurement in question to other such functions should be appropriate (cf.
Przełe˛cki 1974a).
To see the connection to abstraction and idealization, note that appropriate
transformations do not change the interpretations of any statements involving
only empirical terms (in this case {­,∗}= :S , but generalizations are straightfor-
ward). Therefore the statements containing only these terms are abstractions from
statements containing non-empirical terms as well (here ‘m’, ‘≤’, and ‘+’). Any
set Θ of sentences that is true in some modelM of Λ can be taken to make up a
description. Any appropriate transformation yields another modelM′ of Λ, and
any set Θ′ of sentences that is true in M′ but distorts Θ is an idealization of Θ.
This is because appropriate transformations only change the interpretation of the
functions that represent measurements (here ‘m’), so thatΘ∪Λ|S  Θ′∪Λ|S . In
effect, this means that all and only meaningful measurement sentences can be cap-
tured in the more abstract language of empirical terms, since meaningful sentences
are robust under idealization. More precisely, from any set of empirical sentences
that, together with Λ, determines its models up to isomorphism, the truth or
falsity of each meaningful sentence can be inferred (see §6.5). To take an example
from Suppes (1959, 134), m(o1) = 4 is not meaningful, but ϕ  m(o2)≤ m(o1) is
meaningful because {o2 ­ o1} ∪Λ  ϕ.
Abstraction and explanation
In defense of the theoretical indispensability of mathematics, Pincock (2007, 263)
uses Euler’s solution to the Königsberg bridge problem to argue that
when a scientist accepts a mathematical statement like “C (S) = 40”
[“The temperature of S is 40◦C”] or “The bridge system forms a
non-Eulerian graph” there is an implicit adjudication between the
mathematical properties that the scientist believes are appropriate to
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Figure 2.4: The bridges of Königsberg in 1735 (adapted
from Pincock 2007, figure 1).
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Figure 2.5: The graph for Königs-
berg. Labels are added for conve-
nient comparison with the vari-
ables in formula (2.39).
ascribe to the physical system and those that are deemed inappropri-
ate.
From this he concludes that “mathematics allows us to make claims about higher-
order or large-scale features of physical systems while remaining neutral about
the basic or micro-scale features of such systems” (Pincock 2007, 255). In effect,
then, Pincock argues that a mathematical statement accepted to be a description
of a physical system entails some sentences that are considered to be true of the
system, and some sentences that may be false. The latter sentences are silently
ignored, and in this way, mathematics allows one to remain neutral with respect
to some aspects of the physical system.
I will argue that in Pincock’s example of the bridges of Königsberg, the possi-
bility of remaining neutral about some aspects of a physical system has nothing
to do with mathematics—and everything to do with abstraction. This conclusion
also elucidates an otherwise puzzling aspect of the first quotation: The statement
‘C (S) = 40’ seems to be less, not more, neutral than a non-mathematical descrip-
tion of temperature measurement, which should also be compatible with the
Kelvin scale, for instance.
In 1735, Leonhard Euler proved that it is impossible to cross every bridge of
Königsberg (see figure 2.4) exactly once and end up at the starting point of the
walk. He identified the banks and islands of Königsberg with vertices and the
bridges with the edges of an undirected graph (figure 2.5) and showed that this
graph cannot be traced in one line that starts and ends at the same vertex. Pincock
claims that this explanation of the impossibility (the explanandum) exemplifies
the way in which mathematics allows us to stay neutral about the microstructures
of physical systems, because the proof does not rely on the microstructure of
Königsberg, and so does not “fail if the microphysics of the bridges [is] altered”
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(Pincock 2007, 260).
One assumption in Pincock’s argument is that the inference of a sentence ϕ
fails to explain whatever ϕ describes if its premises are false, another is that the
example shows that mathematics can be used to arrive at premises that stay true
under microphysical changes (i. e., are robust). To identify the robust premises
in this case, it is important to note that graphs can be represented in different
ways. For example, one can start with a directed graph, an ordered pair 〈A, f :
I →{〈a, b 〉 | a, b ∈A}〉 with I ∩A=∅, where A is a set of vertices and f a family
of directed edges. An undirected graph can then be defined as a directed graph
in which for each directed edge, there is another directed edge in the opposite
direction. Another option is to define the edges of an undirected graph as a
multiset of two-element subsets of A or as a family of two-element subsets of A:
G = 〈A, f : I →{{a, b} | a, b ∈A}〉 with I ∩A=∅.45
The above representations are reductive explications of ‘vertex’ and ‘edge’, in
that they define the two terms in set theoretic terms (Benacerraf 1965, III.B). To
abstract from the set theoretic terms that occur in the reductive explication of D ,
define
∀y[Ey↔ y ∈ I ] (2.31)
∀x[V x↔ x ∈A] (2.32)
∀y x x ′[C y x x ′↔ f (y) = {x, x ′}] . (2.33)
Since edges and vertices are not individuated, there are no further terms in the
vocabulary. Then the abstraction of the definition of G in terms ofS = {V , E ,C }
is as follows:
∀x[E x→¬V x] (2.34)
∀y x1x2(C y x1x2↔C y x2x1) (2.35)
∀y x1x2x3x4[C y x1x2 ∧C y x3x4→ (x1 = x3 ∧ x2 = x4)∨ (x2 = x3 ∧ x1 = x4)]
(2.36)
∀y x1x2(C y x1x2→ Ey ∧V x1 ∧V x2) . (2.37)
These formulas express that f is a function (2.36) mapping edges to sets (2.35) of
vertices (2.37), which are distinct from edges (2.34).
The description of Königsberg in the language of graph theory relies on the
identification of the parts of Königsberg with vertices and edges:
{∀x(V x↔ Bank x ∨ Island x),∀x(E x↔ Bridge x),
∀y∀x1∀x2(C y x1x2↔ connects y x1x2)} . (2.38)
45Some vertices of the graph (figure 2.5) are connected by multiple edges (i. e. the graph is not
simple). So, pace Pincock (2007, 258), the edges cannot be represented by a set of two-element sets of
vertices.
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Here, ðBank xñ, ðIsland xñ, ðBridge xñ, and ðconnects y x1x2ñ stand for ðx is a
bankñ, ðx is an islandñ, ðx is a bridgeñ, and ðy connects x1 and x2ñ, respectively.
With these definitions, the axioms (2.34)–(2.37) of graph theory are true of Königs-
berg and can be included in Λ, and a full description of Königsberg entails
c  ∃x1 . . . x4∃y1 . . . y7
 ∧
1≤i< j≤4
xi 6= x j ∧∀z

V z→
4∨
i=1
z = xi

∧
∧
1≤i< j≤7
yi 6= y j ∧∀z

E z→
7∨
i=1
z = yi

∧
C y1x1x2 ∧C y2x1x2 ∧C y3x2x3 ∧C y4x2x3∧
C y5x1x4 ∧C y6x2x4 ∧C y7x3x4

.
(2.39)
c is a true description of Königsberg that, together with the axioms of graph
theory, is also complete.46 As Pincock emphasizes, c is also very robust because,
as long as no bridge is torn down or newly built and the river does not change its
course too much, it will remain true of Königsberg. However, there is no reason
to assume that this has anything to do with mathematics, since any description
of Königsberg in terms of banks, islands, bridges, and connections can also be
true and robust as long as it abstracts from enough detail—witness “There are two
banks and two islands, with two bridges connecting the first bank with the first
island, two bridges connecting the first island with the second bank. . . ”.47 On
the other hand, a geometrical description of Königsberg that includes the shape
of the riverbed is not particularly robust at all (under this aspect, figure 2.4 and
Pincock’s version of it have always been false).
It now holds that Λ∪{c}  % with
%  ¬∃x1 . . .∃x7∃y1 . . .∃y7
 ∧
1≤i< j≤7
yi 6= y j ∧
6∧
i=1
C yi xi xi+1 ∧C y7x7x1

,
where % is the translation of the explanandum with the help of (2.38). The expla-
nation uses mathematics only if predicate logic is considered mathematics.
It can now be seen that Pincock’s use of the bridges of Königsberg to argue
that the statement C (S) = 40 allows neutrality with respect to the microstructure
of the physical system confuses two distinct situations. c is an abstraction from a
description of Königsberg that includes river banks, bridges, etc., and it is true
and robust without any implicit adjudication to ignore some sentences. In the case
46Pincock’s mapping account of the application of mathematics is therefore easily applicable.
47Note that this description is, within the vagaries of ordinary language, even complete in its
vocabulary.
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of measuring temperature, however, there is an implicit adjudication, as in the
case of mass measurement. In Suppes’s terminology, only those statements that
are invariant under the appropriate transformations are empirically meaningful
and hence accepted. And they are meaningful not because they are given in
mathematical terms, but because they can also be given in empirical terms, that is,
they are entailed by a description that abstracts from the mathematical terms.48 As
for m(o1) = 4, this does not hold for C (S) = 40. This is why “the bridge system
and this particular graph [in figure 2.5] seem much more intimately connected
than the system with a temperature and the number 40” (Pincock 2007, 259).
2.13 Some conclusions
The explicata for ‘abstraction’ and ‘idealization’ suggested here fulfill the standard
requirements for a successful explication (Kuipers 2007, §1). They are similar to
the explicanda, precise, and fairly simple. Most importantly, they are fruitful, in
that they relate in clear ways to each other, as well as to concepts developed in the
theory of measurement and the formalism of Ramsey sentences. Furthermore,
they clarify the role of mathematics in the sciences. This is why my explications
can be considered (to some extent) successful—not because they capture specific
intuitions.
This independence from intuitions and previous use has, as argued, the con-
sequence that explications are searches for conventions. This does not mean that
they are arbitrary, but, quite to the contrary, that they are chosen according to
expedience,49 on their own or in relation to other concepts or empirical results.
This influence of empirical results on concepts suggests that the distinction be-
tween a priori and a posteriori truths may not be very helpful, since the meaning
postulates, while not forced upon us by the world, are still chosen because of the
way the world works.
The relevance of a posteriori knowledge in the choice of concepts and the
demand for fruitfulness also suggests an important role for the empirical inves-
tigation of science, both within the history of science and within the sociology
or experimental philosophy of science. If the motivation for methodological
naturalism is correct and philosophical concept formation would become more
effective by learning from scientific concept formation, it is important to under-
stand how science goes about forming concepts. And this, of course, requires
empirical research.
However, this defense of naturalism in philosophy only goes so far. It does
48Pincock’s mapping account is again easily applicable to this abstraction, even if ‘C (S) = 40’ is an
idealization (cf. Pincock 2007, 271–272).
49No doubt like many conventions; ISO 216 is a convention about paper formats (A4, A3 etc.), but
there is no question that living without is to the severe detriment of one’s quality of life. I cannot stress
this strongly enough.
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not extend to ontological naturalism, for instance. To the contrary, if the sciences
indeed engage in artificial language methodology as I have argued, and if, pace
Lewis, not all scientific terms can be explicitly defined in previously known
terms, science is free to introduce new objects by convention.50 But this means
that there is no fixed set of ontological objects on which philosophical concepts
and philosophical ontology can rest. What is more, if both philosophy and the
sciences rely on artificial language methodology and in fact often interact in
their development of concepts, the introduction of new objects by philosophical
theories (as suggested, for example, by Church in the opening quote of §2.10) does
not differ from the introduction of new objects by scientific theories, and may
even lead to the acceptance of these new objects in the sciences. Then ontological
naturalism becomes an ill-defined position.
50For a discussion of such “meaning postulates withA -terms controlled by an existential quantifier”,
see Stopes-Roe (1958), Kokoszyn´ska (1964), Przełe˛cki (1969, §8.II), and Winnie (1967).
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Chapter 3
The Received View in the
philosophy of science
The Received View on scientific theories as developed by Rudolf Carnap, Carl
Gustav Hempel, and Herbert Feigl, among others, was arguably “the epistemic
heart” of logical empiricism (Suppe 2000).1 In this view a scientific theory is
formalized as a set of sentences (called theoretical sentences) of predicate logic that
contain only logical or mathematical terms and the terms of the theory (theoretical
terms). The theoretical terms are connected to terms that refer to observable
properties (observational terms) through sets of correspondence rules, sentences
that contain both theoretical and observational terms. The observational terms
are given a semantic interpretation, which, through the correspondence rules
and theoretical sentences, restricts the possible semantic interpretations of the
theoretical terms (Feigl 1970, 5–6; Carnap 1939, §24). Thus, in the terminology of
artificial language methodology, the observational terms are basic terms and the
theoretical terms are auxiliary terms.
The formalization of scientific theories and the analysis of formalized theories
have been very fruitful in the past and promise to stay fruitful in the future (see,
1Parts of this chapter have been presented under the title “Carnap’s unchanging correspondence
rules” at the Second SIFA Graduate Conference at the Cogito Research Centre, Bologna, Italy, on
October 29, in 2009 and under the title “Two constants in Carnap’s philosophy of science” at the
HOPOS 2010 conference at the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, on June the 25,
in 2010. Parts have been presented under the title “On a straw man in the philosophy of science—A
defense of the Received View” at the Salzburgiense Concilium Omnibus Philosophis Analyticis at the
Universität Salzburg, Austria, September 10, 2010 and at the British Society for the Philosophy of
Science Annual Meeting at University College, Dublin, Ireland, on July 9, 2010. I thank the audiences
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for example, Suppes 1968, Betti and de Jong 2008, Betti et al. 2009, Leitgeb 2009).
However, the Received View (the name is due to Putnam 1962, 240), also called
the Syntactic Approach (van Fraassen 1970), the Syntactic View (Wessels 1974,
215), the Standard Conception (Hempel 1970), or the Orthodox View (Feigl 1970),
is currently not an accepted framework for formalization (cf. Suppe 2000, §1).2
Accordingly, any analysis or argument that presupposes this view faces strong
opposition. If the Received View is indeed as unmitigated a disaster as it seems
to many, this state of affairs is just as it ought to be. On the other hand, if the
Received View is a fruitful framework for the formalization of scientific theories,
this state of affairs is unfortunate, not only because it deprives philosophers of
science of a means for analyzing theories, but also because there are analyses that
presuppose the Received View, and that, if correct, would provide deep and helpful
insights into scientific theories and epistemological questions.
One such analysis is given by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) and subsequent
authors, who developed increasingly sophisticated and general explications of
‘explanation’ on the basis of the Received View. Their explications have now been
succeeded by a host of mutually incompatible accounts, which (arguably) have
not always reached the precision and breadth of the original explications. Simi-
larly, the explication of ‘reduction’ by Nagel (1949, 1951) has not been improved
upon so much as abandoned, and in many contemporary discussions, the term
is not explicated at all but rather used in an intuitive way as a primitive concept.
The criteria of empirical significance helpfully summarized and then rejected by
Hempel (1965c) have never recovered their status, and the same holds for the
explications of empirical content developed by Craig (1953) and Ramsey (1929).
Building partly on Ramsey’s results, Carnap (1952, 1958) explicated the notion of
analyticity, a concept that is now often considered impossible to explicate, useless,
or empty. Since it allows a clear analytic-synthetic distinction, it is especially this
last explication that supports Suppe’s stance on the importance of the Received
View for logical empiricism. Therefore, if “being a logical empiricist really is
not a live option for a twenty-first-century philosopher” (Richardson 2007), the
perceived failure of the Received View certainly contributed to this state of affairs.
Such explications (let alone whole philosophical research programs) are gener-
ally not given up without good reason, and indeed there have been many severe
criticisms of the Received View and of the whole project of logical empiricism. As
Carus (2007, 6–7, footnote removed) diagnoses,
most analytic philosophers have striven to distance themselves from
logical empiricism. [ . . . ] In the wider intellectual world, meanwhile,
the reaction against ‘logical positivism’ is even more pronounced.
2It is thus somewhat unfortunate that the name ‘Received View’ has stuck. On the other hand, it
is by now such an obvious misnomer that it is much more easily recognized as a proper name than
‘Syntactic View’, which, given the importance of a semantic interpretation of the observational terms,
is a misnomer as well.
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Despite recent historical interest in the movement, it is still regarded
with almost universal disdain. It functions in the humanities and
social sciences as a kind of ‘other’, against which almost anyone’s
own position may be defined or identified. The baleful influence
of ‘logical positivism’ was felt so widely that it is now a recognised
term of abuse in almost every field outside natural science. [ . . . ]
This widespread rejection in turn exacerbates the embarrassment felt
by analytic philosophers and redoubles their hurry to disavow any
residual connection with the barbaric past.
Few have tried to defend logical empiricism. One, of course, is Carus (2007,
7) himself, who argues that many criticisms of logical empiricism “are seriously
misguided. The ‘logical empiricism’ they reject was never propounded by any of
its leading figures, whose actual doctrines have been largely ignored”. However,
like most other recent defenses (e. g. Maher 2007, Lutz 2009, 2011a, Justus 2011),
his defense pertains only to “Carnap’s larger programme of explication and plu-
ralistic language engineering” (Carus 2007, 39). Most individual projects within
logical empiricism, and specifically the Received View, remain undefended.3 This
seems to leave current projects with a close affinity to the Received View in a
lurch. It can be argued that, for example, the partial structures approach (see §4.3)
and most criteria of empirical significance (see part II) can be phrased within the
Received View, approximative explanations are deductive-nomological (Pearce
and Rantala 1985), asymptotic explanations provide “a friendly amendment to the
deductive-nomological account” (Belot 2005, 144, n. 34), intertheoretic reductions
are Nagelian (Dizadji-Bahmani et al. 2010), and Carnap has provided a useful expli-
cation of analyticity (Papineau 2009b). Thus, if the Received View is a failure, so
much the worse for partial structures, criteria of empirical significance, asymptotic
and approximative explanation, intertheoretic reduction, and analyticity.
In this chapter, I will attempt to rehabilitate the Received View as it emerges
from the later writings of Carnap, Hempel, and (to a smaller extent) Feigl, and
defend it against some of the major criticisms. My strategy will be that of Carus
(2007, 7): Rather than discuss the criticisms’ conceptual merits, I will focus on their
presumptions about the Received View. Many of these, I argue, are contentious
or wrong, making the criticisms attacks on a straw man. Systematic defenses of
different aspects of the Received View follow in the next chapter.
It should be noted that some misconceptions of the Received View could be
easily avoided by reference to its by now canonical exposition4 by Suppe (1974a).
For instance, Burgos (2007, 157), probably misled by the name ‘Syntactic View’,
claims that according to the Received View, “[n]othing non-syntactic constitutes
3Carus (2007, 39, n. 61) lists some exceptions.
4Canonical within the philosophy of science (see, for example, Hughes 1989, 80; Ereshefsky 1991,
62; Morrison and Morgan 1999, 2, n. 1; Muller 2010, §2, n. 1), and sometimes even the history of
philosophy of science (Mormann 1991, 64; Stern 2007, 307, n. 2; Uebel 2008, §3).
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any theory. In particular, whatever is meant or referred to by a term or statement
(i. e., the semantic aspect), it is not constitutive of theories”. In contradistinction,
Suppe (1974a, §II.E) correctly emphasizes that the Received View includes a
semantic interpretation (cf. Carnap 1939, §24).
But some misconceptions are not forestalled by Suppe’s exposition. Of these,
I will take up the Received View’s alleged demand for exhaustive axiomatizations
(§3.4) and its perceived dismissive attitude towards models (§3.7). And even Suppe’s
generally careful exposition contains mistakes, of which I will discuss the claims
that the Received View demands axiomatizations in first order logic (§3.3); that
the bipartition of the vocabulary into theoretical and observational terms is
unduly vague (§3.6.2) and leads to overly complex concepts (§3.6.3); that the
correspondence rules connecting theoretical and observational vocabulary are
considered part of the theory (§3.6.4), cannot take other theories into account
(§3.6.5), and are overly simple (§3.6.6); and that the Received View is intended
to make the meaning of the term ‘theory’ more precise (§3.8). The discussion of
the last of these misconceptions in particular will suggest that the Received View
did not fail, but was abandoned before it had been properly developed or, in fact,
received.
3.1 The decline and fall of the Received View
The following is a historical introduction into the most striking feature of the
Received View, the connection of theories with observations by way of correspon-
dence rules between theoretical and observational terms. This history, beginning
with Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Carnap 1928a, Aufbau from now on), is fairly
well known, although I will emphasize aspects that are important in the sequel
and have not been discussed much in the literature.5
With respect to the correspondence rules between theoretical and observa-
tional terms, Carnap (1963a, §9) himself describes the development of logical
empiricism as a gradual liberalization in his “Intellectual Autobiography” (“Au-
tobiography” from now on). Initially, every kind of knowledge “was supposed
to be firmly supported” by the experiences as described by Wittgenstein’s prin-
ciple of verifiability, “which says that it is in principle possible to obtain either
a definite verification or a definite refutation for any meaningful sentence” (“Au-
tobiography”, 57). In the Aufbau, §35, this principle is expressed in the concepts
of reducibility and construction. Every meaningful sentence is supposed to be
translatable into a sentence about experiences, and this means that “the concepts
of science are explicitly definable on the basis of observation concepts” (“Autobi-
ography”, 59), which are thus the referents of the observational terms.
In “Testability and Meaning” (Carnap 1936, 1937, “Testability” from now on),
5A concordance between the short titles of the works and the references in the bibliography is
given at the beginning of the bibliography on page 413.
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Carnap relaxes this claim because he has come to the opinion that it is impossible
to define disposition terms explicitly in non-dispositional observational terms.
Instead, he suggests that new terms should be introduced by reduction sentences,
that is, necessary and sufficient conditions (see §7.3).
In a short contribution to the Unity of Science Forum, Carnap summarizes
“Testability” (Carnap 1938, fn. 1) and points to the Foundations of Logic and Math-
ematics (Carnap 1939, L&M from now on) for an elaboration of two methods
of constructing a scientific language. One method starts with the observation
terms as primitive and successively introduces theoretical terms through reduction
sentences as in “Testability”. The second method starts with theoretical terms,
which are already related to each other through the postulates of a theory. These
theoretical terms are taken as primitive and further theoretical terms are succes-
sively introduced to finally arrive at observational terms. In the second method,
Carnap suggests, it may be possible to explicitly define all terms. In both methods,
only the observational terms are interpreted. Carnap (1938, 34) claims:
The first way is interesting from the point of view of empiricism
because it allows a closer check-up with respect to the empirical char-
acter of the language of science. By beginning our construction at the
bottom, we see more easily whether and how each term proposed for
introduction is connected with possible observations.
With its reliance on reduction sentences, the first method is supposed to relate
theoretical terms more easily to observational terms because, according to Carnap
(1936, 447, thm. 7), it ensures that the theoretical terms can be reduced to observa-
tional terms.6 It is easy to see that the conditions for theoretical terms given by
the second method can be very complicated. For not all definitions of observa-
tional terms in theoretical terms lead to necessary or sufficient conditions for the
theoretical terms. As an example, consider the definition of an observational term
O by four theoretical terms T1,T2,T3,T4 in
∀x O x↔ [(T1x ∧T2x)∨ (T3x ∧T4x)] . (3.1)
The applicability of O to any object is neither necessary nor sufficient for the
applicability of any of the four theoretical terms. Also, the second method does
not demand that all theoretical terms occur non-trivially in the definition of
an observational term. Some theoretical terms may only be related to other
theoretical terms through the postulates of the theory, which are not further
restricted.
In L&M itself, Carnap elaborates on the distinction between the two methods
6Considering the welter of definitions in “Testability”, it is unsurprising that Carnap did not notice
that this is essentially an empty claim. In §7.5, I show that (chain-)reducible terms can be completely
unrestricted in their interpretation.
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Figure 3.1: Carnap’s diagram of two methods of giving an empirical interpretation to theoretical
terms (Carnap 1939, 205).
for relating theoretical terms (he calls them “abstract”) and observational (“ele-
mentary”) terms (figure 3.1). Carnap (1939, 206) again notes that in the second
method,
so it seems at present, explicit definitions will do. More special laws,
containing less abstract terms, are to be proved on the basis of the
axioms. At least this is the direction in which physicists have been
striving with remarkable success, especially in the past few decades.
But at the present time, the method cannot yet be carried through in
the pure form indicated. For many less abstract terms no definition
on the basis of abstract terms alone is as yet known; hence those terms
must also be taken as primitive. And many more laws, especially in
biological fields, cannot yet be proved on the basis of laws in abstract
terms only; hence those laws must also be taken as primitive.
As is clear from figure 3.1, L&M also marks a clear commitment to a semantic
interpretation of the observational terms. The theoretical terms are interpreted
solely through the correspondence rules as given by one of the two methods.
While the first method describes the observational import of abstract terms
very clearly, scientists “are inclined to choose the second method” (Carnap 1939,
206, §24, emphasis removed). Restricting the first method to explicit definitions
(which are special reduction sentences) would lead to “a science in sensationalistic
form which Goethe in his polemic against Newton, as well as some positivists,
seems to have had in mind”, since every sentence could be translated into an
observation sentence (see claim 7.1). The restriction is not feasible, however,
because “it turns out—and this is an empirical fact, not a logical necessity—that it
is not possible to arrive in this way at a powerful and efficacious system of laws”,
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so that science always uses terms that are not explicitly definable in observational
terms.
Carnap (1962, §5) gives one example in the Logical Foundations of Probability
(Probability from now on): ‘higher temperature than’, as an explication of ‘warmer
than’, should be such that it can be used instead of ‘warmer than’ itself. Carnap
stresses that this requirement has to be fulfilled in most but not all cases, and adds:
The converse of the requirement [ . . . ] would be this: the concept
Temperature is to be such that, if x is not warmer than y (in the
prescientific sense), then the temperature of x is not higher than that
of y. It is important to realize that this is not required, not even “in
most cases”. When the difference between the temperatures of x and y
is small, then, as a rule, we notice no difference in our heat sensations.
Clearly, then, ‘temperature’ cannot be defined in terms of ‘warmer than’.
In two later papers, Carnap does not even mention the first method of inter-
preting theoretical terms, probably because he has come to the conclusion that this
method is insufficient for the theoretical terms of science. In “The Methodological
Character of Theoretical Concepts”, Carnap (1956b, 53, “Theoretical concepts”
from now on) writes:
At the time of [“Testability”], I still believed that all scientific terms
could be introduced as disposition terms on the basis of observa-
tion terms either by explicit definitions or by so-called reduction
sentences. Today I think, in agreement with most empiricists, that
the connection between the observation terms and the terms of theo-
retical science is much more weak than it was conceived [ . . . ] in my
earlier formulations [ . . . ].
Accordingly, he goes on to develop a weaker criterion of empirical significance
for terms and sentences that I will discuss in §7.4.2. In “Beobachtungssprache
und theoretische Sprache”, Carnap (1958, “Beobachtungssprache” from now on)
develops a general method to distinguish between the analytic and the synthetic
content of a theory. In “Theoretical concepts”, 47, §V, Carnap states that the
correspondence rules (C -rules)
specify the relation R which [ . . . ] relates to an observable space-time
region u, e. g., an observable event or thing, a class u ′ of coordinate
quadruples which may be specified by intervals around the coordinate
values x, y, z, t .
On the basis of these C -rules for space-time designations, other C -
rules are given for [theoretical terms]. These rules [ . . . ] hold for any
space-time location. They will usually connect only very special kinds
of value distributions of the theoretical magnitudes in question with
an observable event. For example, a rule might refer to two material
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bodies [ . . . ] observable at locations u and v [ . . . ]. Another rule
may connect the theoretical term “temperature” with the observable
predicate “warmer than” in this way: “If u is warmer than v , then the
temperature of u ′ is higher than that of v ′.”
Carnap here states that observable space-time regions can be assigned space-time
coordinates, and that observational terms are assigned specific values of theoretical
magnitudes. He also emphasizes the asymmetry between observational terms
and theoretical magnitudes when noting that some, but not all, distributions of
theoretical magnitudes are assigned an observable event.7
In “Beobachtungssprache”, 243, Carnap repeats this construction and notes
that there is an asymmetry not only between theoretical magnitudes and ob-
servational predicates, but also between space-time coordinates and space-time
regions:
We can [ . . . ] introduce a system of space-time coordinates by assign-
ing an ordered quadruple of real numbers to each small body at any
time. Through generalization, every such quadruple is then taken
as a representative of a space-time point (that is, an unobservable,
theoretical object). Then physical magnitudes (e. g. mass-density) are
introduced, which have a value for each space-time point, for example
a real number. In our system, a function of this kind is reconstructed
by a function F of quadruples of numbers.8
This passage is a paraphrase of the one from “Theoretical concepts” above. The
space-time region u is given by a small body, and the theoretical magnitudes are
the physical magnitudes. In this passage, however, Carnap is even clearer about
the impossibility of translating every theoretical statement into an observational
statement. In line with his remarks about Goethe in L&M, Carnap (1958, 237)
considers every term explicitly definable in observational terms also to be part of
the observational vocabulary.
Carnap’s introductory text Philosophical Foundations of Physics: An Introduc-
tion to the Philosophy of Science (Carnap 1966, Introduction from now on), based
on a 1958 seminar but updated to include, for example, the results of “Beobach-
tungssprache”, serves as the stopping point of my history of the decline of logical
7In this quote, Carnap blatantly flouts his own point that the relation between ‘temperature’ and
‘warmer than’ does not hold in all cases. This is excusable, though, because this correspondence rule
only serves as an illustration for pedagogical purposes.
8“Wir können [ . . . ] ein raum-zeitliches Koordinatensystem einführen, in dem zunächst jedem
kleinen Körper zu irgend einem Zeitpunkt ein geordnetes Quadrupel reeller Zahlen zugeordnet
wird. Dann wird durch Verallgemeinerung jede solche Quadrupel als Vertreter eines Raum-Zeit-
Punktes (also eines unbeobachtbaren, theoretischen Gegenstandes) genommen. Dann werden auch
physikalische Grössen eingeführt (z. B. Massendichte), die für jeden Raum-Zeit-Punkt einen Wert
haben, etwa eine reelle Zahl. Eine Funktion dieser Art wird in unserem System durch eine Funktion
F von Quadrupeln reeller Zahlen nachkonstruiert.”
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empiricism. Carnap (1966, v) was urged by friends to write the book “because
not many of [his] views on problems in the philosophy of science had been pub-
lished”. The book, which Carnap (1966, vi) believed “may also serve as a general
introduction to the philosophy of science”, provides an interesting glimpse of
what he considered core issues in the philosophy of science.
The shorter parts of the Introduction concern laws, explanation, and probabil-
ity, causality and determinism, and statistical laws. The two longest parts are about
the structure of space and concept formation in the sciences. In both parts, Carnap
stresses the conventional elements in, for example, the conceptualizations of time
and length (Carnap 1966, ch. 8, 9) and the conceptualization of the structure of
space (Carnap 1966, ch. 15). The third longest part deals with the structure of
scientific theories, in which Carnap relies on the bipartition of the vocabulary
into an observational and a theoretical part and the connection between the two
via correspondence rules. There, he repeats the claim that when introducing ob-
servational concepts based on theoretical concepts (his second method of relating
theories to observations), it may be possible to rely on definitions. When starting
from observational concepts and introducing theoretical ones (the first method),
on the other hand, a restriction to definitions is impossible (Carnap 1966, 234).
Carnap’s second method for interpreting theoretical terms is a major point
in Hempel’s contribution to the Encyclopedia of Unified Science, his monograph
Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Sciences (Concept Formation from
now on), which is referenced in the Introduction. There, Hempel (1952, 684)
stresses repeatedly the importance of
theoretical constructs, i. e., the often highly abstract terms used in the
advanced stages of scientific theory formation, such as ‘mass, ‘mass
point’ [ . . . ], ‘volume’, ‘Carnot process’ [ . . . ], ‘proton’, ‘ψ-function’,
etc [ . . . ]. Terms of this kind are not introduced by definitions or
reduction chains based on observables; in fact, they are not introduced
by any piecemeal process of assigning meaning to them individually.
Rather, the constructs used in a theory are introduced jointly, as it
were, by setting up a theoretical system formulated in terms of them
and by giving this system an experiential interpretation.
One way to give an experiential interpretation to a theoretical system consists in
defining further concepts with the help of theoretical constructs and interpreting
those concepts directly. This is Carnap’s second method of giving empirical
meaning to abstract terms described in L&M (figure 3.1); Hempel’s treatment
of ‘mass’ as such a theoretical term (Hempel 1952, §12) was even suggested by
Carnap (Hempel 1952, 738, n. 72). Hempel (1952, §§6–7) considers the use of
theoretical constructs another step in the liberalization of empiricism: The claim
that all terms are explicitly definable in observational terms is the narrower thesis
of empiricism (Hempel 1952, 676), while the claim that all terms are reducible
to observational terms in the sense of “Testability” is the liberalized thesis of
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empiricism (Hempel 1952, 683). The need for reduction sentences shows that the
narrower thesis is false, and the need for theoretical constructs shows that the
liberalized thesis is false.
While Carnap saw value in the concept of correspondence rules until the
end, Hempel (1970, §6) extended his critique of explicit definitions and reduction
sentences to theoretical constructs and dismissed the whole concept of correspon-
dence rules as misguided. Further criticisms of correspondence rules (Suppe 1972,
§II) and the use of axiomatizations in general (Hempel 1970, §3, Suppe 1974a,
§IV.f) contributed to the downfall of the Received View. Hempel (1970, 1974), for
example, abandoned it completely. In its stead, the Semantic View on scientific
theories has become an important framework for the reconstruction of theories,
possibly the dominant one (Suppe 1989, 3, French and Ladyman 1999, 103). In this
view, theories are not formalized as sets of postulates in predicate logic, but rather
via a set theoretical predicate given in the metalanguage, as suggested by Suppes
(1992, §2). The set theoretical predicate directly determines the model theoretic
structures (Suppe 1989, 4, van Fraassen 1980, 44) (see also §4.1). Instead of relying
on correspondence rules, theories are connected to observations through model
theoretic notions such as embeddings (see §4.2.1).
3.2 Three early works of Carnap
Towards a historical defense of the Received View, I will discuss a somewhat
neglected part of the history of the Received View, found in three of Carnap’s
works leading up to the Aufbau: his article “Über die Aufgabe der Physik und
die Anwendung des Grundsatzes der Einfachstheit”9 (Carnap 1923, “Aufgabe”
from now on), his article “Dreidimensionalität des Raumes und Kausalität. Eine
Untersuchung über den logischen Zusammenhang zweier Fiktionen”10 (Carnap
1924, “Dreidimensionalität”), and the monograph Physikalische Begriffsbildung11
(Carnap 1926, Begriffsbildung).
Both Suppe (1974a, 12) and Feigl (1970, 3) cite “Aufgabe” as Carnap’s first
exposition of the logical empiricist’s view of scientific theories (Feigl also mentions
Campbell 1920). Mormann (2007, 159, n. 13) criticizes this classification:
Feigl once went so far to trace back the essentials of the Logical
Empiricist account of empirical theories to an early (pre-Vienna)
paper of Carnap that may well be classified as belonging to his neo-
Kantian period [ . . . ]. This stance betrays, to put it mildly, that Feigl
did not pay too much attention to the amendments that had taken
place since then.
9“On the task of physics and the application of the principle of maximal simplicity.”
10“Three-dimensionality of space and causality. An investigation of the logical connection between
two fictions.”
11Physical Concept Formation.
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However, there are a number of reasons to consider “Aufgabe” a contribution to
logical empiricism’s view of theories. For one, Mormann’s claim rests on the text’s
being written during Carnap’s neo-Kantian period, but even if Carnap wrote
the article while holding neo-Kantian views, this does not mean that they are
manifest or relevant in the article. Carnap himself, for example, does not seem
to think so. When discussing the influence of Kant’s views on his own work in
his autobiography, Carnap (1963a, 12) mentions his doctoral dissertation Der
Raum. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre12 (Carnap 1922, Der Raum from now on),
specifically the chapter on intuitive space (Carnap 1963a, 4), but not “Aufgabe”.
As influences for “Aufgabe”, Carnap rather lists Poincaré and Hugo Dingler, and
at another point Hilbert, Poincaré, and Duhem (Carnap 1963a, §13 and 77–78).
Furthermore, Carnap (1963a, 15) considers “Aufgabe” to belong to the same
“period” as Begriffsbildung. Begriffsbildung was written during his time in Vienna,
and its main points were taken up by Hempel in Concept Formation and Carnap
in the Introduction.
Perhaps most importantly, Carnap begins §13 of his autobiography, entitled
“The Theoretical Language”, with “Aufgabe”. The section continues with Begriffs-
bildung and ends with “Theoretical concepts”. This is relevant because §13 occurs
in Part II of Carnap’s autobiography, entitled “Philosophical Problems”, where
“[i]n each section, a certain problem or complex of problems [is being] dealt with”.
So Carnap himself considers “Aufgabe” a starting point of the development that
led to one of his core articles on scientific theories. In the “Autobiography”, 15,
Carnap also summarizes “Aufgabe” in his later terminology:
I imagined the ideal system of physics as consisting of three volumes:
The first was to contain the basic physical laws, represented as a formal
axiom system; the second to contain the phenomenal-physical dictio-
nary, that is to say, the rules of correspondence between observable
qualities and physical magnitudes; the third to contain descriptions
of the physical state of the universe for two arbitrary time points.
From these descriptions, together with the laws contained in the
first volume, the state of the world for any other time-point would
be deducible (Laplace’s form of determinism), and from this result,
with the help of the rules of correspondence, the qualities could be
derived which are observable at any position in space and time. The
distinction between the laws represented as formal axioms and the
correlations to observables was resumed and further developed many
years later in connection with the theoretical language.
Note that here, too, Carnap points out the continuity between “Aufgabe” and his
later discussions of theoretical terms.
In “Aufgabe” itself, Carnap (1923, §I, all emphases removed) also introduces
12Space. A Contribution to the Theory of Science.
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his main point with a reference to Poincaré and Dingler, but not Kant:
The main thesis of conventionalism, marshaled by Poincaré and con-
tinued by Dingler, says that the construction of physics needs stipu-
lations that are subject to our choice. [ . . . ] But the choice of these
stipulations shall not be arbitrary, but rather be governed by spe-
cific principles, where in the end the principle of maximal simplicity
decides.13
The laws of physics in the first volume can be chosen according to the principle of
maximal simplicity, Carnap (1923, §I) states, because they are not determined by
experience. Whether, for example, the world has a Euclidean or non-Euclidean
geometry depends on the objects that are chosen to be rigid bodies, an example
he repeats in the Introduction when discussing the conventional elements in the
concept of length. Therefore, Carnap (1923, 97) concludes, the laws of physics are
synthetic sentences a priori, but not exactly in the Kantian
transcendental-critical sense. Because that would mean that they
express necessary conditions for the object of experience, themselves
determined by the forms of intuition and of thought. [ . . . ] But the
content [of this volume] is actually often a matter of choice. [ . . . ]
The choice is only to be made according to methodical principles,
especially that of maximal simplicity. As a label for the first volume
the term “hypothetico-deductive system” is therefore preferable to
the Kantian term “a priori” [ . . . ].14
This is also the only passage in “Aufgabe” that contains an explicit reference to
Kant, and it is far from an endorsement of the Kantian doctrine of the synthetic a
priori as adhered to in Der Raum, but rather, in keeping with the “Autobiography”,
an endorsement of Poincaré’s conventionalism (see also Carus 2007, 122).
The connections between “Aufgabe” and Carnap’s later view on scientific
theories are obvious. He makes a distinction that “cannot be emphasized too
strongly”15 between the domain of perception and the domain of physical theories
13“Die Hauptthese des von Poincaré aufgestellten und von Dingler weitergeführten Konventio-
nalismus besagt, daß zum Aufbau der Physik Festsetzungen getroffen werden müssen, die unserer
freien Wahl unterliegen. [ . . . ] Die Wahl dieser Festsetzungen soll aber nicht etwa willkürlich gesche-
hen, sondern nach bestimmten methodischen Grundsätzen, wobei letzten Endes der Grundsatz der
Einfachstheit die Entscheidung zu treffen hat.”
14“synthetische Sätze a priori, allerdings nicht genau im Kantischen transzendental-kritischen
Sinne. Denn das würde bedeuten, daß sie notwendige Bedingungen des Gegenstandes der Erfahrung
ausdrücken, selbst bedingt durch die Formen der Anschauung und des Denkens. [ . . . ] In Wirklichkeit
ist aber [der] Aufbau [des ersten Bandes] vielfach unserer Wahl anheimgestellt. [ . . . ]
Die Wahl ist nur nach methodischen Grundsätzen zu treffen, insbesondere dem der Einfachstheit.
Zur Kennzeichnung des ersten Bandes is demnach dem Kantischen Apriori-Begriffe vorzuziehen der
Begriff ‚hypothetisch-deduktives System‘[ . . . ].”
15“kann gar nicht scharf genug betont werden”
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(“Aufgabe”, 99). The connection between the two domains is given “in a way
through a kind of dictionary that specifies which objects (elements, complexes,
processes) in the second domain correspond to the ones of the first”16. This dictio-
nary is just a metaphor for correspondence rules. Here are Carnap’s examples of
correspondence rules in “Aufgabe”, 99–100:
“To such a blue (designated, for example, according to the Ostwald
color-system) corresponds a specific periodic movement of electrons
(designated by the frequency)”[.] [ . . . ] “To such a pungent smell
(chlorine smell, system of designation missing) corresponds a batch
of electron complexes of a specific structure (Cl-atoms)”; “To such a
heat experience (system of designation missing) corresponds a specific
average kinetic energy of some amount of electron-complexes (atoms
or molecules).”17
Compare this to two examples for correspondence rules given in the Introduction,
233:
An example for such a rule is: “If there is an electromagnetic oscil-
lation of a specified frequency, then there is a visible greenish-blue
color of a certain hue”. Here something observable is connected with
a nonobservable microprocess.
Another example is: “The temperature (measured by a thermome-
ter, and therefore, an observable in the wider sense explained earlier)
of a gas is proportional to the mean kinetic energy of its molecules”.
This rule connects a nonobservable in molecular theory, the kinetic
energy of molecules, with an observable, the temperature of a gas.
In the Introduction, the Ostwald color system is substituted by the hue of the
colors, and the missing system of designation for heat experiences is circumvented
by using an observational term in the wider sense, the temperature according to
a thermometer. The connection to heat experiences is given through the further
correspondence rule specified in “Theoretical concepts”, 48: The observational
relation ‘warmer than’ is interpreted through temperature.
Sometimes, Carnap notes in “Aufgabe”, 103, only the physical laws are con-
sidered part of the theory, so that correspondence rules and descriptions have
to be considered part of the “physiological psychology of the senses”18 and “a
16“gewissermaßen durch eine Art Wörterbuch, das angibt, welche Gegenstände (Elemente, Komple-
xe, Vorgänge) im zweiten Gebiet den einzelnen des ersten entsprechen”
17“‚Einem solchen Blau (bezeichnet z. B. nach dem Ostwaldschen Farbsystem) entspricht eine
gewissen periodische Elektronenbewegung (bezeichnet durch die Schwingungszahl)‘[.] [ . . . ] ‚Einem
solchen stechenden Geruch (Chlorgeruch, Bezeichnungssystem fehlt) entspricht ein Gemenge von
Elektronenkomplexen bestimmter Struktur (Cl-Atome)‘; ‚Einer solchen Wärmeempfindung (Bezei-
chungssystem fehlt) entspricht eine gewisse durchschnittliche kinetische Energie einer Menge von
Elektronenkomplexen (Atomen oder Molekülen).‘”
18“physiologische Psychologie der Sinne”
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(non-existing) descriptive complete science”19. The idea that there is no complete
science to determine the correspondence rules anticipates Carnap’s claim in L&M
that many terms of the non-physical sciences cannot yet be defined in physical
terms.
Carnap gives another example of a correspondence rule in Begriffsbildung, 60,
that is similar to the correspondence rule connecting a pungent smell with an
electron configuration: Specific electron configurations are assigned specific atoms
or crystals, say, chloride and sodium or sodium chloride. These configurations
are then assigned the qualities ‘white’ and ‘salty’. Compare this with the example
from L&M, 207:
[L]et us imagine a calculus of physics is constructed, according to the
second method [cf. figure 3.1], on the basis of primitive specific signs
like ‘electromagnetic field’, ‘gravitational field’, ‘electron’, ‘proton’,
etc. The system of definitions will then lead to elementary terms, e. g.
to ‘Fe’, defined as a class of regions in which the configuration of parti-
cles fulfils certain conditions, and ‘Na-yellow’ as a class of space-time
regions in which the temporal distribution of the electromagnetic
field fulfils certain conditions. The semantical rules are laid down
stating that ‘Fe’ designates iron and ‘Na-yellow’ designates a specific
yellow color. (If ‘iron’ is not accepted as sufficiently elementary, the
rules can be stated for more elementary terms.)
Begriffsbildung has strong connections to “Aufgabe”. The principle of maximal
simplicity from “Aufgabe” is a recurring theme: The introduction of correction
factors for measurement devices (Carnap 1926, 30), the choice of a measurement
scale for temperature (Carnap 1926, 36–37) and measurement scales (Carnap 1926,
23) in general, and the choice between Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry are
all justified by the simplicity of the resulting laws. These questions of simplicity
occur in connection with the formation of physical concepts, the topic of the
monograph. Consider the concept of temperature—different objects, when in
contact with our skin, cause different heat sensations. While it would be possible
to declare two objects to have the same temperature when they feel equally warm,
this choice would “show itself to be inexpedient considering the fact of ‘heat
exchange’”20. This is because one body might cool down noticeably when in
contact with another, while the other does not noticeably warm. Then, “for the
sake of later laws of nature that occur in connection with the concept of specific
heat”21, the other body is ascribed a change in temperature that does not relate
to a noticeable warming (Carnap 1926, 17–18). Carnap (1926, 57) also states that
“the events in future and past are determined if the state is fixed for one point of
19“einer (nicht bestehenden) deskriptiven Gesamtwissenschaft”
20“würde sich jedoch als unzweckmäßig erweisen angesichts der Tatsache des ‚Wärmeausgleichs‘”
21“späteren Naturgesetzen zuliebe, die beim Begriff der spezifischen Wärme auftreten”
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time”22 (cf. “Aufgabe”, 101).
Begriffsbildung also has strong connections to much of Carnap’s and Hempel’s
later work: There is the claim that counting is dependent on time (Carnap 1926,
15), which can be found again in the Introduction, 60, the discussion of rigid
bodies (Begriffsbildung, 25, and Introduction, 91), the distinction between strong
and weak periodicity (Begriffsbildung, 39–40, and Introduction, 80–81), and the
five rules for physical magnitudes that appear in both Begriffsbildung, 22–23,
and the Introduction, 63–65. The strong claim that all measurement is counting
in Begriffsbildung, 15, also occurs in Hempel’s Concept Formation, 719, albeit
weakened to hold for measurements that rely on a concatenation operation for
physical objects. With respect to measurement, Hempel (1952, 737, n. 64) refers
directly to Begriffsbildung. Most importantly, Hempel’s core claim that concept
formation goes hand in hand with theory formation and is influenced by empirical
results can already be found in Begriffsbildung and in “Aufgabe”, since Carnap
argues that the aim of concept formation is to arrive at theories that are simple
given one’s experiences.
Begriffsbildung also relates to “Dreidimensionalität”, 107–108, in which Carnap
relies, as in “Aufgabe”, on the distinction between the domain of perception
and the domain of physical theories. He speaks of experiences of the first level,
which are the phenomena, and experiences of the second level, which can be the
experiences of physics or, since this level is subject to conventional choices, also the
ordinary ones. Ordinary experiences are those involving everyday concepts, where
objects have qualities like color, hardness, etc. and concepts like substance and
causality apply. The contents of the experiences of the first level are the “primary
world”, and those of the second level the “secondary world”, where the secondary
world can be the “physical” or the “ordinary world” (“Dreidimensionalität”, 108).
The connections between the secondary and primary worlds is, with a reference to
“Aufgabe”, given through a “correspondence relation”23 (“Dreidimensionalität”,
108, n. 1).
The Aufbau, finally, puts the discussions of “Aufgabe”, “Dreidimensionalität”,
and Begriffsbildung in a wider perspective. Here, Carnap (1928a, §§1–2, §35,
§156) develops a constructional system in which all statements are translatable
into statements that contain only one primitive relation (although more are
possible). The lower levels of the system constitute the autopsychological objects
out of the primitive relation, the intermediate levels the physical objects out of
the autopsychological objects, and the upper levels the heteropsychological and
cultural objects, constituted from the physical objects. The correspondence rules
of “Aufgabe” and Begriffsbildung are found in the intermediate levels, where the
physical objects are constituted. But more than just the correspondence rules are
22“[D]as Geschehen in Zukunft und Vergangenheit is bestimmt, wenn der Zustand in einem
Zeitpunkt festliegt.”
23“Zuordnungsbeziehung”
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needed to constitute the physical objects from the autopsychological objects.
The autopsychological objects only go up to the visual field, the colors, and
a preliminary time order. The time order is preliminary because it is not always
complete (Aufbau, §120). From these objects, colored world points and world
lines are constituted by demanding that a certain set of desiderata be “satisfied
as far as possible”(Aufbau, §§125–127), by using similarity assumptions (Aufbau,
§135) and, once the upper levels have been constituted, by using observations
of other people (Aufbau, §144). When world lines stay in close proximity to
each other over a period of time, the class of the corresponding world points
are visual things (Aufbau, §128), which, when assigned tactile and other qualities,
lead to perceptual things (Aufbau, §134). Finally, “the entire space-time world,
with the assignment of sense qualities to the individual world points, we call the
perceptual world” (Aufbau, §133). Note that while perceptual qualities are assigned
to things, the perceptual world is the resulting assignment of perceptual qualities
to space-time points. The visual things seem to belong to the “ordinary world” of
“Dreidimensionalität”, while the perceptual world also allows the construction of
the other secondary world—the “physical world”—which is constructed in §136 of
the Aufbau.24 When constructing the physical world, Carnap (1928a, §136) refers
to “Aufgabe”, “Dreidimensionalität”, and Begriffsbildung, and describes the role
of the perceptual world in more detail. He repeats the point that the perceptual
world does not contain laws of the kind that hold in the physical world, but laws
that are “of a much more complicated nature”.25
As a final observation, note that in the construction of the world as described
in the Aufbau, the method of interpreting theoretical terms that is described in
“Aufgabe” is not involved in the assignment of sensory qualities to space-time
points, but covers only the second step, the correlation of numbers as values of
state magnitudes to these sensory qualities. The Kantian notions of Der Raum
would occur somewhere in the construction leading to the assignment of sensory
qualities to space-time points. So whatever Kantian notions about synthetic a
priori statements Carnap had at the time of writing, they would not have been
relevant for the construction developed in “Aufgabe”. This is the final reason
why Mormann’s claim that “Aufgabe” cannot be considered a contribution to the
logical empiricist’s theory of science is incorrect.
3.3 The exclusive use of first order logic
According to Suppe (1974a, 16, 50), proponents of the Received View always
assumed an axiomatization of scientific theories in first order predicate logic or,
24In the translation, the paragraph has the title “The World of Physics”. The original uses the same
phrase (“Die physikalische Welt”) as “Dreidimensionalität”.
25“von viel verwickelterer Gestalt”. Note the similarity of this choice of words to “Dreidimensiona-
lität”, where the laws are “verwickelter Art” (of a complicated kind).
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in Carnap’s later writings, first order logic augmented by modal operators. In
contemporary summaries of the Received View, the option of modal operators is
typically not mentioned, unlike the demand for first order logic (to list just a tiny
fraction: Stegmüller 1978, 40; Beatty 1980, 419; Ereshefsky 1991, 61; Morrison
and Morgan 1999, 2; van Fraassen 2000; Kitcher 2001, 152; Burgos 2007, 157; Frigg
and Hartmann 2008, §4.1; Muller 2010, §2).
Suppes (1967, 56–57) also speaks of the “standard sketch” of scientific theo-
ries, by which he clearly means the Received View, and later discusses “standard
formalizations”, axiomatizations in first order logic (Suppes 1967, 58), without
explicitly identifying the two (some authors who cite the text do so, however, for
example Suppe (1974a, 114, n. 241), Beatty (1980, appendix 1), and Ereshefsky
(1991, 62)). In his discussion, Suppes (1967, 58) puts forth what has become one
of the standard criticisms of the view’s supposed reliance on first order logic:
“Theories [ . . . ] like quantum mechanics [ . . . ] need to use [ . . . ] many results
concerning the real numbers. Formalization of such theories in first order logic is
utterly impractical”. The impracticality of first order axiomatization is, next to
the perceived need for an exhaustive axiomatization discussed below, one pillar of
Stegmüller’s criticism of the Received View (Stegmüller 1978, 39–40).
Beyond being cumbersome, first order logic has a deficiency that even in
principle cannot be avoided: It cannot determine structures with an infinite
domain up to isomorphism. As Suppe (2000, §3) puts it, a “general problem [with
the Received View] was that the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem implied that [the
theory’s] models must include both intended and wildly unintended models”; the
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds only in first order logic. The Semantic View
does not have this problem, because the models of the theory are not defined to
be those of a set of sentences in the object language, but are rather defined directly
in the metalanguage. The Semantic View is superior to the Received View in this
respect since structures can be determined up to isomorphism, as van Fraassen
(1989, §8.6) also stresses: “[W]hen a theory is presented by defining the class of its
models, that class of structures cannot generally be identified with an elementary
class of models of any first-order language”. French and Ladyman (1999, 116–117)
also make this point.26
Whether this criticism is valid—that is, whether something essential about
scientific theories is missed when they are described in first order predicate logic—
is beyond the scope of this book (but see the remarks in §4.1.3 and by Pearce and
Rantala 1985, 135). Rather, I want to note that the Received View is not restricted
to first order logic in any of the sources that Suppe (1974a, §II.E, n. 107) cites for
the final version of the Received View (Carnap 1956b, 1958, 1963c, 1966, Hempel
1965g, 1963). Indeed there is clear evidence that Hempel and Feigl allowed infinite
26There are other criticisms of the Received View that stem from its perceived reliance on first order
logic. For instance, Klein (2011) argues that because it does not allow quantification over predicates,
the Received View does not allow the reduction of multiply realized properties.
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type theory, and overwhelming evidence that Carnap, from the beginning of the
Received View to its final version, assumed it.
For one, even though Carnap’s “Aufgabe” was published after a talk by Hilbert
in which he isolated first order logic as a distinct subsystem of logic, “Aufgabe”
was published before this result appeared in print (cf. Anellis 1996). Arguably, the
distinction between first order logic and type theory was not completely clarified
until 1935 (Hodges 2001, 1–4). Hence it is unsurprising that Carnap does not
mention first order logic or any restriction of the mathematical formalism that
might point towards the restriction to first order logic, except for a reference
to the ideal physics as an “axiomatic system of pure deduction”27 (Carnap 1923,
103). Syntactic deduction is complete for first order logic, but not for type theory
(Gödel 1930, 1931), and relying only on syntactic deduction essentially reduces the
possible inferences of type theory to those of first order logic (Henkin 1950). But
since these results were unknown when Carnap wrote “Aufgabe”, this should not
be read as an exclusive endorsement of first order logic by Carnap. Furthermore,
Carnap thought that type theory was complete (Reck 2007). Indeed, given his
focus on type theory in his research on axiomatics (cf. Reck 2007), it would be
rather surprising if he had demanded first order axiomatizations.
A restriction to first order logic is furthermore incompatible with the logical
pluralism of Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance (Carnap 1934a, §17), which grew out
of the protocol sentence debate in philosophy of science (Carus 2007, 252–256).
Carnap (1956b, §II) sometimes considers different restrictions on the observational
part of a language (since this part is considered to be completely interpreted by
observation), but the theoretical language (LT ) is unrestricted (Carnap 1956b, 46):
For LT we do not claim to have a complete interpretation, but only
the indirect and partial interpretation given by the correspondence
rules. Therefore, we should feel free to choose the logical structure of
this language as it best fits our needs for the purpose for which the
language is constructed.
The choice of a logic for the description of theories is a practical one. If Carnap
had considered first order logic to be the most expedient for all theories, of course,
then he might have developed the Received View based on first order logic, simply
because he would not have expected type theory to be relevant for science.
But Carnap is in clear agreement with Suppes (1967, 58) that first order logic is
too cumbersome, as he explicitly suggests infinite type theory for reconstructions.
Already in the Aufbau, Carnap (1928a, §30) writes that
Russell has applied his theory [of types] only to formal-logical struc-
tures, not to a system of concrete concepts (more precisely: only to
variables and logical constants, not to nonlogical constants). Our
object spheres are Russell’s “types” applied to extralogical concepts.
27“axiomatisches System reiner Deduktion”
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Since the concept of object spheres is used throughout Carnap’s reconstruction
(e. g., §§109–118), there is no question about his stance on its expedience.
It is clear that Carnap’s later writings on the Received View allow for type
theory because each of the works on which Suppe’s exposition is based either
explicitly uses infinite type theory or refers to a work that does. In “Theoretical
concepts”, 43, for instance, he conjectures that “acceptance of the following three
conventions C1–C3 is sufficient to make sure that LT includes all of mathematics
that is needed in science”:
Conventions about the domain D of entities admitted as values of
variables in LT .
C1. D includes a denumerable subdomain I of entities.
C2. Any ordered n-tuple of entities in D (for any finite n) belongs
also to D .
C3. Any class of entities in D belongs also to D .
Convention C1 includes denumerably many objects in the domain, C2 includes
relations of any of the domain’s elements in the domain, and C3 includes classes
of any of the domain’s elements in the domain. The result is that any predicate or
relation in the domain can be in the scope of another predicate or relation, and
this is just infinite type theory. Given the incompleteness of type theory, Carnap
(1956b, 51, 62) relies on semantic entailment rather than syntactic deduction for
his rules of inference.
The article that includes this construction was motivated by Hempel’s un-
published (at the time) discussion of Carnap’s philosophy of science (Hempel
1963).28 Accordingly, Carnap (1963c, §24.A, n. 38) refers to this article in his direct
response to Hempel. He points out some differences between their presentations,
but none with respect to the use of type theory. Carnap (1963c, §24.C, n. 41), also
refers to another elaboration of his position (Carnap 1958, 237), in which he is
even more explicit about his logical assumptions:
Let the structure of LT be such that it contains a type theory with an
infinite series of domains D0, D1, D2, etc.; Dn is called the nth-level
domain. Each variable and each constant belongs to a specific type.
Each variable of type n has Dn as its domain and each constant of
type n refers to an element of Dn .29
In his popular introduction to the philosophy of science, Carnap (1966, 253, n. 2)
28Carnap had read Hempel’s discussion in 1954 (Carnap 1963c, §24.B).
29“Die Struktur von LT sei so, dass sie eine Stufenlogik mit einer unendlichen Folge von Bereichen
D0, D1, D2, usw. enthält; Dn heisst der Bereich n-ter Stufe. Jede Variable und jede Konstante gehört
zu einer bestimmten Stufe. Jede Variable n-ter Stufe hat Dn als Wertbereich, und jede Konstante n-ter
Stufe bezeichnet ein Element von Dn .”
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refers to this text as an elaboration of his position and gives a simplified version of
the conventions C1–C3 from “Theoretical concepts”.
Accordingly, Carnap (1954, §44, §48) uses higher order logic extensively in
axiomatizations of mathematical concepts like the natural numbers, as well as
physical notions like space-time topology. He also relies on higher order logic
for more straightforwardly philosophical investigations, such as discussions of
philosophical method (Carnap 1934a, §§26–27) and the definition of scientific
concepts in phenomenalistic terms as in the Aufbau (Carnap 1928a, §§107–122).
Hempel is not as vocal as Carnap about the use of type theory, but he also
does not dismiss it. Specifically, he does not distance himself from Carnap’s use of
type theory, even when he refers to Carnap’s expositions of the Received View in
type theory (Hempel 1965g, 194–197; 1963, §I, n. 2).
In some cases, he attaches considerable weight to analyzes of first order logic.
For example, in his discussion of the eliminability of theoretical terms, Hempel
(1965g, 211–212) states that Craig’s theorem applies “provided that [the theory]
satisfies certain extremely liberal and unconfining conditions”. Elsewhere, Hempel
(1963, 698) states that Craig’s theorem applies “in a very comprehensive class of
cases”. But, as Hempel himself notes, Craig’s theorem assumes first order logic.
On the other hand, Hempel (1973, 264–265) states later, after having aban-
doned the Received View, that
the precisely characterized languages by reference to which certain
philosophical problems have been studied are often distinctly simpler
than those required for the purposes of science. For example, Car-
nap’s theory of reduction and confirmability, and his vast system of
inductive logic are limited to languages with first-order logic, which
certainly does not suffice for the formulation of contemporary physi-
cal theories. The same remark applies to various studies by Carnap
and other empiricists that deal with the structure and function of
scientific theories [ . . . ].
It is not clear to which of Carnap’s studies on the structure of scientific theories
Hempel refers. Without being seriously mistaken, he cannot mean Carnap’s
expositions of the Received View, quoted above. The last conception of reduction
and confirmability30 in which Carnap (1937) relies on first order logic was quickly
followed by a generalization that allows correspondence rules of any logical kind
for reduction (Carnap 1938, 1939; see also Carnap 1963b, 424).
This misrepresentation of Carnap’s views notwithstanding, the passage shows
that at least in 1973, Hempel was of the opinion that a restriction to first order logic
puts more than just an “extremely liberal and unconfining” condition on scientific
theories. So either Hempel had changed his mind at that point, or he thought that
30See Gemes (1998b, §1.4) for the curious relation between the two via the concept of empirical
significance.
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even without coverage of physical theories, first order logic would suffice for a
“very comprehensive class” of theories. Or, in a more dubious interpretation, he
may have thought that a sentence S is not part of the observational content of a
theory T if T entails S, but S is not deducible from T . Then the observational
content of a theory described in type theory could be captured by transcribing
it into first order logic (Henkin 1950, cf. Leivant 1994, §5.5) and then applying
Craig’s theorem.
All of the preceding claims by Hempel about first order logic are descriptive,
that is, he states its conditions on the axiomatizations of scientific theories. So
while he may have been mistaken about the expedience of type theory, at no point
does he demand that it be excluded from axiomatizations. Instead, Hempel (1965g,
201–202) uses type theory himself to arrive at explicit definitions for real-valued
measurement results in observational terms. He notes that using type theory
“will be considered too high [a price] by nominalists”, but adds that “it would
no doubt be generally considered a worthwhile advance in clarification if for a
set of theoretical scientific expressions explicit definitions in terms of observables
can be constructed at all”. Just like Carnap, Hempel is of the opinion that a
properly observational language must not have a logical apparatus that is too
strong: He cautions that “the definiens will normally be teeming with symbols of
quantification over individuals and over classes and relations of various types and
will be far from providing finite observational criteria of application”. However,
he proceeds to give the definition anyway, showing that he does not consider
exclusive reliance on first order logic a necessity.
Besides using type theory for philosophical analyses, Hempel also considers
higher order axiomatizations of scientific theories to be consistent with the de-
mands of the Received View. Like Feigl (1970, 8), Hempel (1970, §3) lists the
axiomatizations given by Suppes as acceptable within the Received View, and
he explicitly notes that they use “set theory and mathematical analysis” which
are “more powerful” than first order logic. This may be questioned, since there
are first order axiomatizations of set theory and thus of mathematics, insofar as
set theory can be a foundation of mathematics in general. But Hempel’s note
does show once again that he does not consider exclusive reliance on first order
logic necessary. The clearest example, however, is Woodger’s axiomatization of
parts of cell biology (Woodger 1939). Both Feigl (1970, 8) and Hempel (1952, 687)
accept this axiomatization as a possible reconstruction, and Woodger (1939, §III)
explicitly uses type theory. Finally, Hempel (1970, §2, n. 4) also gives a list of expo-
sitions of the Received View; among them are some of the ones by Carnap (1956b,
1966) described above, and another one in which Carnap (1939, §14) explicitly
discusses type theory. There is thus no indication in Hempel’s work that he thinks
that axiomatizations have to rely on first order logic only, and there are multiple
passages in which he either uses type theory himself, endorses reconstructions
that do, or counts works that endorse type theory as expositions of the Received
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View.
Of course, there is an abundance of formulas in first order logic and simple
first order theories in Hempel’s and Carnap’s writings. In discussing Carnap’s
studies of probability theory, which rely solely on first order logic, Hempel (1973,
265) describes and seems to agree with Carnap’s view of these analyses:
[ . . . ] Carnap often stressed that these studies are intended only as the
first stage in the development of more comprehensive theories, and
that the solutions they offer may well permit of extension to more
complex situations.
In other words, the studies focus on cases in which the problem seems solvable, in
the hope that the results can be generalized to more complicated situations. A nice
example of such a generalization is described by Psillos (2000, §1, n. 7), who argues
that Carnap rediscovered the Ramsey sentence approach while trying to generalize
Craig’s theorem to type theory. That Hempel shared Carnap’s view on individual
analyses as a starting point for generalizations is suggested by his discussion of the
problems of confirmation. After noting that a criterion of confirmation should
be applicable to hypotheses of any logical form, Hempel (1965f, §5) suggests
that a criterion that is only applicable to laws of the form ‘All ravens are black’
might “still be considered as stating a particularly obvious and important sufficient
condition of confirmation”.
First order axiomatizations also often appear as examples in Hempel’s writings.
On the use of Ramsey sentences, Hempel (1965g, §9, my emphasis) states that
their
logical apparatus is more extravagant than that required by [the origi-
nal theories]. In our illustration, for example, [the original theories]
contain variables and quantifiers only with respect to individuals
(physical objects), whereas the Ramsey-sentence [ . . . ] contains vari-
ables and quantifiers also for properties of individuals.
When discussing correspondence rules, Hempel (1963, 692, my emphases) again
writes: “For example, the logical framework might be that of the first-order func-
tional calculus with identity”. He adds, again ignoring all of the later publications
by Carnap (1938, 1939, 1956b, etc.) on the topic: “This is, in fact, one of the
principal cases with which Carnap’s theory of reduction is concerned”.31
Hempel’s inaccurate remarks about Carnap’s reliance on first order logic may
help to explain how this misconception became part of philosophical folklore.
Suppes’s switch from the discussion of the “standard sketch”, which is the Received
View, to the discussion of “standard formalizations”, which are not demanded in
the Received View, clearly has also contributed to the confusion, at least in the
31Of course, Hempel mentions first order logic as one of the principal cases. But if type theory is
meant to be the other principal case, his remark is wholly mystifying.
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cases of Beatty (1980), Ereshefsky (1991), and Suppe (1974a). Suppe popularized
this misconception through his canonical exposition. Another possible explana-
tion stems from Carnap’s exclusive reliance on first order logic in his explication of
probability (Carnap 1950b). This part of Carnap’s work may have been influential
enough to overshadow his use of type theory in other works. Finally, Quine’s
stance that higher order logic is not proper logic but rather mathematics (Quine
1970) probably also contributed to the idea that proponents of the Received View
always referred to first order logic when speaking of logic.
The likely influence of Quine’s stance and the logicians who followed him in
this respect (cf. Leivant 1994, §5.2) finds a peculiar analogy in a critique of the
Received View on the grounds that it relies on a distinction between theoretical
and observational vocabulary. In this critique, van Fraassen (1980, §3.6) remarks
that “logicians attached importance to restricted vocabularies, and that was seem-
ingly enough for philosophers to think them important too”, and concludes that
the Received View “focussed attention on philosophically irrelevant technical
questions”. This may very well be true in the case of first order logic, except that
the philosophers in question are not the proponents of the Received View, but
their critics. Now, second order logic is already enough “to capture directly most
all mathematical practice” (Leivant 1994, §5.2, §7; cf. Väänänen 2001, 515), and
capturing mathematical practice only gets easier for higher orders. Thus the slogan
“Mathematics for the philosophy of science, not meta-mathematics”, emphatically
endorsed by critics of the Received View (Muller 2010, §2; cf. van Fraassen 1972,
309; 1989, 221–222),32 makes sense as a criticism of “standard formalizations” only
under the identification of first order logic with meta-mathematics and higher or-
der logic with mathematics. But the slogan “Higher order logic for the philosophy
of science, not first order logic” could just as well have been Carnap’s.
3.4 Exhaustive axiomatization
Although the Received View does not demand first order logic, it may still turn out
to be overly cumbersome if it demands the exhaustive axiomatization of scientific
theories and all of the mathematics they contain. In reference to van Fraassen
(1980), who explicitly argues against the Received View, Suppes (1992, 207–208)
criticizes the philosophers of science who rely on “standard formalizations”:
Suppose we want to give a standard formalization of elementary
probability theory. [Only] after stating a group of axioms on sets,
and another group on the real numbers, [are we] in a position to
state the axioms that belong just to probability theory as it is usually
32The slogan is attributed to Patrick Suppes, but the closest published phrase I could find is: “[T]he
basic methods appropriate for axiomatic studies in the empirical sciences are not metamathematical
(and thus syntactical and semantical), but set-theoretical” (Suppes 1954, 244).
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conceived. In this welter of axioms, those special to probability can
easily be lost sight of.
More important, it is senseless and uninteresting continually to
repeat these general axioms on sets and on numbers whenever we
consider formalizing a scientific theory. No one does it, and for good
reason.
In Suppes’s sense, a standard formalization of a theory is thus not only restricted
to first order logic, but also must specify all of the axioms on every mathematical
concept that occurs in the theory.
Suppes suggests instead a reconstruction of theories in the Semantic View,
which does not require specifying all of the mathematical axioms, and accordingly
leads to much simpler formalizations. Speaking in favor of the Semantic View,
Stegmüller (1979, §1) argues that Carnap’s approach to scientific theories could
only be executed by philosophers with technical abilities far beyond even those of
Montague (1962), who gave an exhaustive axiomatization for Newtonian mechan-
ics. Muller (2010, §7), after suggesting improvements to both the Received View
and the Semantic View that bring them quite close together, concludes that
the gap remains sufficiently wide to prefer the [improved Semantic
View] over the [improved Received View], because the starting point
for [the semantic] construal remains a set-theoretical predicate [ . . . ],
and because the formal theories [ . . . ] need never be spelled out (the
formalising labour that is mandatory in the [Received View] need
not be performed).
Muller explicitly assumes that the welter of axioms Suppes ascribes to standard
formalizations also occurs in the Received View. Van Fraassen (1972, 306) makes
this assumption as well.
It seems, indeed, like an unacceptable burden on philosophical analysis to
demand such “formalizing labor”—the exhaustive axiomatization of every concept
employed by the theory under consideration. Fortunately, contrary to what its
critics claim, the Received View does not demand this. It is true that both Hempel
(1952, 733, n. 24) and Feigl (1970, 8) mention Woodger’s exhaustive axiomatiza-
tion of parts of biology as in keeping with the Received View, but this indicates
only that exhaustive axiomatizations are allowed, not that they are required. Be-
sides Woodger’s axiomatization, Hempel also mentions the axiomatization of
the theory of relativity by Reichenbach and the axiomatization of game theory
by von Neumann and Morgenstern, while Feigl refers to the axiomatizations of
Reichenbach and of Suppes himself, none of which are exhaustive. Hempel (1970,
149–150) later calls Reichenbach’s treatment “axiomatically oriented, though not
strictly formalized”, but still considers Suppes’s treatments to be full-fledged ax-
iomatizations. Hempel (1974, 247, my emphasis) also calls Suppes’s axiomatization
“technically much more elegant and rigorous than Reichenbach’s”, suggesting that
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the exhaustiveness of axiomatizations comes in degrees.
Relatedly, Carnap (1939, §15) notes that it would be “practically impossible to
give each deduction which occurs the form of a complete derivation in the logical
calculus [ . . . ]. But it is essential that this dissolution is theoretically possible and
practically possible for any small part of the process”. In other words, obvious
or uncontentious steps in a derivation may be skipped, as well as the axioms on
which they rely if the axioms are not needed at other points in the derivation.
Carnap (1939, §16) gives a general description of this method, which seems to
describe Suppes’s strategy for avoiding the “welter of axioms” quite well:
Each of the nonlogical calculi [that are applied in science] consists,
strictly speaking, of two parts: a logical basic calculus and a specific
calculus added to it. The basic calculus could be approximately the
same for all those calculi; it could consist of the sentential calculus
and a smaller or greater part of the functional calculus as previously
outlined. The specific partial calculus does not usually contain ad-
ditional rules of inference but only additional primitive sentences,
called axioms. As the basic calculus is essentially the same for all the
different specific calculi, it is customary not to mention it at all but
to describe only the specific part of the calculus.
Since “the functional calculus as previously outlined” contains type theory and
mathematics (Carnap 1939, §14), this allows a large number of axioms to go
unmentioned.
The restriction of the exposition to a specific calculus is quite common ac-
cording to Carnap (1939, §23), as he notes that “the customary formulation of a
physical calculus is such that it presupposes a logico-mathematical calculus as its
basis”. When Carnap (1939, §16) gives a simple theory of thermal expansion as an
example of a calculus, he accordingly uses—but does not axiomatize—its logical
and mathematical concepts. In a derivation within this calculus, mathematical
inferences take up one step and are simply marked “Proved mathem. theorem”.
Hempel (1958, §3) goes one step further when analyzing the role of theoretical
terms in a simple theory of buoyancy, by both using mathematics without giving
all axioms (postulate 3.4) and describing the logical relations in natural language
(postulate 3.3).
Carnap’s description of the additional primitive sentences in a nonlogical
calculus as ‘axioms’ may have led to the misconception that the Received View
demands an exhaustive logical calculus, rather than (at most) an exhaustive specific
one. This distinction may not have been made clear enough in many of the works
of the Received View, although Carnap (1950b, 15–16), for example, refers to his
earlier distinction between the basic and the specific calculus (Carnap 1939, §16)
when discussing formalizations of probability theory, and states:
The formalization (or axiomatization) of a theory or of the concepts
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of a theory is here understood in the sense of the construction of a
formal system, an axiom system (or postulate system) for that theory.
[ . . . ]
In the discussions of this book we are [ . . . ] thinking of those
semiformal, semi-interpreted systems which are constructed by con-
temporary authors, especially mathematicians, under the title of ax-
iom systems (or postulate systems). In a system of this kind the
axiomatic terms (for instance, in Hilbert’s axiom system of geometry
the terms ‘point’, ‘line’, ‘incidence’, ‘between’, and others) remain un-
interpreted, while for all or some of the logical terms occurring [ . . . ]
and sometimes for certain arithmetical terms [ . . . ] their customary
interpretation is—in most cases tacitly—presupposed.
This passage is a general description of how the tacit presupposition of axioms is to
be understood, and it could well serve as a conclusion to the quote by Suppes (1992,
207–208) at the beginning of this section (page 108). It also accurately describes
Carnap’s own methodology for analyzing probability (Carnap 1950b), in that he
uses mathematics without axiomatizing mathematical concepts. And this is not a
singular case: Already in the Aufbau, Carnap (1928a, §112) defines ‘quality class’
by using, but not axiomatizing, arithmetic division (cf. Carnap 1928a, §97).
Therefore, the Received View cannot be criticized for demanding an unwieldy
and overly difficult formalization from all philosophers of science. As their own
practice shows, Hempel and Feigl consider axiomatizations exhaustive enough
even when they do not list each and every axiom used in a derivation. Carnap not
only presents and uses axiomatizations that leave out all of mathematics, but he
also describes in general how a theory can be axiomatized with a specific calculus
alone, while the basic calculus is presupposed.
Of course, one may still criticize the Received View on the grounds that
any kind of axiomatization, whether exhaustive or not, is fruitless.33 Such a
criticism, however, could not be made from within the Semantic View of Suppes
or Stegmüller, since it relies on non-exhaustive axiomatizations. Such an argument
would also need to establish that, for example, Suppes (1968), Betti and de Jong
(2008), Betti et al. (2009), and Leitgeb (2009) are mistaken in their defense of formal
approaches. And finally, as Halvorson (2012, 203) puts it:
[W]hat would “informal philosophy of science” look like? Should
the informal philosopher of science eschew all use of mathematical
notation or concepts? But how then should the informal philosopher
of science discuss quantum mechanics or general relativity or string
theory?
It is plausible that not all scientific theories can be fruitfully axiomatized, but it
also seems clear that some can. In §3.8.2, I will argue that this comparably weak
33I thank an anonymous referee for HOPOS for this point.
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claim is enough to justify the Received View.
3.5 The formalization of theories
Not all formalizations of a scientific theory are equally good. While the Received
View does not demand exhaustive axiomatizations in first order logic, it may
nevertheless assume formalizations that are fruitless or useless. To counter this
charge, I will show that throughout Carnap’s philosophical career, he relied on
formalizations of scientific theories in phase space, which is also van Fraassen’s
preferred formalization.
“Aufgabe”, 97, only contains a very abstract reference to physical laws as axiom
systems and the claim that the physical world is free from perceptual qualities.
This is fleshed out in “Dreidimensionalität”, 107, where the physical world is said
to contain
only space and time magnitudes and certain non-perceptual state
magnitudes. In their purest form, these three kinds of magnitudes
also have a character not in the slightest comparable to space, time,
or perceptual qualities, but are bare assignments of numbers, that is,
relational terms. For intuitiveness, the terms space, time, processes,
changes, etc. will still be used.34
In “Aufgabe”, the third volume of the ideal physics describes the world by giving
the value of each magnitude at each point in space for two different times. In
“Dreidimensionalität”, 120, Carnap notes that one can equivalently give the value
and the derivative of each magnitude at each point in space for just one time. In
“Aufgabe”, 101, Carnap refers to Russell and Mongré-Hausdorff for the proof
that derivatives cannot be considered instantaneous magnitudes, so that a single
moment in time cannot describe the physical world completely; the equivalence
however allows one to use the more expedient description at a single moment. In
contemporary vocabulary, Carnap is in “Dreidimensionalität” describing a phase
space with position and velocity as generalized coordinates.
The laws in this pure physical world are free from the concept of causation as
it occurs in the ordinary world (“Dreidimensionalität”, 108):
The processes of the physical world do not act upon each other,
but for them a dependency holds that must be considered a pure
mathematical-functional relation [ . . . ].35
34“in der es nur Raum- und Zeitgrößen und gewisse nichtsinnliche Zustandsgrößen gibt. In der
reinsten Form haben auch diese drei Größenarten keinerlei mit Räumlichkeit, Zeitlichkeit oder
Sinnesqualität vergleichbaren Charakter, sondern sind bloße Zahlbestimmungen, d. h. Relationster-
me. Aus Gründen der Anschaulichkeit werden trotzdem die Bezeichnungen Raum, Zeit, Vorgänge,
Veränderungen usw. beibehalten.”
35“Die Vorgänge der physikalischen Welt wirken nicht aufeinander, sondern es gilt für sie eine
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In “Dreidimensionalität”, 118, Carnap clearly describes the laws of theories as
restrictions on phase space:
If any element of a class depends on other elements in such a way
that it is uniquely determined whenever some subclass of the others
is determined, we call the dependency-relation a “deterministic law”
and the class “deterministic”. [ . . . ]
Laws of dependency that do not result in a unique determination
for some element even when all others are determined, but still restrict
the possibilities for this element, we call “restricting laws”.36
The conception of a phase space is elaborated in chapter III of Begriffsbildung,
entitled “Abstract level: The four-dimensional world events”37. Here, Carnap first
suggests identifying space-time points by four-tuples so that a physical description
of the world consists in assigning the values of the basic physical magnitudes to
each point in four-dimensional space-time. In a second suggestion, he goes beyond
this geometrical description and lets descriptions of the world consist of sets of
tuples with the first four values being the space-time points, the rest being the
values of the physical magnitudes. This then is the purely numerical phase space
description of “Dreidimensionalität”. As in “Dreidimensionalität”, laws of nature
are in both cases restrictions on the possible descriptions—restrictions on the
possible assignments of values to space-time points in the geometrical case, and
restrictions on the possible sets of tuples in the numerical case (Begriffsbildung,
58). The full correspondence rules that lead to the qualities of ‘white’ and ‘salty’
begin, at the most abstract level, with purely mathematical descriptions in tuples.
These tuples are assigned to electron configurations, which are assigned to specific
crystals, which are finally assigned to the phenomenal qualities (Begriffsbildung,
60).
Carnap (1963a, 15–16) himself considers this aspect of Begriffsbildung to be
closely connected to his later work, writing:
I described the world of physics as an abstract system of ordered
quadruples of real numbers to which values of certain functions are
co-ordinated; the quadruples represent space-time points, and the
functions represent the state-magnitudes of physics. This abstract
conception of the system of physics was later elaborated in my work
on the theoretical language.
Abhängigkeit, die als reine mathematisch-funktionale Beziehung aufzufassen ist [ . . . ].”
36“Wenn irgendein Element einer Klasse derart von andern Elementen abhängt, daß es eindeutig
bestimmt ist, sobald eine gewisse Teilklasse der übrigen festliegt, so nennen wir die Abhängigkeitsbe-
ziehung ein „determinierendes Gesetz“ und die Klasse „determiniert“. [ . . . ]
Abhängigkeitsgesetze, die zwar für irgendein Element, selbst wenn alle übrigen bestimmt sind, nicht
eindeutige Bestimmtheit ergeben, aber doch die Möglichkeit für dieses Element einschränken, nennen
wir „beschränkende Gesetze“.”
37“Abstrakte Stufe: das vierdimensionale Weltgeschehen”
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Of course, the points of Begriffsbildung to which Carnap here refers essentially
recapitulate the same points of “Dreidimensionalität”. Carnap relies on both
works in the Aufbau, §136, where the physical world that he aims to construct is
a “(purely numerical) structure”. The formalism suggested in these three texts is
also used in “Theoretical concepts” and “Beobachtungssprache” (see §3.1), with
the same stress on the purely mathematical character of the space-time tuples and
the assignment of other numbers to those tuples as physical magnitudes at those
space-time points. The discussion in the two early works makes clear the role of
physical theories as restrictions on phase space.
Now compare Carnap’s account of the formalization of scientific theories to
that of van Fraassen. In an outline of his version of the Semantic View (endorsed,
for example, by Suppe 1974a, 222–223), van Fraassen (1970, 328–329) focuses on
the formal structure of nonrelativistic theories in physics [ . . . ]. A
physical theory then typically uses a mathematical model to represent
the behavior of a certain kind of physical system. A physical system
is conceived of as capable of a certain set of states, and these states
are represented by elements of a certain mathematical space, the state-
space. [ . . . ] To give the simplest example, a classical particle[’s] [ . . . ]
state-space can be taken to be Euclidean 6-space, whose points are the
6-tuples of real numbers (qx , qy , qz , px , py , pz ).
Van Fraassen (1970, 330) then distinguishes between laws of coexistence, laws
of succession, and laws of interaction. In the non-statistical case (van Fraassen
1970, §5.1), laws of coexistence select the physically possible subset of the state-
space (van Fraassen 1970, 330), laws of succession select, in the instantaneous state
picture, the physically possible trajectories in the state-space (van Fraassen 1970,
331), and laws of interaction at least in principle reduce to the above (van Fraassen
1970, 332).
It is striking how close van Fraassen’s schema for the formalization of scientific
theories resembles Carnap’s in “Aufgabe”, “Dreidimensionalität”, Begriffsbildung,
“Theoretical concepts”, and “Beobachtungssprache”. Both accounts describe a
classical particle as located in four-dimensional space-time, being assigned the
relevant physical magnitudes (momentum in van Fraassen’s example). In both
accounts, the phase space38 is restricted by the scientific theory.
The difference between the accounts lies mainly in their use of semantics: In
Carnap’s account, the phase space description is given in the object language and is
related to observations via correspondence rules in the object language. With the
adoption of Tarski’s semantics in L&M, a semantic interpretation is given to the
observations in the metalanguage. In van Fraassen’s account, the interpretation of
physical theories relies on “elementary statements”:
38‘Phase space’ seems to be a more common term for this description of physical systems than
‘state-space’.
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Besides the state-space, the theory uses a certain set of measurable
physical magnitudes to characterize the physical system. This yields
the set of elementary statements about the system (of the theory): each
elementary statement U formulates a proposition to the effect that a
certain such physical magnitude m has a certain value r at a certain
time t . (Thus we write U = U (m, r, t ) [ . . . ].)
[ . . . ] For each elementary statement U there is a region h(U ) of
the state-space H such that U is true if and only if the system’s actual
state is represented by an element of h(U ). [ . . . ] The mapping h (the
satisfaction function) is the third characteristic feature of the theory.
[ . . . ] The exact relation between U (m, r, t ) and the outcome of an
actual experiment is the subject of an auxiliary theory of measure-
ment, of which the notion of “correspondence rule” gives only the
shallowest characterization.
The swipe about correspondence rules references an article by Suppes (1967).
I will show in §3.6.6 that both Suppes and van Fraassen greatly underestimate
the complexity allowed by the correspondence rules as suggested by Carnap and
Hempel. In van Fraassen’s account, the phase space description is given in the
metalanguage and semantically related to the elementary statements in the object
language, which are then related to measurement outcomes via correspondence
rules, possibly in the object language. Van Fraassen is silent about the semantic
interpretation of the measurement outcomes.
At the theory level, that is, the restriction of the phase space by the theory,
the only difference between Carnap and van Fraassen is that the former considers
the description to be part of the object language, the latter considers it part of
the metalanguage. But since both Carnap and van Fraassen take their respective
languages to include all of mathematics and allow as much or as little explicit
formalization as expedient (see §3.4), this difference is merely verbal.
Later versions of van Fraassen’s the Semantic View left out elementary state-
ments, relying only on the restriction of the phase space, and a relation of the
theory to observations in the metalanguage (for example, van Fraassen 1989, 365,
n. 34; French and Ladyman 1999). But without an object language, there cannot
be a metalanguage (see n. 32), and so this account is in fact very close to that
of Carnap in his early works, where a theory is described in phase space (with
the help of some language, of course) and connected within the language to a
distinguished set of (observation) sentences, without mention of their semantic
interpretation. The main difference seems to be that Carnap assumes that the
language is or can be completely formal, while van Fraassen only assumes that it
is precise enough to describe the notions of model theory (see §4.2.1) and of the
phase space formalism. The alleged difference between the object language and
the metalanguage then is rather the difference between a well-defined language
and the semi-regulated language of mathematics as it is found in textbooks and
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research papers.
3.6 Connecting theoretical and observational terms
by correspondence rules
Many criticisms of the Received View essentially maintain that it is misguided
to assume a bipartition of the language into observational and theoretical terms,
and a connection between those terms via correspondence rules. Starting from a
history of the nature of correspondence rules, I will argue that Carnap’s examples
for observational and theoretical terms were correct within the framework of
the Received View, and that the bipartition of a language does not have to be
unduly complex. Furthermore, correspondence rules for the theoretical terms of
one theory can come from other theories, and neither have to be (nor have been)
overly simple.
3.6.1 The structure of correspondence rules
The typical view on Carnap’s position on correspondence rules (see §3.1) is that
in the Aufbau, Carnap assumed the explicit definability of all theoretical terms in
observational terms, but that later he progressively weakened his stance until he
assumed that (i) theoretical terms are not definable in observational terms and (ii)
observational terms may be definable in theoretical terms. I now want to show
that in fact Carnap always assumed (i), and that (ii) is, if anything, a strengthening
of his original position.39
In “Aufgabe”, as in the Introduction, the correspondence rules are such that
any statement in observational terms can be described in theoretical terms, but
not vice versa. Carnap (1923, 100) writes about the correspondence rules (the
“dictionary”):
The dictionary can be used in both directions: It serves both for the
translation of a phenomenal fact into the physical and conversely. It
has to be noted, however, that the correlation is unique only in the
second case; while, for two different reasons, a specific phenomenal
content generally corresponds to not only one specific physical fact
but an infinite set of them.40
Carnap thus claims that the dictionary associates with each physical state exactly
39I thank Christopher French for helpful discussions about this section.
40“Das Wörterbuch ist in beiden Richtungen benutzbar: es dient sowohl zur Übersetzung eines
phänomenalen Tatbestandes in den entsprechenden physikalischen, wie auch umgekehrt. Es ist jedoch
zu bemerken, daß nur im zweiten Falle die Zuordnung eindeutig ist; während aus zwei verschiede-
nen Gründen einem bestimmten Empfindungsinhalt i. A. nicht nur ein bestimmter physikalischer
Tatbestand entspricht, sondern eine unendliche Menge von solchen.”
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one phenomenal state, but with each phenomenal state an infinite set of physical
states.
Carnap’s first reason for the lack of uniqueness in the latter case is the exis-
tence of multiple microscopic realizations of physical macrostates in, for example,
thermodynamics. His second reason is the perception threshold (Carnap 1923,
100). Later, in Probability, Carnap argues that because of this perception threshold,
it cannot be required that there is a difference in temperatures only if there is a
difference in heat sensations (see §3.1). Carnap adds two more reasons in “Dreidi-
mensionalität”, 126: First, a sensation does not uniquely identify the location of
its physical source; second, a sensation (e. g., of a color) corresponds to a multitude
of physical states (e. g., a multitude of frequency distributions of electromagnetic
waves).
In modern terminology, this feature of the correspondence rules can be phrased
syntactically or semantically. (Of course, in 1923 Carnap could not have made that
distinction easily, since he first learned of it from Tarski, whom he did not meet
until 1930 (Carnap 1963a, 60, 30).) If the phenomenal and physical facts are given
by sentences (that is, syntactically), Carnap claims that for every observational
sentence ω, the correspondence rules entail that ω is true if and only if one of
infinitely many theoretical sentences is true. A special case of this situation occurs
when the theory entails that the infinitely many theoretical sentences are true if
and only if one other theoretical sentence is true. For example, a physical theory
may entail that one of infinitely many descriptions of physical microstates is true if
and only if some description τ of a physical macrostate is true. In this special case,
the correspondence rules together with the theory entail thatω is equivalent to τ,
that is, the observational sentence can be translated into a theoretical sentence.41
If this holds for all formulas of the observational language, it is known from the
theory of definition that every observational term can be explicitly defined in
theoretical terms. Thus if Carnap assumed the translatability of all observational
formulas, his earliest view is equivalent to (ii), that all observational terms are
definable in theoretical terms (although without the qualification that this may be
the case). Otherwise, his later view was stronger than his earlier view.
Conversely, Carnap assumed that for every theoretical sentence τ, the corre-
spondence rules entail that if τ is true, then exactly one observational sentence
is true, but the converse does not hold. Thus Carnap’s earliest view was that no
theoretical sentence is equivalent to an observational sentence, or in other words,
that no theoretical sentence is translatable into an observational one. It is known
from definition theory that then no theoretical term is definable in observational
terms. Hence Carnap’s earliest view entails (i).
If the phenomenal and physical facts are given by model theoretic structures
(that is, semantically), Carnap claims that a structure for the theoretical vocabulary
can be expanded in at most one way to a model of the correspondence rules, since
41Note that Carnap does not use ‘translation’ in the modern sense.
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there is exactly one observational structure for each theoretical one. Thus the
correspondence rules entail an explicit definition for each observational term
(according to Beth’s theorem) for correspondence rules in first order logic and
(according to theorem 3 by Tarski 1935) for a finite number of correspondence
rules in finite type theory (cf. Leivant 1994, §5.1). On the other hand, each
structure for the observational vocabulary can be expanded to infinitely many
models of the correspondence rules. This means that the correspondence rules
do not entail an explicit definition for each theoretical term (according to Padoa’s
theorem).
In other words, already in his very first publication on the structure of theo-
ries, Carnap claims that (i) theoretical terms cannot be defined in observational
terms, and he might also claim that (ii) observational terms can be defined in
theoretical terms. Later, however, Carnap only went so far as to state that given
the contemporary state of science it seems that in the future, all observational
terms can be explicitly defined—see §3.1). Of course, when he wrote “Aufgabe”,
definition theory and formal semantics were not yet developed enough to phrase
this consequence so clearly, but this is what his position entails. Furthermore,
Carnap (1936, 168) referred to Tarski’s article (Tarski 1935) very soon thereafter,
and so could have seen the relation then.
In his “Autobiography”, Carnap (1963a, 15–16) notes the close connection of
his later work to the phase space approach in Begriffsbildung, but he does remark
upon the similarly close connection to the relation of physical magnitudes and
experiences described in Begriffsbildung: As in “Aufgabe”, the relation is given
through a translation (Begriffsbildung, 60):
The retranslation of the pure statements about numbers of the ab-
stract physics into statements about qualities is possible because a
specific distribution of values is unambiguously assigned to specific
physical qualities, and finally specific perceptual qualities.42
An example would be the translation of the quadruples of numbers into average
kinetic energies as described in “Beobachtungssprache”, from there into tempera-
ture as described in the Introduction, and finally into heat experience as described
in Probability.
Since the assignments are unique, Begriffsbildung in effect repeats the claim
that observational states are uniquely determined by physical states. Carnap does
not explicitly state that the reverse is not the case, but repeats his claim from
“Aufgabe” and “Dreidimensionalität” that there is a perception threshold (Carnap
1926, 17):
At first, we could try [ . . . ] to assign a higher temperature to one
42“Die Rückübersetzung der reinen Zahlenaussagen der abstrakten Physik in Qualitätsaussagen ist
möglich, weil einer bestimmten Werteverteilung bestimmter Zustandsgrößen stets eindeutig bestimmte
physikalische Qualitäten, schließlich bestimmte Sinnesqualitäten zugeordnet sind.”
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body than another when it effects a stronger perception of warmth
[ . . . ]. However, this assignment procedure would prove itself to be
inexpedient in light of the fact of “heat exchange”. This is because,
when two bodies come into contact [and] only one changes percepti-
bly, then (for the sake of later laws of nature in connection with the
concept of specific heat) the other one is assigned a converse change
of imperceptible magnitude. 43
This illustration of the perception threshold led Carnap in the earlier two articles
to conclude that the theoretical states are not uniquely determined by the observa-
tional states. In Begriffsbildung, Carnap does nothing to counter this conclusion.
He thus does not give a perfectly clear endorsement of the thesis about the inde-
finability of theoretical terms that he would later hold; this clear endorsement
is given in the Aufbau, of all places—even though it is typically seen as the most
explicit endorsement of the explicit definability of all theoretical terms.
The “physicoqualitative correlation” that Carnap describes in the Aufbau,
§136, consists, first, of a one-to-one correspondence between the world points
of physics (the space-time points of Begriffsbildung) and the world points of the
perceptual world. Second, the many-one relation of “Aufgabe” and Begriffsbildung
holds between the physical magnitudes and the perceptual qualities. While each
physical state can be assigned a perceptual state,
in the opposite direction, the correlation is not unique; the assign-
ment of a quality to a world point in the perceptual world does not
determine which structure of state magnitudes is to be assigned to
the neighborhood of the corresponding physical world point of the
world of physics; the assignment merely determines a class to which
this structure must belong.
In his autobiography, Carnap (1963a, 19, §2) notes the relation of this part of the
Aufbau to his later work:
For the construction of the world of physics on the basis of the tem-
poral sequence of sensory qualities, I used the following method. A
system of ordered quadruples of real numbers serves as the system
of co-ordinates of space-time points. To these quadruples, sensory
qualities, e. g., colors, are assigned first, and then numbers as values of
physical state magnitudes. [ . . . ] In general, I introduced concepts by
43“Zunächst könnten wir versuchen, [ . . . ] einem Körper dann eine höhere Temperatur zuzu-
schreiben als einem anderen, wenn er eine stärkere Wärmeempfindung [ . . . ] hervorruft. Dieses
Zuschreibungsverfahren würde sich jedoch als unzweckmäßig erweisen angesichts der Tatsache des
„Wärmeausgleichs“. Wenn nämlich zwei Körper in Kontakt treten [und] nur bei dem einen eine Ände-
rung wahrnehmbar [ist], so wird, (späteren Naturgesetzen zuliebe, die bei dem Begriff der spezifischen
Wärme auftreten) dem andern eine entgegengesetzte Änderung von nicht wahrnehmbarer Größe
zugeschrieben.”
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explicit definitions, but here the physical concepts were introduced
instead on the basis of general principles of correspondence, simplic-
ity, and analogy. It seems to me that the procedure which is used in
the construction of the physical world, anticipates the method which
I recognized explicitly much later, namely the method of introducing
theoretical terms by postulates and rules of correspondence.
Typically, the discussion of Carnap’s attempt in the Aufbau to define all theoretical
terms in observational ones has followed Quine (1969b), and focused on the first
step at which Carnap’s procedure fails: The construction of the phenomenal
world through simplicity and analogy. Carnap (1963a) himself treats the step to
the phenomenal world together with the step to the physical world, and thereby
brushes over the point I have made here: Even if Carnap had succeeded in explic-
itly defining the concepts of the perceptual world, the physical magnitudes and
anything that relies on physical magnitudes for its construction are not explicitly
definable, according to his own position.
Contrary to this result, Friedman (1992) claims that Carnap rather gives a
method for arriving at explicit definitions in spite of the one-to-many relation
between phenomenal and physical facts. Friedman (1992, 21) wonders how it is
possible, “as Carnap claims in §179 [of the Aufbau], to translate all statements of
science into ‘statements about the basic objects, namely, about relations between
elementary experiences’”. And Friedman (1992, 21–22) suggests the following
answer:
Section 136 of the Aufbau refers us to “Aufgabe” for more details on
the physical-qualitative coordination. Although Carnap repeats the
claim that the coordination between “phenomenal facts” and corre-
sponding state-magnitudes is only unique [ . . . ] in the direction from
the latter to the former, he there outlines a procedure for nonetheless
approximating to a unique assignment of physical state-magnitudes
by focusing on a small neighborhood of a given phenomenally charac-
terized space-time point and working back and forth using the laws
of physics (1923, pp. 102–03). The crucial point is that the laws of
physics, together with an unambiguous determination of phenomenal
qualities from physical state-magnitudes, provide a methodological
procedure for narrowing down the ambiguity in the assignment of
physical state-magnitudes: in principle, a unique assignment is thereby
constructed after all. It appears, then, that in §136 of the Aufbau Car-
nap intends to achieve an unambiguous constitution of the world of
physics by just such a methodological procedure.
I do not think that this is Carnap’s claim. The method to which Friedman refers
is described in a passage in which Carnap relaxes the idealizing assumptions about
the third volume of an ideal physics, the complete knowledge of the state of the
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world. “Then the task is to calculate from the observed state of a bounded area,
namely our environment in space-time, the state of a different space-time area.”44
As a technical problem of this task, Carnap notes that to calculate even the state
of an arbitrarily small area just for one second would demand knowledge of the
state of the world in a 300 000 km radius. The bigger problem is that in principle
the physical state of an area cannot be uniquely determined from observations,
because the dictionary contains only one-many relations.
The method to come to predictions is given in the following passage, which I
quote almost in full:
For the following reason, a physics that is very far away even from
this more cautious fiction can make predictions based on observations
at all: To a specific observation report belong indeed an infinite set
of physical states of the area, and therefore a set of states of the same
cardinality for the future state under investigation [ . . . ]. But in many
cases, retranslating this infinite set of physical states into perceptual
contents results in a comparably small set of perceptual contents,
which in advantageous cases form a continuous region of qualities
(i. e., a domain of similar colors). First, the aspiration is now to make
observations that do not result in several unconnected regions of
qualities for the future point in time, and then to narrow down the
range of the one region of qualities as much as possible. [ . . . ] In
special cases and if the time interval is not too big, [the deficiencies
of the prediction] can be completely eliminated, that is, a unique
prediction can be reached. [ . . . ] This holds for the prediction of
perceptual contents, which is the only one demanded in practice. In
contradistinction, science always stays infinitely far away from the
unique prediction of physical states even for arbitrarily small time
intervals.45
44“Dann lautet die Aufgabe: aus dem beobachteten Zustande eines beschränkten Bereiches, nämlich
unserer raumzeitlichen Umgebung, den Zustand eines anderen Raum-Zeitbereiches zu berechnen.”
45“Daß trotzdem eine Physik, die auch von dieser vorsichtigeren Fiktion noch sehr weit entfernt ist,
überhaupt Vorausberechnungen auf Grund von Beobachtungen anstellen kann, hat folgenden Grund:
Zu einem bestimmten Beobachtungsbefund gehört allerdings eine unendliche Menge physikalischer
Zustände des Bereiches, und damit auch eine gleichmächtige Menge solcher Zustände für den zu
erkundenden zukünftigen Augenblick [ . . . ]. Aber bei Rückübersetzung dieser unendlichen Menge
physikalischer Zustände in Empfindungsinhalte ergibt sich in vielen Fällen eine verhältnismäßig kleine
Menge von Empfindungsinhalten, die in günstigen Fällen ein stetiges Qualitätsbereich bilden (d. h.
ein Bereich ähnlicher Farbtöne). Das Bestreben ist nun zunächst darauf gerichtet, die Beobachtungen
so anzustellen, daß sich nicht mehrere unzusammenhängende Qualitätsbereiche für den zukünftigen
Zeitpunkt ergeben, und dann darauf, die Grenzen des einen Qualitätsbereiches möglichst zu verengern.
[ . . . ] In besonderen Fällen für nicht zu lange Zeitabstände können [die Mängel der Voraussage] völlig
beseitigt, also Eindeutigkeit der Voraussage, erreicht werden. [ . . . ] Das gilt für die praktisch allein
verlangte Voraussage von Wahrnehmungsinhalten. Von der eindeutigen Voraussage physikalischer
Zustände dagegen bleibt die Wissenschaft auch bei noch so kleinen Zeitabständen immer unendlich
weit entfernt.”
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So, contrary to Friedman’s claim, Carnap does not give a method for explicitly
defining the terms of physics. Rather, he points out that for some cases, exact
prediction of a future observation in a small region of space-time, but not of a
future physical state, is possible. His argument against the prediction of physical
states rests on the one-many relation between observations and physical states,
the assumptions that physical states can be determined only through observations
(this is implicit), and that for each physical state, there is exactly one physical state
in the future (a set of physical states evolves over time into a set of physical states
of the same cardinality). Since at any point in time, one can only determine an
infinite set of physical states, any prediction can therefore also only determine an
infinite set of physical states. (Carnap does not consider the possibility of using
observations at more than one point in time to narrow down the set of physical
states.)
Carnap states that, for practical purposes, it is only necessary to predict future
perceptual contents, not future physical states. And this, he argues, is possible
even uniquely if the future point in time is not too far away and the circumstances
are also favorable in other (not further determined) respects. Otherwise, unique-
ness has to be given up, so that the goal is then to come to a prediction of one
continuous and as small as feasible range of possible perceptions.
In “Dreidimensionalität”, 123–124, Carnap denies not only the possibility of
unique predictions of phenomenal contents, but even of any restrictions on the
possible elements of experience at all. Nonetheless, probabilistic predictions can
be given:
While [ . . . ] neither deterministic nor restricting laws hold, there
are frequency functions both for the spatial distribution of the simul-
taneous elements and the chronological series. The possibility of
predictions is based on such frequency functions of a complicated
kind.46
3.6.2 Carnap’s bipartition of the language
I have already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter that some defenses of
the Received View can be put forth based on Suppe’s exposition. Suppe himself
also defends the Received View against some criticisms, most notably those by
Putnam (1962). Putnam argues, first, that there is no acceptable conceptualization
of ‘partial interpretation of theoretical terms’ and, second, that the bipartition of
the vocabulary of science into observational and theoretical terms is not possible.
The second charge rests on the claim that in actual scientific theories, the theoreti-
cal terms of the Received View are not the terms that are introduced by theories
46“Es gelten [ . . . ] zwar weder determinierende noch beschränkende Gesetze, aber doch Häufigkeits-
funktionen sowohl für die räumliche Verteilung der gleichzeitigen Elemente, als auch für die zeitliche
Reihe. Auf solchen Häufigkeitsfunktionen verwickelter Art beruht die Möglichkeit von Voraussagen.”
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and that observation reports do not only contain observational terms.
Suppe incisively criticizes both claims, the first one by devising a partial
interpretation (Suppe 1971),47 the second one by noting that Putnam’s criticism of
the bipartition of the vocabulary relies on ordinary language, while the Received
View assumes a rational reconstruction, which could allow the introduction of
a bipartition (Suppe 1972). In other words, Putnam’s second charge rests on
a confusion of the rational reconstruction of theories with the description of
scientific theory and practice.48 With respect to observation reports, Carnap
(1931a, 437–438) himself already notes that
With the “primary” protocol I mean the one we would get if we were
to keep writing and processing of the protocol strictly separate, that
is, include no sentences in the protocol that were indirectly attained.
[ . . . ] A primary protocol would be very cumbersome. It is hence
practically expedient that the formulations of the protocol already
use inferred designations.49
Thus Carnap already assumed that, in the ordinary language sense, observation
reports do not only contain observation terms.
According to Suppe (1974a, 83), it is hard to say what a bipartition introduced
in a rational reconstruction would look like, however, because “the ways advocates
of the Received View have attempted to specify the distinction fail to specify it
precisely or in such a way that their paradigm examples of observation terms and
theoretical terms clearly do qualify as such”. So first, it is not always clear which
terms are observable and which are theoretical, and second, those terms that are
allegedly clearly observable or clearly theoretical are not.
An example of the imprecision of the attempts is, according to Suppe, Carnap’s
explication of ‘observable’ as “properties directly perceived by the senses” (Carnap
1966, 255), because it is not clear whether the property has to be always directly
perceivable or just sometimes. In the former case, Carnap’s examples of ‘blue’ and
‘warmer’ as observable terms (Carnap 1966, 259) are incorrect, Suppe (1972, 6)
argues, because sufficiently small blue objects are not observable, and an object of
−250◦C is warmer than one of−273◦C. Therefore, a property has to be observable
if it is sometimes directly perceivable. Then ‘being a gas’ and ‘being electrically
charged’ are observable because sometimes, it is possible to smell a gas or receive
a shock. One could doubt this conclusion arguing that one does not smell that
47Note, however, that Suppe adds the possibility of interpreting theoretical terms directly. This is
not necessary for his defense, and also historically inaccurate, as I spell out in §3.7.
48In still other words, Putnam criticizes an application of artificial language philosophy for being an
incorrect application of ordinary language philosophy.
49“Mit dem „ursprünglichen“ Protokoll ist dasjenige gemeint, das wir erhalten würden, wenn wir
Protokollaufnahme und Verarbeitung der Protokollsätze im wissenschaftlichen Verfahren scharf
voneinander trennen würden, also in das Protokoll keine indirekt gewonnenen Sätze aufnehmen
würden. [ . . . ] Ein ursprüngliches Protokoll würde sehr umständlich sein. Daher ist es für die Praxis
zweckmäßig, daß die Formulierung des Protokolls schon abgeleitete Bestimmungen verwendet.”
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something is a gas, but rather only perceives certain manifestations of being a gas.
But this argument cannot be correct, because analogously one does not directly
perceive that an object is hard, but only certain manifestations of it being hard
(Suppe 1972, 7, n. 7).
Suppe’s argument fails, and is in fact already anticipated and countered by
Carnap himself. For Suppe uses the term ‘warmer than’ simply as a synonym for
‘higher temperature than’. But this is not what Carnap has in mind, since he points
out in Begriffsbildung, 35–36, that because of the perception threshold, there are
cases of higher temperature that do not feel warmer, and that indeed temperature
is an abstract concept that corresponds to no single physical measurement device
(and thus a fortiori not to human perception) (see §3.6.6). In “Aufgabe”, Carnap
is very explicit that whether concepts like warmer or blue apply is a matter of
perception. The contents of perception do not occur at all in theoretical physics,
which is not obvious because terms like ‘pressure’ and ‘heat’ are used in both
domains (“Aufgabe”, 99). This confusion of physical and observational concepts is
probably easiest to see in Suppe’s response to the criticism that one does not smell
that something is a gas, but only a specific gas smell. He claims that then, one
would also not feel that an object is hard, but only one manifestation. Obviously,
he uses ‘hard’ in the physical sense, while the manifestation of hardness then
would be exactly the meaning of ‘hard’ that Carnap is after.
That Carnap fails to specify precisely the distinction between observational
and theoretical terms is unsurprising, for one because what one person can perceive
may be imperceptible for another. In “Testability”, Carnap (1935a, §16) discusses
“sufficient reduction bases”, sets of terms to which all other can be reduced with
the help of reduction sentences. According to Carnap, the visual sense provides a
sufficient reduction basis, and so does the visual sense restricted to shades of gray
or even only black and white, since colors can be determined with the help of a
spectrometer with a gray or black-and-white display. Since a spectroscope may
use tangible scale-marks and pointers and thus be used by a blind and deaf person,
the sense of touch provides a sufficient reduction basis as well. Thus different
persons may have different observation terms based on their abilities. What is
more, according to Carnap (1932, 224) each person can choose the observation
terms depending on the context:
Every concrete sentence of the physicalistic system-language can serve
as protocol-sentence in some situation. Let G be a law (i. e., general
sentence of the system-language). To check G, one has to derive con-
crete sentences that relate to specific space-time points [ . . . ]. From
these concrete sentences one has to derive further concrete sentences
using other laws and logico-mathematical rules of derivation, until
one reaches sentences that one wants to accept in the specific case.
And it is a matter of choice which sentences one intends to use as
such endpoints of the reduction, that is, as protocol-sentences. When-
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ever one wants to—for instance, if there are doubts or one wants to
consolidate the scientific hypotheses more securely—one can reduce
those sentences previously accepted as endpoints again to other ones
and choose those to be endpoints. In any case, this reduction for the
purpose of checking G has to stop at some point. But in no case does
this reduction have to stop at a specific point. From any sentence, one
can go further back; there are no absolute primary sentences for the
construction of science.50
Carnap thus explicitly considers it a matter of choice which sentences are taken
to be primitively interpreted (cf. Oberdan 1990). Furthermore, Carnap’s parti-
tion of the set of concepts into different levels in the Aufbau already suggests
that ‘observability’ is not a categorical property but a comparative relation, so
that concepts can be more or less observable. In Begriffsbildung, Carnap (1926,
ch. III) accordingly speaks of abstract distributions of values first being assigned
“physical qualities, and finally perceptual qualities”. Similarly, in L&M, Carnap
(1939) describes an “order of definitions”, leading in successive steps from observa-
tional to theoretical terms and vice versa (cf. figure 3.1). When giving examples
of correspondence rules, he notes that “if ‘iron’ is not accepted as sufficiently
[observational], the rules can be stated for more [observational] terms” (Carnap
1939, 207, my emphasis).
3.6.3 Suppe’s bipartition of the language
Suppe’s solution to the problems of determining which terms are observable is to
classify not properties, but occurrences of properties as observable or unobserv-
able. With this bipartition, Suppe (1974a, 84) suggests,
one could employ separate terms terms of L to refer to observable
entities or attribute occurrences and others to refer to nonobservable
ones—for example, one might employ ‘redo’ to refer to observable
occurrences of the property red and ‘redt’ to refer to nonobservables.
50“Jeder konkrete Satz der physikalistischen Systemsprache kann unter Umständen als Protokollsatz
dienen. G sei ein Gesetz (d. h. allgemeiner Satz der Systemsprache). Zum Zweck der Nachprüfung
sind aus G zunächst konkrete, auf bestimmte Raum-Zeit-Stellen bezogene Sätze abzuleiten [ . . . ]. Aus
diesen konkreten Sätzen sind mit Hilfe anderer Gesetze und logisch-mathematischer Schlußregeln
weitere konkrete Sätze abzuleiten, bis man zu Sätzen kommt, die man im gerade vorliegenden Fall
anerkennen will. Dabei ist es Sache des Entschlusses, welche Sätze man jeweils als derartige Endpunkte
der Zurückführung, also als Protokollsätze verwenden will. Sobald man will, – etwa wenn Zweifel
auftreten oder wenn man die wissenschaftlichen Thesen sicherer zu fundieren wünscht, – kann man
die zunächst als Endpunkte genommenen Sätze ihrerseits wieder auf andere zurückführen und jetzt
diese durch Beschluß zu Endpunkten erklären. In jedem Fall muß man mit der Zurückführung zum
Zweck der Nachprüfung irgendwo haltmachen. In keinem Fall aber ist man gezwungen, an einer
bestimmten Stelle haltzumachen. Man kann von jedem Satz aus noch weiter zurückgehen; es gibt keine
absoluten Anfangssätze für den Aufbau der Wissenschaft.”
124
Foundations Connecting theoretical and observational terms by correspondence rules 3.6
All observational terms that also apply to unobservable occurrences in the orig-
inal theory would therefore be split up into two, one term that applies only to
observable, one term that applies only to unobservable instances.51 Note that this
comparably simple introduction of new terms becomes vastly more complicated
when more-place predicates and functions are considered. It is indeed not obvious
that for all many-place predicates that can apply to both observable and unobserv-
able objects at once, two new predicates can be found so that one applies only
to unobservable objects, the other only to observable objects. This is also what
Suppe (1972, 8) notes:
Some provision will have to be made to allow comparisons between
nonobservable and observable occurrences of properties, and also
for comparative relations whose applications straddle the observable,
nonobservable border. It is not clear whether this proposal is work-
able; but it is clear that it will be rather complicated if it is.
Even if the proposal is workable, however, Suppe (1974a, 84) argues that it might
be a Pyrrhic victory:
Such an artificial drawing of the observational–theoretical distinction
certainly is going to make the Received View reconstruction of a
theory very complex, introducing a degree and kind of complexity
not found in theories as they are employed in actual scientific practice.
And this added complexity is not worth the cost, because the observational–
theoretical bipartition does not mark anything of epistemic interest: Suppe (1974a,
85) concurs with Putnam (1962) that the distinction between theoretical terms,
those that come from a scientific theory, and non-theoretical terms is important,
but that the distinction between observational and non-observational terms does
not capture this. And observation reports, which are also epistemically significant,
often employ non-observational terms. Therefore, the bipartition of a language
into observational and theoretical terms is not useful.
The conventionality of the distinction between observational and theoretical
terms discussed in §3.6.2 already counters the argument that the observational–
theoretical distinction does not mark anything of interest. A clear response to
Suppe’s claim that the bipartition of the vocabulary must lead to an overly complex
language can be derived from the fact that Carnap considered it possible to define
observational terms in theoretical terms, but not vice versa.
Giving an explicit definition of phenomenal terms in observational terms
does not overstep the restrictions on correspondence rules that Carnap set in
51Putnam (1962, 241, n. 2) dismisses this option on the grounds that “‘[b]eing an observable thing’
is, in a sense, highly theoretical and yet applies only to observables!” This objection fails because first,
not all senses of ‘theoretical’ are relevant to the Received View, and second, ‘being an observable thing’
does not occur as a predicate in Suppe’s reconstructed observational language.
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“Aufgabe”. And this allows a reconstruction of scientific language in which a term
that is applied both to observable and unobservable objects can be replaced by one
observable and one theoretical term, but in a far less problematic way than Suppe
suggests. Suppe assumes that ‘red’ becomes ‘redo’ and ‘redt’, where the extensions
of the two new terms are disjoint:
∀x[Rx↔ (Ro x ∨Rt x)]∧∀x(Ro x→¬Rt x) , (3.2)
where ‘Ro ’ stands for ‘redo’ etc. But instead, ‘red’ could be considered a theoretical
term (R) that applies to anything that reflects light of a certain spectrum, even if
too small to see (which is Suppe’s implicit assumption). ‘redo’ could then be the
restriction of this term to those objects that are actually visible (V ) to the naked
eye as determined by the whole of science, which includes physiology:52
∀x[Ro x↔ (Rx ∧V x)] . (3.3)
There are now at least two ways in which one can define ‘perceptibly warmer
than’ (W ) if one again follows Suppe and assumes that being warmer is the same
as having a higher temperature (T ). One way is to simply restrict all comparisons
to those objects that can still be touched (S) because they are neither too hot nor
too cold, that is
∀x∀y[W xy↔ (S x ∧ Sy ∧T x > T y)] . (3.4)
Even ignoring the perception threshold, this definition might simply be physi-
ologically incorrect, however, because objects that have too high or too low a
temperature probably still feel very hot or very cold, only that there is no differ-
ence felt between any of the objects that are too hot or those that are too cold. So
a better definition of ‘perceptibly warmer than’ (including a perception threshold
of t ) would be
∀x∀y W xy↔ [∃z(S z ∧T x ≥ T z ∧T z ≥ T y)∧T x > T y + t] . (3.5)
All the objects that have too high a temperature to be touched could then be de-
fined as of equal perceptible warmth, and would be warmer than any of the objects
that can be touched or have too low a temperature to be touched. Analogously for
temperatures that are too low. Of course, the physiologically correct formula is
likely to be still more complicated (with, for instance, t being dependent on tem-
perature and individual), but not as an artifact of the Received View’s formalism,
but because of the complexity of the relation.
The “unusual consequences” of an artificial introduction of a bipartition into
natural language that Suppe (1972, 7) identifies then become less unusual as well.
52Note that V is not an observational term and thus Putnam’s criticism (see n. 51) does not apply.
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If I take an O-red [redo] object of minimal area and smash it to
pieces, the pieces will not be O-red, but rather N -red [redt]. And [i]f
I combine together a number of N -red blood specks I will obtain an
O-red blood patch.
With the definition (3.3) suggested above, this would be true, but missing the
important point: The redo object of minimal area already is redt, and its parts stay
that way when smashed. But smashing the object results in objects that are not
longer observable, and therefore are not redo. Similarly, a redo blood patch is also
redt. These considerations show that Suppe’s method for devising a bipartition of
the vocabulary rests (like Putnam’s criticism) on the incorrect assumption that
theoretical terms cannot apply to observable objects.
Finally, Suppe’s method rests on the assumption that the vocabulary of a
rational reconstruction must take as its starting point natural language. But this
does not have to be the case, as Bohnert (1963, §II) and Carnap (1963c, 938–939)
argue (see §2.4).
3.6.4 Correspondence rules as components of theories
Closely connected to the bipartition of the language is the role of correspondence
rules, the rules that connect the observational terms with the theoretical terms.
After an exposition of criticisms by Schaffner (1969) and Suppes (1962, 1967),
Suppe (1974a, 109, footnote omitted) concludes that
the Received View’s treatment of correspondence rules is inadequate
in three important respects: first, it mistakenly views them all as com-
ponents of theories, rather than as auxiliary hypotheses; second, the
account ignores the fact that correspondence rules often constitute
explanatory causal chains which employ other theories as auxiliary
hypotheses; third, insofar as correspondence rules characterize the ex-
perimental connections between phenomena and theory, the account
is oversimple and epistemologically misleading.
Suppe’s three criticisms of the role of correspondence rules are echoed, for example,
by Thompson (1988, §3).
To incorporate correspondence rules in the theories is mistaken, Suppe ar-
gues, because if correspondence rules are part of the theory, then any change in
the correspondence rules is a change in the theory. Since correspondence rules
incorporate experimental methods, any new procedure to apply the theory to
phenomena leads to a new theory. But this, he states, is at best misleading, since
the theory stays the same, even if it can be applied in a new way.
This first of Suppe’s criticisms is probably best compared to Carnap’s note
in “Aufgabe”, 103–104, that it is a matter of linguistic convention whether corre-
spondence rules are considered part of the theories or not (see page 97). At worst,
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Suppe’s criticism could then be seen as an argument why it would be inexpedient
to consider correspondence rules parts of the theories. Furthermore, Carnap
treated the correspondence rules as separate from the theories most of the time
simply because he assumed that correspondence rules could incorporate other
theories, as I will argue next.
3.6.5 Correspondence rules and other theories
According to Suppe, the application of a theory typically relies on theoretical
hypotheses, that is, hypotheses that derive from other theories. To apply a theory
that describes movement in a vacuum to real experiments, for example, one needs
theoretical hypotheses that describe the effect of air resistance on the predictions
of the theory (Suppe 1972, 15). That the Received View does not take this into
account is Suppe’s second criticism.
But there is no reason to believe that in the Received View, correspondence
rules cannot contain laws from other theories, as Suppe claims. Quite to the
contrary, Carnap (1923, 103) specifically notes in “Aufgabe” that the connection
from the axioms of a theory all the way down to the observations would need the
whole of science which, at this point, does not exist (see §3.2). In the Aufbau, §106,
Carnap is similarly explicit: All the definitions he suggests in the “constructional
system” are based on the results of empirical sciences:
As concerns the content of our constructional system, let us empha-
size that it is only a tentative example. The content depends upon
the material findings of the empirical sciences; for the lower levels in
particular, upon the findings of the phenomenology of perception,
and psychology. The results of these sciences are themselves subject
to debate; since a constructional system is merely the translation of of
such findings, its complete material correctness cannot be guaranteed.
In Begriffsbildung, Carnap even spells out specific laws that are to be part of the
definitions of specific concepts, for example the law of thermal expansion that is
taken into account for the definition of length (see §3.6.6). Finally, the claim that
correspondence rules cannot incorporate other theories flies in the face of the idea
of the unity of science, a core notion of logical empiricism (cf. Cat 2011, §4).
3.6.6 The complexity of correspondence rules
In his third criticism, Suppe charges that the role of correspondence rules in
the Received View is overly simple and misleading because it does not take into
account the hierarchy of theories that, according to Suppes (1962, 260), mediates
between a theory and the phenomena:
One of the besetting sins of philosophers of science is to overly sim-
plify the structure of science. Philosophers who write about the
128
Foundations Connecting theoretical and observational terms by correspondence rules 3.6
representation of scientific theories as logical calculi then go on to say
that a theory is given empirical meaning by providing interpretations
or coordinating definitions for some of the primitive or defined terms
of the calculus. What I have attempted to argue is that a whole hier-
archy of models stands between the model of the basic theory and
the complete experimental experience. Moreover, for each level of
the hierarchy there is a theory in its own right. Theory at one level is
given empirical meaning by making formal connections with theory
at a lower level.
‘Model’ here refers to the model of a theory, so that for each level including the
level of data, there is a theory, and through formal connections of these theories,
the model of the basic theory is eventually connected to the model of the data.
Many of the connections between the levels are statistical.
Statistical connections are indeed absent in most of the discussions of corre-
spondence rules, and I will come back to this point in §3.8.2. Overall, however,
it is rather surprising that Suppes and Suppe charge the Received View with
oversimplifying the relation between theory and observation. For in “Aufgabe”,
Carnap does not even consider science to be developed enough to give the full
correspondence rules, and in the Aufbau, Carnap states that the correspondence
rules are only formalizing empirical findings, so that the correspondence rules are
as complicated as the sciences determine them to be. In Begriffsbildung, Carnap
spells out in some detail what is needed to develop quantitative concepts from
qualitative ones and how to incorporate correction factors into the formation of
new concepts like length. In other words, he gives a description of how a theory
containing the concept length connects to quantitative or qualitative observations,
correction factors and all.
The hierarchical structure of the connection between theory and observations
is already described in Begriffsbildung (see §3.5) and is a core motif in the Aufbau,
with its succession of steps to define the terms of the physical world. It also occurs
in Carnap’s later writings (e. g., Carnap 1939) (cf. figure 3.1).
But even leaving out the question of correction factors and levels of theories,
Carnap’s and Hempel’s view on the relation between observational and measure-
ment terms is in line with contemporary views. Already in Begriffsbildung, 22–23,
Carnap discusses the relations and functions that have to hold for the objects of a
domain so that one can assign a physical magnitude to them. These are
1. The topological definition of a magnitude
Precondition and reason for the introduction of a magnitude is
an empirical finding of the sort that two relations hold between
the objects (bodies, processes) of some domain: one transitive,
symmetrical and one transitive, asymmetrical. [ . . . ] One then
stipulates that numbers have to be assigned to the objects in such
a way that
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a) objects in the transitive, symmetric relation are assigned
the same number
b) an object in the transitive, asymmetric relation to another
is assigned a lower number than the other object.
2. The metrical definition of the magnitude through three stipula-
tions [ . . . ]
a) One has to choose a scale, that is, stipulate when two scale-
distances, that is, the difference between two values of the
respective magnitude, should be considered equal.
b) One has to choose a zero point of the scale, that is, stipulate
when an object is to be assigned a value of zero.
c) One has to choose a unit, that is, stipulate when an object
is to be assigned the value of one.53
Compare this with Carnap’s discussion of the introduction of numerical values in
the Introduction, 63–65:
Rule 1 [ . . . ] states that, if the relation EM holds between objects a
and b , the two objects will have equal values of the magnitude M . In
symbolic form:
If EM (a, b ), then M (a) = M (b ) . (3.6)
Rule 2 [ . . . ] says that, if the relation LM holds between a and b , the
value of the magnitude M will be smaller for a than for b . In symbolic
53
“1. Die topologische Definition einer physikalischen Größe
Voraussetzung und Anlaß für die Einführung einer Größenart ist ein erfahrungsmäßiger Befund
von der Art, daß zwischen den Objekten (Körpern, Vorgängen) irgend eines Bereiches zwei
Beziehungen bestehen: eine transitive, symmetrische und eine transitive, asymmetrische. [ . . . ]
Es wird dann bestimmt, daß die Zuschreibung der Zahlen zu den Objekten des Bereiches so
geschehen soll, daß
a) den Objekten, zwischen denen die transitive, symmetrische Beziehung besteht, gleiche Zahlen
zugeschrieben werden,
b) einem Objekt, daß in der transitiven, asymmetrischen Beziehung zu einem anderen steht, eine
niedere Zahl als dem andern zugeschrieben wird.
2. Die metrische Definition der Größe durch drei Festsetzungen [ . . . ]
a) Es ist eine Skalenform zu wählen, d. h. eine Festsetzung darüber zu treffen, wann zwei Skalen-
strecken, also zwei Größendifferenzen der betreffenden Größe, als gleich gelten sollen.
b) Es ist ein Nullpunkt der Skala zu wählen, d. h. eine Festsetzung darüber zu treffen, wann
einem Objekt der Größenwert Null zugeschrieben werden soll.
c) Es ist eine Einheit zu wählen, d. h. eine Festsetzung darüber zu treffen, wann einem Objekt
der Größenwert Eins zugeschrieben werden soll.”
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form:
If LM (a, b ), then M (a)<M (b ) . (3.7)
[ . . . ] Rule 3 tells us when to assign a selected numerical value, usually
zero, to the magnitude we are attempting to measure. [ . . . ]
Rule 4, usually called the rule of the unit, assigns a second selected
value of the magnitude to an object by specifying another easily
recognized, easily reproducible state of that object. This second value
is usually 1, but it may be any number different from the number
specified by Rule 3. [ . . . ]
Rule 5 [ . . . ] specifies the empirical conditions EDM , under which
we shall say that [ . . . ] the difference between any two values of the
magnitudes for a and for b is the same as the difference between two
other values, say, for c and for d . This fifth rule has the following
symbolic form:
If EDM (a, b , c , d ), then M (a)−M (b ) = M (c)−M (d ) . (3.8)
Since Carnap (1966, 54–55) assumes EM to be transitive and symmetric and assumes
LM to be transitive and asymmetric, Rule 1 corresponds to condition 1a) from
Begriffsbildung, Rule 2 to condition 1b), Rule 3 to 2b), Rule 4 to 2c), and Rule 5 to
2a). As in Begriffsbildung, 23, Carnap (1966, 65) considers Rule 5 to be the most
important one of the last three rules (conditions 2a–c).
In the Introduction, 54–57, Carnap points out that EM and LM must be more
than just transitive and symmetric or asymmetric to allow the introduction of a
numerical magnitude. For a thorough discussion, he refers to Hempel’s Concept
Formation, §§10–11. Hempel’s discussion is based on an article by Suppes (1951) on
axioms for extensive quantities, which is a contribution to standard measurement
theory (cf. Krantz et al. 1971, §§3.1, 3.5.1). Carnap’s discussion, both its formal
assumptions and its methodological considerations were at the core of a course
at the George Washington University Department of Continuing Education on
calibration laboratory management and a series of seminars given in the 1970s at
the National Bureau of Standards (Simpson 1981, 291). In an article based on this
course, Simpson (1981, abstract) develops Carnap’s theory of measurement and
“its applications to metrology [ . . . ] as an aid to program planning and evaluation”,
e. g. quality control. Clearly, then, the Received View on correspondence rules is
not far from actual science, at least as far as measurement is concerned.
In the case of axiomatizations, it turned out that Carnap had often relied on
the same kind of formalizations that would later be used in the Semantic View.
Analogously, the actual correspondence rules that Carnap and Hempel considered
are in line with those of the Semantic View (as developed by Suppes) and with
measurement theory in general. Therefore Carnap and Hempel did not rely on
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notions of the relation between observational terms and theoretical (measurement)
terms that are oversimplified or naïve compared to those of the Semantic View.
(Note also how nicely the distinction between the observational terms EM and
LM and similar terms (cf. Krantz et al. 1971, §§1.1–1.2) on the one hand, and the
theoretical term M (cf. Krantz et al. 1971, §§1.1–1.2) on the other fits into the
Received View’s bipartition of the language.)
Of course, the correspondence rules are not discussed in such depth in all
publications; “Aufgabe”, for example, contains almost no information about
correspondence rules, and those that it does contain are indeed very simple. But
that does not mean that correspondence rules must be sketchy, or even that they
were generally sketchy in the Received View.
I now want to go further and argue that both Carnap and Hempel had accurate
ideas about the development of measurement concepts. In Begriffsbildung, 35–36,
Carnap describes the introduction of a scale on the basis of a conception of
‘warmer than’. This is done by choosing a value of zero for the thawing point of
water, a value of 100 for the boiling point of water, and choosing the change of
temperature to be proportional to the change of volume of mercury in this range.
Carnap points out that, since the concept of volume depends on the concept of
length, and the concept of length based on rigid bodies has a correction factor
for thermal expansion and thus involves temperature, this may seem circular.
But this circularity can be avoided in two ways: First, simply by ensuring that
length is defined relative to a fixed temperature of the measuring rod. Second,
by taking into account the different levels of precision: The initial concept of
length can be determined without a correction factor, then be used to determine
the concept of temperature, which can then be used again to determine a refined
concept of length, etc. Hempel (1952, 739, n. 77) similarly refers to the “method
of successive approximations” described by physicist Victor F. Lenzen (1938, §13),
which is Carnap’s second method, as an example of the interplay between concept
and theory formation. Materials other than mercury lead to different scales, and
the physical concept of “thermodynamic” temperature finally was chosen to be
different from all these scales, so that for each material, a set of correction factors
has to be used. This choice has the advantage that “the laws of thermodynamics,
which have gained a fundamental relevance in the newer physics, have the simplest
form”54.
The important point now is that Carnap’s (and Lentzen’s) conceptual analysis
has historical examples: In the already mentioned recent study of the development
of the concept of temperature, for example, Chang gives examples in the sections
“The Iterative Improvement of Standards: Constructive Ascent” (Chang 2004,
44–48) and “Accuracy through Iteration” (Chang 2004, 212–217). In conclusion,
Carnap and Hempel not only had a realistic idea of correspondence rules, but
54“die Gesetze der Thermodynamik, die in der neueren Physik eine fundamentale Bedeutung
gewonnen haben, die einfachste Form annehmen.”
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also correctly analyzed or (in Hempel’s case) relied on the iterative nature of the
formation of numerical concepts.
3.7 Models
Clearly, the Received View does not demand overly simple exhaustive axiomatiza-
tions in first order logic, but it does demand axiomatizations. This emphasis on
axiomatization has been another source of criticism, since it suggests a dismissive
attitude towards scientific models. The attitude is summarized well by Frigg and
Hartmann (2008, §4.1):
Within [the syntactic view], the term model is used in a wider and in a
narrower sense. In the wider sense, a model is just a system of semantic
rules that interpret the abstract calculus [ . . . ]. In the narrower sense,
a model is an alternative interpretation of a certain calculus [ . . . ].
Proponents of the syntactic view believe such models to be irrelevant
to science. Models, they hold, are superfluous additions that are at
best of pedagogical, aesthetical or psychological value [ . . . ].
A model in the wider sense is just any (Tarskian) model theoretic model of the
calculus. Frigg and Hartmann do not claim that the Received View does not allow
such models, for obvious reasons: Carnap (1939, II.10; 1963c, §10.II) made explicit
use of model theoretic models, for example by relying on semantic entailment
for the rules of inference of scientific theories (Carnap 1956b, 51, 61). Hempel
similarly embraced model theoretic models (Kim 1999, 6) and relied on them, for
example, in his discussion of vague terms (Hempel 1939, §2).
Frigg and Hartmann leave implicit that a model in the narrower sense is an
alternative to some literal interpretation. The literal interpretation of electro-
dynamics, for example, refers to waves in an electric field, while an alternative
interpretation may refer to waves in an elastic solid. Hence, technically, any model
in the wider sense except the literal interpretation is a model in the narrower
sense. According to Frigg and Hartmann, then, proponents of the Received View
consider it superfluous to distinguish any specific non-literal interpretation within
the class of models in the wider sense.
Frigg and Hartmann cite Carnap (1939) and Hempel (1965b) as proponents of
this dismissive attitude towards models in the narrower sense. Given the central
role of models in science and current philosophy of science, the attitude has
provoked a lot of criticism, and has generally been seen as a disadvantage of the
Received View when compared to the Semantic View, which is considered to be
more hospitable to scientific models (see, for example, da Costa and French 1990;
Morrison and Morgan 1999; Suppe 2000, Bailer-Jones 2003, §2; Muller 2010, §2).
This is again neatly summarized by Frigg and Hartmann (2008, §4.1):
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The semantic view of theories [ . . . ] reverses this standpoint [of the
Received View towards models] and declares that we should dispense
with a formal calculus altogether and view a theory as a family of
models. Although different version[s] of the semantic view assume
a different notion of model [. . . ,] they all agree that models are the
central unit of scientific theorizing.
Note that the last sentence just means that all versions of the Semantic View
agree that the central unit of scientific theorizing should be called ‘models’, but
disagree on what the central unit is. Unless the disagreement is over specific kinds
of models in the narrower sense of Frigg and Hartmann, some versions of the
Semantic View therefore assume that models in the narrower sense are not the
central unit of scientific theorizing. In this respect, the Received View could thus
be in agreement with those versions.
In the following, I will discuss Carnap’s and Hempel’s stance towards two
kinds of models: I will argue that Carnap and Hempel in fact allow and use models,
understood as possibly idealized theories with limited scope. Furthermore, they
only claim that one specific use of models in the narrower sense is not essential to
scientific theories, and are joined in this attitude by a major proponent of (one
version of) the Semantic View, Patrick Suppes.
First, however, I note the failure of one specific defense of the Received View
with respect to its stance on models. Suppe (1974a, 90) claims that “Carnap and
Hempel do make it clear at various places that independent nonobservational
semantic interpretations [of theories] are permissible”. While it “must be admitted
[ . . . ] that they tended to do so begrudgingly and also to belittle the importance
of giving such interpretations” (Suppe 1974a, 90, n. 191), Suppe (1974a, 91) argues
that in the Received View, theoretical terms can be
interpreted as referring to electrons, electron emissions, and so on,
where ‘electron’, ‘electron emission’, and so forth, have their normal
meaning in scientific language. If we look at theoretical terms such
as ‘electron’, we find that [ . . . ] much of the meaning concerns extra-
observational associations—for example, for electrons there might
include various features of the billiard-ball model, various classical
intuitions about macroscopic point-masses, and so on.
Thus, alternative interpretations of the calculus of a theory can play a role in
the Received View. However, one of the sources that Suppe cites to support
this defense is a statement by Hempel about a new approach to scientific theories
(Achinstein et al. 1974, 260), which he proposed after having given up the Received
View. In describing his new approach, Hempel (1974, IV) explicitly states that
the “extensive theoretical use of antecedent terms appears to me to throw into
question the [Received View’s] conception of the internal principles of a theory
as an axiomatized system whose postulates provide ‘implicit definitions’ for its
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extralogical terms”. Hempel thus does not assert that direct interpretations of
the calculus of the theory (through the “antecedent terms” used in the theory)
are permissible in the Received View. Quite the opposite, he considers the need
for (or use of) direct interpretations of theoretical terms a reason to give up the
Received View.
Hempel’s interpretation of the Received View seems correct in that Suppe’s
two other sources for his defense are very explicit about the impossibility of
such non-observational interpretations. Carnap (1939, 204) notes the possibility
of assigning meanings to the theoretical terms in the metalanguage, but adds
that if there is someone “who does not know physics but has normal senses and
understands a language in which observable properties of things can be described”,
and we want to enable him to “apply [the theory] to his observations in order
to arrive at explanations and predictions”, this strategy is useless. Therefore “we
have to give semantical rules for elementary terms only, connecting them with
observable properties of things”. This is not even a begrudging endorsement of
the use of non-observational interpretations.
In Suppe’s third source, Hempel (1963, 696) argues with reference to Carnap
(1939) that interpreting theoretical terms in a metalanguage offers “little help
towards an understanding of those expressions. For the criteria will be intelligible
only to those who understand the metalanguage in which they are expressed”.
The argument for this conclusion is detailed by Rozeboom (1970, 204–205).
Carnap (1956b, 47, §V) is indeed very clear that there is no interpretation
of the theoretical language LT independent of the correspondence rules: “There
is no independent interpretation of LT . [ . . . ] The [theoretical terms] obtain
only an indirect and incomplete interpretation by the fact that some of them are
connected by the [correspondence rules] with observational terms”. Hempel’s
and Carnap’s reluctance to assume a direct interpretation of theoretical terms is
unsurprising, since they held that such a direct interpretation is impossible. This
is the thesis of semantic empiricism (cf. Rozeboom 1962), a core assumption of
logical empiricism, and the basis of, for example, Carnap’s use of the Ramsey
sentence and his solution to the problem of analyticity (Psillos 2000).
A good starting point for a defense of the Received View on models is rather
the discussion of two different kinds of models given by Hempel (1965a, §6). He
calls instances of the one kind ‘theoretical models’, noting that they are also known
as “mathematical models” (Hempel 1965a, 445–446). “Broadly speaking, and
disregarding many differences in detail”, he continues, “a theoretical model of this
kind has the character of a theory with more or less limited scope of application”.
As examples, Hempel lists models of learning, conflict behavior, and other social,
political, and economic phenomena. Models of this kind, Hempel notes, are often
idealizations in that they disregard factors relevant for the phenomenon under
study, oversimplify the relations of their parameters, and may be applicable only
under very specific conditions.
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Clearly, theoretical models are models neither in the narrower sense nor in
the wider sense of Frigg and Hartmann. In contemporary philosophy of science,
however, the term ‘model’ may often refer to theoretical models. A case in point is
a recent discussion by Weisberg (2007) of a predator-prey model. Vito Volterra, in
an effort to analyze the populations of Adriatic fish, stipulated certain properties
of a predator-prey relationship between the populations to arrive at two coupled
differential equations. These equations allowed him to predict the qualitative
effects of fishing on the different populations. Weisberg (2007, §2.1) notes that
Volterra himself recognized that “his model was extremely simple and highly
idealized with respect to any real world phenomenon”—in short, that it was a
theoretical model as defined by Hempel. Hempel’s notion of a theoretical model
is also at least one way to make sense of the existence of incompatible models (cf.
Frigg and Hartmann 2008, §5.1), for one because two theoretical models with
restricted domains may be incompatible when their domains are taken to be
unrestricted. More importantly, two theoretical models with overlapping domains
may disregard different relevant factors and oversimplify the relations of their
parameters in different ways.55
Thus, an important meaning of ‘model’ in science and philosophy of science
may be the theoretical model in Hempel’s sense. Since theoretical models are
theories, there is no question that they play an important role in the Received
View. In fact, Carnap’s simple theory of thermal expansion and Hempel’s simple
theory of buoyancy are theoretical models, and so is Carnap’s axiomatization
of space-time topology, as it idealizes physical particles as points (Carnap 1954,
197–198). Those versions of the Semantic View that consider theoretical models
to be the central unit of scientific theorizing are therefore, in this respect, in
agreement with the Received View.
Hempel calls the other kind of model that he considers ‘analogical’. He first
defines two sets L1 and L2 of sentences to be syntactically isomorphic if L1 can
be obtained from L2 by renaming the nonlogical constants that appear in its
sentences. A system S1 is then an analogical model of a system S2 with respect
to the sets of laws L1 and L2 if L1 is true of S1, L2 is true of S2, and L1 and L2
are syntactically isomorphic. It is easy to see that, by renaming the nonlogical
constants, the interpretation of L1 by S1 can be turned into an interpretation of
L2 and vice versa. Therefore, an analogical model of this kind is an alternative
interpretation of a calculus, and thus for Frigg and Hartmann a model “in the
narrower sense”.
Hempel (1965a, 440–441) lists three ways in which analogical models can be
useful. First, an analogical model “may make for ‘intellectual economy’” because
“all the logical consequences of the [one system’s laws] can be transferred to the
new domain by simply replacing all extra-logical terms by their counterparts”.
A set of mutually analogical models allows for the development of one “general
55I thank Christopher Belanger for impressing upon me the importance of incompatible models.
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mathematical theory” that describes all systems at once, “without distinguishing
between the different subject matters to which the resulting theory can be applied”.
The intellectual economy of this is straightforward: Investigate the logical or
mathematical features of the laws once, and apply the results to all systems with
syntactically isomorphic laws.
Second, analogical models can “facilitate one’s grasp” of the laws in a new
domain by “exhibiting a parallel with [laws] for a more familiar domain” (Hempel
1965a, 441). The wave equations of electrodynamics, for example, can be qualita-
tively analyzed by simply thinking about waves in visible things, because those
are sometimes governed by syntactically isomorphic equations.
“More important”, Hempel continues, “well-chosen analogies or models may
prove useful ‘in the context of discovery’, i. e., they may provide heuristic guidance
in the search for new explanatory principles”. This is the third use of analogical
models. Hempel (1965a, 445) elucidates:
Considering the great heuristic value of structural analogies, it is
natural that a scientist attempting to frame a new theory should let
himself be guided by concepts and laws that have proved fruitful in
previously explored areas. But if these should fail, he will have to
resort to ideas that depart more and more from the familiar ones.
As an example, Hempel adduces the development of quantum mechanics, which
started out close to classical mechanics but became considerably less analogical,
thereby gaining in scope.
The first two uses of analogical models are, in a sense, of psychological value,
just as Frigg and Hartmann contend. The third, heuristic use of analogical models
is not so, nor is its main value pedagogical or aesthetic. That the heuristic use does
not play a major role in the Received View on scientific theories is unsurprising,
because the Received View was not developed for analyses in the context of
discovery, but rather for analyses in the context of justification (cf. Feigl 1970, 3–4,
13–14).
Hempel (1965a, 438–439) only dismisses the use of analogical models as es-
sential for explanation, and his argument is straightforward: Assume that some
feature of a system is to be explained. To find an analogical model of the system,
the system’s laws have to be established. These laws are all that is needed to give an
explanation of the feature, and so no analogical model is required. This argument
rests on the D-N-schema of explanation, and it is not obvious how this translates
to other explications of explanation. But whether it translates or not, Hempel does
establish that an analogical model (in his sense) is not needed to derive statements
about a system from the system’s laws.
Carnap’s dismissal of models is similarly confined. Discussing ‘understanding’
in physics (Carnap 1939, 209–210), he notes:
When abstract, nonintuitive formulas, as, e. g., Maxwell’s equations
137
3 The Received View in the philosophy of science Criteria of Empirical Significance
of electromagnetism, were proposed as new axioms, physicists en-
deavored to make them “intuitive” by constructing a “model”, i. e., a
way of representing electromagnetic microprocesses by an analogy to
known macroprocesses, e. g., movements of visible things.
Not only did these attempts fail, Carnap states, but they are also unnecessary:
It is important to realize that the discovery of a model has no more
than an aesthetic or didactic or at best a heuristic value, but is not at
all essential for a successful application of the physical theory.
Like Hempel, Carnap does not dismiss theoretical models or question the use-
fulness of analogical models in the context of discovery (which he does not even
mention here). He only objects to the demand that every formalism be supplied
with an analogical model in terms of macroprocesses; that is, he objects to analogi-
cal models as necessary for the theory’s application. Assuming that the theory is
successfully applied by deriving true statements from it, this objection is justified
by Hempel’s argument against the need for analogical models in explanations.
When Carnap (1966, 232–233) does mention the context of discovery, he
accepts the prominent role of analogical models:
[I]magine that we are [ . . . ] preparing to state for the first time some
theoretical laws about molecules in a gas. [ . . . ] We do not know the
exact shape of molecules, so let us suppose that they are tiny spheres.
How do spheres collide? There are laws about colliding spheres, but
they concern large bodies. Since we cannot directly observe molecules,
we assume their collisions are analogous to those of large bodies [ . . . ].
These are, of course, only assumptions; guesses suggested by analogies
with known macrolaws.
Carnap (1966, 174–175) only cautions that visual models (which, arguably, are
the most important analogical models) are neither necessary nor sufficient for
applying theories, but can be helpful. And these models can turn out to be true:
A physicist must always guard against taking a visual model as more
than a pedagogical device or makeshift help. At the same time, he
must also be alert to the possibility that a visual model can, and
sometimes does, turn out to be literally accurate. Nature sometimes
springs such surprises. [ . . . ]
A theory may move away from models that can be visualized;
then, in a later phase, when more is known, it may move back again
to visual models that were previously doubted.
Thus Carnap, like Hempel, considers analogical models important, but not neces-
sary for the application of a theory to the system.
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Let me compare this stance with the one taken by Suppes (1960) in one of the
articles that cemented the Semantic View’s position as an account of scientific
theories that is especially hospitable to models (see Muller 2010, §2). Suppes (1960,
289) argues that
the concept of model in the sense of Tarski may be used without
distortion and as a fundamental concept in [physics, social science,
and mathematical statistics]. In this sense I would assert that the
meaning of the concept of model is the same in mathematics and the
empirical sciences. The difference to be found in these disciplines is
to be found in their use of the concept.
Suppes’s claim is thus that in all three disciplines ‘model’ means what Frigg and
Hartmann call ‘model in a wider sense’. Therefore, Suppes’s argument cannot
possibly establish that the Semantic View is more hospitable to analogical models
than the Received View. Suppes (1960, 289) also explicitly excludes Hempel’s
theoretical models from his discussion by cautioning against
one very common tendency, namely, to confuse or amalgamate what
logicians would call the model and the theory of the model. It is very
widespread practice in mathematical statistics and in the behavioral
sciences to use the word ‘model’ to mean the set of quantitative
assumptions of the theory, that is, the set of sentences which in a
precise treatment would be taken as axioms [ . . . ].
Since theoretical models are theories, not models of theories, they are excluded
from Suppes’s discussion like analogical models. Note that Suppes here in effect
claims that many of the so-called models used in the sciences are actually theories,
and thus play an important role in the Received View.
Suppes (1960, 290) does acknowledge that “many physicists want to think
of a model of the orbital theory of the atom as being more than a certain set
theoretical entity. They envisage it as a very concrete physical thing built on the
analogy of the solar system”. It is not exactly clear whether Suppes has Hempel’s
analogical models in mind here, or simply considers the “concrete physical thing”
the thing with the actual nucleons and electrons (i. e., the literal interpretation of
the formalism). If the latter, this is not a model in either the wide or the narrow
sense. But Suppes (1960, 291) clearly refers to an analogical model in his discussion
of
Kelvin’s and Maxwell’s efforts to find a mechanical model of electro-
magnetic phenomena. Without doubt they both thought of possible
models in a literal physical sense, but it is not difficult to recast their
published memoirs on this topic into a search for set-theoretical mod-
els of the theory of continuum mechanics which will account for
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observed electromagnetic phenomena. Moreover, it is really the for-
mal part of their memoirs which has had permanent value. Ultimately
it is the mathematical theory of Maxwell which has proved important,
not the physical image of an ether behaving like an elastic solid.
According to Suppes, Kelvin and Maxwell aimed to find the regularities that govern
electromagnetic phenomena by using an analogy with mechanical phenomena.
Therefore, they used analogical models in the context of discovery, in the sense
discussed by Hempel and Carnap. But Suppes’s interest lies in the possibility of
describing electrodynamics with a mathematical model, that is, of giving a model
in the wider sense. And the permanent value of Maxwell’s theory is, I take it,
its applicability, for which Suppes considers the analogical model irrelevant—as
Hempel establishes in his argument against their role in theoretical explanations.
Overall, Suppes’s attitude seems at most as hospitable towards scientific models
as that of Hempel and Carnap. To conclude that the Semantic View is directly
related to scientific models because it uses model theory is but a fallacy of equiv-
ocation, and whether scientific models are better formalized in predicate logic
or model theory is an open question whose answer will probably depend on the
kind of model under consideration and what is meant by ‘better’.
3.8 The concept and object of explication
Suppe (1974a, 58; 2000, S104) develops a direct argument against the Received View
that is closely related to the question of the axiomatizability of scientific theories.
As the first premise, he “take[s] it as being reasonably clear from Carnap’s and
Hempel’s writings that they intend their analysis to provide an explication of the
concept of a scientific theory”. Carnap (1950b, §§2–6) gives a detailed discussion of
the idea behind and the structure of an explication. The explication of a vague or
otherwise unclear notion, the explicandum, consists in the development of a new
concept, the explicatum56, that is to take the explicandum’s place in some analyses.
The explicatum has to fulfill four requirements: Some similarity to the explicatum,
precision in the rules for its use, fruitfulness in the development of theories, and
simplicity (to the extent allowed by the previous three requirements).57
The requirements, Suppe (1974a, 59) notes, are “rather vague as to the relation-
ship in which the explicatum should stand to the explicandum”, and he therefore
introduces as his second premise an “adequacy criterion” given by Chomsky (1957,
§2.1), which “seems to be in accord with Carnap’s position” (Suppe 1974a, 59).
According to this criterion, an explication is adequate only if “the explicatum
denote[s] all the clear-cut instances, and none of the clear-cut noninstances” of the
56Reichenbach (1951, 49) prefers ‘explicans’ on linguistic grounds, Stein (1992, 281) defends Carnap’s
choice of terminology.
57See page 19.
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explicandum. In other words, the explicatum has to concur with the explicandum
within the boundaries of the explicandum’s vagueness, so that explication is a kind
of precisification.58 This is also how, for example, Bishop (1992, 268) and Gaines
(2010, 168) interpret Carnap’s account.59
This criterion of adequacy allows the Received View to be tested, because if
it “can be demonstrated that there are clear-cut examples of scientific theories
which do not admit of the required canonical formulation [of the Received View],
or else show[n] that certain clear-cut examples of nonscientific theories fit their
analysis”, then this shows “the inadequacy of the Received View” (Suppe 1974a,
60). It is not difficult for Suppe (1974a, 65) to find examples to establish his third
premise, that many scientific theories cannot be axiomatized. These include
Darwin’s theory of evolution, Hoyle’s theory on the origin of the
universe, [and] Freud’s psychology [ . . . ]. Furthermore, it is mani-
fest that most theories in cultural anthropology, most sociological
theories about the family; theories about the origin of the American
Indian [ . . . ] are all such at present that any attempts at axiomatization
would be premature and fruitless [ . . . ].
Since “[s]ome theories do admit of fruitful axiomatization, however”, Suppe
(1974a, 63) concludes that “the Received View is plausible for some but not all
scientific theories”. Similarly, Beatty (1980, appendix 1) considers the impossibility
of axiomatizing “evolutionary theory, Freudian psychology, theories of the origin
of the universe, and many others” to be a major problem of the Received View
(and curiously traces this impossibility to the Received View’s perceived restriction
to first order logic).
First, note that Suppe’s conclusion (that the Received View is plausible for
some, but not all theories), does not follow from his premises; the correct con-
clusion is that the Received View is false. Second, ð{∀x(P x ∨Q x),Oc↔ P c}ñ
is axiomatizable and fulfills all further requirements of the Received View if P
and Q are uninterpreted theoretical predicates, O is an interpreted observational
predicate, and c is an interpreted observational constant. Some such sets of sen-
tences are clearly not called ‘scientific theory’ in ordinary language, for example
if ðP xñ stands for ðx is fooñ, ðQ xñ for ðx is barñ, c for ðthe catñ, and ðO xñ for
ðx is on the matñ. Thus the Received View is false independently of Suppe’s third
premise. Given the ease of this apparent disproof of the Received View, it should
come as no surprise that Suppe’s first and second premises are false.
58In the terminology of §2.8.3, every element of the vagueness set of a vocabulary is a possible
precisification of the vocabulary’s interpretation.
59Carus (2007, 285–287) lays out how the even stronger requirement that explicatum and explican-
dum must have the same meaning leads to a criticism of explication itself.
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3.8.1 The concept of explication
Carus (2007, 257–259) describes how an earlier incarnation of explication, Car-
nap’s notion of translation (Carnap 1934a, §§74–79), was indeed meant to preserve
the meaning of the original term (which was not yet called ‘explicandum’) as
closely as possible. But for explication itself, Suppe’s sole source for the first
premise is Chomsky (1957, §2.1), who references neither Carnap nor Hempel for
his criterion of adequacy for explication. He does mention Goodman (1951, 5–6),
but Goodman (1951, §I,1) lists precisification only as one kind of explication (he
speaks of ‘constructional definition’). Contrary to Suppe’s first premise, Goodman
(1951, 5) notes that for explications in general, scientists and philosophers often
“trim and patch the use of ordinary terms to suit their special needs, deviating
from popular usage even where it is quite unambiguous”.
In his discussion of Goodman’s view on explication, Carnap (1963c, §21) does
not take issue with the possible deviation of the explicatum from the explican-
dum. This is unsurprising given that Carnap (1950b, 5–6) himself allows for such
deviation, and even uses the explication of ‘fish’ as an example, just like Goodman:
[O]ne might perhaps think that the explicatum should be as close to
or as similar with the explicandum as the latter’s vagueness permits.
However, it is easily seen that this requirement would be too strong,
that the actual procedure of scientists is often not in agreement with
it, and for good reasons. [ . . . ] In the construction of a systematic
language of zoölogy, the concept Fish designated by this term has
been replaced by a scientific concept designated by the same term
‘fish’; let us use for the latter concept the term ‘piscis’ in order to avoid
confusion. When we compare the explicandum Fish with the expli-
catum Piscis, we see that they do not even approximately coincide.
The latter is much narrower than the former; many kinds of animals
which were subsumed under the concept Fish, for instance, whales
and seals, are excluded from the concept Piscis.
This settles the question of Carnap’s (and Goodman’s, for that matter) stance on
Chomsky’s criterion of adequacy.
Hempel’s position, on the other hand, is more ambiguous. Often he seems
to be in accord with Carnap: In a monograph on concept formation, Hempel
(1952, 663) refers to Carnap’s exposition without taking exception to the possible
deviation of the explicatum from the explicandum, and states:
Explications, having the nature of proposals, cannot be qualified as
being either true or false. Yet [ . . . ] they have to satisfy two major
requirements: First, the explicative reinterpretation of a term or—as is
often the case—of a set of related terms must permit us to reformulate
[ . . . ] at least a large part of what is customarily expressed by means
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of the terms under consideration. Second, it should be possible to
develop, in terms of the reconstructed concepts, a comprehensive,
rigorous and sound theoretical system.
Note that Hempel does not demand that the explicatum coincide with the ex-
plicandum to the extent that the latter’s vagueness permits. He only demands
that what can be expressed with the explicandum can also be expressed with the
explicatum (or the explicata), and even this only in a large portion of cases, but
not necessarily in all. Most importantly, according to Hempel explications cannot
be false, which they could be if there was a condition of adequacy for the relation
of explicandum and explicatum.
Another passage by Hempel also suggests his agreement with Carnap. In a
review of Goodman’s exposition of explication, Hempel (1953, 113–114) states:
It seems to me important to note [ . . . ] that the stage of rigorous
construction in philosophy [ . . . ] presupposes a preconstructional
clarification of the explicanda under investigation. [ . . . ] But in the
pursuit of its objective, analysis cannot be content with a purely
descriptive account of linguistic behavior patterns: it has to point
out the pitfalls inherent in the various modes of usage [ . . . ]. And
from here on, it is only a short step [to] explicitly proposing certain
modifications of existing usage which will enhance clarity and which
promise to be theoretically fruitful. Once this last step has been taken,
the stage is set for the development of a constructional system for the
readjusted explicanda[.]
It is of no relevance in this context that Hempel here, in a quite puzzling shift
of terminology, allows the explicanda to deviate from actual usage, rather than
allowing the explicata to deviate from the clear cases of the explicanda. The
important point is that Hempel allows the explicata to deviate from clear cases of
actual usage.
Perhaps most importantly, Hempel, like Carnap, allows the explicatum to
have a logical structure different from the explicandum. In fact, Hempel (1952,
§10) argues that the explication of a classificatory explicandum by a comparative
explicatum is often a sign of an investigation’s maturity (see also Hempel and
Oppenheim 1936), as the explication of ‘warm’ by ‘warmer than’ illustrates (cf.
Carnap 1950b, §4). And if the logical structure of the explicatum is different from
that of the explicandum, it is not even clear what it would mean for the explicatum
to denote “all the clear cut instances and none of the clear cut non-instances” of
the explicandum.60
However, Hempel (1950, §6) also answers the question of “how [ . . . ] to judge
60That is why Laudan (1986, 120) misrepresents Carnap’s conception of explication when he
criticizes that “as far as Carnap was concerned, one of the necessary tests for determining whether
the philosopher had done a proper job of explicating the methodological terminology of science
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the adequacy of a proposed explication, as expressed in some specific criterion of
cognitive meaning” with two criteria, the first of which relies on the fact that
there exists a large class of sentences which are rather generally rec-
ognized as making intelligible assertions, and another large class of
which this is more or less generally denied. We shall have to demand of
an adequate explication that it take into account these spheres of com-
mon usage; hence an explication which, let us say, denies cognitive
import to descriptions of past events or to generalizations expressed
in terms of observables has to be rejected as inadequate.
Unfortunately, Hempel is not explicit about whether an explicatum always has to
coincide with the explicandum’s clear cases, but speaks of an explication “taking
into account” common usage, which is determined by “rather general” agreement
on the positive instances and “more or less general” agreement on the negative
ones.
In a defense of his and Oppenheim’s explication of scientific explanation,
Hempel (1965a, §11) similarly states:
Like any other explication, the construal here put forward has to
be justified by appropriate arguments. In our case, these have to
show that the proposed construal does justice to such accounts as are
generally agreed to be instances of scientific explanation, and that it
affords a basis for a systematically fruitful logical and methodological
analysis of the explanatory procedures used in empirical science.
While the phrase ‘do justice to such accounts’ is not as clear as one might wish,
this is quite possibly the passage in which Hempel comes closest to demanding
that the explicatum include all clear positive instances of the explicandum (note
that he does not demand agreement on negative instances). It was written in the
years of 1963 and 1964 at the Center for Advanced Study (Hempel 1965e), about
18 years after his monograph on concept formation was researched and perhaps
written (Hempel 1952, 731, n. 1), and a year before he gave a lecture that would
form the core of his rejection of the Received View (Hempel 1970, 142, n. 1).
Maybe Hempel had simply changed his mind. At the Center, he also met Thomas
Kuhn for the first time, whose ideas “certainly contributed to [his] shift from
an antinaturalistic stance to a naturalistic one” in the later years (Hempel 1993).
Maybe the passage marks the first tiny step in this direction.
On the other hand, the passage sounds suspiciously similar to the preceding
one published in 1950, which precedes the publication of Hempel’s monograph
involved ascertaining whether one’s proffered explication (the ‘explicans’) could be substituted without
alteration of truth-value into all or most of those contexts where the explicandum occurred!” Whenever
the logical structure of the explicatum is different from that of the explicandum, a substitution is not
possible at all, as it would not result in a syntactically well-formed sentence.
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on concept formation (though not the research that led to it). The dissonance
may therefore just be the result of loose language, which leaves—barely—enough
room to conform to Carnap on the relation of explication and precisification.
Hempel’s position on explication may also simply have been inconsistent. When it
comes to explicating ‘cognitive significance’, for instance, he states that “cognitive
significance in a system is a matter of degree”, and sees this as a reason for disposing
of the concept altogether. Instead of “dichotomizing this array [of systems] into
significant and non-significant systems”, he states, one should compare systems of
sentences by their precision, systematicity, simplicity, and level of confirmation
(Hempel 1951, 74; cf. Hempel 1965c, 117). But the explication of a classificatory
concept by a comparative one is exactly what he, at about the same time, claims
to be an indicator of an investigation’s maturity.
In summary, Carnap clearly did not conceive of explication as a specific kind
of precisification, and unless Hempel was very confused about Carnap’s stance,
neither did Hempel. Considering that Hempel’s position was unclear at some
points, I want to note that explication is a core concept of what Rorty (1967a) has
called ‘ideal language philosophy’ (Carnap 1963c, §19; Maxwell and Feigl 1961,
488; Lutz 2009, §2). In a defense of ideal against ordinary language philosophy,
Maxwell and Feigl (1961, 491) are very explicit about the possible deviations of an
explicatum from its explicandum:
[W]e see absolutely no reason to believe that examination of ordinary
use in the “paradigm”, normal cases can provide us with definitive
rules for “proper” use in the unusual and novel cases. [ . . . ]
Furthermore—and this is of crucial importance—consideration of
atypical cases often points up possible inadequacies and may suggest
improvements in our conceptualization of the “normal” cases.
Because Maxwell and Feigl consider philosophical problems to be often linked to
the unusual and novel cases, their first point is an explicit rejection of the viability
of ordinary language philosophy: In order to tackle philosophical problems, ordi-
nary language might have to be precisified, but ordinary language itself gives no
clue as to which precisification is right. The second point extends this rejection to
the areas where ordinary language is unambiguous, for even a precisified language
might be inadequate, and thus language use in the clear cases might require modifi-
cation. The rendering of explication as precisification means giving up the core of
ideal language philosophy.61
3.8.2 The object of explication
Feigl certainly considered the Received View to be about explication, not just
precisification: Maxwell and Feigl (1961, 489–490) call explication ‘rational re-
construction’, and in a defense of the Received View, Feigl (1970, 13) speaks of
61See Carus (2007, especially ch. 10–11) for a much more thorough discussion of this point.
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the Received View as being concerned with “the rational reconstruction of the-
ories”. But this does not mean that Feigl agrees with Suppe’s second premise,
according to which the Received View is meant as an explication of the term
‘theory’. For Feigl does not speak of the rational reconstruction of ‘theory’, or
the rational reconstruction of the concept (or notion) of a theory, but the rational
reconstruction of theories. In the same text, he does speak of the “analysis of the
notion of evidential support” and the “concept of probability” (Feigl 1970, 9, my
emphases), so it is improbable that Feigl would simply ignore the use-mention
distinction when speaking about theories. Indeed, in an earlier passage of the same
text he remarks that “logicians of science [ . . . ] analyze a given theory in regard to
its logical structure” (Feigl 1970, 8, emphasis changed), that is, a specific theory,
not the term denoting all of them. My thesis is therefore that the Received View
is not meant to explicate ‘theory’, but rather to provide a framework in which
specific theories like the general theory of relativity or evolutionary theory can
be explicated. Again in the words of Feigl (1970, 13): “[T]he ‘orthodox’ view of
scientific theories can help in clarifying their logico-mathematical structure, as
well as their empirical confirmation (or disconfirmation)”.
One piece of evidence for this view is that there is, to my knowledge, no text by
Hempel, Carnap, or Feigl in which either mentions a successful explication of the
term ‘theory’. Quite to the contrary, when Hempel (1983, §6) discusses “Carnap’s
views on the analytic elaboration of methodological concepts and principles [to
which he] refers [ . . . ] as explication”, he notes that among those philosophical
issues that Carnap so elaborated are “standards for a rational appraisal of the
credibility of empirical hypotheses”, but he does not include the concept of an
empirical hypothesis or theory itself. He writes:
Explication plays an important role in analytic philosophy, where it
has often been referred to as logical analysis or rational reconstruction.
All the accounts proposed by analytic empiricists for such notions
as verification, falsification, confirmation, inductive reasoning, types
of explanation, theoretical reduction, and the like are instances of
explication.
This is a rather comprehensive list of the concepts at the core of logical empiri-
cism’s philosophy of science. If ‘theory’ had been explicated as well, it would be
very surprising for Hempel to not have mentioned such a central concept at all.62
After having given up the Received View in favor of his competing account,
Hempel was actually asked whether his new view was meant as a description of
the actual use of ‘theory’ (in a discussion published in the conference proceedings
edited by Suppe (1974b) himself). Sylvain Bromberger asks (Achinstein et al. 1974,
261):
62As an analogy, consider the claim “All of Einstein’s enduring contributions to physics such as the
explanations of Brownian motion and critical opalescence, the prediction of stimulated emission and
the Bose-Einstein condensate, the explanation of the photo-effect, and the like were made before 1930.”
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Exactly what is the status of this analysis of a theory? [ . . . ] As an
analysis of the concept of a theory, that is, the concept that is embod-
ied in our use of the word ‘theory’ in English or equivalent ones in
other languages, I think it is demonstratively false. [ . . . ] The view
that a theory consists of an uninterpreted calculus and rules of inter-
pretation [ . . . ] was a program which, if successful, would have made
explicit the rules that govern or that ought to govern acceptance and
rejection of theories. [ . . . ] Now do you envisage your new [analysis]
as entailing a program that will show how the theories that we in fact
have might ultimately be analyzed?
Bromberger here claims that Hempel’s new account does not correctly describe
the actual use of the term ‘theory’ in ordinary language, and then asks whether
it is meant to achieve the goal of the Received View. He takes this goal to be the
successful explication of the rules for accepting and rejecting theories.
Hempel’s reply is telling:
Professor Bromberger is right in stressing the programmatic side
of the standard conception. One of its objectives was to explicate,
and appraise from the point of view of an analytic-philosophical
conscience, the principles governing concept formation in scientific
theories. Another objective was similarly to exhibit and appraise the
principles governing the testing of scientific theories. [ . . . ]
My paper was intended principally as a criticism of the basic
assumptions by means of which the standard construal tackles its task;
I did not put forward a properly developed alternative.
Again, Hempel does not mention the explication of the term ‘theory’ as a goal
of the Received View. Instead, he agrees with Bromberger that one goal was the
explication of the rules of acceptance and rejection, that is, for the testing of
scientific theories. He adds that another goal was the explication of the rules of
concept formation. Furthermore, Hempel seems to agree with Bromberger that
his new account fails to correctly describe the actual use of the term ‘theory’ and
that his new account might nonetheless achieve the goals of the Received View.
Therefore, he cannot be of the opinion that the goal of the Received View is to
describe the use of the term ‘theory’.
In a critical discussion of the Received View, Hempel (1970, 148) explicitly
addresses the relation between the Received View and explication: “[T]he standard
construal [ . . . ] was intended [ . . . ] as a schematic explication that would clearly
exhibit certain logical and epistemological characteristics of scientific theories”.
Since the Received View is not an explication but an explication schema, it is
incomplete until it is applied to something. The explication of a scientific theory
would then be an instantiation of this schema. In other words, the Received View
provides a framework for explicating specific scientific theories.
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Beyond the general impression of Carnap’s and Hempel’s writings, Suppe
(1974a, §IV, A, n. 126) cites an early article by Carnap (1931a, §§5, 7) as evidence
for the claim that a theory that “does not admit of a canonical reformulation
meeting the conditions [ . . . ] of the Received View [ . . . ] is not a genuine scientific
theory”. This article, he states, contains a “very explicit version of the claim for
the initial version of the Received View”, where the “initial version” is that from
the time of the Vienna Circle. That this claim still holds for the final version is,
according to Suppe, borne out by the addendum to the article’s English translation,
in which Carnap (1963b) “reaffirms this claim in its essential form”.
In the two sections to which Suppe refers, Carnap (1931a, 453) argues for
physicalism, the thesis that “every scientific sentence can be translated into the
physicalistic language”63 and that through this, “the whole of science becomes
physics”64 (Carnap 1931a, 463, emphasis removed). His argument for these conclu-
sions relies on the explicit definability of all scientific terms in observational terms,
and the explicit definability of all observational terms in physical terms. Because
explicit definability is transitive, the explicit definability of all scientific terms
in physical terms follows immediately from these two claims. In the addendum,
Carnap (1963b) notes that the explicit definability of all scientific terms in obser-
vational terms has to be given up and substituted by “reducibility through a kind
of conditional definitions” (cf. Carnap 1936, 1937) or relations “still more flexible”
(cf. Carnap 1956b). For then-current presentations of physicalism, Carnap refers
to two discussions by Feigl (1958, 1963) and a work of his own (Carnap 1963c, §7).
Both of Feigl’s works discuss the reducibility of mental states to physical states.
It is surprising to me that Suppe sees in these discussions a justification of
his second premise. Clearly, the texts are about the terms that can be reduced to
physical language, and according to the thesis of physicalism held by Carnap, any
meaningful term can be reduced to physical terms. But to infer from this posi-
tion that the Received View explicates ‘theory’ would at least require additional
premises, for example, the premises that all physical theories can be formalized
according to the Received View, that all and only sets of sentences reducible to
a theory are themselves theories, and that all and only scientific theories can
be reduced to physics with the help of the reduction statements. But the latter
premise was explicitly denied by Feigl (1963, 241–245) and Carnap (1963c, 883)
at the time of the final version of the Received View, and also in the very article
Suppe uses to support his second premise. There, Carnap (1931a, 449) states with
respect to the reducibility of biology to physics that “the thesis of the universality
of the physical language [ . . . ] is not about the reducibility of the biological laws to
the physical, but the reducibility of the biological terms to the physical [ . . . ]. And
this reducibility can, in contradistinction to the former, be easily shown”.65 In
63“Unsere Überlegungen [ . . . ] führen somit zu dem Ergebnis, daß jeder wissenschaftliche Satz in
die physikalische Sprache übersetzbar ist.”
64“Dadurch [ . . . ] wird die gesamte Wissenschaft zu Physik.”
65“[Bei der] These von der Universalität der physikalischen Sprache [ . . . ] handelt es sich nicht um
148
Foundations The concept and object of explication 3.8
conclusion, Suppe’s textual evidence fails to make his case for the second premise.
Since the Received View is a framework intended to help in the explication
of theories, there is no problem if it also allows one to explicate things that are
not scientific or not theories. It is more problematic if the Received View relies
on assumptions that are not fulfilled by all theories, so that it cannot aid in their
explications. Like Suppe, Carnap (1939, 202) was clearly aware that some scientific
theories could not, at that point, be fruitfully formalized, and hence a fortiori
could not be fruitfully formalized according to the Received View. He writes:
Any physical theory, and likewise the whole of physics, can [ . . . ]
be presented in the form of an interpreted system, consisting of a
specific calculus (axiom system) and a system of semantical rules for
its interpretation [ . . . ]. It is, of course, logically possible to apply the
same method to any other branch of science as well. But practically
the situation is such that most of them seem at the present time to be
not yet developed to a degree which would suggest this strict form of
presentation.
So Carnap held the view that in principle, all theories can be fruitfully formalized.
He plausibly also held the view that the better developed a theory is, the closer it
comes to being so formalizable. But Carnap was also of the opinion that Suppe
expresses in his third premise, that many theories cannot be fruitfully formalized
“at present”.
Clearly, then, Carnap was not of the opinion that all theories can be explicated
in the Received View. I think it is most plausible that Carnap’s attitude to the
Received View was like his attitude to first order axiomatization as communicated
by Hempel: It is the first stage in the development of more comprehensive frame-
works for explication, and it may permit generalizations to deal with theories that
cannot be axiomatized in (modal) predicate logic. The explications and analyses
based on the Received View (for example, of theory testing or concept formation),
therefore have the form of conditionals: If a theory can be reconstructed according
to the Received View, then the respective explication or analysis is applicable.
Carnap (1923) in fact expresses this view in his earliest paper on the Received
View. He introduces an ideal physics, consisting of a completely axiomatized
theory, a set of correspondence rules, and a complete description of the physical
world at two points in time. Carnap (1923, 96) describes the value of such a fiction
thusly:
To determine the direction that physics should take at any stage, the
fiction of a completed construction of physics can be of great help, as
die Zurückführbarkeit der biologischen Gesetze auf die physikalischen, sondern um die Zurückführ-
barkeit der biologischen Begriffe [ . . . ] auf die physikalischen. Und diese Zurückführbarkeit kann, im
Unterschied zu der ersteren, leicht erwiesen werden.”
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it were, as a target at infinite distance.66
Later in the text, Carnap actually loosens one of his assumptions about the
completed construction of physics, the assumption that at two points in time, the
state of all physical magnitudes is known at all points in space. By considering
what the restriction to observable phenomena means for the possible values of
the physical magnitudes, Carnap tries to arrive at a more general theory about
scientific theories starting from a special case, just as in his remark about first
order logic. Note that this restriction to statements about observable states has the
effect that the theoretical terms are interpreted only through the observational
terms and the correspondence rules, that is, it leads to semantic empiricism. Thus
this generalization becomes a core feature of the later Received View.
Shimony describes this search for generalizations as fundamental to Carnap’s
way of working. In an homage after Carnap’s death, he writes that Carnap “took
particular delight in technical advances which permitted him to widen the scope of
his investigations without loss of precision” (Feigl et al. 1970, XXVI). And indeed
Carnap (1956b, 49) considers another generalization of the Received View. After
giving examples of correspondence rules (C -Rules), he states:
In the above examples, the C -rules have the form of universal postu-
lates. A more general form would be that of statistical laws involving
the concept of statistical probability [ . . . ]. A postulate of this kind
might say, for example, that, if a region has a certain state specified
in theoretical terms, then there is a probability of 0.8 that a certain
observable event occurs [ . . . ]. Or it might, conversely, state the prob-
ability for the theoretical property, with respect to the observable
event. Statistical correspondence rules have so far been studied very
little.
First, note that with the inclusion of statistical relations, correspondence rules in
the Received View can be in every respect as complex as the “hierarchy of models”
that Suppes (1962, 260) would describe six year later, lamenting the “besetting
sin of philosophers of science [ . . . ] to oversimplify the structure of science.”67
Second, if the Received View was meant as a definitive framework for theory
explication, such a generalization would not make sense. Hence I think it is clear
that Carnap considered the Received View’s reliance on formalization in predicate
logic a restriction that could be shed in further generalizations. Accordingly,
Carnap spent the rest of his life studying probability.68
66“Für die Feststellung der Richtung, in der die Physik auf irgendeiner Stufe weiterschreiten soll,
kann die Fiktion eines vollendeten Aufbaues der Physik, gewissermaßen als Zielpunkt im Unendlichen,
gute Dienste leisten.”
67It is doubtful, however, that probabilistic correspondence rules can lead generally to explicit
definitions of all observational terms in theoretical terms, as Carnap hoped for his second method of
interpreting theoretical terms (see figure 3.1).
68Similarly, Reichenbach (1951, 48) supposes that Carnap’s theory of probability “is intended
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Thus, the Received View was meant to give a framework in which one can
explicate individual theories that are formulated precisely enough to be axioma-
tized, and was meant to allow the incorporation of new developments in logic
and mathematics to widen its applicability. Criticizing the Received View for its
inability to capture a specific kind of non-formal reasoning in the sciences (say,
causal inferences) thus simply amounts to a request to develop inference systems
that can capture this kind of reasoning (say, default logic).
3.9 Aftermath
Suppe (2000) locates the end of the Received View as a philosophical program in
Hempel’s presentation at a conference in Urbana on the structure of scientific
theories, held in March 1969:
The Received View on Theories was the epistemic heart of Logical
Positivism. Twelve hundred persons were in the audience the night it
died. [ . . . ] The Received View had been under sustained attack for a
decade and a critical mass of main protagonists had been assembled to
fight it out. Carl Hempel [ . . . ] was expected to present the Received
View’s latest revision. Instead he told us why he was abandoning both
the Received View and reliance on syntactic axiomatizations (Hempel
1974). Suddenly we knew the war had been won, and the Symposium
became an energized exploration of where to go now.
I will come back to the description of a philosophical investigation as a siege in
§3.10. My main interest here lies in the key role that Hempel’s critique of the
Received View seems to have played. Hempel’s presentation was to a large extent
based on a presentation given at a conference on the problems of correspondence
rules at the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science held in May 1966 in
Minneapolis. If, in keeping with Suppe’s metaphor, the Received View indeed
died with Hempel’s disavowal, it did not die in March 1969—this is only when its
body turned up. And while the Urbana conference did not have any proponent of
the Received View, the Minneapolis conference saw two spirited defenses, one by
Feigl (1970) and one by Rozeboom (1970).
In his presentation “The crisis of philosophical semantics”, Rozeboom (1970,
202) focuses on the interpretation of theoretical terms and explicitly notes the
possibility of theoretical terms being closer or less close to observational terms, as
Hempel and Carnap before him. The goal here is to “set up a notion of the obser-
vation language [that allows] the possibility of later agreeing with somebody who
says that the observation terms also contain theoretical meanings” (Achinstein
to overcome the shortcomings of his reduction chains, which are applicable only in cases where
probability relations can be practically replaced by logical implications, and which thus are too
primitive instruments for the construction of scientific language”.
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operational
definitions
correspon-
dence rules
definitions
postulates
primitive
concepts
defined
concepts
empirical
concepts
“soil” of
observation
(experience)
Figure 3.2: The relation of theoretical and observational terms according to Feigl (1970, 6). Feigl’s
figure differs from mine in that it does not include the labels on the left side and uses dashed lines both
for definitions and correspondences rules.
et al. 1970, 242) by defining the bipartition of the vocabulary relative to one lan-
guage, so that one language’s theoretical terms can be another’s observation terms.
Feigl (1970) gives a more general defense of the Received View in his presentation
“The ‘orthodox’ view of theories: remarks in defense as well as critique”. The
probably best known part of his discussion is the diagram of the logical relations
between the theoretical terms and the observations (figure 3.2).
According to Feigl (1970, 5–6), the primitive theoretical terms are interrelated
through the postulates, and used to define other concepts. These concepts are then
linked to concepts that refer to “items of observation” like mass and temperature.
“These empirical concepts”, Feigl states, “are in turn ‘operationally defined’, i. e.,
by a specification of the rules of observation, measurement, experimentation, or
statistical design which determine and delimit their applicability and application”.
Note that the correspondence rules determine a “one-to-one correspondence”
(Feigl 1956, 21) between the defined terms and the empirical terms—that is, for
each observational term, there is a coextensive theoretical term. In Feigl’s diagram,
the operational definitions could seem to be semantic interpretations, but as his
description makes clear, they embody many non-interpretative elements like rules
of measurement and statistical design. Furthermore, operational definitions had
already been discussed in depth by Hempel as best understood as reduction sen-
tences, that is, syntactical notions. In Carnap’s two methods to interpret postulate
systems, on the other hand, the distinction between syntax and semantics is clear:
The observable terms have a semantic interpretation, as shown in his diagram
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(figure 3.1), and whatever interpretation the theoretical terms have comes through
their connection to the observational terms by the correspondence rules. In the
first method, these correspondence rules take the form of reduction sentences
from observational to increasingly theoretical terms (figure 3.3), in the second
method, the correspondence rules consist of explicit definitions of increasingly
observational terms by more theoretical ones or, since “Theoretical concepts”, con-
ditional probabilities between sentences involving observational and theoretical
terms (figure 3.4).
Thus Feigl’s account does not describe very well Carnap’s account of the
Received View, in which there is no distinction between explicit definitions (or re-
duction sentences) and correspondence rules, and the observational terms are not
related to the observations by operational definitions but by semantic interpreta-
tions. Furthermore, Carnap allows also probabilistic correspondence rules, which
is not captured in Feigl’s account. Hempel argues that real valued functions like
mass and temperature cannot be specified by operational definitions or reduction
sentences in a purely observational language, so that Feigl’s categorization of mass
and temperature as empirical concepts is too inclusive. These misrepresentations
are unrelated to Feigl’s defense of the Received View, however.
The all-out critique by Hempel (1970) at the conference, “On the ‘standard
conception’ of scientific theories”, makes for a puzzling read: Much of what
Hempel criticizes in the Received View has not been proposed by either Carnap or
himself. His counterproposal is actually closer to the Received View than the view
he criticizes. Even taking into account Hempel’s misrepresentation of Carnap’s
work with respect to first order logic (see §3.3), this may sound preposterous, and
I have been grappling with this puzzle without finding a good explanation, but let
me first lay out the evidence, and then suggest a possible explanation of Hempel’s
misrepresentation of Carnap’s and his very own earlier views.
Hempel’s new account relies on a theory-relative distinction of the vocabulary
into a theoretical vocabulary, containing terms newly introduced by the theory
T , and a pre-theoretical or antecedent vocabulary. T is then presented as a pair of
sets of sentences, T = 〈B , I 〉, the internal principles I and the bridge principles
B . Sentences in I contain only theoretical terms, while there are no restrictions
on bridge principles. Alternatively, T can be represented as the set of the logical
consequences of B ∪ I (Hempel 1970, 142–144). The Received View, Hempel
states, represents a theory T as a pair of and uninterpreted calculus C and a set
of correspondence rules R (Hempel 1970, 146–147). The correspondence rules
“give empirical import or applicability to the calculus by interpreting some of
its formulas in empirical terms—namely in terms of the vocabulary that serves
to describe the phenomena which the theory is to explain”. While in his new
account, the bridge laws are part of the theory, in the Received View, the status
of the correspondence rules is unclear. “One plausible construal” puts them in
the metalanguage, stipulating the truth of certain sentences in the language of the
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postulates
abstract
concepts
reduced terms
correspondence rules:
reduction sentences
elementary terms
semantic interpretation
observable properties
Figure 3.3: Feigl’s diagram
adapted to Carnap’s first
method of interpreting
theoretical terms for one
specific choice of the observa-
tional/theoretical bipartition.
The dotted arrows point from
reducing to reduced terms.
postulates
abstract
concepts
correspondence
rules: definitions
defined terms
observable properties
semantic interpretation
elementary terms
Figure 3.4: Feigl’s diagram
adapted to Carnap’s second
method of interpreting theo-
retical terms for one specific
choice of the observational/
theoretical bipartition. The
dot-dash arrows point from
terms of the definiens to the
definienda.
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theory “containing both theoretical and pre-theoretical terms”.
This construal of the correspondence rules is central for one of Hempel’s
criticisms. Questioning the advantages of the Received View’s assumption of ax-
iomatization, he notes that axiomatization yields a “general criterion determining,
for any sentence S, whether S is asserted by the theory”. But this is not a defense
of the Received View, he states, because “the standard construal assumes axiomati-
zation only for the formulas of the uninterpreted calculus C rather than for all the
sentences asserted by T ” (Hempel 1970, 148–149, §3). This is very, very puzzling.
First, because Carnap clearly assumes the axiomatization of the correspondence
rules in his publications, starting from “Aufgabe”. This is unsurprising, since
correspondence rules derive from other, also axiomatized theories. Second, and
more importantly, because this statement renders Hempel’s article inconsistent.
In a footnote to the above quotation, Hempel states that “by contrast[,] in the
investigations by Ramsey (in ‘Theories’) and by Craig concerning the avoidability
of theoretical terms in favor of pre-theoretical ones, axiomatization of the entire
theory is presupposed.” (Hempel 1970, n. 8). But in the Introduction, Carnap uses
Ramsey’s method to avoid theoretical terms, and Hempel (1970, 146, n. 4) cites
the Introduction as one exposition of the Received View. Furthermore, he states
that he has “himself relied on the standard construal” in “Dilemma”, where he
uses Craig’s and Ramsey’s methods himself. Thus Hempel’s conceptualization of
bridge principles as axiomatized is that of the Received View’s conceptualization
of correspondence rules.
Another criticism of Hempel’s relies on an elaboration of the Received View’s
concept of empirical terms (Hempel 1970, 153, §4):
the assumption of an axiomatized uninterpreted calculus [ . . . ] sug-
gests that the basic principles of a theory [ . . . ] are formulated ex-
clusively by means of a ‘new’ theoretical vocabulary [ . . . ]. Actually,
however, the internal principles of most scientific theories employ
not only ‘new’ theoretical concepts but also ‘old’, or pre-theoretical,
ones [ . . . ].”
This seems to confuse both the explication with the description of theories and
Hempel’s own new account with the Received View: What vocabulary most
scientific theories do, in fact, employ, is irrelevant for a rational reconstruction.
As Suppe has argued at length, it is only relevant whether the theories can be
reconstructed with a specific vocabulary. And as pointed out in connection with
the bipartition of the language (see §3.6.2), how theoretical terms are distinguished
from observational terms is a matter of convention. Hempel’s new account is
committed to the distinction between antecedent vocabulary and vocabulary
newly introduced by one specific theory, but this is not the distinction of the
Received View.
Both of Hempel’s criticisms can be presented in relation to his new account:
In the first case, he criticizes the Received View on the grounds that, unlike his
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new account, correspondence rules are given in the metalanguage, while in fact
the Received View does not differ in this respect from his new account. In the
second case, Hempel attributes a position of his new account (that theoretical
terms are those introduced by the theory under investigation) to the Received
View, while in fact only his new account relies on this assumption. This confusion
about basic assumptions may be the result of something like a Gestalt-switch in
Hempel’s thinking: Friedman (2003) points out how Hempel was very close to
Neurath’s naturalism during the time of the Vienna Circle, and how he followed
Carnap in focusing on explication while in close contact with him. Also under
the influence of Kuhn, who joined him in Princeton, Hempel swayed back to a
naturalistic description of science. It seems to me that after this paradigm shift,
Hempel had, as Kuhn conjectured for scientists in general, difficulties appreciating
the basic assumptions of the previous paradigm, the Received View.
While Kuhn contributed to Hempel’s disavowal of the Received View (Hempel
1993) and thus moved him farther away from Carnap, there is also a clear influ-
ence of Carnap on Kuhn via Hempel with respect to meaning holism. In what
way Carnap was even of the same opinion as Kuhn in this respect has been an
object of discussion, for example between Earman (1993) and Irzik and Grünberg
(1995). Their perceived disagreement, however, stems from Irzik and Grünberg
misunderstanding Earman’s point. “By semantic holism”, Irzik and Grünberg,
289 “mean the doctrine that the theoretical postulates of a theory contribute to he
meaning of theoretical terms occurring in them and that a change in the mean-
ing of theoretical postulates results in a change in meaning”, and they state that,
contrary to Earman, Carnap was a meaning holist. Their point is straightforward:
According to Carnap, theoretical terms are partially interpreted via correspon-
dence rules and the postulates of the theory, and therefore a theory change leads
to a change of the interpretation of theoretical terms. Earman, however, considers
and rejects the possibility of Carnap being a meaning holist by way of a denial of
the analytic/synthetic distinction Earman (1993, 11–12). Given Carnap’s steadfast
adherence to the distinction, such an attempt must fail. Earman (1993, 12) does
allow for Carnap being a meaning holist in other ways, and indeed explicitly refers
to a discussion by Friedman (1987) for an argument to that effect.
There is a connection between Carnap and Kuhn with respect to the lack of
an analytic/synthetic distinction and meaning holism, but it is genealogical, not
conceptual. Kuhn (1993, 312) phrases this kind of meaning holism thusly: “When
the process [of learning scientific terms] is complete, the language or concept
learner has acquired not only meanings, but also, inseparably, generalizations
about nature”. That is, concept formation in the sciences is “inseparably” con-
nected to empirical knowledge. Kuhn (1993, 312) finds this position in Hempel’s
Concept Formation and states: “Though it was many years before I saw its full
relevance to my emerging position, it fascinated me from the start, and its role in
my intellectual development must have been considerable”. I have already noted
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that Hempel’s monograph borrows heavily from Carnap’s Begriffsbildung, and
even arrives at its core point, the close connection between concept and theory
formation, based on considerations from Carnap’s “Aufgabe” and Begriffsbildung.
Hempel points this out in connection with reduction sentences both in Concept
Formation, 680, and in his discussion of Carnap’s philosophy of science (Hempel
1963, 691), where he adds that
the introduction of fruitful new concepts in science is always inti-
mately bound up with the establishment of new laws, as is shown
quite clearly already in Carnap’s early little work, Physikalische Be-
griffsbildung, which presents a lucid elementary analysis of the opera-
tional and the logical aspects of concept formation in physics.
Hempel wrote the first version of this article in 1954, two years after the publi-
cation of Concept Formation. There is little room for doubting that he held this
opinion already when writing the latter. This very straightforward genealogical
relation between Carnap’s and Kuhn’s meaning holism must not be mistaken for
a conceptual relation: Carnap never made the step from the factual interrelation
of concept and theory formation to the “inseparable” connection of meaning to
factual statements. Conceptually, Carnap’s insistence on the analytic/synthetic
distinction blocked this path, as Earman notes. On the other hand, Carnap’s
concept of explication, or his earlier principle of maximal simplicity, clearly states
the enormous role of empirical facts in the development of scientific concepts. It
is only that a theory is not all empirical fact, so that concept and theory formation
go hand in hand without making the analytic/synthetic distinction impossible.
Another genealogical influence of Carnap on purported adversaries goes
through Poland. The formal semantics that I have presented in §2.8 are devel-
oped in a little and little known book on “the logical syntax and semantics of the
language of empirical theories” by Marian Przełe˛cki (1969, 1). His analysis is based
on “Testability”, L&M, “Theoretical concepts”, Concept Formation, “Dilemma”,
and other works in the tradition of the Received View. Like these, he assumes a
distinction between observational and theoretical terms and allows a direct inter-
pretation only for observational terms. Przełe˛cki (1975, 284) thought of himself as
“positivistically-minded” and of the monograph as an introduction to the Received
View (Przełe˛cki 1974b, 402).
The major invention of Przełe˛cki’s account is the inclusion of vague terms
(Przełe˛cki 1969, §3.II) in his discussion. This also allows him to consider vague
observational terms, and here he parts ways with Carnap’s account: While in
Carnap’s treatment, observational terms do not apply to unobservable objects (in
that, for example, an object too small to see is determinately not red), Przełe˛cki
construes observational terms as completely vague for unobservable objects (in
that, for example, for an object too small to see it is undetermined whether it is red
or not red) (Przełe˛cki 1969, 39–41). Note that Przełe˛cki’s semantics is thus exactly
that of Andreas (2010) as far as true theories are concerned (see §2.10.2). Note also
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that this construction still blocks Suppe’s claim that parts of a red object that are
too small to see are also red. Przełe˛cki (1969, ch. 10) further suggests a conception
of theoretical terms as relative to a theory, along the lines of Rozeboom (1970).
This he does under the heading “Towards a more realistic account”, echoing both
Carnap in “Aufgabe” and Rozeboom in their position that the Received View is
an idealization with the hope of being generalizable.
Przełe˛cki’s work is interesting for one because it has both been claimed to be
in the tradition of the Received View (Pearce 1981, 3) and to be a precursor or even
an elaboration of the Semantic View (da Costa and French 1990, 249; Volpe 1995,
566) by the respective view’s proponents. Van Fraassen (1980, 64, n. 22; 1989, 227)
even traces the inspiration for his concept of empirical adequacy, the core concept
of his account, to Przełe˛cki’s work. The Semantic View was initially developed as
competitor to the Received View (see Suppe 1974a, §V.C), and so it is surprising
that there is such a direct connection between the two.
As I have pointed out above, both Feigl and Hempel considered the semantic
axiomatizations by Patrick Suppes to be compatible with the Received View,
and at the Urbana conference, that is, after having abandoned the Received View,
Hempel stated that “[t]his procedure [semantic axiomatization] has certain logical
attractions, but these do not invalidate any of the reservations that I expressed con-
cerning some of Professor Suppes’s arguments for the desirability of axiomatiza-
tion in science, for those arguments were essentially independent of the particular
mode of axiomatic formalization” (Achinstein et al. 1974, 257). Suppe’s account
of the death of the Received View is therefore blatantly misleading: Hempel did
abandon syntactic axiomatizations, but not because they are syntactic, but because
they are axiomatizations. At no point in his discussion does he take issue with the
reliance on syntax, and his criticisms are even directed explicitly at a defense of
semantic axiomatizations by Suppes (1968).
3.10 Conclusion
[Heraclitus’s] words, like those of all the philosophers before Plato, are only known
through quotations, largely made by Plato or Aristotle for the sake of refutation. When
one thinks what would become of any modern philosopher if he were only known
through the polemics of his rivals, one can see how admirable the pre-Socratics must
have been, since even through the mist of malice spread by their enemies they still
appear great.
(Russell 1961, 64)
I do not think that it needs malice to misrepresent a position, but honest opponents
(and even neutral expositors, like Russell arguably was) may very well make
mistakes in their exposition, especially when the topic is emotionally charged.
And Suppe (2000, §1) speaks of the Received View as having been “under sustained
attack”, with the “war [having] been won” because the Received View “died”. Van
Fraassen (1989, 365–366) speaks about the Received View as a “tragedy”, and uses
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(van Fraassen 1989, 365–366, n. 8)
the word deliberately: It was a tragedy for philosophers of science to
go off on these logico-linguistic tangles, which contributed nothing
to the understanding of either science or logic or language. It is still
unfortunately necessary to speak polemically about this, because so
much philosophy of science is still couched in terminology based on
a mistake.
Rozeboom (1970, 196) prefaces his discussion of the Received View with a regret:
[B]y the late 1950’s the empiricist analysis of scientific theory had
pushed to the brink of what could have been—and might still become—
a revolutionary breakthrough in the philosophy of cognition. How-
ever, the dominating style of philosophical argument, persuasive and
holistically critical rather than discovery oriented, has severely im-
peded realization of this prospect. By “persuasive and holistically
critical”, I mean dialectic which seeks primarily to recruit allegiance
to some favored doctrine while treating any flaw of discomfiture in
prima facie competing doctrines as sufficient ground for their total
dismissal.
Thus I think it is plausible that the discussion about the Received View has been
polemical enough to explain why even crystal clear philosophical positions have
been misrepresented.
One such crystal clear position is the Received View’s stance on type theory
(§3.3). Neither Carnap, Hempel, nor Feigl ever restrict reconstructions of theories
to first order logic. Carnap assumes type theory in all of his expositions of the
Received View, and uses it in his philosophical discussions (e. g., his solution to the
problem of empirical content and analyticity and his discussion of philosophical
method) as well as in his analyses of specific mathematical and scientific theories.
Hempel refers to Carnap’s expositions of the Received View without ever taking
issue with the use of type theory. And he himself uses type theory in his exposition
of the relation between observational and measurement terms, and, like Feigl,
lists explications of theories that use type theory as compatible with the Received
View. That first order logic is cumbersome to use and inadequate to describe
specific mathematical structures up to isomorphism cannot, therefore, form a
viable argument against the Received View.
The proponents of the Received View also did not demand exhaustive axioma-
tizations of all of the mathematics that appears in a scientific theory (§3.4). Carnap
describes how mathematical and logical constants with a standard interpretation
can be used without mentioning their axiomatizations, and Hempel and Feigl
consider reconstructions of theories that are not exhaustive to be compatible
with the Received View. Furthermore, both Carnap and Hempel relied on non-
exhaustive axiomatizations in their analyses of, for example, probability, scientific
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inference, and the role of theoretical terms. Hence, the difficulty of arriving at
exhaustive axiomatizations cannot count against the Received View. What is more,
the formalization of scientific theories usually chosen by Carnap is the same phase
space approach as that of van Fraassen (§3.5).
The bipartition of the language is neither as implausible nor as complicated
as claimed. Arguments to the contrary essentially rest on a misunderstanding
of the structure of the correspondence rules and the unjustified assumption that
theoretical terms never apply to observational objects (§3.6). Relatedly, the cor-
respondence rules in the Received View are not nearly as misguided or naïvely
simple as claimed by critics. In fact, they allow both hierarchies and statistical
relations as demanded by Suppes. And both Carnap and Hempel assumed corre-
spondence relations between observational terms and numerical terms that are in
line with Suppes’ and other’s work on measurement theory. What is more, both
Carnap and Hempel had historically accurate ideas about the formation of new
concepts.
Also, of the many meanings and uses of the term ‘model’, Hempel and Carnap
doubt only the indispensability of one use of models under one meaning (§3.7):
Neither considers it necessary that the laws of a theory be given an alternative,
visualizable interpretation to determine the consequences of the theory. Nonethe-
less, Hempel describes a host of conveniences that come with such analogical
models, and both Carnap and Hempel see much value in analogical models in the
context of discovery. And both Carnap and Hempel themselves employ theoreti-
cal models, one of the many other possible kinds of models. Because of this and
since the Received View is, in fact, at least as hospitable to analogical models as
the Semantic View described by Suppes, there is no obvious reason to dismiss the
Received View or prefer the Semantic View because of the relevance of scientific
models.
Additionally, not all explications are precisifications (§3.8.1), so it is prima
facie not a problem when the explicatum of a term does not conform to the expli-
candum in all clear cases. Carnap explicitly takes this stance, and Hempel relies on
Carnap’s account of explication. To demand that explications be precisification
would furthermore undermine the basic tenet of ideal language philosophy and
thus of the Received View. Finally, the Received View is not meant as an expli-
cation of the term ‘theory’ (§3.8.2). Rather, it is meant as a framework in which
specific scientific theories can be explicated. Furthermore, it is meant as a precise
framework that allows one to explicate some theories, while the explication of
other theories would require either their further development or a generalization
of the Received View. Because of the last two points, it is not a failure of the
Received View that it does not make the use of ‘theory’ in ordinary language
more precise.
Thus I end this chapter on a gloomy note, for I think it has by now become
clear that a viable philosophical positions was not so much analyzed and criticized
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as caricatured and smeared. The following chapters will be more positive, however,
as they are, to use Suppe’s words, an “exploration of where to go now”.
161

Chapter 4
Defending the Received View
In the previous chapter, I have given a historical defense of the Received View
on scientific theories and models by showing that many of the criticisms of the
Received View rely on incorrect presumptions about the Received View. Often, I
have also pointed to a host of discussion from its proponents that already expound
what its critics claim is incompatible with the Received View. In this chapter, I will
give a systematic defense of the Received View by showing that it indeed allows
features that, according to its critics, are impossible within the Received View.
Specifically, I will argue that it allows describing van Fraassen’s notion of empirical
adequacy (thus capturing van Fraassen’s ideas about the relation between theory
and observation) and partial structures (thus formalizing the lack of knowledge of
a domain). First, however, I will compare syntactic and semantic formalizations
of theories more generally.
4.1 Syntactic and semantic formalizations
Suppes (1968, 654–656) lists a variety of rewards that come with formalizing
a theory: explicitness, standardization, abstraction from non-essential aspects,
objectivity, and the possibility of identifying self-contained, minimal assumptions.
In particular, he suggests that these rewards can be reaped by using formalizations
in set theory or first order predicate logic (Suppes 1968, 653). Presumably, he
would also argue that formalizations in higher order logic and model theory can
lead to the same rewards.1
1A very early version of this section has been presented at Herman Philipse’s Dutch Research
Seminar in Analytic Philosophy at Utrecht University. Parts have been presented under the title “What’s
right with a syntactic approach to theories and models?” at the EPSA 09 at the Vrije Universiteit,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, on October 23, 2009 and at the workshop Perspectives on Structuralism at
the Center for Advanced Studies/Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-
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Let me for now call the reliance on formalizations in predicate logic of first
or higher order ‘syntactic’, and the reliance on formalizations in set or model
theory ‘semantic’.2 In this terminology, the Received View is a specific syntactic
approach that additionally assumes a bipartition of the vocabulary and allows a
direct interpretation only of the basic terms. In the following, I will argue that,
contrary to common opinion, a number of problems that syntactic approaches
allegedly face are solvable if they are solvable in semantic approaches. In discussing
the relative merits of syntactic approaches, I will ignore the ontological question
of whether theories can be identified with either kind of description (or, for that
matter, with platonic objects, sets of propositions, thoughts, actions, connection
weights in brains, combinations thereof. . . ). Given that scientific theories are
typically not formalized according to either kind of approach, they are probably
ontologically different from both kinds of descriptions.3
There are good reasons to suspect that the use of predicate logic has fallen prey
to the “persuasive and holistically critical” style of philosophical argument against
the Received View that Rozeboom lamented; that is, it is often dismissed because
of other, logically independent aspects of the Received View. For example, in the
introduction to the proceedings of the Urbana conference, Suppe (1974a, 114)
concludes that
it is amply clear from the discussion of the observational-theoretical
distinction and correspondence rules above that many of the epis-
temically relevant distinctions concerning theories cannot be drawn
syntactically, and thus that the Received View’s insistence on ax-
iomatic canonical reformulation is untenable. Hence, if formalization
is desirable in a philosophical analysis of theories, it must be of a
semantic sort.
In the discussion of the theoretical-observational distinction, however, Suppe
(1974a, II.B) only discusses its relation to the analytic-synthetic distinction and the
problems of making the theoretical-observational distinction based on a partition
of the vocabulary. Suppe’s criticism of correspondence rules (Suppe 1974a, II.E)
is based on his presentation of Suppes’s hierarchy leading from observations
to theories, which Suppe considers incompatible with the Received View. His
description, however, is itself phrased in syntactic terms (cf. Suppe 1974a, 108,
n. 225), and therefore clearly not an example of principled restrictions on syntactic
Universität München, Germany, on February 17, 2012. I thank the participants for helpful discussions.
This section has also profited a lot from a reading group at Tilburg University with Reinhard Muskens
and Stefan Wintein.
2Although this is standard terminology, it is somewhat incongruous: Set theory and predicate logic
are foundational theories in that they can each be used as a sort of basic language in which to formalize
other theories. Model theory, on the other hand, is one of those theories that can be so formalized.
3Ontologically different given the majority’s way of talking about theories, that is. Relying on an
artificial language methodology also in the metalanguage, I assume with Church (see §2.10) that the
semantics of a theory is also a matter of choice. I will not, however, defend this assumption here.
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approaches. None of his criticism rests on the Received View’s use of predicate
logic.
A similar pattern can be found in the already mentioned conclusion about the
relation between theory and observation by van Fraassen (1980, 56):
The syntactically defined relationships are simply the wrong ones. Per-
haps the worst consequence of the syntactic approach was the way it
focused attention on philosophically irrelevant technical questions. It
is hard not to conclude that those discussions of axiomatizability in re-
stricted vocabularies, ‘theoretical terms’, Craig’s theorem, ‘reduction
sentences’, ‘empirical languages’, Ramsey and Carnap sentences, were
one and all off the mark—solutions to purely self-generated problems,
and philosophically irrelevant. The main lesson of twentieth-century
philosophy of science may well be this: no concept which is essentially
language-dependent has any philosophical importance at all.
There are two possibilities to interpret this quote. On the one hand, the conclu-
sion is drawn from arguments against an observational-theoretical distinction
based on a bipartition of the vocabulary (van Fraassen 1980, §3.6),4 and refers to
Ramsey and Carnap sentences and theoretical vocabularies. This suggests that van
Fraassen’s critique is directed at the bipartition of a theory’s vocabulary into an
observational and a theoretical part. On the other hand, the talk of syntactically
defined relationships, language-dependence, and Craig’s theorem suggests that there
is something wrong with the use of any syntactic concept, whether depending on
a bipartition of the vocabulary or not.
My contention is that some philosophers of science have inadvertently devel-
oped a motte-and-bailey doctrine as described by Shackel (2005, 298–299). In a
motte-and-bailey castle, the area of a bailey is determined by the weak defense at
its perimeter, typically a palisade and a moat, the motte is a hill inside the bailey,
sometimes surmounted by a keep (see figure 4.1). An attack on the bailey is far
more likely to succeed than an attack on the motte, but if the bailey is taken,
the defendants can simply retreat to the motte and wait until the attackers have
given up. Then they can reclaim the bailey, a much nicer place than the motte.
More spacious, for one thing. Analogously, a motte-and-bailey doctrine relies
on an ambiguity between two positions: One easy to defend but comparably
uninteresting (the motte), and one hard to defend but very interesting (the bailey).
The rhetorical trick consists in retreating to the motte position when defending,
and moving back to the bailey position when free to develop an argument, helped
by the ambiguity.
The motte in this case is the claim that the Received View as typically conceived
is untenable. This position is easy to defend, because beyond the use of predicate
4Van Fraassen (1980, 54, 220, n. 12) restricts the application of Craig’s theorem to those cases as
well.
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bailey
keep q
motte
Figure 4.1: Plan of Duffus Castle, a motte-
and-bailey castle near Elgin, Morray, Scotland
(MacGibbon and Ross 1887, 279, labels added).
logic, the Received View is incorrectly taken to rely on exhaustive axiomatizations
in first order logic, on a dismissal of scientific models, and correctly taken to rely
on the mentioned bipartition of the scientific vocabulary, on the restriction of
the interpretation to observational terms, and on the description of the relation
between the axioms of a theory and observation statements by correspondence
rules. Any of these additional assumptions can be questioned, and all of them have
been. The bailey is the claim that any syntactical approach to scientific theories
and models is untenable. This is a sweeping claim, which in van Fraassen’s case,
for instance, entails that predicate logic self-generates problems and does not allow
developing concepts with any philosophical importance at all. The ambiguity
that allows this motte-and-bailey doctrine is explicit in the synonymous use of
the terms ‘Received View’ and ‘syntactic view’, and implicit, for example, in the
above passages by Suppe and van Fraassen.
The previous chapter criticized a host of aspects of the motte position. In this
section, I will consider the bailey position, the claim that syntactic approaches
to theories and models are untenable.5 I will try to defend syntactic approaches
relative to semantic approaches, in which theories and models are formalized in
formal semantic models or, and this will be repeatedly a point of discussion, in set
theoretical structures.
Semantic approaches are widely thought to avoid a number of perceived short-
comings of syntactic approaches: (i) Syntactic approaches often have unintended
models, unlike semantic approaches, (ii) syntactic approaches require and have
5It is already evidence for the irrelevance of the distinction between syntactic and semantic ap-
proaches in the philosophy of science that a rather thorough defense of the Received View is possible
without ever countering the more fundamental bailey position.
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failed to provide an account of the relation between language and the world, (iii)
semantic approaches are language independent, (iv) the relation between theory
and observation is misleading or wrong in syntactic approaches, (v) the description
of scientific theories in syntactic approaches is cumbersome, (vi) with their focus
on models, semantic approaches are closer to actual scientific practice. I will argue
that if the first three of these problems can be solved for semantic approaches,
they can be solved for syntactic ones as well. That the same holds for the last three
problems then follows easily. Since I have already argued historically in §3 that the
last three alleged problems do not occur in the Received View of Carnap, Hempel,
and Feigl, this amounts to the systematic claim that their view is consistent.
Given its thesis, this section can probably count as a contribution to the
“endless silly, largely unpublished debates over what semantic approaches can
do that syntactical or statement approaches intrinsically cannot” which Suppe
(2000, S103) laments. There are still justifications for its existence. First, beyond
the intrinsic strength of axiomatizations in predicate logic, my discussion also
covers the connection of a theory’s description to the world, the relation between
formalizations in set theoretical structures and formalizations in models, and
the language independence of the approaches. Hence at most some of it is silly.
Second, even if the debates are silly, many philosophers of science do hold the
view that an analysis of science better use a semantic approach, and sometimes
make it sound like semantic approaches are intrinsically superior. After all, Suppe
(1974b, 114) himself claims early in the history of the discussion that “if formaliza-
tion is desirable in a philosophical analysis of theories, it must be of a semantic
sort”. And looking back at the discussion since he made this claim, Suppe (2000,
S110, my emphasis) concludes that “by construing theories in terms of families
of models, semantic analyses—and they alone—have real potential for parlaying
such new philosophical wisdom [gained by focusing on models] into enhanced
understanding of theories”. These claims suggest, at least on the surface, that there
is an intrinsic advantage of semantic approaches. Third, if the debates are silly,
it might be a good idea to finally put them to rest. This, incidentally, is what I
would like to contribute to. As a first step, I may note that this contribution to
the debate is published.
4.1.1 Translating between sentences and models
According to van Fraassen (1980, 44),
[t]he syntactic picture of a theory identifies it with a body of theo-
rems, stated in one particular language chosen for the expression of
that theory. This should be contrasted with the alternative of present-
ing a theory in the first instance by identifying a class of structures
as its models. In this second, semantic, approach the language used
to express the theory is neither basic nor unique; the same class of
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structures could well be described in radically different ways, each
with its own limitations.
In the semantic approach, a theory is thus formalized by a class of structures, in
the syntactic approach by a set of sentences. It seems plausible that every syntactic
description of a scientific theory can be captured by a semantic one, because any
set Σ of sentences determines the set S of its models through the mapping
Φ :Σ 7→ S := {S |S Σ} . (4.1)
Σ has a fixed vocabulary V , containing mi -place predicates Pi , n j -place functions
F j , constants ck , and in higher order logic their respective types. V does not
disappear by the mapping Φ, since every structureS ∈ S contains a mapping from
V to a set of extensions with the corresponding arity and type. V , sometimes
called the ‘signature of ofS’ can thus be read off uniquely fromS (Hodges 1993,
4).
However, Φ does lose some information because it cannot distinguish between
equivalent sets of sentences, that is, if Σ  Θ, then Φ(Σ) =Φ(Θ). This can pose
problems, for example when modifying a theory: One formulation of a theory can
be vastly superior to an equivalent one when it needs to be generalized or adjusted,
as van Fraassen (1980, §3.5) has pointed out. Relatedly, the formulation is also
relevant when it comes to the inductive support of parts of the theory: If the data
support one postulate but not another, a formulation that keeps the two postulates
separate is arguably better than one that contains a single postulate equivalent to
their conjunction. Thus, if irrelevant conjunctions indeed pose a problem for an
explicatum of ‘confirmation’ (cf. Fitelson 2002), the possibility of reformulating
a theory allows hiding the conjunction, and thus make the irrelevant conjunct
harder to detect. And if the problem of irrelevant conjunctions can only be solved
by distinguishing between equivalent formulations, then semantic approaches are
incapable of a solution.6
The loss of distinction between equivalent sets of sentences does not pose a
problem, however, if the results of an analysis of a scientific theory are invariant
under the theory’s equivalent reformulation; and outside of questions of induction,
many interesting analyses of scientific theories are so invariant. Conversely, it is
often considered a problem if an analysis of the theory is not (witness, for example,
Hempel 1965f, §§4–5; Carnap 1956b, 56; Winnie 1970, 294–295).7
6This, of course, assumes semantic approaches that indeed do not incorporate a theory’s specific
formulation.
7This also makes it easy to see that one well-known criticism of the Received View rests on a
non-sequitur: Van Fraassen (1980, 55) states that in the Received View, a theory TN(0) that postulates
absolute space cannot be empirically equivalent to a theory TNE that does not postulate absolute space,
because even if absolute space is considered a theoretical term (and therefore existentially quantified
over in a Ramsey sentence), TN(0) still postulates the existence of something that TNE does not
postulate. But as the Ramsey sentence (2.15a) of the toy theory of pain (2.14) on page 48 shows,
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Conversely, any set of structures S yields a set of sentences Σ through the
mapping
Ψ : S 7→Σ := {ϕ |S  ϕ for allS ∈ S} . (4.2)
Ψ(S) is thus the set of sentences true in S (see §2.8.1). For many logics, Ψ is not
the inverse of Φ. For instance, S may not be closed under elementary equivalence,
while in first order logic, Φ(Ψ(S)) is. Of course, the set S′ :=Φ(Ψ(S)) is mapped
onto itself by Φ ◦Ψ. Conversely, any set Σ of sentences that is closed under
entailment is mapped onto itself by Ψ ◦Φ. For such sets of sentences and sets
of structures, Φ and Ψ are therefore duals in first order logic. Call the class of
models of a single set of sentence∆-elementary. It is known that there are classes
of relational first order structures that are not∆-elementary, but are complements
of a ∆-elementary classes, or are the union of ∆-elementary classes. All and
only classes that are unions of∆-elementary classes are closed under elementary
equivalence (Bell and Slomson 1974, 141–144).
Higher order logic can often distinguish between elementary equivalent but
non-isomorphic structures, and the use of logics that allow formulas with infinitely
many quantifiers, conjuncts, or disjuncts increases the number of classes for
which Ψ is the dual of Φ. For simplicity, I will assume in the following that the
classes of structures under discussion do not need to be described as the unions of
different classes of models of sets of sentences.8 But as a matter of principle (that
is, independently of the logic used), Ψ always loses information because it cannot
distinguish between two non-identical sets of element-wise isomorphic structures,
that is, ifS'T for allS ∈ S,T ∈ T, then Ψ(S) =Ψ(T) even if S 6= T. However,
if the results of an analysis of a scientific theory are invariant under isomorphic
transformations of theories (a natural demand that is usually fulfilled),9 this does
not pose a problem.
It is sometimes argued that as a matter of principle, more information is lost in
the mapping Ψ than simply the distinction between isomorphic structures. Suppe
(2000, S104), for example, argues that syntactic approaches are in principle unable
to capture some analyses of scientific theories, because for syntactic descriptions,
[a] general problem [is] that the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem im-
plie[s] that [ . . . ] models must include both intended and wildly
unintended models. Unintended models provide potential counterex-
amples.
Blocking them more concerns eliminating syntactical-approach
equivalent reformulation can sometimes eliminate a perceived existential commitment. A toy theory
for van Fraassen’s example that is syntactically isomorphic to the toy theory for pain would be ‘All
objects are in an absolute space and every object in an absolute space moves straight unless acted upon’.
I will discuss this problem more generally in connection with structural realism in §11.6.
8In other words, I will assume that the classes can be captured as the models of a single set of
sentences or cannot be captured as models of sentences at all.
9See, for example, van Fraassen’s notion of a theory (§4.2.1).
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artifacts than dealing with substantive analysis. [ . . . ] For example,
Kitcher’s (1989) unification explanation account has a very simple idea.
But he develops it syntactically spending most of the paper trying
to block unintended consequences that are artifacts of his formalism.
[ . . . ]
This is the correct sense of [the] claim symbolic logic is an inap-
propriate formalism.
First and foremost, Suppe’s criticism is not directed at syntactic approaches
(or symbolic logic) in general, because the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem does
not hold in higher order logic. And the standard examples of structures that
cannot be captured in first order logic, e. g. the natural numbers and the reals,
can be described up to isomorphism in higher order logic if a full semantics is
assumed (Enderton 2009, §2).10 There are structures that cannot be described
up to isomorphism, not even in predicate logic of transfinite order (Enderton
2009, §2, §4). However, set theory itself can be described up to isomorphism by
(and only by) the addition of axioms about the existence of specific inaccessible
cardinals (Väänänen 2001, 516). Since the proof theory of higher order logic is
not complete for full semantics (Väänänen 2001, 505), entailment needs to be
defined semantically in terms of structures. However, there is no good reason to
disallow the use of structures in syntactic approaches, since they presume only that
scientific theories can be analyzed by way of their description in predicate logic.
They do not presume that the analysis itself must proceed wholly in the object
language. As I have noted in §3.7, the use of formal models to define entailment
was even part of the Received View.
Second, for predicate logic of any order, some structures can be characterized in
that language up to isomorphism. If the theory has a finite domain, for example, all
structures that are syntactically equivalent in a first order language are isomorphic
(Hodges 1993, §2.2, ex. 5), so that there are no unintended models.
Third, whether the existence of unintended models poses a problem depends
on the kind of analysis sought after. The answers to questions that can be phrased
in the object language, for example, do not depend on isomorphism, since oth-
erwise they would provide a means of distinguishing between non-isomorphic
models. And an analysis that requires isomorphism in only a finite subdomain of
the theory’s domain (for example in the domain of observations) is immune to
the problem even in a first order language. In general, it is doubtful that the obser-
vational content of a theory will be changed by the mapping Ψ, as the number of
observations will always stay well below any inaccessible cardinal.
Finally, Suppe’s criticism rests on an equivocation of ‘unintended model’ and
‘non-standard model’, the latter referring to a model that is syntactically equivalent
but not isomorphic to a standard model. Even though Kitcher spends a lot of
10Leivant (1994, §3.1, §5.4) and Väänänen (2001, 504–505) discuss the difference between full
semantics and Henkin semantics. I will come back to this in §4.1.4.
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work blocking unintended consequences, the unintended consequences are not
syntactically equivalent to intended ones and can therefore be blocked by syntactic
means. Kitcher’s account is a good example of how difficult it can be to develop a
formalization of an idea, but not of a failure of a syntactic approach because of the
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. Put crudely, if the unintended consequences could
be blocked by using a predicate logic of higher order, Kitcher would probably not
have shied away from it for lack of a complete proof theory.
4.1.2 Language independence
According to the quote by van Fraassen (1980, 44) above, “the same class of
structures could well be described in radically different ways, each with its own
limitations”, and in the words of Suppe (1989, 4), the semantic approach
construes theories as what their formulations refer to when the formu-
lations are given a (formal) semantic interpretation. Thus, ‘semantic’
is used here in the sense of formal semantics or model theory in
mathematical logic.
French and Ladyman (1999, 114–115) similarly assume that the structures used in
semantic approaches do not contain a vocabulary when they discuss a criticism of
semantic approaches they attribute to Mauricio Suárez: If a semantic approach
uses models as they are defined in model theory, it is still dependent on a language,
since a model “is a structure and an interpretation of a formal language in terms
of that structure (that is, a map from the symbols of the syntax to elements of the
structure)”. If models are taken to involve such a mapping, French and Ladyman
(1999, 114) write,
it is clear that the celebrated claim of the linguistic independence of
considering models (and not first-order formalizations of theories),
stressed by adherents of the semantic approach as giving it a clear
advantage over the syntactic view, is simply not true.
They quote a concurring passage by van Fraassen (1989, 366):
The impact of Suppes’s innovation [switching to models] is lost if
models are defined, as in many standard logic texts, to be partially
linguistic entities, each yoked to a particular syntax. In my terminol-
ogy here the models are mathematical structures, called models of a
given theory only by virtue of belonging to the class defined to be the
models of that theory.
“Thus,” French and Ladyman (1999, 115) conclude, “van Fraassen should be inter-
preted as talking about structures by those who wish to understand model in the
sense of the ‘standard logic texts’”.
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However, it is not exactly clear what French and Ladyman mean by ‘structure’,
except that it contains the extensions of symbols, and not the symbols itself.
They do claim that van Fraassen’s “emphasis on structure is compatible with this
definition of model theory from a contemporary textbook”, according to which
model theory “is the study of the construction and classification of structures
within specified classes of structures”. Of course, everything in this quote from
Hodges (1993, ix) depends on his definition of ‘structure’. A few pages further on
(Hodges 1993, 1), there is evidence that his definition might not be what French
and Ladyman think it is:
Model theorists are forever talking about symbols, names and labels.
A group theorist will happily write the same Abelian group multi-
plicatively or additively, whichever is more convenient for the matter
in hand. Not so the model theorist: for him or her the group with
‘·’ is one structure and the group with ‘+’ is a different structure.
Change the name and you change the structure.
One of the reasons that Hodges (1993, 2) gives for this focus on symbols is that
we shall often want to compare two structures and study the homo-
morphisms from one to the other. What is a homomorphism? [ . . . ]
[A] homomorphism from structure A to structure B is a map which
carries each operation of A to the operation with the same name in B .
But, of course, it is the definition of a structure that shows whether symbols play
a role in model theory. Here is, for example, the part of his definition that deals
with relations (Hodges 1993, 2, my notation):
For each positive integer n [a structure contains] a set of n-ary rela-
tions on |A| (i. e. subsets of |A|n), each of which is named by one or
more n-ary relation symbols. If R is a relation symbol, we write RA
for the relation named by R.
It is clear that the symbols play an important role in a structure: They identify
the extensions by naming them.
So where does the confusion stem from? Why would one assume that a struc-
ture contains not, for example, pairs of relation symbols and relations 〈R, RA〉,
but only the relations RA? Again, some hints come from Hodges’s text. For one,
many model theorists take a liberal stance on what counts as a name. Hodges
(1993, 3), for example, puts “no restrictions at all on what can serve as a name. For
example any ordinal can be a name, and any mathematical object can serve as a
name of itself”. If an object can serve as its own name, it is understandable that
the two might be confused. This possibility for misunderstanding is increased by
a liberal stance on notation. Again Hodges (1993, 4, my notation):
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Some writers define A to be an ordered pair 〈|A| ,I 〉 where I is a
function taking each symbol S to the corresponding item SA. The
important thing is to know what the symbols and the ingredients are,
and this can be indicated in any reasonable way.
For example a model theorist may refer to the structure
〈R,+,−, ·, 0, 1,≤〉 .
With some common sense the reader can guess that this means the
structure whose domain is the set of real numbers, with constants 0
and 1 naming the numbers 0 and 1, a 2-ary relation symbol ≤ naming
the relation ≤, 2-ary function symbols + and · naming addition
and multiplication respectively, and a 1-ary function symbol naming
minus.
Seeing structures written as tuples might easily lead to the belief that structures
are tuples. Of course, that this is a misunderstanding can be seen unequivocally
from Hodges’s definition of ‘structure’. His is a standard definition also used by,
for example, Chang and Keisler (1990, §1.3), who even explicitly define A to be an
ordered pair 〈|A| ,I 〉. Smith (2008) calls structures as defined by Hodges ‘labeled
structures’, but I will stick with ‘structures’. Like syntactic approaches, semantic
approaches using structures therefore have one specific object language.
French and Ladyman would have found a definition better suited to their
position in a less contemporary textbook (Bell and Slomson 1974, §3.2) in which
a relational structure is an ordered pair
A= 〈A,{Rn | n ∈ω}〉 ,
where [ . . . ] for n ∈ ω Rn is a finitary, say λ(n)-ary relation on A.
[ . . . ] The relational structure A will count as an interpretation of
the language L [= {Pn : n ∈ ω}] if the degrees of the relations Rn
correspond to the degrees [δ(n)] of the predicate letters Pn . That
is, for n ∈ ω, δ(n) = λ(n). In this case we say that the relational
structure A is a realization of the language L and that L is appropriate
for the structure A.
This definition of what one could call ‘pure structures’ (Smith 2008) seems to be
used by many proponents of the semantic approach (e. g., da Costa and French
1990, French and Ladyman 1999). It is free of any specific vocabulary up to the
vocabulary’s similarity type, that is, any appropriate vocabulary can be used with
the structure.
A structure A = 〈A,I 〉 contains an interpretation I mapping, say, the re-
lations {Pi}i∈I , from a vocabulary V to their extensions, {PAi | i ∈ I }. A pure
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structure, on the other hand, contains instead an indexed set {PAi }i∈I of exten-
sions.11 But this introduces a vocabulary through the back door: The mapping
from I to the set {PAi | i ∈ I } that is needed to define such an indexed set is is
the same as an interpretation with the vocabulary I . Any claim that I is not a
vocabulary but an index set has to rely on commitments (or rather declarations)
outside of the formalism.
In the set theoretic semantic approach by Suppes and Stegmüller, pure struc-
tures are written as tuples with the domain as first element, which can avoid this
hidden dependence on a specific vocabulary: Tuples may, for example, be intro-
duced as primitives, with axioms like 〈a1, . . .an〉= 〈b1, . . . , bn〉⇔ a1 = b1, . . . ,an =
bn . They may also be defined through sets, as in Kuratowski’s definition. Of course,
one can still introduce a vocabulary by assigning, for example, natural numbers to
the positions of the tuple, but this assignment is not unique. In fact, any mapping
from a well ordered index set (an ordered index set with a smallest element of each
subset) with the right cardinality would do. The common method of representing
a tuple 〈a1, . . . ,an〉 as a set of pairs {〈1,a1〉, . . . , 〈n,an〉} again introduces a vocab-
ulary, the natural numbers {1, . . . , n}. This, incidentally, is the vocabulary that
Carnap (1958, 242) chooses to name physical objects.
Since structures can have infinite vocabularies, but tuples are finite, pure
structures cannot be tuples if they are to be able to express anything that structures
can express. In line with the possibility of assigning some finite well-ordered index
set to tuples, I therefore suggest to let a pure structure Aˆ contain a domain A and
a mapping from an arbitrary well-ordered index set to a set of extensions on the
domain. The arbitrariness of the index set can be captured by identifying any two
mappings that only differ in their index sets:
Definition 4.1. A representative of a pure structure Aˆ is a triple 〈A,a,≺〉, where
a : I −→I (V ) is a mapping from the index set I to the image of an interpretation
I , and ≺ is a well-ordering of I . Two triples 〈A,a,≺〉 and 〈A,a′,≺′〉 represent
the same pure structure, [〈A,a,≺〉] = [〈A,a′,≺′〉], if and only if there is an order
isomorphism f : I −→ I ′ and a ◦ f = a′.
The use of an interpretation I is simply a way to ensure that a maps only to
set theoretical objects that can be extensions of predicate, function, or constant
symbols. The definition determines a tuple if and only if the index sets of the
representatives are finite. In both the finite and infinite case, the order of the
objects in I (V ) is preserved as in an ordered set, and additionally, elements of
I (V ) can occur repeatedly.
11It is clear from their use ofω as an index set that Bell and Slomson (1974) intend ‘{Rn | n ∈ω}’
to be an indexed set, in my notation ‘{Rn}n∈ω ’ (rather then the set of the indexed set’s elements).
For if R2 = R3, then {Ri }i∈{1,2,3} 6= {Ri }i∈{1,2}, while

Ri | i ∈ {1,2,3}
	
=

Ri | i ∈ {1,2}
	
; Bell and
Slomson thus need indexed sets to allow for different names with identical extension.
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Definition 4.1 does not introduce a specific vocabulary, and is as language
independent as the use of tuples: Even if not represented as a mapping from natural
numbers to extensions, a tuple can be assigned a well-ordered index set, and this
definition of pure structures only makes this possibility explicit. To stress the
point: The infinity of vocabularies in definition 4.1 is not artificially introduced.
Both indexed sets and tuples assume some set or multiple sets of entities that
provide a vocabulary. Index sets can be used as vocabularies immediately, since
they are already mappings from some set to a set of extensions. Tuples are either
defined as a mapping from a range of natural numbers to a set of extensions
or allow the introduction of such a mapping without any further assumptions
except about the elements of the index set. In definition 4.1, the identification of
structures with different index sets avoids this one further assumption.
Muller (2010) has suggested a similar conception for the use in semantic ap-
proaches, but he considers his conception an extension of semantic approaches,
and justifies it with the need to connect theories to the world with its help. I will
shortly revisit Muller’s suggestion for connecting theories to the world below; at
this point I only want to stress (again) that definition 4.1 is not an extension of the
concept of a structure used in semantic approaches, but rather an acknowledgment
of the infinity of vocabularies implicitly contained in it.
In the definition of ‘structure’ given by Bell and Slomson (1974), the index
set I plays the role of the set of relation symbols {Pi | i ∈ I } used by Chang and
Keisler (1990) and Hodges (1993). For examples relevant in the following, see the
definitions of ‘reduct’, ‘isomorphism’, and ‘substructure’ by Chang and Keisler
(1990, 20–23) and by Bell and Slomson (1974, 153, 73), respectively. Definition 4.1
requires a somewhat more elaborate modification of standard definitions, of which
I will only give the modification for the notion of embedding. Since pure structures
are given by classes of mappings with well-ordered index sets, embeddings between
pure structures can be defined via a bijection between the index sets of their
representatives and a function from one pure structure’s domain to the other’s,
just like for labeled structures. In this definition (which I give only for pure first
order structures), the position in the ordering of the index sets plays the role of
the element of the vocabulary.
Definition 4.2. A pure first order structure Aˆ can be embedded in a pure first
order structure Bˆ if and only if for any two representatives Aˆ= [〈A,a,≺〉] with
a : I −→I (V ) and≺ an ordering on I , and Bˆ= [〈B , b ,≺′〉]with b : J −→I (V ′)
and≺′ an ordering on J , there is an order isomorphism g : I −→ J and an injective
mapping h : A−→ B such that
1. for all c ∈ I mapped to constants by a, h(a(c)) = b (g (c)),
2. for all F ∈ I mapped to n-ary functions by a and all x1, . . . , xn ∈ A,
h
 
a(F )(x1, . . . , xn)

= b
 
g (F )

(h(x1), . . . , h(xn)), and
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Figure 4.2: Functions between arbitrary represen-
tatives of two structures Aˆ = [〈A,a,≺〉], Bˆ =
[〈B , b ,≺′〉] so that Aˆ can be embedded in Bˆ.
I I (V ) A
J J (V ′) B
a
g
b
h
3. for all P ∈ I mapped to n-ary relations by a and all x1, . . . , xn ∈ A,〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ a(P )⇔〈h(x1), . . . , h(xn)〉 ∈ b (g (P )),
h is called an embedding of Aˆ in Bˆ. If h is surjective, Aˆ and Bˆ are called isomorphic.
Embeddability of pure structures only has to be shown for one representative
of each pure structure:
Lemma 4.1. Pure first order structure Aˆ can be embedded in pure first order structure
Bˆ if and only if there are two representatives Aˆ= [〈A,a,≺〉] with a : I −→I (V )
and ≺ an ordering on I , and Bˆ = [〈B , b ,≺′〉] with b : J −→ I (V ′) and ≺′
an ordering on J , an order isomorphism g : I −→ J , and an injective mapping
h : A−→ B such that conditions 1–3 of definition 4.2 are fulfilled.
Proof. The proof from left to right is immediate. For the other direction, assume
[〈A, c ,≺∗〉] = Aˆwith c : K −→I (V ) and [〈B , d ,≺′∗〉] = Bˆwith d : L−→I (V ′).
By definition 4.1, there are order isomorphisms i : K −→ I and j : J −→ L (see
figure 4.3). Then there is an order isomorphism k : K −→ L and a one-to-one
mapping h : A−→ B such that
1. for all m ∈ K mapped to constants by c , h(c(m)) = h ◦ a ◦ i(m) = b ◦ g ◦
i(m) = b ◦ j−1 ◦ j ◦ g ◦ i(m) = d ( j ◦ g ◦ i(m)) = d (k(m)),
2. for all F ∈ K mapped to n-ary functions by c and all x1, . . . , xn ∈ A,
h
 
c(F )(x1, . . . , xn)

= h
 
a ◦ i(F ))(x1, . . . , xn)

= b ◦ g ◦ i(F )(h(x1), . . . ,
h(xn)) = b ◦ j−1 ◦ j ◦ g ◦ i (F )(h(x1), . . . , h(xn)) = d (k(F ))(h(x1), . . . , h(xn)),
and
3. for all P ∈ I mapped to n-ary relations by c and all x1, . . . , xn ∈ A,〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ c(P )⇔ 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ a ◦ i(P )⇔ 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ a ◦ i(P )⇔〈h(x1), . . . , h(xn)〉 ∈ b◦g◦i (P )⇔〈h(x1), . . . , h(xn)〉 ∈ b◦ j−1◦ j◦g◦i (P )⇔〈h(x1), . . . , h(xn)〉 ∈ d (k(P ))
The definition of embedding for pure structures respects the standard defini-
tion of embedding for structures (Hodges 1993, 5) in that there is a connection
between structures and pure structures, and under this connection, the two defi-
nitions of embedding are interchangeable. More precisely, any structure A gives
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Figure 4.3: Functions between four
representatives of two structures
Aˆ= [〈A,a,≺〉] = [〈A, c ,≺∗〉], Bˆ=
[〈B , b ,≺′〉] = [〈B , d ,≺′∗〉].
K
I I (V ) A
J J (V ′) B
L
c = a ◦ ii
k = j ◦ g ◦ i
a
g
b
j
d =
b ◦ j
−1
h
rise to a representative of a pure structure Aˆ by a well-ordering of its vocabulary,
and any pure structure Aˆ contains a structure A among its representatives. From
the definition of embedding for pure structures, it follows that a pure structure
Aˆ can be embedded in a pure structure Bˆ if and only if they are represented by
some structures A andB with the same vocabulary and the same ordering of the
vocabulary, and A can be embedded inB:
Claim 4.2. Pure first order structure Aˆ can be embedded in pure first order Bˆ if and
only if there are first order structuresA= 〈A,I 〉 andB= 〈B ,J 〉 and a well-ordering
≺ such that Aˆ= [〈A,I ,≺〉], Bˆ= [〈B ,J ,≺〉], and A can be embedded inB.
Proof. For the proof from left to right, choose any representatives 〈A,a,≺〉 of
Aˆ and 〈B , b ,≺′〉 of Bˆ. Now choose for V the index set of a, I = a, and J =
b ◦ g , where g is the order isomorphism from I to J . The claim follows from
definition 4.2 because for any Q ∈ V , h(QA) = h ◦ a(Q) = b ◦ g (Q) =J (Q) =
QB in the domain of Aˆ, which is also the domain of A.
For the proof from right to left, choose g = id. The claim follows with
lemma 4.1 because for any Q ∈ V , h(I (Q)) = h(QA) = QB =J (g (Q)).
Putting it slightly differently, Aˆ can be embedded in Bˆ if and only if for any
two structures A and B that represent, with a common well-ordering of their
vocabulary, Aˆ and Bˆ, A can be embedded inB:
Corollary 4.3. Pure first order structure Aˆ can be embedded in Bˆ if and only if
for any structures A= 〈A,I 〉 and B= 〈B ,J 〉 and any well-ordering ≺ such that
Aˆ= [〈A,I ,≺〉] and Bˆ= [〈B ,J ,≺〉], A can be embedded inB.
Proof. Immediately from claim 4.2 and lemma 4.1.
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Conversely, a structure A can be embedded in a structure B if and only if,
under some well-ordering of their vocabulary, they represent pure structures Aˆ
and Bˆ, respectively, such that Aˆ can be embedded in Bˆ. The proof assumes the
axiom of choice.
Corollary 4.4. First order structure A= 〈A,I 〉 can be embedded inB= 〈B ,J 〉 if
and only if [〈A,I ,≺〉] can be embedded in [〈B ,J ,≺〉] for some well-ordering ≺.
Proof. Note that I and J must have the same vocabulary. The proof from right
to left follows immediately from theorem 4.2. For the proof from left to right,
note that any vocabulary V can be well-ordered (assuming the axiom of choice).
The claim again follows immediately from theorem 4.2.
Again, putting this slightly differently, A can be embedded inB if and only
if under any well-ordering, they represent pure structures Aˆ and Bˆ, respectively,
such that Aˆ can be embedded in Bˆ:
Corollary 4.5. First order structure A = 〈A,I 〉 can be embedded in structure
B= 〈B ,J 〉 if and only if [〈A,I ,≺〉] can be embedded in [〈B ,J ,≺〉] for all well-
orderings ≺.
Proof. Immediately from corollary 4.4 and lemma 4.1.
These results show that language independent pure structures and typical
model theoretic operations between them are well-defined. It also shows that noth-
ing is lost by discussing embeddings only for structures or only for pure structures.
Language independence can be achieved at any point by introducing an ordering
for the vocabulary, turning the structures into representatives of pure structures.
Conversely, the ordering can be eliminated at any point in the discussion by choos-
ing, for all pure structures at once, one of the possible vocabularies. It is clear that
other model theoretic notions besides embedding have similar analogues for pure
structures.
The independence from a specific vocabulary which French and Ladyman
(1999) call ‘much celebrated’ seems indeed important, since language is inherently
conventional, or at least relative to a group of speakers. Understanding ‘propo-
sitions’ “in the medieval sense of the term”, that is, as “interpreted sentences of
some particular language” Suppe (1974a, 204–205), argues that therefore theories
cannot be the propositions in which they are formulated:
Suppose a theory is first formulated in English, and then is translated
into French. The English formulation and the French formulations
constitute different collection of propositions; if theories were collec-
tions of propositions, then the translation of the theory into French
would produce a new theory; but, of course, it does not—it is the
same theory reformulated in French.
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Suppe’s point is clear: The ideal gas law does not change only because one uses
the names ‘pression’, ‘volume’, ‘constante de Boltzmann’, and ‘températur’ in-
stead of ‘pressure’, ‘volume’, ‘Boltzmann constant’, and ‘temperature’. The use
of structures as defined above avoids the use of any specific vocabulary, and thus
supports the claim by van Fraassen (1989, 222) that “in discussions of the structure
of theories [language] can largely be ignored”.
The freedom the use of pure structures brings with it is limited, of course,
because an extension’s position in the pure structure takes over the role of its
name in a structure. This is important when it comes to questions of embed-
dings between structures, since, for example, the pure structure corresponding
to the tuple 〈{1,2,3},{1,2},{3}〉 is isomorphic to (and therefore embeddable in)
〈{a, b , c},{a, b},{c}〉, but not in 〈{a, b , c},{c},{a, b}〉.
The simultaneous switch of all structures to pure structures indeed leads to a
freedom to choose between an infinity of vocabularies, and thus the freedom from
any specific one. So assume that two modelsA andA′ of two sets of sentencesΘ in
V and Θ′ in V ′, under some order of their vocabularies, represent the same pure
structure Aˆ. Then the models are reducts of some structureB in V ∪V ′ which
is a model of both Θ and Θ′. But B is also a model of identity claims between
any two elements of V and V ′ that have the same position in the pure structure.
In the vocabulary V ∪V ′, each symbol of V can thus be used as the definiens
of the symbol of the same position in V ′ and vice versa. These identifications
therefore allow the definitional extension of either theory to the other. Since
explicit definitions are non-creative, neither theory gains content by the addition
of the definitions, and thus it is possible to go from, say,Θ toΘ′ by first extending
Θ through the definitions and then eliminating the V -symbols from the resulting
theory. The effect, of course, is a simple renaming of the symbols, since up to
equivalent reformulation, the two theories are syntactically isomorphic.
But in its neutrality with respect to the vocabulary, the semantic view is too
liberal, for not every renaming makes sense. In the ideal gas law for example,
the translation should allow the renaming of ‘températur’ into ‘temperature’,
but not into ‘pression’. For syntactic approaches, this restriction on renamings
can be expressed by introducing analytic sentences. Any renaming not entailed
by analytic sentences is not allowed. Then, ‘temperature’ can be renamed as
‘températur’, but not as ‘pression’.
There is another problem with arbitrary renaming, for it is not only too
liberal in some respects, it is also too restrictive in others. It does not, for example,
avoid the language dependence referred to by Suppe (1974a, 204–205), who notes,
relying on the medieval notion of ‘proposition’, that
quantum theory can be formulated equivalently as wave mechanics
or as matrix mechanics; whichever way it is formulated, it is the same
theory, though its formulations as wave mechanics will constitute a
collection of propositions which is different from the collection of
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propositions resulting from its formulations as matrix mechanics.
Obviously, the difference between matrix mechanics and wave mechanics goes
beyond a mere renaming of the predicate-, function-, and object-symbols. But this
is a problem for the semantic view as well, because if more than the names of the
extensions changes, the description in terms of pure structures changes as well.
Hence when Hendry and Psillos (2007, 137, my emphasis) in connection with
matrix and wave mechanics state that “a (semantic) model of one could be turned
into a model of the other”, they effectively point out that the pure structures are
not the same.
The use of explicit definitions can again provide a solution to this kind of
language and structure dependence. So far, only the simplest kind of definition
was used, a simple identification of symbols. That way, it is clear that a theory Θ
and a theory Θ′ are equivalent given the definitions. But this comparison of two
theories can be generalized to include any kind of explicit definitions. Two theories
Θ,Θ′ are definitionally equivalent if and only if both can be extended by explicit
definitions such that they become equivalent. Then their models can be turned
into each other by a procedure analogous to the one described above: First expand
the model of one theory to include the defined symbols of the definitions. This
expansion is unique. Then reduce the resulting interpretation to the vocabulary of
the other theory (cf. Hodges 1993, 61). This allows the identification of theories
that differ not only in the vocabulary they use, but also in the structures of
their models. The procedure therefore also allows for structural differences in
the description of theories, and thus can not only be used to extend the syntactic
approaches, but also the semantic ones.12
Unlike the demand for the identification of inferentially equivalent sets of
sentences, the demand for the identification of definitionally equivalent sets of
sentences clearly must be restricted. The first reason is that not every symbol
of one language can be translated into any symbol of another, as the example
of ‘pression’ and ‘températur’ shows. The second reason is that when it comes
to induction, Goodman (1965) argues that there are good and bad names, or,
as he puts it, projectible and non-projectible terms. A theory containing the
names ‘green’ and ‘blue’ and some term ‘t’ for a specific time is definitionally
equivalent to a theory that instead contains the names ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ and ‘t’
when, first, ‘grue’ is defined as ‘green before t , blue at and after t ’, and mutatis
mutandis for ‘bleen’, and, second, ‘green’ is defined as ‘grue before t , bleen at
and after t ’ and mutatis mutandis for ‘blue’. But, assuming that t lies in the
future, a theory like ‘All emeralds are green’ leads to correct predictions based on
induction, while ‘All emeralds are grue’, leads to false predictions. For ‘green’, but
12There is no obvious reason why the identification of theories could not be relaxed even further.
One could, for example, identify theories Θ in T and Λ inL if and only if Θ can be definitionally
extended to entail Λ and vice versa. Once this step is taken, one could consider two theories identical
when they are mutually reducible in one or another sense of reducibility (see §11).
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not ‘grue’ is projectible, as far as emeralds are concerned.13 The relativization of the
projectibility of terms to the domain of emeralds is crucial, however. As Davidson
(1966) argues, ‘grue’ is a perfectly projectible predicate as far as ‘emeraters’ are
concerned, where an emerater is an emerald before t , and a large body of water
thereafter; ‘green’, on the other hand, fails to be projectible relative to ‘emerater’. It
may thus be that there are no bad names, only bad combinations of names: ‘Grue’
and ‘emerater’ is good, as is ‘green’ and ‘emerald’, while ‘green’ and ‘emerater’ is as
bad as ‘grue’ and ‘emerald’. I will not pursue these considerations further, and will
here just express the hope that it may be possible to describe good combinations
of names via sets of systematic redefinitions of all terms in a vocabulary.
4.1.3 Sentences, structures, and the world
A set Σ of sentences of predicate logic is not enough for applying a theory to
the world, for if A Σ , any set of the same cardinality as A can be made into a
structure of Σ as well:
Claim 4.6. Let |A| = A and card(A) = card(B). Then there is a B ' A with
|B|= B.
Proof. If card(A) = card(B), then there exists a bijection g : A−→ B . For each
relation PAi in A, define P
B
i
:= g (PAi ), for each function f
A
j and each tuple b¯ ∈
B n j (or arguments for functions of higher order), define f Bj (b¯ ) = g ( f
A
j (g
−1 b¯ )),
and for each constant cAk , define c
B
k
:= g (cAk ). It is straightforward to show that
B'A.
Corollary 4.7. Let A Σ and card(A) = card(B). Then there is aB with |B|= B
andB Σ .
Proof. From claim 4.6, because sets of sentences can determine structures at most
up to isomorphism.
Considering that any bijection between a set and the domain of A will do
for the proof of claim 4.6, it is clear that any element of A can be exchanged for
any other element. In light of claim 4.7, it is clear that a set of sentences can be
connected to the world (beyond statements about the number of its objects) only
if there is a way to distinguish between isomorphic structures. For this reason,
Przełe˛cki introduces the the set of intended structures N (see page 43) and I have
introduced the set of possible structures M (definition 2.2). M allows Σ to make
more than cardinality claims about the world, and N allows checking whether
Σ is true in the world (rather than just makes a correct cardinality claim about
13This consideration is arguably a generalizations of the considerations of the importance of
differences in equivalent axiomatizations discussed in §4.1.1, which also revolve around non-deductive
inferences.
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the world). The definitions of M and N allow the assumption that the vocabulary
V of Σ is bipartitioned into a directly interpreted setB of terms and a setA
of terms interpreted only via the interpretation ofB . But the bipartition can be
trivial, specifically, the definitions do not assume thatA 6=∅. Therefore one can
chooseB = V and interpret all terms in V directly.
It is important to see that the requirement for possible structures does not
trivialize syntactic approaches by allowing all semantic tools: As postulated in
§2.8.1 and definition 2.2, the set M of possible structures only distinguishes
between isomorphic structures, even ifB = V ; hence the isomorphic closure
of M is always the class of all V -structures. Therefore, the isomorphic closure of
the possible models of Σ is always the class of all models of Σ (see the proof of
claim 2.1)—in other words, in syntactic approaches, non-isomorphic structures
have to be distinguished by sentences of the object language.
In the Received View, an interpretation maps the basic (“observational”) vo-
cabulary to extensions that contains objects of the world. This gives a general way
of connecting syntactic descriptions to the world: Their interpretations map at
least one symbol to an extension that contains an object of the world—a worldly
extension, as I will call it from now on. Interpretations with a worldly extension
are accordingly worldly interpretations, and the analogous holds for models and
structures.
If there are worldly structures, the connection between syntactic descriptions
and the world can be determined by worldly possible structures. These can be
given by actually showing (pointing to) members of worldly sets and relying
on the psychological fact of intersubjective agreements about similarity between
experiences (Przełe˛cki 1969, 35–38).14 More commonly, the worldly sets are de-
scribed in a metalanguage (thereby leaving out the question of how the terms of
the metalanguage are connected to the world; see §3.7). As van Fraassen (1989,
222) puts it: “Any effective communication proceeds by language, except in those
rare cases in which information can be conveyed by the immediate display of an
object or happening”. Either approach assumes that it is possible to build sets
out of worldly objects, which is a somewhat problematic assumption. Since an
interpretation maps to such sets, it is also assumed that it is possible to have a
function from a vocabulary to worldly extensions. Whether these assumptions
are plausible is a matter of discussion, but reaches too far into the philosophy of
mathematics to be discussed here. It will turn out that their status is irrelevant
for the comparison of semantic and syntactic approaches with respect to their
14The reliance of logical empiricists on the ostensive interpretation of terms gave rise to the opinion
that in effect, logical empiricism reduces theories to pointing and grunting. For a critique that is
another example of the “holistically critical” attitude, see Angelides (2004, 402–403), who takes one
consequence of this reliance to be “the current, popular idea that the natural sciences need not be
governed by moral concerns; or if they do, such moral governance only need be justified by appeals
to governmental, technological, or, happily in this most learned of eras, divine authority”. For a
constructive discussion of ostensive interpretations see Eberle (1990).
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connection to the world.
The connection to the world has sometimes been claimed to be a strong point
of semantic approaches, because they escape the problem of connecting linguistic
entities to the world (Chakravartty 2001, 327). However, the connection between
pure structures and the world is not completely straightforward either:
Corollary 4.8. Let
Aˆ = A and card(A) = card(B). Then there is a Bˆ ' Aˆ withBˆ= B.
Proof. From claims 4.6 and 4.3.
Thus just as syntactic approaches must have a means to distinguish between
isomorphic structures, semantic approaches must have a means to distinguish
between isomorphic pure structures. This suggests a more precise distinction
between syntactic and semantic approaches:
Definition 4.3. Syntactic approaches describe theories with sentences in the object
language and with structures. Non-isomorphic structures are only distinguished
by sentences in the object language.
Definition 4.4. Semantic approaches describe theories with pure structures.
Semantic approaches thus distinguish between isomorphic and non-
isomorphic pure structures by a (set theoretic) description of the pure structures.
How the connection between pure structures and the world is to be envisaged
in semantic approaches depends on whether the pure structures are meant to be
worldly or non-worldly. Suppe’s statement quoted in section 4.1.2 that semantic
approaches construe theories as the formal referents of the theories’ formulations
(see page 171) suggests that the pure structures used in semantic approaches contain
worldly extensions, that is, are worldly themselves. Da Costa and French (2000,
fn. 2) also seem to assume that the pure structures are worldly when they state
that “the set-theoretic models are constructed in set theories with Urelemente
(individual[s], systems, portions of the universe, real things,. . . ).”
A pure structure has as one of its representatives a structure (with a vocabu-
lary), and accordingly the existence of a worldly pure structure entails the existence
of a worldly structure. This structure then provides the connection of the linguis-
tic entities with the world. Therefore, if a semantic approach successfully connects
theories to the world by using pure worldly structures, syntactic descriptions can
be connected to the world as well.15
15For pure structures taken as indexed sets along the lines of Bell and Slomson (rather than equiva-
lence classes of indexed sets), the modification of the discussion is straightforward: The index set I can
be used directly as a vocabulary, providing the interpretation a : I −→ a(I ). If a specific vocabulary
V is desirable, any isomorphism g : V −→ I leads to the interpretation I = a ◦ g : V −→ a(I ). The
discussions below can modified analogously.
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Mostly, however, the pure structures discussed in semantic approaches are not
supposed to be worldly (see, e. g., French and Ladyman 1999). They are simply
abstract set theoretic entities—no dogs, observations, or electrons are members
of the sets. Theses non-worldly pure structures then have to be connected to the
world somehow. I will discuss four ways to do so.
In the first way, the theory described by pure structures is supposed to be
isomorphic to some worldly pure structure.16 But because of corollary 4.6, if
the theory is about more than just the cardinality of its domain, there has to be
one isomorphism (with an order isomorphism g between the index sets) or a
set of distinguished isomorphisms that connect each non-worldly pure structure
Aˆ = [〈A,a,≺〉] with those worldly pure structures that the theory structure is
supposed to refer to. The result is again a worldly pure structure, since for each g
and worldly pure structure Aˆ, [〈A,a◦ g , g−1(≺)〉] is again a worldly pure structure,
and thus the previous discussion applies.
A second way to connect a non-worldly pure structure to the world is chosen
by Muller (2010). He suggests taking a pure structure (which he takes to be a
tuple), and allowing it to be assigned any compatible vocabulary. The appropriate
vocabulary can then be chosen according to expedience. The connection to the
world is then given through an interpretation of the vocabulary. First, it is clear
that this approach to connect semantic descriptions to the world presumes that
it is possible to connect syntactic descriptions to the world. Furthermore, what
Muller describes is basically a pure structure, since the index set of the structure
can be assigned any vocabulary, that is, any other index set.
A third way to connect non-worldly pure structures to the world is the sim-
ilarity of the pure structure to the system it is meant to represent. French and
Ladyman (1999) argue successfully that this relation, left largely undefined, is
much too vague to be of much use. Thus even if, within the boundaries of its
vagueness, similarity connects theories to the world, the success of this approach
has been achieved only by significantly lowering the precision of the analysis. As-
suming that syntactic approaches aim for more precision, this approach therefore
at best achieves a different goal.
French and Ladyman (1999, 115, cf. 113) argue instead that the connection to
the world is simply not a problem to be solved by semantic approaches:
The theoretical models [the pure structures of the theory] are held to
relate to models of the phenomena and these are just other structures.
That these represent real events and processes cannot be determined
by the content of the theory, but is a pragmatic fact about our language
[ . . . ] and it is unreasonable to demand that the semantic view explains
the nature of representation in general.
Note that this clearly falls short of the idea that semantic approaches are easier
16In semantic approaches, isomorphisms are often used as analogues to Tarski’s definition of truth.
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to connect to the world than syntactic approaches. Without an account of the
relation between theories and the world, French and Ladyman’s stance completes
a terminological confusion. Because of their reliance on possible structures, syn-
tactic approaches are semantic, and now, stripped of their connection to the
world and relying on pure structures, semantic approaches stay on the level of the
language of set theory, and hence are purely syntactic.
In French and Ladyman’s approach, there is simply one set of sentences about
structures (those describing models of the phenomena) that are distinguished as
representing real events. It is of historical interest to note that the idea to connect
the sentences of a language to the world by determining their relations to a distin-
guished subset of the whole language goes back to Neurath (1932), who postulated
the translatability of all scientific sentences into protocol sentences (cf. Carnap
1932). If neither predicate logic nor set theory are given a formal connection to
the world, they are simply languages that are assumed to describe the world in
some not further specified way. Then, for example, the question of non-standard
models does not even arise (neither for first order nor higher order logic, nor set
theory) unless an additional metalanguage is artificially introduced (Väänänen
2001). If there is a metalanguage, however, set theory and higher order logic are
equally expressive (Väänänen 2001, 506–507). In a sense, then, the discussion in
§4.1.1 about the possibilities to capture structures up to isomorphism stacks the
deck against syntactic approaches: It rests on the assumption that set theory is
not a language that describes the world, but is the world (specifically, the world
is a worldly structure), and the task of syntactic approaches is to describe the set
theoretic world. If one instead treats, with French and Ladyman, set theory just as
another language, it cannot describe the world more precisely than higher order
logic. Väänänen (2001) further argues that neither set theory nor higher order
logic can describe the world more precisely than first order logic.
The set theoretical notions used in semantic approaches can be axiomatized
within first or higher order predicate logic (Väänänen 2001). In this case, the one
plausible advantage of semantic approaches stripped of their direct relation to
the world becomes that they unify a major part of the mathematical component
of scientific theories: Many mathematical concepts can be defined through the
membership relation, which becomes the only non-logical mathematical constant.
All axioms involving the defined constants then become theorems of the defini-
tional extension of the axioms of set theory. This, of course, does not touch the
problem of non-mathematical constants; some of these may still not be definable
through set-membership, although their relations may be axiomatizable by sen-
tences involving set-membership.17 The difference between syntactic and semantic
approaches excluding their respective connection of theories to the world then
amounts to the restriction to set theory on the side of semantic approaches, and
no such restriction on the side of syntactic approaches. If a theory is formalized
17This may also be the case with some mathematical concepts.
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in a semantic approach, switching to a syntactic approach would thus allow the
abstraction from all terms that do not originally occur in the formalized theory,
including the membership relation. A semantic approach, on the other hand,
would cease to be a semantic approach if one abstracted from the membership
relation.
In conclusion, then, the connection to the world is equally problematic for
syntactic and semantic approaches. And a solution for one approach, for example
the pragmatic one suggested by van Fraassen (2006), also provides a solution for
the other.18
4.1.4 On the motte position
I have so far argued directly against the bailey position, the position that syntactic
approaches are untenable. I now want to show that the criticism of syntactic
approaches is indeed a motte-and-bailey doctrine, that is, I want to discuss briefly
why not all syntactic approaches have to rely on first order logic or exhaustive
axiomatization, use partial interpretations, or ignore the role of scientific models.
The use of higher order predicate logic
As I have argued at length in §3.3, the restriction to first order logic is already
historically inaccurate with respect to the Received View, which should be a
hint that it is an inappropriate restriction for syntactic approaches in general. A
possible justification of the restriction may be the absence of a complete proof
theory in higher order logic, which leads to a loss of the nice features of first order
logic described by Rantala (1978), and also makes it necessary to use model theory
and thus structures when determining which statements are entailed by a set of
sentences. However, there is no good reason to disallow the use of structures in a
syntactic approach. As argued in section 4.1.3, syntactic approaches need possible
worldly structures to makes more than cardinality claims about the world. But
the use of a set of worldly structures that is not closed under isomorphism is, if
anything, more problematic than the use a set of non-worldly structures closed
under isomorphism. Thus, given that model theory only needs such non-worldly
structures, there seems to be no further problem for using entailment as a means of
inference. As pointed out in §3.7, Carnap himself relied on semantic entailment.
The impracticality of syntactic axiomatizations
Sometimes the difference between syntactic and semantic approaches seem to
consist mainly in the difference between exhaustive and non-exhaustive axiomati-
18I have argued that solutions for semantic approaches are also solutions for syntactic approaches.
The argument for opposite direction can rely on the fact that every structure represents a pure structure
and, if needed, corollary 4.5.
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zations (cf. Stegmüller 1979, Suppes 1992). But of course, both an axiomatization
in a syntactic approach and an axiomatization in a semantic approach can be
non-exhaustive. On the other hand, a scientific theory may well be exhaustively
axiomatized as, for example, by Woodger (1939), and the description of structures
may be given within an exhaustive axiomatization of, say, ZFC. As discussed
in §3.4, Carnap notes and argues for the necessity of non-exhaustive axiomatiza-
tions, and also gives guidelines on which axioms to include and which steps of an
inference to spell out in detail.
Carnap does insist that in principle, well-developed theories can be exhaus-
tively axiomatized. And while there is no reason that syntactic approaches have
to insist even in principle on exhaustive axiomatization, some authors seem to
suggest that (i) this is what makes an approach syntactical, and (ii) this is also what
leads to problems. I have just argued against (i), but I also want to look shortly
at (ii). French and Ladyman (1999, 116), in the article in which they argue that
the connection to the world is not a problem that has to be tackled by semantic
approaches, object to such an exhaustive axiomatization of set theory based on
two points. First, they note that “there are many set-theories these days”. This
either means that there are different equivalent formalizations or that there are
different non-equivalent formalizations. In the first case, some set theoretic ax-
ioms are simply not mentioned in a non-exhaustive axiomatization, in the second
case, this means that the theory is incompletely described by a non-exhaustive
axiomatization until one of the different formalizations is chosen. The first case is
reasonable, as stated above, but also available to syntactic approaches. The second
case is unproblematic if the different axiomatizations agree on those statements
that are being analyzed. If they disagree, then the analysis cannot proceed until
the relevant axioms are given (see §2.3.2).
The second point is that, “when set and the membership relation are charac-
terized implicitly by means of an axiom-system, then the Löwenheim-Skolem
theorem tells us of the existence of non-standard models of set theory” (French and
Ladyman 1999, 116). One thus has the choice of not mentioning the axioms or ac-
cepting non-standard models. But as Väänänen (2001) argues convincingly, the idea
of non-standard models is meaningless unless one assumes a metalanguage in which
to describe mathematical objects, and an object language in which one can try and
describe those same mathematical objects with the help of some interpretation.
The metalanguage itself has no non-standard models until a meta-metalanguage is
introduced.
Furthermore, even assuming that the set theory that French and Ladyman
(1999) are envisioning has a metalanguage, it is not clear that the existence of
non-standard models is the result of axiomatization, and not rather their discovery.
Finally, since French and Ladyman (1999) exclude the connection to the world
from the problems the semantic view has to solve, there is no clear need for a
model theory, and hence neither for non-standard models; it would not be clear
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what these models would stand for—since they are not connected to the world,
they are at best some interesting formal feature of the axiomatization.
So I conclude that there is no obvious reason why exhaustive axiomatization
leads to less precision, to wit, the inability to exclude non-standard models, but
even if it did, this is not more of a problem for syntactic approaches than for
semantic approaches. For neither approach needs to rely on exhaustive axiomati-
zations.
Models
I have ended my discussion of models in the Received View with the conclusion
that arguments for the advantage of semantic approaches over syntactic approaches
with respect to scientific models rest on an equivocation of scientific and model
theoretic model. Here, I want to point out that independently of which meaning
of ‘model’ is chosen, syntactic approaches are on a par with semantic approaches.
If ‘model’ is understood model theoretically (that is, synonymously to ‘struc-
ture’), then the possibility of using higher order logic allows capturing structures
up to isomorphism (modulo an assumption about inaccessible cardinals), and the
use of possible structures with V =B allows capturing individual structures.
Furthermore, semantic approaches relying on pure structures involve structures
only indirectly, as representatives of pure structures (semantic approaches relying
on indexed structures involve structures directly, with the index set as the vocabu-
lary). If, on the other hand, ‘model’ refers to scientific models, then the question
is whether semantic approaches can describe the world (or anything that is not a
pure structure, for that matter) better than syntactic approaches. I have answered
this question in the negative in §4.1.1 and §4.1.3.
Partial interpretations and correspondence rules
The partition of V into basic and an auxiliary terms, the direct interpretation
of only the basic terms, and the interpretation of the auxiliary terms through
the interpretation of the basic terms and the correspondence rules are specific
to the Received View. They are also obviously independent from the decision
between syntactic and semantic approaches. That the use of a subvocabulary is not
restricted to syntactic approaches can be seen from the model theoretic concept of
a reduct of a structure, in which all those extensions not belonging to the terms of
a subvocabulary are eliminated (Hodges 1993, 9). The definition of a reduct for a
structure can be extended to also cover pure structures by using the set of positions
in a structure rather then the set of terms in a vocabulary. In fact, in part II I will
present a number of criteria of empirical significance that have been suggested
within semantic approaches and that rely on a bipartition of the vocabulary.
Conversely, there is no reason why, for example, van Fraassen’s concept of
embedding, which relies on substructures rather than reducts, cannot be captured
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in syntactic terms. One attempt to this effect has been undertaken by Turney
(1990), who introduces the concept of implanting as the syntactic counterpart
of van Fraassen’s embedding, that is, isomorphism to empirical substructures of
a theory. I doubt that Turney’s definition of ‘implanting’ does justice to van
Fraassen’s notion of embedding, but do think that embedding has a syntactical
counterpart. The important point is that, while embedding is defined semantically
in terms of structures or pure structures, there is no prima facie reason that
the notion cannot also be captured syntactically. As already mentioned, Suppe’s
description (Suppe 1974a, II.E) of how a theory relates to the data according to
Suppes (1962) is given in syntactic terms, and thus already shows that it is possible
to capture this conception syntactically.
There is also no reason why a syntactic approach cannot rely on possible
structures with V =B . As I have argued in §4.1.3, this does not trivialize the
distinction between syntactic and semantic approaches. Historically, Feigl (1950,
“personal postscript”), for example, did not endorse the view of a partial interpre-
tation of the vocabulary of theories, even though he clearly was a proponent of
syntactic approaches, and even something very close to the Received View.
There is, however, the possibility that the relation of a theory to the observa-
tions cannot be captured at all in any formalism, for example because the relation
is achieved through completely implicit, contextual knowledge of the scientists.
While a discussion of this possibility would lead to far afield, I might just note
that this assumes that the implicit knowledge or the context dependence cannot
be made explicit. That this is so certainly needs some kind of proof and would,
because of the preceding results, either hold for both semantic and syntactic
approaches, or for neither.
4.2 Empirical adequacy in the Received View
I have argued that the standard account of measurement and Suppes’ account of a
hierarchy between observations and theories can be captured in the Received View.
I have also argued that van Fraassen’s account of the formalization of scientific
theories is that of Carnap. I have also argued that if van Fraassen relies on a
single language, then his account is in fact that of the early Carnap, who relies
on protocol sentences in the same language as the theory to connect theory and
observations.
I now want to show that van Fraassen’s account of the relation between theory
and observation, empirical adequacy, can even be captured in the Received View
with its bipartition of the language, and even assuming that the pure structures in
van Fraassen’s account have to be described in the object language of the Received
View. Turney (1990) argues for a weaker result, namely that empirical adequacy
can be captured syntactically, but his formalization of empirical adequacy rests on
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a misunderstanding of van Fraassen’s position (see §4.2.1).19
4.2.1 Definitions
Within constructive empiricism, van Fraassen (1980, 64) states,
[t]o present a theory is to specify a family of structures, its models;
and secondly, to specify certain parts of those models (the empirical
substructures) as candidates for the direct representation of observable
phenomena.
Furthermore the models of the theory “are describable only up to structural
isomorphism” (van Fraassen 2008, 238; cf. 2002, 22). More formally, this can be
phrased as follows:
Definition 4.5. A theory is a family {Tn}n∈N of structures (the models of the
theory) such that each of its members Tn = 〈Tn , PTni , FTnj , cTnk 〉i∈In , j∈Jn ,k∈Kn has a
set En of empirical substructures, such that for each E ∈ En , E ⊆ Tn . With each
model, a theory also contains every isomorphic structure and its corresponding20
empirical substructures.
For convenience in the sequel, I am not using pure structures in the definition.
Given corollary 4.5, this is only a notational choice. Strictly distinguishing be-
tween the set O of observable objects and the unobservable objects, van Fraassen
(1980, 64) suggests to describe observable phenomena by structures as well: “The
structures which can be described in experimental and measurement reports we
can call appearances” (van Fraassen 2008, 286). This suggests
Definition 4.6. Appearances are given by a set P of structures such that the domain
of eachP ∈ P is a subset of O. A structureP ∈ P is an appearance.
Note that the set of appearances does not have to be closed under isomorphism.
Van Fraassen (1980, 64) then defines a theory to be “empirically adequate if it has
some model such that all appearances are isomorphic to empirical substructures
of that model” (cf. van Fraassen 1991, 12):
Definition 4.7. A theory {Tn}n∈N is empirically adequate for appearances P if
and only if there is some n ∈N such that for everyP ∈ P, there is an E ∈ En with
E'P.
19An early version of this section has been presented under the title “Syntactic characteristics of
empirical substructures” at the PhDs in Logic conference at Gent University, Belgium, February 19,
2009. I thank the audience for helpful discussion.
20To be precise: If f : Tm −→ Tn is an isomorphism between Tm and Tn , then the set En of
empirical substructures that corresponds to Em contains all and only those structures En for which
there is an Em ∈ En such that f is an isomorphism between Em and En .
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Definition 4.7 defines the empirical adequacy of a theory relative to a set of
appearances. In contradistinction, empirical adequacy simpliciter is defined as
empirical adequacy for the set of all appearances (cf. Monton and Mohler 2008,
§1.5). Therefore any set P of appearances that does not contain all of them may
allow the deductive inference that some theory is not empirically adequate; but
the inference that a theory is empirically adequate will have to be in some way
ampliative. And it is for empirical adequacy simpliciter that van Fraassen (1980,
12, emphasis removed) claims that “acceptance of a theory involves as belief only
that it is empirically adequate”. Thus it is possible to determine by deduction that
a theory should not be accepted (assuming that one tries to avoid false beliefs), but
not that a theory should be accepted.
A note on terminology: Van Fraassen (1980, 66) and others (e. g., Turney 1990,
431; Suárez 2005, §4.1; Monton and Mohler 2008, §§1.5–1.6) occasionally speak of
the empirical adequacy of a theory as the embeddability of the appearances into a
model of the theory. But the two are not equivalent:P ∈ P can be embedded in
Tn if and only ifP is isomorphic to any substructure of Tn (Hodges 1993, 6). The
substructure does not have to be an empirical substructure. In the following, I will
call an isomorphic mapping to an empirical substructure an empirical embedding.
In a more puzzling oversight, some exponents of empirical adequacy, (e. g.
Suárez 2005, 39), rely on
Definition 4.8. A theory {Tn}n∈N is idiosyncratically empirically adequate for
appearances P if and only if for everyP ∈ P, there are an n ∈N and an E ∈ En
such that E'P.
Definitions 4.7 and 4.8 are equivalent if there is only one appearance, P = {P}
(as assumed by Turney 1990),21 but not in general: Let the appearances be given by
the set of the two structures {〈{1,2},{1,2}〉, 〈{3,4},{3}〉}. Let the theory be given
by the family with members T1 = 〈{0,1,2,},{0,1,2}〉 and T2 = 〈{3,4,5},{3,4}〉
as well as the singleton sets of empirical substructures E1 = {〈{1,2},{1,2}〉} and
E2 = {〈{3,4},{3}〉}. Let all other models of the theory be isomorphic to T1
or T2 and have the corresponding empirical substructures. Then the theory is
idiosyncratically empirically adequate by virtue of the identity mapping on each
of the appearances’ domains, but it is not empirically adequate.
Since theories are closed under isomorphism, an appearance is empirically
embeddable in a model of a theory if and only if it is an empirical substructure
of a model of that theory (Hodges 1993, ex. 1.2.4b). Therefore a theory is id-
iosyncratically empirically adequate if and only if all appearances are empirical
substructures of models of the theory (that is, in definition 4.8, E'P could be
21 This is decidedly not what van Fraassen in general assumes (personal email from June 15, 2011),
and it is also incompatible with his definitions of appearances and empirical adequacy quoted above:
The “structures” given by measurements are appearances, and in the case of empirical adequacy, “all
appearances are isomorphic to empirical substructures” of a single model.
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exchanged for E = P). This is not the case for empirical adequacy: Let the ap-
pearances be given by the set of the two structures {〈{a, b},{a, b}〉, 〈{c , d},{c}〉},
where a, b , c , and d are distinct objects. Let the theory be given by the family
with the member T1 = 〈{1,2,3},{1,2}〉 and the set of empirical substructures
E1 = {〈{1,2},{1,2}〉, 〈{2,3},{2}〉}. Let all other models of the theory be isomor-
phic to T1 and have the corresponding empirical substructures. Then the theory
is empirically adequate, but every bijection from {1,2,3}—and thus every iso-
morphism for T1—maps 2, the object shared by the empirical substructures, to a
single object. Since the domains of the appearances do not share an element, the
appearances therefore can never be empirical substructures of the same model of
the theory.
4.2.2 Syntactic empirical adequacy
I first want to show that, as Turney tries to show, there is no important philosoph-
ical divide between syntactic and semantic approaches when it comes to empirical
adequacy. For van Fraassen, a theory is given by a family {Tn}n∈N and a set of
substructures En for each structure Tn . The individual elements of En are not
distinguished among each other (apart from being different), and each element
E ∈ En is determined by its domain E and Tn . Thus for each Tn , En is determined
by the extension {E |E ∈ En} of a predicate S of the next order. Therefore each Tn
can be taken as the structure T′n = 〈Tn , PTni , FTnj , cTnk ,{E | E ∈ En}〉i∈In , j∈Jn ,k∈Kn .
The resulting family {T′n}n∈N can then be captured by a set of (sets of) sentences
Θ. I will again for simplicity assume that Θ is a single set of sentences.22
Each appearance P ∈ P can also be described by a set of sentences ΦP. But,
of course,P contains only one of a host of domains of appearances, so that the
sentences in ΦP must be taken as relativized to one of those domains. Giving the
domain P ofP the name ‘EP’, this leads to a set Φ
(EP)
P
of relativized sentences.23
The set of all appearances can then be expressed as the set of sentences {SEP |P ∈
P} ∪ Φ(EP)
P
P ∈ P	, containing for each predicate EP the higher order sentence
SEP stating that EP is an empirical predicate, and the relativized descriptions of
the appearances. Empirical adequacy then becomes the consistency of a theory
with the appearances:
Claim 4.9. Let {T′n}n∈N be the family of structures T′n = 〈Tn , PTni , FTnj , cTnk ,
ST
′
n 〉i∈In , j∈Jn ,k∈Kn with ST
′
n := {E | E ∈ En}, and Θ be such that {T′n | n ∈ N}
22As noted in §4.1.1, this will often require strengthening the logic beyond first order.
23The relativization σ (EP) of a sentence σ consists of the restriction of all quantifiers in σ to EP
(Hodges 1993, Theorem 5.1.1). For any set Σ of formulas, Σ (EP) is the set of the relativization of the
elements of Σ .
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is the set of models of Θ. Let each appearance P be described up to isomorphism by
ΦP. Then {Tn}n∈N is empirically adequate for P if and only if
Θ∪{SEP |P ∈ P} ∪

Φ
(EP)
P
P ∈ P	 (4.3)
is consistent.
Proof. The set (4.3) is consistent iff it has a model. This is the case iff there is some
model Tn of Θ such that for allP ∈ P, there is an E ∈ En with E=Tn |E  Φ(EP)P .
The latter is is the case iff E  Φ(EP)
P
∪{∀xEPx}  ΦP, that is, iff E is isomorphic
toP.
There is another way to capture empirical adequacy syntactically that relies
on the basic idea that the appearances P determine the intended structures of a
theory {Tn}n∈N . This is in line with the notion of intended structures, since they
are meant to incorporate empirical information. Thus, for the appearances P,
define the intended structures NP as the class of those structuresN that contain
all P ∈ P as substructures, and additionally contain the higher order extension
SN := {|P| |P ∈ P}. Then {Tn}n∈N is empirically adequate for P if and only if
Θ is true in at least one intended structureN ∈NP. If the observations are given
syntactically as well, that is, that NP is up to isomorphism described by ΦP, then
the theory is empirically adequate if and only if Θ∪ΦP is consistent.
4.2.3 Empirical adequacy in a bipartitioned language
Claim 4.9 captures empirical adequacy as a consistency condition, assuming that
the phenomena and the theory rely on the same vocabulary. In the Received
View, however, the observations are identified by their vocabularyB , and the-
oretical claims in a disjoint vocabularyA are connected to the observations by
correspondence rules.
One way to capture empirical adequacy in the Received View works in the
special case that each En is a singleton set,
24 and the modified theory {T′n}n∈N (see
§4.2.2) can be given by a single set of first order sentences Θ. Then Θ determines
the class {A|E  A  Θ} of empirical substructures, and {Tn}n∈N is empirically
adequate if and only if P = {P} with P ∈ {A|E | A  Θ}. In this case, one can
use the model theoretic fact that any class of substructures {A|E | A  Θ} of a
theory Θ is a pseudoelementary class {A|B
A Θ∗} for some theory Θ∗ with at
most as many non-logical constants as Θ (Hodges 1993, theorem 5.2.1). Θ∗ can be
seen as a rational reconstruction of Θ that allows for the analyses given within the
Received View. Thus Θ is empirically adequate in light of the appearances {P} if
24Although this is not van Fraassen’s assumption (see n. 21), it is often presumed in discussions of
empirical adequacy.
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and only ifP can be expanded to a model of Θ∗, which by lemma 2.4 is the case if
and only ifP  RB (Θ∗).
Given that the empirical adequacy of a theory can be phrased syntactically in
one vocabulary, it is very simple to capture empirical adequacy in the bipartitioned
vocabulary of the Received View more generally. For this, one can simply treat the
original vocabulary as theoretical and introduce a second, observational term for
each theoretical one. Thus, for each Pi one can introduce an observational term
P ∗i , and analogously for function and constant symbols. The appearances can then
be given by structures with the starred, observational vocabulary instead of the
unstarred vocabulary, and the correspondence rules simply identify the starred
with the respective unstarred terms. Either of the syntactical methods from §4.2.2
then allows capturing empirical adequacy in the Received View.
In keeping with Carnap’s hope that all observational terms can be defined
in theoretical terms, one can also restrict the identification of theoretical with
observational terms to observable objects. This is perhaps the most faithful trans-
lation of empirical adequacy into the Received View. For each relation Pi , the
correspondence rule then can have the form
∀x¯[P ∗i x¯↔∃Y (SY ∧Y x1 ∧ · · · ∧Y xmi )∧ Pi x¯] . (4.4)
Thus the observational relations can be explicitly defined in theoretical terms, as
Carnap had hoped.25
Things are not as straightforward for functions, since functions have to be
defined over the whole domain. One could thus substitute an n j + 1-ary observa-
tional relation Q∗j for each n j -ary theoretical function F j with
∀x¯[Q∗i x1 . . . xn j+1↔∃Y (SY ∧Y x1 ∧ · · · ∧Y xn j )∧ F j x1 . . . xn j = xn j+1] (4.5)
or disappoint Carnap’s hope and rely on the conditional definition
∀x¯[∃Y (SY ∧Y x1 ∧ · · · ∧Y xn j )→ (F ∗j x¯ = F j x¯)] . (4.6)
However, since the value of the observational functions is irrelevant outside
the domains of the empirical substructures, the conditional definitions could be
completed by conditionally defining that outside of the empirical subdomains, the
observational functions all have the same, arbitrarily chosen value. The explicit
definition of all constant symbols is discussed in §4.2.4.
Thus the Received View can capture not only only Suppes’ hierarchy from
observations to theories and typical measurement relations, but also van Fraassen’s
account of the relation of theory and appearances.
25Friedman (1982, 276–277) sketches a similar approach for capturing empirical adequacy syntacti-
cally.
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∗ ∗ ∗
Claim 4.9 throws doubt on van Fraassen’s claim that science “aims to give us
theories that are empirically adequate” (van Fraassen 1980, 12), at least if empirical
adequacy is meant to be the only aim of science, or even a particularly interesting
one. For empirical adequacy is cheap: A tautology is consistent with any set of
sentences describing the appearances, and thus its set of models is empirically
adequate. This is obvious given claim 4.9, but can also be seen in van Fraassen’s
original definition: Simply choose as theory the class of all structures and for each
structure the set of all its substructures as empirical substructures.
Claim 4.9 and its use in a formalization of a theory according to the Received
View also allows a comparison of empirical adequacy with accounts of the relation
between theory and observations suggested in the Received View. In line with, for
example, Carnap (1966, 240–241), Muller (2010, 90) describes the aim of scientific
theories in the Received View to be observational adequacy, for which a theory
has to entail the observations made so far. He adds (Muller 2010, 90, n. 8):
This concept of observational adequacy (ObsAdeq) should not be con-
fused with Van Fraassen’s well-known concept of empirical adequacy
(EmpAdeq). Three differences between ObsAdeq and EmpAdeq: (i)
ObsAdeq relies on the distinction between theoretical and observa-
tional concepts whereas EmpAdeq does not rely on that; (ii) ObsAdeq
depends on historical time whereas EmpAdeq is timeless (quantifies
universally over historical times); (iii) EmpAdeq requires for its defi-
nition a conception of a scientific theory that results from the Model
Revolution, because it cannot be defined in the [Received View].
I have shown that differences (i) and (iii) are easily overcome, that is, can be
avoided by capturing van Fraassen’s definition of a theory syntactically. I have
already pointed out that without an ampliative inference, van Fraassen is restricted
to empirical adequacy with respect to the observations made so far; conversely,
there is no reason to assume that the logical empiricists were only interested in
theories that entail observations made so far, but will not entail the observations
made in the future. Thus difference (ii) is not one of principle, but at best one
of primacy of definition: One could define ‘preliminary empirical adequacy’ as
‘empirical adequacy given the appearances observed so far’, and define ‘eternal
observational adequacy’ as ‘observational adequacy at the end of all time’.
Muller misses the real difference: A theory is empirically adequate if it is not
shown to be wrong by observations, while a theory is observationally adequate if it
asserts what is observed. For this reason, Sober’s remark that “empirical adequacy
consists in making predictions that are borne out in experience” (Sober 1990) is
similarly misleading. For empirical adequacy consists in not making predictions
that are not borne out in experience.26 And one way to achieve this is not to make
26Sober’s formulation could be interpreted to state that empirical adequacy consists in making only
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predictions.
This raises the question what the predictions of a theory are when it is defined
in van Fraassen’s way, and again the syntactic reformulation guides the way. If
a theory Θ entails the observations, every model T′n (defined as in claim 4.9)
of Θ is also a model of the observations. This is the case if and only if every
empirical substructure E ∈ En of every structure in {Tn}n∈N , a theory as defined
in definition 4.5, is isomorphic to an appearance, an element of P.
4.2.4 Generalizing empirical adequacy
Before discussing a shortcoming of van Fraassen’s conception of empirical ade-
quacy, I shortly want to defend it against an unjustified criticism: In his account
of the hierarchy connecting measurements and theories, Suppes (1962) notes that
measurement results are discontinuous sets of values, while many theories are
given for continuous values. In their “cardinality objection”, Bueno et al. (2002,
503) argue that this poses a problem for empirical adequacy, because the domains
of the appearances “in general are finite”. The implicit assumption of the cardi-
nality objection is that empirical substructures always have infinite domains, but
this is not necessarily so. For theories can have both infinite and finite empirical
substructures, since for any model Tn of a theory, the set of empirical substruc-
tures En can be closed under the substructure relation, that is, if E ∈ En and
E′ ⊆E, then E′ ∈ En , so that with every empirical substructure E, all of E’s finite
substructures are empirical substructures as well.
This response to the cardinality objections is hampered only by the problems
stemming from the severe restrictions placed by definition 4.5 on the models
{Tn}n∈N of a theory. For it follows from the definition of a substructure that
every constant of a model Tn has to be in the domain E of each of its substructures
E ∈ En . Furthermore, every function of the model E ∈ En must map all (tuples
of) elements of E to elements of E (Hodges 1993, lemma 1.2.2).
If now a theory {Tn}n∈N is empirically adequate, every appearance is a sub-
structure of some Tn , so that Tn ’s domain Tn contains observable objects, all
constants of Tn are observable objects, and all functions of Tn map observable
objects to other observable objects. If now the theory is about, say, elementary
particles, the observable objects are, for example, the results shown on the mea-
surement instruments or (parts of) the measurement instruments themselves.
These then have to satisfy those formulas that the theory ascribes to elementary
particles, and all constants in the theory have to be results shown on measurement
instruments or, respectively, (parts of) measurement instruments.27
predictions that are borne out in experience, allowing the demand to be vacuously fulfilled. In this
case, it would be correct (but misleading).
27Because of claim 4.6, this can formally always be arranged by defining appropriate relations,
functions, and constants for the observable objects (assuming the right cardinality of the empirical
substructures’ and the appearances’ domains), but this would trivialize empirical adequacy (cf. van
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One may object to these criticisms for two reasons. For one, in early works van
Fraassen (1970, §3) relied on “elementary statements” and a “satisfaction function”
to give the relation between a theory and observations, so that one could argue
that the model theoretic formalization above does not capture van Fraassen’s
position. However, van Fraassen (1989, 365, n. 34) himself states that he soon
“found it much more advantageous to concentrate on the propositions expressible
by elementary statements, rather than on the statements themselves”. Thus van
Fraassen had abandoned the reliance on elementary statements and satisfaction
functions by the time he defined empirical adequacy. More importantly, empirical
adequacy is defined without reference to either of the two concepts, and thus an
analysis of empirical adequacy does not have to take them into account either.
One may also object that the terms ‘embedding’, ‘substructure’, and ‘iso-
morphism’ are not meant literally, but refer to relations between theories and
appearances given by either satisfaction functions or something completely differ-
ent. Possible support comes from van Fraassen’s standard example of embedding,
the seven point geometry (1980, §3.1; 1989, §9.1), which is not an embedding in
the sense of model theory (Turney 1990, 441–443). But this looks more like an
oversight than a conscious decision. More generally, the terms are well-defined
within, but not outside of model theory, where in general they also do not occur
together. And the objection makes van Fraassen use these terms in a different,
undefined way without pointing this out. It also renders downright nonsensical
passages in which he uses technical results from model theory. For example, van
Fraassen (1980, 43) discusses cases in which “every model of T1 can be embedded
in (identified with a substructure of) a model of T2.” The parenthetical equivalence
claim relies on the model theoretic definition of ‘embedding’ and ‘substructure’,
on the closure of the set of models of a theory under isomorphism, and the equiva-
lence of embedding and the substructure relation for isomorphically closed classes
of structures (Hodges 1993, ex. 1.2.4b). If the terms were not meant in the model
theoretic sense, there would be no reason at all for this equivalence claim.
I now want to show that the problem resulting from van Fraassen’s reliance
on substructures can easily be solved in the Received View. In van Fraassen’s
definition 4.5 of a theory, the components of a theory that are connected to the
appearances are given by empirical substructures. The Received View, on the other
hand, allows theories to contain non-observational terms, which themselves do
not have to be directly connected to the appearances. This suggests the following
generalization of definition 4.5:
Definition 4.9. A theory is a family {Tn}n∈N of structures (the models of the
theory) such that each of its members Tn = 〈Tn , PTni , FTnj , cTnk 〉i∈In , j∈Jn ,k∈Kn has a
set En of empirical relativized reducts, such that for each E ∈ En , there is a setAE
of terms such that E ⊆ Tn |AE . With each model, a theory also contains every
Fraassen 2006); I am assuming here that the trivialization problem has been solved.
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isomorphic model and its corresponding empirical relativized reducts.
This means that every empirical relativized reduct E ∈ En is a relativized
reduct of Tn , E=Tn |EAE , which is already implicitly used by Suárez (2005, 38)
instead of the notion of a substructure in his discussion of empirical adequacy. The
formalizations of empirical adequacy in the Received View given in the preceding
section are easily generalized to this new definition.
The new definition solves the problems connected with the use of substruc-
tures: There can be unobservable constants, and functions from observable objects
to unobservable ones, since the constants’ and functions’ symbols may not be
in the vocabularyAE. The definition may also alleviate the problem that, to be
empirically adequate, a theory has to describe observational relations between
observable objects: A theory may, for instance, already contain or be extended to
contain the term ‘being part of’ and terms for observable objects and relations.
This would allow, say, elementary particles to be treated as parts of observable
objects, rather than as observable objects themselves (cf. Przełe˛cki 1969, 86–87).
Both the elementary particles and the everyday objects would then be in the
(extended) theory’s domain, but the observational vocabulary of the theory might
then refer only to observable objects, not elementary particles.
Besides these technical problems that stem from the reliance on substructures,
there are two ways in which empirical adequacy is too strict to be used in most
contexts of scientific research because it relies on an isomorphism between the
appearances and the empirical substructures. For one, most theories’ implications
for the appearances are not true up to arbitrary precision. But the theories are
still empirically adequate up to some precision, that is, approximately empirically
adequate. Approximately empirically adequate theories like the ray theory of
light, quantum field theory, and general relativity are clearly useful although not
empirically adequate according to definition 4.7. For this reason, van Fraassen
(1989, 366, n. 5) himself suggests, but does not explicate, the notion of ‘approximate
embedding’.
Second, scientists are seldom if ever in the situation that they know what the
exact appearances are. Rather, their knowledge only restricts what appearances
are epistemically possible, for example because it stems from measurements with a
certain amount of error. Definition 4.7 does not allow for such lack of knowledge,
since it refers solely to the set of appearances. This makes sense, since a theory that
is empirically adequate as far as we know is not always an empirically adequate
theory. Still, definition 4.7 may define a concept that can never be applied in
scientific research. As van Fraassen (1991, 12) puts it: “Empirical adequacy, like
truth, admits of no degrees”.
Both problems can be solved at once when the appearances are given by sets
of sentences, for sets of sentences allow omissions as defined in §2.12. Whatever
is not known about the appearances can be omitted from their description. To
capture the notion of approximate empirical adequacy, one omits every sentence
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that, given the approximation, could be false.28
4.3 Partial structures in the Received View
I have so far discussed means to capture semantic approaches that rely on structures.
The partial structures approach generalizes the previously discussed semantic
approaches because partial structure generalizes structure. The partial structure
approach is in the vanguard of semantic approaches (da Costa and French 2000;
Le Bihan 2011, n. 3, §5) and one of the main reasons why the Received View is
considered inferior to the semantic approaches (French and Ladyman 1999). I will
show that the core notions of the partial structures approach, quasi-truth, partial
homomorphism, and partial isomorphism, can be captured very naturally within
the Received View in two different ways.
4.3.1 Definitions
The partial structures approach is motivated by a simple epistemological point:
Most of the time, scientists do not have enough information about a domain to
determine its structure with arbitrary precision. For most relations, it is at best
known of some tuples of objects that they fall under the relation and known of
some objects that they do not fall under it. For many if not most tuples this is
unknown. Similarly, the value of a function is not know for all of its possible
arguments. Partial structures are defined to take this lack of knowledge into
account.
While most works on partial structures in the philosophy of science (e. g.,
da Costa and French 1990, Bueno 1997, da Costa and French 2000) do not consider
functions, and the foundational paper by Mikenberg et al. (1986) does not consider
constants, the respective definitions can be easily combined to give
Definition 4.10. A˜ is a partial structure for the symbols {Pi , F j , ck}i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K if
and only if
A˜=


A, P A˜i , F
A˜
j , c
A˜
k

i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K , (4.7)
where A 6= ∅, P A˜i =


P A˜,+i , P
A˜,−
i , P
A˜,◦
i

is a tripartition of Ami for each i ∈ I ,
F A˜j : CA˜, j −→A is a function with domain CA˜, j ⊆An j for each j ∈ J , and cA˜k ∈A
for each k ∈K .
The definition of partial structures by Mikenberg et al. (1986, def. 1) is re-
covered for K = ∅, the definition by da Costa and French (1990, 255–256) and
28The two problems can also be solved by a direct generalization of van Fraassen’s semantic notion
of an appearance (Lutz 2011b,c).
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da Costa et al. (1998, 605) for J = ∅.29 Lack of knowledge is represented by
non-empty sets P A˜,◦i and sets CA˜, j ⊂An j .
Taking into account background knowledge, expressed by a set Π˜ of sentences,
the primary statements, Mikenberg et al. (1986, def. 2.ii) and da Costa and French
(1990, 256) give
Definition 4.11. StructureB is A˜-normal for primary statements Π˜ if and only
if B = A, P A˜,+i ⊆ PBi ⊆ Ami − PA,−i for each i ∈ I , FBj |C j = F A˜j for each j ∈ J ,
cBk = c
A˜
k for each k ∈K , andB  Π˜ .
This allows the definition of quasi-truth, also called ‘pragmatic truth’ or
‘partial truth’:
Definition 4.12. Sentence ϕ is quasi-true in partial structure A˜ relative to primary
statements Π˜ if and only if there is a structure B that is A˜-normal for Π˜ and
B  ϕ.
One of the most important properties of quasi-truth is that incompatible
sentences can be quasi-true without quasi-truth being trivial: Let A˜ be the partial
structure


A,


P A˜,+1 , P
A˜,−
1 , P
A˜,◦
1

, cA˜1

with A= {1,2,3}, P A˜,+1 = {1}, P A˜,−1 = {3},
cA˜1 = 2, and Π˜ =∅. Then P1c and ¬P1c are both quasi-true, while ¬∃xP1x is not.
Bueno et al. (2002, 503–504) define partial homomorphisms between partial
structures:
Definition 4.13. A partial homomorphism from partial structure A˜ to partial
structure B˜ is a mapping f : A−→ B for which the following holds: If a¯ ∈ P A˜,+i
then f (a¯) ∈ P B˜,+i and if a¯ ∈ P A˜,−i then f (a¯) ∈ P B˜,−i for all i ∈ I , if a¯ ∈ CA˜, j
then f (a¯) ∈ CB˜, j and for all a¯ ∈ CA˜, j , f
 
F A˜j (a¯)

= F B˜j
 
f (a¯)

for all j ∈ J , and
f
 
cA˜k

= cB˜k for all k ∈K .
Bueno (1997, 596) introduces the notion of a partial isomorphism between
partial structures containing only relations, which can be generalized as follows:
Definition 4.14. A partial isomorphism from partial structure A˜ to partial struc-
ture B˜ is a bijection f : A−→ B for which the following holds: a¯ ∈ P A˜,+i if and
only if f (a¯) ∈ P B˜,+i and a¯ ∈ P A˜,−i if and only if f (a¯) ∈ P B˜,−i for all i ∈ I , a¯ ∈CA˜, j
if and only if f (a¯) ∈ CB˜, j and for all a¯ ∈ CA˜, j , f
 
F A˜j (a¯)

= F B˜j
 
f (a¯)

for all
j ∈ J , and f  cA˜k = cB˜k for all k ∈K .
29While da Costa and French (1990, 255) and da Costa et al. (1998, 605) define partial structures
only for relations, their further definition of A˜-normal structures presumes that partial structures can
contain constants as well.
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4.3.2 Partial structures generalized by vagueness sets of B -
structures
Partial structures express our empirical knowledge about some domain, expressed
in vocabulary V . In §2.8.1 and §2.8.2, such empirical knowledge is expressed
by intended structures, a special case of which are vagueness sets. Every partial
structure can be expressed with the help of a vagueness set (see definition 2.4 on
page 45):
Definition 4.15. Let A˜ =


A, P A˜i , F
A˜
j , c
A˜
k

i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K be a partial structure
and Π˜ a set of primary statements. Then the vagueness set for {P+i , P−i , F +◦j ,
c+◦
k
}i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K over A with penumbral connections W (Pi , F j , ck )i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K = Π˜
and P+i = P
A˜,+
i , P
−
i = P
A˜,−
i , F
+◦
j = F
A˜
j ∪ (An j −CA˜, j )×A, and c+◦k = {cA˜k } for
i ∈ I , j ∈ J , k ∈K corresponds to A˜ and Π˜ .
Lemma 4.10. For any partial structure A˜, the set of A˜-normal structures relative to
Π˜ is the corresponding vagueness set.
Proof. ‘⇒’: Let B be A˜-normal for Π˜ . Then B = A and B fulfills W (Pi , F j ,
ck )i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K . Furthermore, P+i = P
A˜,+
i ⊆ PBi ⊆ Ami − PA,−i = Ami − P−i for
each i ∈ I , F jB|CA˜, j = F A˜j so that FBj ⊆ F A˜j ∪ (An j −CA˜, j )×A = F +◦j for each
j ∈ J , and cBk = cA˜k ∈ {cA˜k }= c+◦k for each k ∈ K . ThusB is in the vagueness set
corresponding to A˜ and Π˜ .
‘⇐’: Let B be in the vagueness set for {P+i , P−i , F +◦j , c+◦k }i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K over A
with penumbral connections W (Pi , F j , ck )i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K . Then B = A and B  Π˜ .
Furthermore, P A˜,+i = P
+
i ⊆ PBi ⊆ Ami − P+i = Ami − PA,−i for each i ∈ I ,
FBj ⊆ F +◦j = F A˜j ∪ (An j −CA˜, j )×A so that F jB|CA˜, j = F A˜j , and cBk ∈ c+◦k = {cA˜k }
so that cBk = c
A˜
k . ThereforeB is A˜-normal for Π˜ .
Since not every vagueness set corresponds to a partial structure, the notion
of a vagueness set is a proper generalization of the notion of a partial structure.
Incidentally, this generalization solves two problems that stand in the way of many
applications of partial structures in the analysis of scientific theories: While the
interpretations of relation symbols in partial structures can capture fairly general
cases of lack of knowledge, there can be no lack of knowledge whatsoever when it
comes to constant symbols, because they are interpreted uniquely. And the inter-
pretation of function symbols, practically important because many mathematized
theories are teeming with functions, captures only a kind of lack of knowledge
encountered very seldom in the sciences. For in a partial structure A˜, the values
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of a function F A˜j are known with arbitrary precision over CA˜, j , but not at all
over An j −CA˜, j . In contradistinction, the measurement of, say, the time averaged
intensity ψ of a light wave over some spatial interval [x1, x2] will typically have a
finite precision, giving a range of possible intensity values [y1, y2]⊂R≥0 for each
point x ∈ [x1, x2]. While this can be neatly captured by vagueness sets, a partial
structure can only capture measurements that, at any point x, give either a precise
value ψ(x) = y3 ∈R≥0, or no value at all.
Przełe˛cki (1976, 378–379) suggests to use vagueness sets to define approximate
truth and call a set Θ of sentences approximately true in a vagueness set N if and
only if there is at least one element of N in which all elements of Θ are true.
The relation between quasi-truth and approximate truth is given by
Claim 4.11. Θ is quasi-true in partial structure A˜ for Π˜ if and only if Θ is approxi-
mately true in the corresponding vagueness set.
Proof. Immediately from lemma 4.10.
Therefore approximate truth is a generalization of quasi-truth. Note that if a
partial structure corresponds to a singleton vagueness set, quasi-truth in the partial
structure is equivalent to truth in the structure in the corresponding vagueness
set.
The notions of a partial isomorphism and homomorphism can also be gener-
alized with the help of vagueness sets:
Claim 4.12. Let A and B be the vagueness sets corresponding to partial structures A˜
and B˜ with Π˜ =∅. Then f is a partial isomorphism between A˜ and B˜ if and only
if for all A ∈A there is aB ∈ B and for allB ∈ B there is an A ∈A such that f is
an isomorphism between A andB.
Proof. ‘⇒’: Let f : A −→ B be a partial isomorphism between A˜ and B˜
and let A be in A. By lemma 4.10, A is A˜-normal for ∅. Since f is a bi-
jection, it is an isomorphism from A to B with PBi = f
 
PAi

for each
i ∈ I , FBj x1 . . . xn j = f
 
FAj f
−1(x1) . . . f −1(xm j )

for each x1, . . . , xn j ∈ B n j ,
j ∈ J , and cBk = f
 
cAk

for each k ∈ K . Furthermore, B is B˜-normal,
because first, P B˜,+i = f
 
P A˜,+i
 ⊆ f  PAi  = PBi ⊆ f  P A˜,−i  = P B˜,−i . Sec-
ond, CB˜, j = f
 
CA˜, j

and hence FBj x1 . . . xn j = f
 
FAj f
−1(x1) . . . f −1(xn j )

=
f
 
F A˜j f
−1(x1) . . . f −1(xn j )

= F B˜j x1 . . . xn j for all x1, . . . , xn j ∈ CB˜. Third,
cBk = f
 
cAk

= f
 
cA˜k

= cB˜k . By lemma 4.10, B ∈ B. By the same reasoning, if
B ∈ B, there is an A ∈A such that f −1 and thus f is an isomorphism between A
andB.30
30This half of the proof generalizes the rough proof given by Bueno (2000, 279–280).
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‘⇐’: Assume that f : A−→ B is a bijection but not a partial isomorphism
between A˜ and B˜. Then there are an i ∈ I and some x1, . . . , xmi ∈ A such that
(i) PA,+i x1 . . . xmi and not P
B,+
i f (x1) . . . f (xmi ) or (ii) not P
A,+
i x1 . . . xmi and
PB,+i f (x1) . . . f (xmi ) or (iii) P
A,−
i x1 . . . xmi and not P
B,−
i f (x1) . . . f (xmi ) or (iv)
not PA,−i x1 . . . xmi and P
B,−
i f (x1) . . . f (xmi ), or there is a j ∈ J such that for
some x1, . . . , xm j ∈ A, (v) CA˜, j x1 . . . xm j and not CB˜, j f (x1) . . . f (xm j ) or (vi) not
CA˜, j x1 . . . xm j and CB˜, j f (x1) . . . f (xm j ) or (vii) for some (x1, . . . , xm j ) ∈ CA˜, j ,
f
 
F A˜j x1 . . . xn j
 6= F B˜j f (x1) . . . f xn j , or (viii) there is a k ∈K such that f cA˜k 6= cB˜k .
It is to be shown that (∗) there is an A ∈A for which there is noB ∈ B or there is
anB ∈A for which there is no A ∈A such that f is an isomorphism between A
andB.
If (i) holds for some i ∈ I and x1, . . . , xmi , then choose an A˜-normal structure
with PAi x1 . . . xmi , if (ii) holds for some i ∈ I and x1, . . . , xmi , then choose an
B˜-normal structure with PBi f (x1) . . . f (xmi ), and analogously for (iii) and (iv).
Then, if f is an isomorphism between A and B, in case (i) B is not B˜-normal
because PB,+i f (x1) . . . f (xmi ) does not hold, in case (ii) A is not A˜-normal because
PA,+i x1 . . . xmi does not hold, and analogously for (iii) and (iv). If (v) holds for
some j ∈ J and x1, . . . , xn j ∈A, choose FBj f (x1), . . . , f (xn j ) 6= f
 
F A˜j x1 . . . xn j

, and
analogously for (vi). Then, if f is an isomorphism betweenA andB, in case (v)A is
not A˜-normal because FAj x1 . . . xn j = f
−1 FBj f (x1) . . . f (xn j ) 6= F A˜j x1 . . . xn j , and
analogously for (vii). For any A˜-normal structure A and any B˜-normal structure
B, if (vii) holds, FAj x1, . . . , xn j = F
A˜
j x1 . . . xn j 6= F B˜j x1, . . . , xn j = FBj x1, . . . , xn j
and if (viii) holds, cAk = c
A˜
k 6= cB˜k = cBk . (∗) follows by lemma 4.10.
Claim 4.13. Let A and B be the vagueness sets corresponding to partial structures A˜
and B˜ with Π˜ = ∅. Then f is a partial homomorphism between A˜ and B˜ if and
only if for all A ∈A there is aB ∈ B and for allB ∈ B there is an A ∈A such that f
is a homomorphism between A andB.
Proof. Similar to the proof of claim 4.12.
4.3.3 Partial structures asA -structures
When capturing partial structures via vagueness sets and identifying quasi-truth of
a theory with approximate truth, one assumes that the theory is formulated in
the same vocabulary in which our empirical knowledge (expressed by the partial
structure) is formulated. But there is another way to capture partial structures
that assumes a distinction between a basic vocabulary, in which our empirical
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knowledge is formulated, and an auxiliary vocabulary, in which our theories are
formulated.
In a partial structure, a relation symbol Pi has, in a sense, two separate inter-
pretations. For one, there are its clear instances P A˜,+i . They can be determined, for
example, by their similarity to paradigmatic instances of Pi , or, more likely when
it comes to scientific terms, by the fulfillment of some sufficient condition. Then
there are also the clear non-instances P A˜,−i . These are determined, for example,
by their similarity to paradigmatic non-instances of Pi , or by the failure to fulfill
some necessary condition. Determining whether some tuple is in P A˜,+i is thus
more or less unrelated to determining whether some tuple is in P A˜,−i . (That a
tuple is in P A˜,◦i will typically only be determined by its being in neither P
A˜,+
i nor
P A˜,−i .) Given the difference in determining the members of P
A˜,+
i and of P
A˜,−
i , it
is natural to assign separate symbols of a language to these two concepts, say, P+i
and P−i .
In a partial structure, the interpretation F A˜j of an n j -place function symbol
F j can be seen as the clear instances of an n j + 1-ary relation. In analogy to the
relation symbols in partial structures, it is natural to assign an n j +1-place relation
symbol F +j to the concept that determines these clear instances. F
A˜
j does not have
a value if its argument is not in CA˜, j , and thus for every n j + 1-tuple not in the
relation named by F +j , it is unknown whether it falls under the function or not.
Thus there is no need for a relation symbol that names the clear non-instances of
F j .
Since constant symbols are interpreted in the usual way, this leads to a new
language L ′ = {P+i , P−i , F +j , ck}i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K , chosen so that {P+i , P−i , F +j }i∈I , j∈J ∩
L =∅. And any partial structure forL determines a structure forL ′:
Definition 4.16. L ′-structure A corresponds to partialL -structure A˜ if and only
if |A|= A˜, P+i A = P A˜,+i and P−i A = P A˜,−i for each i ∈ I , F +j A = a¯b | a¯ ∈ CA˜, j
and F A˜j (a¯) = b
	
for each j ∈ J , and cAk = cA˜k for each k ∈K .
In this definition, a¯b stands for the tuple (a1, . . . ,an j , b ) ∈ An j+1. Note that
for every partial structure A˜ there is exactly one structure A that corresponds
to A˜. By introducing for each function symbol and each constant symbol of
the partial structure a relation symbol that names all the clear non-instances of
the function or constant symbol, respectively, one can again generalize partial
structures similarly to §4.3.2. The notion of a structure corresponding to a partial
structure thus provides a general way of defining a preciseB -language starting
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from vague terms.
Despite having two separate interpretations, the relation symbols P+i and P
−
i
are of course connected, since they are known to refer to instances and, respec-
tively, non-instances of the same relation symbol Pi fromL . This connection, and
the fact that over a restricted domain, F +j is equivalent to a function F j are thus
background assumptions. They can therefore be described by primary statements
in languageL ∗ =L ∪L ′:
Π = Π˜ ∪⋃
i∈I
∀x¯(P+i x¯→ Pi x¯),∀x¯(P−i x¯→¬Pi x¯)	
∪⋃
j∈J
∀x¯∀y(F +j x¯y→ F j x¯ = y)	 . (4.8)
In every structure A that corresponds to a partial structure, relation F +j
A can
provide a sufficient condition for function values because by definition 4.16, tuples
in F +j
A differ in their last elements only if they also differ in one of their previous
elements.
Since the structure A corresponding to a partialL -structure A˜ is itself anL ′-
structure,Π cannot be true inA. However,Π may be true in an expansion ofA to
L ∗, which differs from A only in that it interprets the symbols inL ∗−L ′. With
the help of corresponding structures, it is now possible to describe quasi-truth
relative to Π˜ :
Claim 4.14. L -sentence ϕ is quasi-true in partialL -structure A˜ with respect to Π˜
if and only if the correspondingL ′-structure has an expansion C such that
C  {ϕ} ∪Π . (4.9)
Proof. ‘⇐’: Let A correspond to A˜ and C be an expansion of A such that C 
{ϕ} ∪Π . Then C|L  {ϕ} ∪ Π˜ , |C|L | = |C| = A, and P A˜,+i = P+i A = P+i C ⊆
PC|Li ⊆Ami − P−i C = Ami − P−i A = Ami − P A˜,−i for each i ∈ I . Furthermore, for
each a¯ ∈CA˜, j , F C|Lj (a¯) = b if a¯b ∈ F +j C, and, since F C|Lj is a function, also only if
a¯b ∈ F +j C. Since further F +j C = F +j A, and a¯b ∈ F +j A if and only if a¯ ∈ CA˜, j and
F A˜j (a¯) = b , it holds that F
C|L
j |CA˜, j = F A˜j for each j ∈ J . Finally, c
C|L
k
= cAk = c
A˜
k .
Thus C|L is A˜-normal and hence ϕ is quasi-true in A˜.
‘⇒’: Let A be theL ′-structure that corresponds to A˜ and let ϕ be quasi-true
in A˜ with respect to Π˜ . Then there is anL -structureB such thatB  Π˜ ∪ {ϕ}
and P+i
A = P A˜,+i ⊆ PBi ⊆Ami − P A˜,−i = Ami − P−i A for each i ∈ I . Furthermore,
F A˜j = F
B
j |CA˜, j and thus for each j ∈ J , a¯ ∈ An j , and b ∈ A, a¯b ∈ F +j A only if
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FBj (a¯) = b . Finally, c
A
k = c
A˜
k = c
B
k for each k ∈K . Define theL ∗-structure C so
that C|L ′ =A and C|L =B. Then C  {ϕ} ∪Π .
Somewhat shorter, ϕ is quasi-true in A˜ with respect to Π˜ if and only if its
corresponding structure has an expansion in which {ϕ} ∪Π is true.
In the new formalization of quasi-truth, the languageL ′ is, in keeping with
the basic motivation for partial structures, considered to be directly interpreted,
while the interpretation of L ∗−L ′ = {Pi , F j }i∈I , j∈J is only given through the
interpretation ofL ′ and the primary statementsΠ . This reliance on a basic and
an auxiliary vocabulary and their connection by a set of sentences distinguishes
the Received View from other syntactic approaches.31 In principle, all results from
the Received View can therefore be used for partial structures. I want to present
only one.
Claim 4.15. If Π˜ and L are finite, then L -sentence ϕ is quasi-true in partial L -
structure A˜ with respect to Π˜ if and only if for the correspondingL ′-structure A it
holds that
A  RL ′
 
ϕ ∧∧Π . (4.10)
Proof. Since Π˜ andL are finite, so are Π andL ∗. Therefore, by claim 4.14, ϕ
is quasi-true in A˜ if and only if A has an expansion C such that C  ϕ ∧∧Π .
By lemma 2.4 (page 59), there is such an expansion if and only if A  RL ′
 
ϕ ∧∧
Π

.
Somewhat shorter, ϕ is quasi-true in A˜ with respect to Π˜ if and only if
RL ′
 
ϕ ∧∧Π is true in the structure corresponding to A˜.
The features of quasi-truth that follow from definition 4.12 can now also
be recovered from claims 4.14 and 4.15. For example, that two incompatible
sentences can both be quasi-true in the same partial structure follows from the fact
that, given the primary statements Π , two incompatibleL -sentences can have
compatible Ramsey sentences.
The differences between the definitions for partial homomorphisms and iso-
morphisms are analogous to the differences between the standard definitions of
homomorphism and isomorphism between structures (Hodges 1993, 5), so that
they can be easily discussed together:
31Incidentally, the sentences ∀x¯(R+i x¯ → ¬P−i x¯), i ∈ I and ∀x¯∀y∀v¯∀w(F +j x¯y ∧ F +j v¯w ∧∧
1≤r≤n j xr = vr → y = w), j ∈ J , which follow from Π and contain only basic terms, express
that in a partial structure A˜, P A˜,+i ∩ P A˜,−i =∅ for all i ∈ I and F A˜j is a partial function for all j ∈ J .
Since they are therefore basic presumptions of the formalism, they are good candidates for analytic
sentences inL ′ (cf. Carnap 1952).
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Claim 4.16. LetA correspond to A˜, andB to B˜. Then f is a partial homomorphism/
partial isomorphism from A˜ to B˜ if and only if f is a homomorphism/isomorphism
from A toB.
Proof. The proof for relations and constants is immediate. For functions, the
following holds:
‘⇒’: For all j ∈ J , a¯ ∈ An j , and b ∈ A, a¯b ∈ F +j A if and only if a¯ ∈ CA˜, j and
F A˜j (a¯) = b . This holds only if/if and only if f (a¯) ∈CB˜, j and F B˜j
 
f (a¯)

= f (b ),
that is, f (a¯) f (b ) ∈ F +j B.
‘⇐’: For all j ∈ J , a¯ ∈ CA˜, j and F A˜j (a¯) = b if and only if a¯b ∈ F +j A. This
holds only if/if and only if f (a¯) f (b ) ∈ F +j B, that is, f (a¯) ∈CB˜, j and F B˜j
 
f (a¯)

=
f (b ).
Somewhat shorter, a mapping between two partial structures is a partial
homomorphism/partial isomorphism if and only if it is a homomorphism/
isomorphism between their corresponding structures.
Claims 4.14 and 4.16 reduce the concepts of the partial structures approach
to the model theory of first order logic, claims 4.15 and 4.16 reduce them to
the model theory of second order logic. For example, since the truth value of a
sentence of second order logic is conserved under isomorphisms, it follows from
claims 4.15 and 4.16 that the quasi-truth-value of a sentence is conserved under
partial isomorphisms.
4.4 Combining semantic and syntactic approaches
If van Fraassen (1980, 56) was right in his in his claim that syntactic concepts are
“off the mark”, solutions “to purely self-generated problems, and philosophically
irrelevant”, the preceding results would establish a reductio ad empirismum logicum
of his own position, the partial structures approach, and semantic approaches in
general. But insofar as these approaches have proven their merits (or can prove
their merits once their generalizations within the Received View are taken into
account), the inference has to go in the opposite direction: The tools developed
within logical empiricism are more useful than its detractors have acknowledged.
The close connection between the approaches allows a comparison of more
specific versions, for example approaches in first order predicate logic and ap-
proaches in first order model theory. Here, standard model theory has already
led to major results, which only had to be put to work, for example by Przełe˛cki
(1969) and then later, for example, by van Benthem (1982, 2011).
Taking the close relation seriously also allows identifying a problem in either
approach if the problem has already been identified in the other. In general,
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those problems of syntactic approaches that do not stem from axiomatization
in first order logic have their analogues in semantic approaches, as the above
examples of the connection to the world and language dependence show. The
conclusion by Chakravartty (2001, 326, §1) that “[r]ealism on the semantic view
is by no means impossible, but faced with precisely those familiar, perennial
difficulties of reference and correspondence that some semanticists think their
approach does without” is another case in point. Given the translatability of
semantic into syntactic descriptions and vice versa (§4.1.1) and the similarity in
the solutions to connect either description to the world (§4.1.3), it would indeed be
surprising if all semantic approaches differed from all syntactic approaches in their
ontological commitments. Another example comes from theories that cannot
be fruitfully formalized. Typically, those theories are considered a problem for
syntactic approaches (see, for example Suppe 1974a, 63 and Beatty 1980, appendix
1), but the above results show that if a theory is not fruitfully formalizable in a
syntactic approach, neither is it so formalizable in a semantic one. Of historical
interest are the problems that led Hempel to abandon both the Received View
and reliance on syntactic axiomatizations in general. He takes as a starting point
of his criticism a defense of axiomatizations by Suppes (1968), which, so Hempel
(1974, 248), argues for “[t]he importance of axiomatically formalizing scientific
theories, much in the manner [ . . . ] envisaged by the standard construal”. But,
of course, Suppes (1968, 653) defends formalization in the sense “of a standard
set-theoretical formulation”, not in “the stricter conception of a first-order theory
that assumes only elementary logic.” Much of Hempel’s criticism takes issue with
the notion that one can analyze a scientific theory as an uninterpreted formal
system, be it uninterpreted in a semantic or a syntactic approach. Hempel (1974,
251) concludes that the
extensive theoretical use of antecedent terms appears to me to throw
into question the conception of the internal principles of a theory as
an axiomatized system whose postulates provide “implicit” definitions
for its extralogical terms. [ . . . ] Hence, the theoretical “calculus” of
a theory of this kind cannot be regarded as a strictly formalized,
uninterpreted system, and the concepts of model theory cannot be
applied to it without qualifications.
I have already argued that Hempel overstates his case, and indeed fundamentally
misrepresents the Received View in his discussion, but it is important to see
that his criticism applies to non-worldly pure structures as much as it applies to
uninterpreted sets of sentences and was indeed explicitly directed at a semantic
approach.
A more positive use of the close relation is the transfer of solutions from one
view to the other. One example is the definitional expansion of theories to allow
the identification of theories with formally different structures in semantic views
(§4.1.2). As already noted, this goes far beyond the pure avoidance of assigning
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different names to the same sets. Other examples are the concept of a substructure
in model theory, which captures the syntactic notion of a subvocabulary, the use
of the Ramsey sentence by Sneed (1979), the syntactic description of empirical
embeddings, and the description of partial truth by the truth of a Ramsey sen-
tence. With respect to the relation between the Received View and van Fraassen’s
conception of scientific theories, Turney (1990, 449) concludes:
We see now that there is a syntactic method, which is equivalent
to his semantic method. The moral is this: The relevant distinction
here is not between syntax and semantics. [ . . . ] It is between two
ways of linking theory and observation: Correspondence rules versus
embedding/implanting.
Of course, Turney assumes in this quote that correspondence rules cannot capture
his conception of implanting, and that his conception of implanting captures van
Fraassen’s notion of empirical embedding. Neither is true, but the importance of
Turney’s point is this: If the difference between syntactic and semantic approaches
is seen as one of formulation, it is possible to search for commonalities between
the views and to transfer solutions from one approach to the other. On a meta-
level, I therefore do hold the position of the critics of syntactic approaches: The
language in which an analysis is phrased, whether it uses pure or indexed structures,
structures, or structures and an object language, matters very little.
In the next two parts, I will provide examples of the power of syntactic
approaches including the Received View and (again) their close proximity to
semantic approaches.
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Chapter 5
Preliminary remarks on
criteria of empirical
significance
Criteria of empirical significance are demarcation criteria meant to distinguish
between those statements or terms that have some connection to empirical state-
ments and those that do not. An early criterion suggested by Ayer was quickly
shown to be trivial; it was followed by a slew of amendments and new trivialization
proofs succinctly summarized and extended by Pokriefka (1983), who cuts out the
middleman and proves the triviality of his amendment himself (Pokriefka 1984).
The latest contributions to this “puncture-and-patch industry” (Lewis 1988b, §XII)
are two criteria by Wright (1986, 1989) and trivialization proofs by Lewis (1988b,
§IV, n. 12), Wright (1989, §II), and Yi (2001).
This history has “done a lot to discredit the very idea of delineating a class
of statements as empirical” (Lewis 1988b, §I). In what Gemes (1998b, §1.1) calls
“the problem of past failures”, the failure of Ayer’s early criterion and subsequent
amendments is used for an enumerative induction to conclude that the problem
of demarcation cannot be solved at all. As Lewis (1988b, 127, footnote removed)
further notes, the many amendments have
led to ever-increasing complexity and ever-diminishing contact with
any intuitive idea of what it means for a statement to be empirical.
Even if some page-long descendant of Ayer’s criterion [provably
admitted] more than the observation-statements and less than all the
statements, we would be none the wiser. We do not want just any
class of statements that is intermediate between clearly too little and
clearly too much. We want the right class.
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This also holds for criteria that do not amend Ayer’s criterion, as their multi-
tude suggests that they are little more than arbitrary bipartitions of the class of
statements. Call this ‘the charge of arbitrariness’.
After proving, almost in passing, that Ayer’s own amendment of his early
criterion is trivial, Church (1949, 53) concludes that “any satisfactory solution of
the difficulty will demand systematic use of the logistic method”. In this spirit,
I will provide formalizations of the major criteria of empirical significance and
analyze their logical structure. The first result of these analyses will be that the
charge of arbitrariness is unfounded, for the non-trivial criteria are equivalent or
bear strong inferential relations to each other and to concepts from definition-
and measurement theory. I will also suggest a way to avoid the assumption that
trivialized Ayer’s criterion and its successor, thereby solving the problem of past
failures.
These are already good reasons to look more closely at criteria of empirical
significance, but there are others. For one, many criticisms of the criteria have
seen rebuttals, mostly because they rely on misunderstandings of the criteria’s
intended applications. There is also still a need for criteria of empirical significance.
Sometimes a criterion is needed to state very clearly what is not generally in
dispute, as in Sober’s discussions of the empirical significance of claims about a
designer of life whose intentions and abilities are unknown (Sober 1999, 2007,
2008). In other cases, a generally accepted endeavor is put under scrutiny, like
string theory (Smolin 2006, Woit 2006), fish stock assessment theories (Corkett
2002), or natural selection (Wassermann 1978). The empirical significance of more
philosophical positions like theism (Diamond and Litzenburg 1975) or realism
and antirealism (Sober 1990) have also been investigated.
To be successful, an explication of empirical significance should thus contribute
to the solution of scientific and philosophical problems. But beyond this, an
explication should also suggest entirely new research questions—this will be the
subject of part III. In the end, these results will provide evidence that the search
for criteria of empirical equivalence has been successful.
5.1 Methodological presumptions
The development of a criterion of empirical significance out of the vague and intu-
itive concept variously described as ‘having empirical content’, ‘being connected
to observations’, ‘being testable’, and ‘being empirically meaningful’ amounts to
an explication. Since explication is not the same as precisification (see §3.8.1), it
would therefore not be helpful to rely on examples of intuitively clear cases of
empirical significance or lack of empirical significance. I will instead rely on con-
ditions of adequacy (see §2.3.1). Concepts are typically explicated in a restricted
domain; Tarski, for instance, restricted himself to predicate logic when explicating
‘truth’, as did Carnap when explicating ‘analytic’. Such a restriction is acceptable
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and indeed almost always necessary to attain any results at all (Martin 1952). It is
therefore not a fundamental problem that the explicata discussed in the following
assume a language of first or higher order predicate logic. Rather, in the spirit of
Carnap (see §3.3, §3.8.2), the explicata should be seen as first steps towards the
development of more general criteria. In other words, the criteria define empirical
significance on the condition that the language is one of predicate logic. As argued
in §4.1, this is not a more restrictive assumption than assuming the language of
pure structures. Furthermore, the equivalences discussed here will suggest imme-
diate generalizations beyond predicate logic. Finally, in the following I will discuss
syntactic, model theoretic, and set theoretic criteria of empirical significance and
the conditions under which they are equivalent.
More problematic than the use of predicate logic is that some of the criteria
discussed in the following (the semantic ones, by the way) assume a bipartition of
the non-logical vocabulary V as in the Received View. I have argued in §3.6 and
§4.2 that a bipartition does not have to lead to an overly complex vocabulary, and
that the assumption of a bipartition is not stronger or less natural than those by
Suppes, van Fraassen, or in measurement theory. Furthermore, in keeping with
artificial language philosophy, the vocabulary does not have to be partitioned into
observational and theoretical terms, but only into in some sense basic and auxiliary
terms, where the basic terms must only be unproblematic for the purposes at
hand. According to Nielsen (1966, 15), for example, Flew’s charge that theological
statements are not falsifiable (Flew 1950) assumes that all and only “non-religious,
straightforwardly empirical, factual statements” have primitive meaning. Flew
thus does not consider it a requirement thatB -terms be observation terms, but
only thatB -sentences be empirical or factual sentences. And Flew (1975, 274)
claims that it is enough to assume that all and only statements about “anything
which happens or which conceivably might happen in the ordinary world” have
primitive meaning, so thatB -sentence only have to be about the ordinary world.1
Furthermore, I will show in §6.8.1 how the restrictions that the criteria discussed
here place on the descriptions of observations can be weakened.
There is, however, an important subtlety to be considered: In §2.8.3, I have
assumed that the set of intended structures NB does not have to be a singleton
set because of vagueness. Therefore, in general not every B -sentence β has a
determinate truth value in NB , even under complete empirical information. In
those cases, the truth or falsity of β is a matter of convention, and hence not
empirically significant. As will become clear, however, those criteria that rely
on a bipartition of the language presume that all B -sentences are themselves
empirically significant and that allB -terms are precise. There are two ways to
respond to this problem. The most obvious is to keep theB -terms as they are
and define the set of empirically significant B -sentences as a subset of all B -
1These are only illustrations: I especially do not think that Flew’s circumscription of the B -
sentences is precise enough (see §9.1).
215
5 Preliminary remarks on criteria of empirical significance Criteria of Empirical Significance
sentences. I do this in §6.8.1. The other, and technically simpler response is to
introduce a new set ofB -terms that are not vague and therefore have only a single
intended structure as element of NB . I have developed and applied one way to
arrive at a language without vague terms in §2.10.2 and §4.3.3, where the vague
terms are included in the set of auxiliary terms, and their positive and negative
extensions make up the new set of basic terms. This response is the technically
more satisfying, and is also the one that leads to the historically prominent criteria
of empirical significance.
Below, I will make a distinction between syntactic and semantic criteria of
empirical significance based on whether the observations are described by sets
ofB -sentences or byB -structures. WithB -structures, observations can be de-
scribed up to isomorphism, and withB -sentences up to what I will call syntactical
equivalence. Two structures A andB are syntactically equivalent (A≡B) if and
only if their respective theories are equivalent (Th(A)  Th(B)), that is, for all
sentences σ , A  σ if and only if B  σ . Thus in first order logic, syntactic
equivalence is elementary equivalence.
5.2 On the explicanda
The criteria discussed in the following are not meant to determine the meaning of
sentences as Ruja (1961), for instance, assumes in his critique, or the meaning of
terms. Rynin (1957, 51–53) and Gemes (1998b, §1.5) argue in some detail that this is
not the point of the criteria, but it is also obvious from their formal structure: The
criteria are classificatory (so that a sentence or term can be empirically significant
or not), while a criterion of meaning has to define a relation between sentences or,
respectively, terms and meanings. More substantially, no amount ofB -sentences
may be enough to give the meaning of a term if a distinction is made between the
evidential basis for ascribing a theoretical term to a state and the reference of the
term in that state (Feigl 1950, 48).
Pace Rynin (1957, 51), ‘empirical significance’ does not explicate ‘meaningful-
ness’, either, because the meaning of sentences and terms is generally accepted to
be determined by both the sentence’s or term’s empirical import and the rules
that govern its use with other sentences or terms (Carnap 1939, §25). Thus even a
sentence or term not connected in the slightest to observation can be meaningful
(cf. Sober 2008, 149–150). Whether there is more to the meaning of sentences
and terms beyond their empirical import and relation to other sentences and
terms depends on the status of semantic empiricism, which asserts the opposite
(Rozeboom 1962, §II; Rozeboom 1970; Przełe˛cki 1969, §§5–6; Przełe˛cki 1974b,
402–403). This understanding of the criteria as criteria for the empirical meaning-
fulness of sentences is in line with Popper’s notion of falsifiability as a demarcation
criterion between empirical and non-empirical sentences (Popper 1935, §4, §9; cf.
Carnap 1963c, §6.A).
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Gemes (1998b, §1.4) argues that a criterion of empirical significance does not
have to be a criterion of inductive confirmability. In connection with claim 6.7, I
will point out previous results in the philosophy of science that show the need
for a distinction between contexts in which only deductive inferences are possible
and contexts in which only probabilistic inferences are possible. Accordingly, I
will discuss criteria for the former contexts—deductive criteria of empirical signifi-
cance (§6 and §7)—separately from criteria for the latter contexts—probabilistic
criteria of empirical significance (§8). A major topic in the following will be the
compatibility of deductive and probabilistic criteria in contexts that allow both
deductive and probabilistic inferences. A sentence may then be called empirically
significant (simpliciter) if and only if it is deductively empirically significant or
probabilistically empirically significant.
Finally, I will restrict the discussion to descriptive, extensional sentences,
and thus assume that the language whose well-formed sentences are to be tested
for significance does not contain modal operators. This does not mean that the
following discussion is of no value for, say, obligation- or necessity-statements,
however, since those sentences may contain descriptive subformulas, a closure of
which can be tested for significance (Marhenke 1950, 3). Furthermore, the criteria
discussed here may allow for a generalization to languages that do contain modal
operators.
5.3 General arguments about criteria of empirical
significance
The typical argument against any kind of criterion of empirical significance is
a pessimistic induction based on the problem of past failures: Since so far no
adequate criterion has been found, it is argued, it is improbable that one will
ever be found (cf. Hempel 1965b, Suarez 2000). Of course, this argument is no
more than a plausibility consideration. Since there has not been a unified, detailed
overview of the topic since Hempel’s two essays (Hempel 1950, 1951)2 and many
critiques of suggested conditions are controversial themselves, the pessimistic
induction is far from strong. Accordingly, it has been rejected by some, for example
Feigl (1956) and Justus (2010).
A more general argument against a class of deductive criteria for terms has
been given by Berkowitz (1979) based on a condition of adequacy suggested by
Achinstein. Achinstein (1964, 99; 1968, 78, my formulation) proposes
Condition 1. If a set of sentences Σ is such that the occurrence of a term Vi in
Σ suffices/does not suffice to guarantee that Vi is significant, then the occurrence
of Vi in any set of sentences that is logically equivalent toΣ also suffices/does not
2Hempel (1965c) gives a shortened and edited combination of the two. Misak (1995) gives a
non-technical discussion and focuses on the criteria suggested before Hempel’s overview articles.
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suffice to guarantee that Vi is significant.
As an example, Achinstein (1968, 78) notes that according to condition 1,
the terms in σ are significant in a theory Σ = {σ → τ,σ} only if they are also
significant in the theory Σ ′ = {σ ,τ}.
Berkowitz (1979, 463, my notation) then states that many criteria of signifi-
cance are based on the idea that “the occurrence of Vi in Σ suffices to guarantee
that Vi is essential to the deduction of observational consequences”, where ‘essen-
tial’ means that some observational (basic) consequences are not entailed without
the sentences that contain Vi . Simplifying Berkowitz’s argument somewhat, one
can, for every setΣ of sentences, define a minimal setΩ of basic sentences entailed
by Σ and rewrite Σ  Σ ∪Ω. Thus no Vi that occurs in Σ but not in Ω can be
empirically significant. Note that condition 1 has a natural analogue for criteria
for the empirical significance of sentences, and that Berkowitz’s trivialization
proof has such an analogue, too, with the result that only basic sentences can be
empirically significant.
Berkowitz counters his own argument by calling into question condition 1.
To argue that a Vi is inessential for the derivation of a sentence σ from Σ by
equivalently reformulating Σ and thus using a set of sentences containing Vi is, “in
a sense, [ . . . ] begging the question” (Berkowitz 1979, 464). Indeed, a criterion
developed by Gemes (1998a) explicitly disallows some equivalent reformulations
of sets of sentences, and it is therefore doubtful that condition 1 can be considered
uncontroversial.
A general argument for the existence of a criterion of significance is given by
Sober (1999, 48) in terms of the testability of a hypothesis (cf. Sober 2008, 149):
If it makes sense to say that an experiment does or does not test a given
hypothesis, why is it suddenly misguided to ask whether any experi-
ment could test the hypothesis? [ . . . ] If a set of observations provides
a test of a proposition because it bears relation R to that proposition,
then a proposition is testable when it is possible for there to be a set
of observations that bears relation R to the proposition. Testing is
to testability as dissolving is to solubility. If we can understand what
testing is, we also should be able to understand what testability is.
The argument is, in terms of significance, the following: For each sentence σ and
for eachB -sentence β, we know whether β tests σ . σ is significant if and only if
there is aB -sentence that tests σ . Therefore, we know for each sentence whether
it is significant. However, Sober’s inference assumes that we have a means of going
through all observation sentences in a finite amount of time, that is, have some
effective means of applying the criterion by which we know whether β tests σ .
Sober’s premise is also contentious, since it is not clear that for each sentence and
eachB -sentence, it is unequivocally decidable whether the latter tests the former.
Sober may just have relied on an unfortunate turn of phrase, with the term
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‘understanding’ suggesting some mental process that relates ‘testing’ to ‘testability’.
The term can be avoided completely: Sober (2008, 35) himself assumes that his
concept of testing (and hence also his concept of testability) is an explicatum.
Thus his claim can be rephrased as ‘If we have an adequate and fruitful explicatum
for ‘testing’, we also immediately have an adequate and fruitful explicatum for
‘testability’’. Specifically, given the relation between ‘testing’ and ‘testability’ that
Sober assumes, a definition of ‘observationω tests Σ ’ immediately leads to the
definition ‘Σ is testable if and only if it is possible for there to be an observation
ω such thatω tests Σ ’.
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Chapter 6
Deductive criteria for
sentences
As discussed in chapter §5, the problem of past failures suggests that it is simply
impossible to find an adequate demarcation criterion. And every new suggestion
for a criterion will have to face the charge of arbitrariness, according to which not
every non-trivial criterion is adequate. Rather, a criterion has to have the right
relation to its explicandum. In this chapter, I will show that several criteria of
empirical significance for sentences can overcome the charge of arbitrariness, since
they are closely related to each other and the original explicandum.1
For the criteria are equivalent (§6.2.1) or nearly equivalent (§6.2.2) to falsifia-
bility, which is also the non-trivial core of Ayer’s criteria. Falsifiability in turn is
closely connected to verifiability (§6.3). Falsifiability and verifiability are more
inclusive than the (universally panned) criterion demanding both (§6.4), which
is itself more inclusive than the criterion of strong B -determinacy, suggested
independently by Patrick Suppes, Marian Przełe˛cki, and David Lewis (§6.5). More
inclusive than both falsifiability and verifiability is the criterion that demands
either one, and which has been suggested by David Rynin in a syntactic and
by Przełe˛cki in a semantic formulation. A criterion given by Carnap, once it is
modified to avoid triviality, is a variant of this (§6.6). Falsifiability, verifiability,
their disjunction, and strongB -creativity thus make up the four major criteria of
empirical significance.
The entailment relations between the four major criteria (summarized in
figures 6.1 and 6.2) suggest the introduction of comparative concepts of empirical
1Parts of this chapter have been presented under the title “Empirical significance, Ramsey sen-
tences, and the theory of definition” at the PhDs in Logic II conference at Tilburg University, The
Netherlands, February 19, 2010. I thank the audience for helpful discussions. This chapter has also
profited enormously from a reading group and further discussions at Tilburg University with Reinhard
Muskens and Stefan Wintein.
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significance, which provide a rebuttal to one of Hempel’s criticisms of the concept
of empirical significance (§6.7.1). And since the different formulations of each
major criterion have been arrived at by different considerations, the formulations’
equivalence allows a cumulative defense of each of them (§6.7.2).
Because of the equivalences, one can also choose based on expedience which
formulation to generalize. I suggest two generalizations. The first weakens the
criteria’s presumptions about basic sentences (§6.8.1). I arrive at the the other
by modifying an otherwise trivial criterion by Elliott Sober. This leads to a
generalization of falsifiability that takes general background assumptions into
account and is a further elaboration of criteria suggested previously by Carnap and
Popper. This generalization transfers directly to all other criteria, and supplants
the assumption at the heart of the trivial amendments of Ayer’s criterion, thereby
solving the problem of past failures (§6.8.2).
6.1 Preliminaries
All of the criteria in the following refer to a consistent set of analytic sentences or
meaning postulatesΠ . Przełe˛cki (1974a, 345) argues that the meaning postulates
ΠA for the auxiliary terms should beB -conservative with respect to ΠB , the
meaning postulates for the basic terms. That is,ΠA should place no restrictions onB -sentences or their interpretations beyond those given throughΠB . I will not
make this assumption, but rather generalize concepts and results where necessary.
I have defended the viability of the concept of analyticity in §2. The assumption
of a set of analytic sentences is also not necessarily a restriction, sinceΠ may be
empty. On the other hand, demanding Π = ∅ severely restricts the inferences
that are possible—analytic entailment then coincides with logical entailment. If,
for example, Π cannot even contain stipulative definitions, it is impossible to
introduce terms like ‘linear’ and ‘continuous’, so that the inference from ‘function
f is linear’ to ‘function f is continuous’ is impossible. I will further discuss the
role ofΠ in the criteria in §6.8.2.
The criteria under discussion are meant to explicate empirical significance for
sentences, not terms. Whether this is a restriction at all is a matter of debate. While
Carnap (1956b) considers criteria for terms possible and perhaps even preferable to
criteria for sentences (see also Hempel 1965c, §3), Przełe˛cki (1974a, 345–346), for
example, considers such criteria misguided. But even if, pace Przełe˛cki, criteria for
terms do turn out to be desirable, the criteria for sentences do not thereby become
superfluous. Rather, they define empirical significance under the condition that
the object under scrutiny is a sentence, not a term. I will discuss the relation of
the criteria for sentences to the criteria for terms in §7.
As discussed in §5.2, I will assume in the following that the criteria under
discussion are meant to be applied in contexts that allow only deductive infer-
ences, and thus not as criteria of inductive confirmability. Under this assumption,
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some restrictions on the criteria are overly restrictive. Hempel’s restriction of
observational information to finite sets of molecular sentences (Hempel 1965c,
§2) is the best example of this. In its stead, I will mainly rely on what Carnap
sometimes calls the ‘extended observation language’, which contains all sentences
that contain only logical andB -terms (cf. Psillos 2000, 158–159). The language
thus also includes all quantified sentences, and thus “empirical laws” or “empirical
generalizations” (Carnap 1966, 225–227). I will revisit restrictions on the basic
sentences in §6.8.1.
6.2 Falsifiability
6.2.1 Syntactic criteria
As I will discuss in §6.8.2, Hempel’s formulation of the falsifiability criterion
deviates from Popper’s original criterion in at least one crucial respect, but it can
serve as a good starting point for my discussion. Hempel (1965c, 106) states his
“requirement of complete falsifiability in principle” like this:
A sentence has empirical meaning if and only if its negation is not
analytic and follows logically from some finite logically consistent
class of observation sentences.
Since I am here not interested in criteria of confirmability, I will drop Hempel’s
requirement that the set of basic sentences be finite.2 For two reasons, I will also
allow the analytic entailment of the sentence’s negation. First, analytic entailment
is a simple generalization of logical entailment that can be undone by demanding
that Π be empty. Second, only tautologicalA -sentences follow logically from
a consistent set of B -sentences, and therefore no A -sentences have empirical
meaning according to Hempel’s definition.3 Finally, I will generalize the criterion
for sentences to a criterion for sets of sentences because this allows the discussion
of theories that cannot be finitely axiomatized and thus not be described in a
single sentence. The generalization is straightforward: If τ is a sentence and Σ
a set of sentences, then Σ  ¬τ if and only if Σ ∪ {τ}  ⊥, where ‘⊥’ is some
contradiction. And in the second formula, the restriction to a singleton set is
superfluous. With these modifications and my terminology, the criterion says that
a set of sentences is empirically significant if and only if it is syntactically falsifiable
2 A generalization of the criterion that can capture this requirement is given in §6.8.1.
3This focus on the empirical significance of sentences withA -terms is not as ahistorical as it may
seem: Carnap (1928a, §§61–67) already focused on the relation of all the sentences of a language to
those sentences containing only a subset of its terms (the “basic relations”). Consider also Schlick’s and
Ayer’s example sentence ‘The Absolute enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress’,
whose alleged lack of content hinges on the term ‘Absolute’ (Ayer 1936, 36). With his focus on the
untenability of induction, Popper (1935, §V) was arguably an exception (in this respect, see n. 2 above).
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and not analytically false.4
Definition 6.1. A set Ω of sentences falsifies a set Σ of sentences if and only if
Ω ∪Σ ∪Π ⊥.
Definition 6.2. A set Σ of V -sentences is syntactically falsifiable if and only if it
is falsified by a possible set ofB -sentences.
Note that the relation between falsification and falsifiability is analogous to
that of testing and testability described by Sober: Falsifying is to falsifiability as
testing is to testability (see §5.3). Since a falsifiable sentence cannot be analytic, the
criterion of empirical significance could also be formulated as the demand that a
sentence be syntactically falsifiable and analytically contingent.
As an example, assume that ‘q’ stands for ‘foo’, ‘Ax’ for ‘x is bar’, ‘c ’ for ‘the
cat’, and ‘B x’ for ‘is on the mat’. Then in most contexts, B ∈B and c ∈B , and
forΠ =∅, A∈A and q ∈A . The sentences Bc ∧Aq and ∀x(B x ∧Ax) are then
syntactically falsifiable because ¬Bc  ¬(Bc ∧Aq) and ∃xB x  ¬∀x(B x ∧Ax).
∀xB x ∨ ∀xAx is not falsifiable, however, because the interpretation of A can
always be chosen to encompass the whole domain, so that there is noB -sentence
that entails ¬∀xAx, and hence noB sentence that entails ¬∀xB x ∧¬∀xAx  
¬(∀xB x ∨∀xAx).
Even though I have defined ‘B -sentence’ to be any sentence containing only
B -terms, syntactic falsifiability, like all other syntactic criteria in the following,
only presumes that the B -sentences form some distinguished set of sentences.
When ‘B -sentences’ is defined in this way, the syntactic criteria are thus immedi-
ately generalized so that they do not rely on a bipartition of the vocabulary.
The criterion of falsifiability is typically introduced with the observation that
few universally quantified sentences are entailed by molecular basic sentences, but
their negations may be so entailed. But even assuming that most scientific laws
can be given as universally quantified sentences, this purely formal observation
is no justification of the criterion. The most important justification rather relies
implicitly on the notion ofB -conservativeness, which is a necessary condition
for explicit definitions (cf. Belnap 1993; Gupta 2009, §2.1).
Definition 6.3. A set Σ of V -sentences is syntacticallyB -conservative with re-
spect to a set∆ of V -sentences if and only if for any set Ω ofB -sentences and for
anyB -sentence β, Ω ∪Σ ∪∆ β only if Ω ∪∆ β.
A set of V -sentences is syntacticallyB -creative with respect to∆ if and only
if it is not syntacticallyB -conservative with respect to∆.5 If a logic is compact,
Ω∪Σ ∪∆ β if and only if there is a finite setΩ′ such thatΩ′∪Σ ∪∆ β. This
4As noted in §5.1, the qualifier ‘syntactic’ here does not refer to the use of syntactic deduction (‘`’),
but to the syntactic description of empirical states (by sentences).
5Note again that ‘syntactic’ refers to the syntactic description of the observations. This terminology
is essentially that of Przełe˛cki (1969, 52).
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is equivalent to Σ ∪∆ ∧Ω′→β. Hence for first order logic, and if the set of
basic sentences is closed under truth-functional composition,6 Σ is syntactically
B -conservative relative to∆ if and only if for anyB -sentenceβ,Σ∪∆ β only
if∆ β.
That the definition of a new term not in B must be B -conservative en-
capsulates the idea “that the definition not have any consequences (other than
those consequences involving the defined word itself) that were not obtainable
already without the definition”, as Belnap (1993, 123) puts it. Thus, a set that
is syntactically B -conservative with respect to Π sanctions no inferences be-
tweenB -sentences that are not already sanctioned by Π . In the following,B -
conservativeness simpliciter is understood to beB -conservativeness with respect
toΠ .
Popper’s justification of falsifiability essentially starts fromB -creativity be-
cause he demands “that the theory allow us to deduce, roughly speaking, more
empirical singular statements than we can deduce from the initial conditions alone”
(Popper 1935, 85). By assuming that the negation of a basic sentence is itself a basic
sentence, he thus justifies his definition of falsifiability with the help of
Claim 6.1. A set Σ of V -sentences is syntactically falsifiable if and only if Σ is
syntacticallyB -creative with respect to Π .
Proof. ‘⇒’: IfΩ∪Σ∪Π ⊥, thenΩ∪Σ∪Π β for any basic sentenceβ. Since
Ω ∪Π 6⊥, there is some β such that Ω ∪Π 6β.
‘⇐’: For β and Ω with Ω ∪Σ ∪Π β and Ω ∪Π 6β, Ω ∪ {¬β} ∪Π 6⊥
and Ω ∪{¬β} ∪Σ ∪Π ⊥.
The relation between falsifiability andB -creativity provides a justification for
Reichenbach’s (and Nielsen’s and Flew’s) claim that theB -sentences only need to
be unproblematic, not observational (see §5.1): The theory of definition and the
concept ofB -creativity are independent of the meaning of theB -terms.
Sticking with the interpretation ofB -sentences as observational, a falsifiable
sentence could be said to have empirical import, where “a sentence S has empirical
import if from S in conjunction with suitable subsidiary hypotheses it is possible
to derive observation sentences which are not derivable from the subsidiary hy-
potheses alone”, as Hempel (1965c, 106) puts it (suitable subsidiary hypotheses
for falsifiability being analytic and observational). It is one of the cruel jokes of
philosophical terminology that he is describing Ayer’s two criteria of verifiability.
Given the close connection between Ayer’s and Popper’s criteria, it is unsurprising
that the justification that Ayer provides for his criteria complements Popper’s
justification. Ayer (1936, 97–99) argues that the function of an empirical hypoth-
esis is to predict experiences, and thus arrives at his first criterion of empirical
significance, namely that “the mark of a genuine factual proposition [is] that some
6This is always the case if theB -sentences are defined as all those containing onlyB -vocabulary.
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experiential propositions can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other
premises without being deducible from those other premises alone”, where an
experiential proposition “records an actual or possible observation” (Ayer 1946,
38–39).
Because no restriction is put on the “certain other premises”, Ayer’s first
criterion is trivial in that it includes every non-analytic sentence (cf. Lewis 1988a).
One way to avoid this triviality is to demand that the other premises be B -
sentences, which makes the criterion equivalent toB -creativity. Instead, Ayer
(1946, 13) proposes two definitions. The first stipulates that
a statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an observation-
statement, or is such that in conjunction with one or more observa-
tion-statements it entails at least one observation-statement which is
not deducible from these other premises alone [ . . . ].
If ‘entailment’ is understood as ‘analytic entailment’7 and the criterion is meant as
a necessary and sufficient condition, this can be paraphrased as
Definition 6.4. A V -sentence σ is directly verifiable if and only if σ is a B -
sentence or there is some set Ω of B -sentences and a B -sentence β such that
Ω ∪{σ} ∪Π β and Ω ∪Π 6β.
Without any assumptions about the set of basic sentences, the next claim follows
immediately:
Claim 6.2. A V -sentence σ is directly verifiable if and only if σ is aB -sentence or
is syntacticallyB -creative with respect to Π .
The condition that σ may be aB -sentence is not redundant because σ may be
analytic and therefore notB -creative with respect toΠ .
In his second definition, Ayer (1946, 13) proposes
to say that a statement is indirectly verifiable if it satisfies the following
conditions: first, that in conjunction with certain other premises [Γ ]
it entails one or more directly verifiable statements [β] which are not
deducible from these other premises alone; and secondly, that these
other premises do not include any statement that is not either analytic,
or directly verifiable, or capable of being independently established
as indirectly verifiable.
Since analytic entailment already allows the inclusion ofΠ in the premises of an
inference,Π can be dropped from the auxiliary assumptions Γ . In the special case
that Γ is a set ofB -sentences and β aB -sentence as well, indirect verifiability
7This is what Ayer seems to do, since he calls translations from one language into another ‘logically
equivalent’ (Ayer 1946, 6–7). Lewis (1988b, §II, fn. 5) gives an independent argument for reading Ayer
in this way, but also notes that this entails some redundancies in Ayer’s definitions.
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reduces to direct verifiability (cf. Pokriefka 1983),8 so that Γ can contain B -
sentences instead of directly verifiable sentences. Ayer’s criterion can then be
stated as
Definition 6.5. A V -sentence σ is indirectly verifiable if and only if there is a set
Γ of indirectly verifiable orB -sentences and a sentence γ that is directly verifiable
such that {σ} ∪Γ ∪Π  γ and Γ ∪Π 6 γ .
To avoid circularity, one would have to demand that the set of indirectly
verifiable sentences is the least subset of the set of V -sentences that fulfill the
definiens of definition 6.5.9 This new definition is recursive (cf. Moschovakis 1974,
1): The set of indirectly verifiable sentence is given by
⋃∞
k=1 Ik with Ik as follows:
I1 is the set of sentences σ for which {σ}∪Γ ∪Π  γ and Γ ∪Π 6 γ with Γ a set
ofB -sentences, and Il+1 is the set of sentences σ for which {σ} ∪Γ ∪Π  γ and
Γ ∪Π 6 γ with Γ =⋃lk=1 Ik .
Church (1949) shows that for any sentence, as long as there are three logically
independent B -sentences, the sentence or its negation is indirectly verifiable,
a trivialization that is possible even if γ is required to be a B -sentence. This
trivialization can be avoided by restricting both Γ and γ to B -sentences, but
this more exclusive version of indirect verifiability then again just amounts to
B -creativity or, equivalently, falsifiability.
In connection with his first criterion, Ayer (1936, 38) argues that a “hypothesis
cannot be conclusively confuted any more than it can be conclusively verified”,
but that a sentence is verifiable “if it is possible for experience to render it probable”
(Ayer 1936, 37). Ayer (1936, 99) then argues that “if an observation to which a
given proposition is relevant conforms to our expectations, the truth of that propo-
sition is confirmed. [Then] one can say that its probability has been increased.”
‘Probability’ is here not used in its mathematical sense, but as a measure of our
“confidence” in a proposition (Ayer 1936, 100). Thus although Ayer justifies his
criterion with the purpose of theories, which according to him is the assertion
of observation sentences, he develops his criterion under the assumption that an
empirically significant sentence is one that can be confirmed or disconfirmed.
Furthermore, he assumes that a sentence is confirmed if one of its consequences
turns out to be true. This prediction criterion of confirmation is discussed and
rejected by, for example, Hempel (1965f, §7).
Gemes (1998b, §1.4) discusses the historical importance of the assumptions
that empirical significance is the same as confirmability and that confirmation can
be explicated by purely formal means. He argues that the failure of the search for
8This holds even without the assumption needed for Church’s trivialization proof given below,
simply by restricting Γ andβ; hence I consider it an innocent observation that does not just transform
one trivial criterion into another one.
9Arguably, this is what Ayer means by his demand that the other premises be “capable of being
independently established” as indirectly verifiable.
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a criterion of empirical significance is inherited from the failure of purely formal
criteria of confirmation: Purely formal criteria of confirmation allow the use of
any terms whatsoever, and thus specifically terms that are not projectible given
the other terms of the language (see §4.1.2). This is one reason why purely formal
criteria of confirmation are not viable. Many criteria of empirical significance
were based, like Ayer’s, on some purely formal criterion of confirmation, and
therefore have failed as well.
6.2.2 Semantic criteria
SyntacticB -conservativeness has a semantic counterpart:
Definition 6.6. A set Σ of V -sentences is semantically B -conservative with
respect to a set ∆ of V -sentences if and only if for each B -structure AB for
which there is a V -structureB ∆ withB|B =AB , there is also a V -structure
C ∆∪Σ with C|B =AB .
A set of V -sentences is semanticallyB -creative with respect to∆ if and only if
it is not semanticallyB -conservative with respect to∆. Definition 6.6 is slightly
more general than that given, for example, by Przełe˛cki (1974a, 345), so that it
allows for any V -sentence in ∆. A description of the generalization is given in
appendix 6.11.1. Note that, like the other semantic definitions up to §6.7.1, this
definition relies essentially on a bipartition of the vocabulary.
Assuming again that B ∈ B and c ∈ B , Π = ∅, A ∈ A , and q ∈ A , the
sentences Bc ∧Aq and ∀x(B x ∧Ax) are semanticallyB -creative because everyB -
structure can be expanded toΠ , butAB with BAB = {1,2} and cAB = 3 cannot be
expanded to a model of either sentence. ∀xB x∨∀xAx is notB -creative, however,
because everyB -structure AB can be expanded to a model A of ∀xB x ∨∀xAx
by choosing AA = |AB |.
As announced in §5.1, the difference between semantic and syntactic conser-
vativeness lies in the precision of the empirical information, specifically in the
difference between isomorphism (‘'’) and syntactical equivalence (‘≡’):10
Claim 6.3. A set Σ of V -sentences is syntacticallyB -conservative with respect to ∆
iff for eachB -structureAB for which there is a V -structureB ∆ withB|B ≡AB ,
there is a V -structure C ∆∪Σ with C|B ≡AB .
Proof. ‘⇒’: Assume AB is syntactically equivalent to a structure that can be
expanded to a modelB of∆. Then chooseΩ∪{¬β} equivalent to Th(AB ). It fol-
lows thatB Ω∪{¬β}∪∆ and thusΩ∪∆ 6β. By syntacticB -conservativeness,
Ω ∪Σ ∪∆ 6 β, so there is a C  Ω ∪ {¬β} ∪Σ ∪∆  Th(AB )∪Σ ∪∆. Thus
there is a C Σ ∪∆ such that C|B ≡AB .
10See §5.1. Because of claim 2.1, definition 6.6 could be formulated with ‘'’ instead of ‘=’.
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‘⇐’: Let Ω ∪∆ 6 β. Choose A  Ω ∪∆∪ {¬β}; by assumption, there is a
C Σ ∪∆ with C|B ≡A|B and thus C Ω∪Σ ∪∆∪{¬β}, so thatΩ∪Σ ∪∆ 6
β.
This suggests:
Claim 6.4. A set Σ of V -sentences is semanticallyB -conservative with respect to
∆ only if Σ is syntacticallyB -conservative with respect to ∆. The converse does not
hold in first order logic.
Proof. ‘⇒’: From claim 6.3 because A|B =B|B only if A|B ≡B|B .
‘ 6⇐’: See appendix 6.11.2.
Of course, the two criteria are equivalent in all languages in which syntactic
equivalence amounts to isomorphism. A short overview of mainly philosophical
treatments of the relation is given in appendix 6.11.2. Because of the difference
between syntactic and semanticB -conservativeness, it may not always be possible
to bipartition the set of analytic sentences Π such that ΠA is semanticallyB -
conservative with respect to ΠB : If Π is only syntactically conservative with
respect to ΠB , there are some B -models of ΠB that cannot be expanded to
models ofΠ , and there is noB -sentence that excludes all and only those structures
when added toΠB .
The analogy between syntactic and semanticB -conservativeness suggests a
semantic criterion of falsifiability analogous to syntactic falsifiability.
Definition 6.7. AB -structure AB falsifies a set Σ of V -sentences if and only if
for all C Π with C|B =AB , C 6Σ .
In other words, a structure AB falsifies Σ if and only if Σ is false in every
possible structure that is an expansion of AB .
Definition 6.8. A set Σ of V -sentences is semantically falsifiable if and only if it
is falsified by a possibleB -structure.
Now the following holds:
Claim 6.5. A set Σ of V -sentences is semantically falsifiable if and only if Σ is
semanticallyB -creative with respect to Π .
Proof. Σ is semanticallyB -creative with respect toΠ iff there is an AB that has
an expansion B Π (which is always the case since Π is consistent) and every
expansion C Π of AB is such that C 6Σ . Because of claim 2.1, this holds iff Σ
is semantically falsifiable.
The relation between syntactic and semantic falsifiability is then given by
claims 6.5, 6.4 and 6.1. Claim 2.1 will be used silently in the following, that is, I
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will argue as if a structure is possible if and only if it can be expanded to a model
ofΠ .
David Lewis argues that one of his explications of ‘partial aboutness’ is closely
connected to syntactic falsifiability. To see that it is even more closely connected
to semantic falsifiability, consider first Lewis’s explication of ‘aboutness’ as super-
venience. According to Lewis (1988b, 136), a “statement is entirely about some
subject matter iff its truth value supervenes on that subject matter. Two possible
worlds which are exactly alike so far as that subject matter is concerned must
both make the statement true, or else both make it false”. Assuming that possible
worlds are all and only those worlds in which all analytic sentences are true, and
assuming that all statements can be expressed by sets of V -sentences, there is a
one-to-one mapping from possible worlds to V -structures (cf. Kemeny 1963, §IV).
Lewis does not explicate what it means for possible worlds to be “exactly alike”
with respect to a subject matter (except that ‘being exactly alike’ is an equivalence
relation), so I suggest identifying subject matters by the vocabulary used to de-
scribe them: Two possible worlds are exactly alike with respect to a subject matter
B if and only if the reducts of their corresponding structures toB are identical.
The identification of subject matters by their vocabulary is arguably what Dorr
(2010) has in mind when suggesting that “Xs are more fundamental than Ys” only
if it is possible to “introduce a language in which I can talk about Xs without even
seeming to talk about Ys” (see §2.7). It is also arguably a central idea in Nagel’s
notion of reduction (Nagel 1951, 330), which requires that
every term which occurs in the statements of [the reduced discipline]
S2 [ . . . ] must be either explicitly definable with the help of the vocab-
ulary specific to the primary discipline [S1] [ . . . ] or well-established
empirical laws must be available with the help of which it is possible
to state the sufficient conditions for the application of all expressions
in S2, exclusively in terms of expressions occurring in the explanatory
principles of S1.
Nagel’s discussion thus suggests that different disciplines typically rely on different
vocabularies (see §11.1). Fodor (1974, 98) explicitly assumes “that a science is indi-
viduated largely by reference to its typical predicates” (see §11.3). This assumption
leads to
Definition 6.9. A set Σ of V -sentences is about subject matter B if and only
if for any V -structures A Π ,B Π with A|B =B|B it holds that A Σ iff
B Σ .
To distinguish aboutness more clearly from partial aboutness, I will also
sometimes speak of sentences being entirely about a subject matterB when they
are about a subject matterB .
Lewis (1988b, §VII, footnote removed) suggests to weaken definition 6.9 based
on an ordinary language analysis of the modifier ‘partly’:
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The recipe for modifying X by ‘partly’ is something like this. Think
of the situation to which X , unmodified, applies. Look for an aspect
of that situation that has parts, and therefore can be made partial.
Make it partial—and there you have a situation to which ‘partly X ’
could apply. If you find several aspects that could be made partial, you
have ambiguity.
In this case, X stands for ‘Statement S is about subject matterB ’. Lewis identifies
four different aspects of the situation that have parts. The most obvious aspect
is S itself, but considering parts of it leads Lewis (1988b, §XI) to a criterion that
distinguishes between logically equivalent sentences. Another aspect is the subject
matterB . In order to arrive at a non-trivial criterion, Lewis (1988b, §IX) must
assume that it is clear what it means for a subject matter to be “close-knit” and
either “sufficiently large” or “sufficiently important”. Clarifying these terms may,
however, lead to an infinite regress, for instance if it turns out that a subject
matter is close-knit if and only if the sufficiently large or important parts are
partially about each other. Making the supervenience partial leads Lewis (1988b,
§X) to a probabilistic conception of empirical significance, although I will argue
in §6.6 that this is not the only option. Only his treatment of the content of a
statement stays within the boundaries of predicate logic, if the above translation
from modal semantics into model theory is assumed. Lewis (1988b, §VIII) defines
the content of a statement as the set C of possible worlds that it excludes. In the
model theoretic paraphrase, the content of a set Σ of sentences is thus given by
CΣ := {A
 A Π and A 6 Σ}. The content of Σ is about subject matterB if
and only if Σ itself is about subject matterB , which is the case if and only if
for any two B,C  Π with B|B = C|B , B ∈ CΣ iff C ∈ CΣ . The parts of the
content of Σ are then defined as the subsets of CΣ , which leads to
Definition 6.10. Part of the content of a set Σ of V -sentences is about subject
matterB if and only if there is a non-empty set of structures F ⊆ CΣ :=

A

A Π and A 6Σ	 such that for any twoB Π ,C Π withB|B = C|B ,B ∈ F
iff C ∈ F.
Lewis does not demand F to be non-empty, but without this restriction, part
of the content of every sentence is about subject matterB . If there is a way to
capture any content (any set of possible worlds) by a sentence, Lewis (1988b,
§VIII) notes, part of the content of a sentence is about subject matterB iff the
sentence is syntactically falsifiable.11 But Lewis’s definition 6.10 is better compared
to semantic falsifiability:
11To be more precise, since Lewis does not demand F to be non-empty, he can show that part of a
statement’s content is about subject matterB if and only if the statement is incompatible with some
statement entirely about subject matterB . But according to definition 6.9 and Lewis (1988b, 141)
himself, contradictions are entirely about subject matterB , and since contradictions are incompatible
with every statement, this shows that his definition is trivial. Demanding F to be non-empty excludes
contradictions.
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Claim 6.6. Part of the content of a set Σ of V -sentences is about subject matterB if
and only if Σ is semantically falsifiable.
Proof. ‘⇒’: Assume part F⊆CΣ ofΣ ’s content is about subject matterB . Define
AB :=A|B for some A ∈ F. Since A ∈ F and according to definition 6.10 either
allB withB|B =AB are in F or none is, all suchB are in F. Since all suchB
are also in CΣ ,B 6Σ , and the possible structure AB falsifies Σ .
‘⇐’: Assume Σ is semantically falsified by AB . Define F :=

B
 B 
Π andB|B = AB
	
. Since ∅ 6= F ⊆ CΣ , part of Σ ’s content is about subject
matterB .
Because of claims 6.1, 6.5, and 6.6, the relation between syntactic falsifiability
and Lewis’s definition 6.10 is the same as that between syntactic and semantic
B -creativity, which is given in claim 6.3.
A sentence whose content is partly about subject matterB could also be said
to have some basic orB -content, and indeed this is essentially how Carnap (1928b,
327–328) described a criterion of meaningfulness at the time of the Vienna circle
(see page 247). Decades later, he argued that, absent sentences already established
as analytic, theB -content of a sentence σ is given by its Ramsey sentence RB (σ)
(Psillos 2000). As discussed in §2.8.2, RB (σ) plausibly describes σ ’s basic content.
Now, a criterion of the meaning of a set of sentences cannot be a criterion of
empirical significance (see §5.2). Analogously, a description of theB -content of a
set of sentences cannot be a criterion of empirical significance either.12 Something
weaker is needed, namely a criterion to determine when the basic content is non-
empty. Since anything that is already entailed by the analytic sentences is not an
empirical claim, this suggests
Definition 6.11. IfΠ can be finitely axiomatized, let Π˜ be this axiomatization.
Then a V -sentence σ hasB -content if and only if Π˜ 6 RB
 
σ ∧∧Π˜.
Under this definition, Carnap’s later notion ofB -content squares well with
the notion of falsifiability:
Claim 6.7. If Π can be finitely axiomatized, then a V -sentence σ hasB -content if
and only if σ is semanticallyB -creative with respect to Π .
Proof. A sentence σ is Ramseyfied by substituting every A -term Ai , 1 ≤ i ≤
n in σ by a variable Xi and existentially quantifying over each Xi , leading to∃X1 . . .Xnσ[A1/X1, . . . ,An/Xn]. Define g : {Ai}1≤i≤n→{Xi}1≤i≤n ,Ai 7→Xi .
‘⇐’: Assume that σ has noB -content. Since RB
 
σ ∧∧Π˜ is aB -sentence,
Π˜  RB
 
σ ∧∧Π˜ if and only if RB Π˜  RB σ ∧∧Π˜. Then for any AB ,
AB  RB
 ∧
Π˜

only if AB  RB
 
σ ∧∧Π˜. Thus for any AB , if there is
12A reminder: If Σ is a finite set of sentences, I will sometimes write RB (Σ) instead of RB (
∧
Σ).
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a satisfaction function ν mapping each variable Xi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n to an extension
of the same type over |AB | such that AB , ν 
∧
Π˜[A1/X1, . . . ,An/Xn], there
is a satisfaction function ν ′ such that AB , ν ′ 
 
σ ∧∧Π˜[A1/X1, . . . ,An/Xn].
Now assume that AB can be expanded to a model B  Π˜ . B = 〈|B| , f 〉 with
domain |B| and a function f that maps every V -term to an extension of the
same type in |B|. Since B expands AB , |B| = |AB |. Thus any extension ν of
f |{A1,...,An} ◦ g−1 to all variables of the language is a satisfaction function such
that AB , ν 
∧
Π˜[A1/X1, . . . ,An/Xn]. By assumption, there is then a satisfaction
function ν ′ such thatAB , ν ′ 
 
σ∧∧Π˜[A1/X1, . . . ,An/Xn]. Then any extension
f of ν ′|{X1,...,Xn}◦g to allA -terms can be used to expandAB to a model of
∧
Π˜∧σ ,
and therefore σ is semanticallyB -conservative with respect to Π˜ .
‘⇒’: Similar.
Claim 6.7 generalizes lemma 2.4. The close connection between a theory’s
Ramsey sentence and the theory’s falsifiability provides another reason to distin-
guish between deductive and probabilistic criteria of empirical significance. For
Scheffler (1968, 273–274), Niiniluoto (1972), Tuomela (1973), and Raatikainen
(2010) have argued in detail that in contexts that allow inductive inferences, a
theory can be disconfirmed without its Ramsey sentence being false, so that fal-
sification of a theory and its disconfirmation come apart. Insofar confirmation
and disconfirmation of a theory are determined by probabilistic inferences, this
means that one has to distinguish between criteria of empirical significance for
contexts that allow only deductive inferences and criteria for contexts that allow
only probabilistic inferences.
6.3 Verifiability
Another criterion of empirical significance that has been proposed very early
on is that of syntactic verifiability (Hempel 1965c, 104). Modifying Hempel’s
formulation in a way analogous to his formulation of falsifiability leads to
Definition 6.12. A set Ω of V -sentences verifies a setΣ of V -sentences if and only
if Ω ∪Π Σ .
Definition 6.13. A set Σ of V -sentences is syntactically verifiable if and only if
there is a possible set Ω ofB -sentences that verifies Σ .
A set of sentences is then empirically significant if and only if it is analytically
contingent and syntactically verifiable. Assuming again that B ∈B and c ∈B ,
Π =∅, A∈A , and q ∈A , the unfalsifiable sentences Bc∨Aq and ∀xB x∨∀xAx
are verifiable because Bc  Bc ∨Aq and ∀xB x  ∀xB x ∨∀xAx. On the other
hand, the falsifiable sentence ∀x(B x∧Ax) cannot be verified, since noB -sentence
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entails ∀xAx, and thus noB -sentences entails ∀xB x ∧∀xAx  ∀x(B x ∧Ax).13
Hempel (1965c, 106) points out the following straightforward
Claim 6.8. A V -sentence σ is syntactically verifiable if and only if ¬σ is syntactically
falsifiable.
The restriction to single sentences is essential, since there is no straightforward
generalization of negation to arbitrary sets of sentences. It seems appropriate to
also give a semantic version of verifiability.
Definition 6.14. AB -structure AB verifies a set Σ of V -sentences if and only if
for all C Π with C|B =AB , C Σ .
Definition 6.15. A set Σ of V -sentences is semantically verifiable if and only if
there is a possibleB -structure that verifies Σ .
And again, the following can easily be shown to hold:
Claim 6.9. A V -sentence σ is semantically verifiable if and only if ¬σ is semantically
falsifiable.
The relations between syntactic and semantic falsifiability described in claims
6.3 and 6.4 therefore transfer to the verifiability of sentences. For sets of sentences,
a relation analogous to claim 6.3 holds as well:
Claim 6.10. A set Σ of V -sentences is syntactically verifiable if and only if there
is a possible B -structure AB such that Σ is verified by each possible B -structure
syntactically equivalent to AB .
Proof. ‘⇒’: Assume that the possible set ofB -sentences Ω verifies Σ . Then for
every B  Ω ∪Π , B  Σ . Since Ω is possible, there is some such B. Choose
AB =B|B . Then every C with C|B ≡ AB is such that C  Ω. Since for every
possible B -structure syntactically equivalent to AB , there is such a C, every
possibleB -structure syntactically equivalent to AB verifies Σ .
‘⇐’: Assume that every possibleB -structure syntactically equivalent to AB
verifies Σ . Choose Ω  Th(AB ). Since AB is possible, Ω ∪Π has a model, and
thus Ω is possible. By assumption,B Ω ∪Π only ifB Σ , and thus Ω verifies
Σ .
As in the case of falsifiability, semantic verifiability is like syntactic verifiability,
except that the basic information is given by structures, not sets of sentences. Sub-
stituting in claim 6.10 ‘verifiable’ by ‘falsifiable’ and ‘verified’ by ‘falsified’ results
in a simple paraphrase of claim 6.3 that makes this analogy obvious. Furthermore,
claims 6.9 and 6.7 entail the following:
13Thus we can never verify that everything is on the mat and is bar, because we can never verify
that everything (or indeed anything) is bar.
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Claim 6.11. If Π can be finitely axiomatized, let Π˜ be this axiomatization. Then a
V -sentence σ is semantically verifiable if and only if Π˜ 6 RB
 ¬σ ∧∧Π˜.
Even if the basic content of σ is considered to be the set of possible B -
sentences orB -structures that verify σ , however, RB (¬σ) (which I will call the
reverse Ramsey sentence) is not the basic content of σ forΠ =∅. Rather, it can
be shown similarly to the proof of claim 6.7 that the possibleB -structures that
verify σ are the models of the negation of the reverse Ramsey sentence ¬RB (¬σ).
And this sentence is also analytically entailed by the sameB -sentences as σ , since
β  σ if and only if ¬σ  ¬β, which holds if and only if RB
 ¬σ  ¬β, and
thus if and only if β  ¬RB
 ¬σ. The connection to claim 6.11 is rather that σ
is verifiable if and only if its basic content is not empty; and σ ’s basic content is
empty if ¬RB (¬σ) has no models, that is,  RB (¬σ).
6.4 Falsifiability and verifiability
Calling a sentence empirically significant if and only if it is both falsifiable and
verifiable ensures that the negation of any empirically significant sentence is also
empirically significant. For this reason, Hempel (1965d, 122) considers a version
of this criterion that allows only finite sets of molecular basic sentences, which
he rejects as too strong. Rynin (1957, 51) also rejects such a finite version of this
criterion. But Hempel’s demand that the negation of a meaningless sentence be
itself meaningless relies on nothing but intuition, an intuition that Rynin (1957,
55–56), for example, does not share. Hempel’s consideration in favor of defining
empirical significance as the conjunction of falsifiability and verifiability thus fails
as a justification in artificial language philosophy because it relies crucially on an
intuition; it fails in traditional, naturalized, and ordinary language philosophy
because that intuition is not robust.
A real, though small, advantage of the criterion is that a sentence that is both
verifiable and falsifiable is automatically analytically contingent, and therefore the
criterion can be formulated without demanding analytic contingency explicitly.
Probably the main reason for using this criterion is that it is a sufficient condition
for empirical significance for both proponents of falsifiability and proponents
of verifiability (see Kitts (1977) for an example of this kind of argument). This
dialectical advantage and the slight convenience in formulation cannot, however,
outweigh the criterion’s lack of other justifications.14
14Note that I am not claiming that the criterion is inadequate. I am only claiming that so far, there
have been no arguments in its favor.
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6.5 StrongB -determinacy
Given that the conjunction of falsifiability and verifiability had already been
considered too strong a criterion of empirical significance by Hempel and Rynin,
it may seem surprising that even stronger criteria have been suggested since.
However, first, Hempel and Rynin reject criteria that allow only finite sets of
molecularB -sentences. Second, the stronger criteria have advantages not found
in the conjunction of falsifiability and verifiability.
Przełe˛cki (1974a, §I) suggests a criterion of empirical significance for sentences
that can easily be generalized to sets thereof:15
Definition 6.16. AB -structureAB determines a setΣ of V -sentences if and only
if for all V -structuresB,C Π withB|B = C|B =AB it holds thatB Σ iff
C Σ .
Definition 6.17. A set Σ of V -sentences is strongly semanticallyB -determined if
and only if it is determined by every possibleB -structure.
Since this definition includes analytically determined sentences, a set of sen-
tences should be called empirically significant if and only if it is strongly seman-
ticallyB -determined and analytically contingent. The truth value of a strongly
semanticallyB -determined set Σ of sentences is fixed by any interpretation of
the basic terms in any domain, because Σ is either true in all possible models that
expand such aB -structure, or it is false in all such models. Hence
Claim 6.12. A set Σ of V -sentences is strongly semanticallyB -determined if and
only if every possibleB -structure either falsifies or verifies Σ .
As Przełe˛cki (1974a, 346–347) already notes, this definition is very exclusive. If,
for example, the auxiliary term A1 is conditionally defined by {∀x[B1x→ (B2x↔
A1x)]} = : Π , and ‘B1’, ‘B2’, and ‘b ’ are basic terms, then the possible structure
AB = 〈{1,2},{〈B1,{1}〉, 〈B2,{1}〉, 〈b , 2〉}〉 does not determine A1(b ). Therefore,
A1(b ) is not strongly semanticallyB -determined. This is unsurprising, because,
in Lewis’s terminology, the definition includes only sentences that are (entirely)
about subject matterB :
Claim 6.13. A set Σ of V -sentences is strongly semanticallyB -determined if and
only if Σ is about subject matterB .
Proof. ‘⇒’: AssumeB,C Π ,B|B = C|B . ThenB|B is a possibleB -structure,
and by assumption,B Σ iff C Σ .
‘⇐’: Assume AB is a possibleB -structure. For any two possible V -structures
B, C with B|B = AB and C|B = AB , it holds that B|B = C|B and thus, by
assumption,B Σ iff C Σ .
15Przełe˛cki (1969, 93) calls sentences that fulfill a special case of this criterion “strongly determined”
(cf. Przełe˛cki 1974a, n. 2). Whence my choice of terminology.
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That the criterion is relevant despite being exclusive is shown by a justification
very attuned to the needs of the measuring scientist and questions of symmetry.
Suppes (1959, 131) begins his justification with the idea that
[a]n empirical hypothesis, or any statement in fact, which uses nu-
merical quantities is empirically meaningful only if its truth value
is invariant under the appropriate transformations of the numerical
quantities involved.
The numerical quantities are functions, and transformations that lead only from
one adequate function to another are appropriate (Suppes 1959, 132). To be
adequate, a function has to fulfill the conditions of adequacy for the measurement
it represents. Suppes (1959, 135) states the conditions for functions m representing
mass measurement as
Πmass := {∀x∀y (x ­ y↔ mx ≤ my),
∀x∀y (m(x ∗ y) = mx + my)} , (6.1)
where ‘­’ stands for ‘is at most as heavy as’, ‘∗’ stands for physical combina-
tion, and x and y are silently understood to range over physical objects. Suppes
(1959, 135) notes that “the functional composition of any similarity transforma-
tion ϕ with the function m yields a function ϕ ◦m which also satisfies” Πmass,
where a similarity transformation in Suppes’s sense is also called a positive linear
transformation. Therefore, Suppes (1959, 138) suggests that
a formula S [ . . . ] is empirically meaningful [ . . . ] if and only if S is
satisfied in a model M [ . . . ] when and only when it is satisfied in
every model [ . . . ] related toM by a similarity transformation.
To connect Suppes’s criterion to Lewis’s and thereby to Przełe˛cki’s, note first
that ­ and ∗ play the role of basic terms with some set of axioms ΠB (Suppes
1959, 135, n. 7), and m is the sole auxiliary term. Now let B[m/ϕ ◦ mB] be
the structure thatB becomes when m is interpreted by ϕ ◦mB instead of mB.
Suppes’s criterion of adequacy can then be paraphrased like this:16
Definition 6.18 (Empirically meaningful statements about mass). Assume the
standard interpretation for arithmetical terms. Then a V -sentence σ is empirically
meaningful if and only if for anyB ΠB∪Πmass and any C, if C=B[m/ϕ◦mB]
and ϕ is a positive linear transformation, thenB  σ if and only if C  σ .
Suppes justifies the demand that truth values have to be invariant under positive
linear transformations on the grounds that all and only such transformations lead
16Przełe˛cki’s paraphrase is slightly different, for one because he aims to prove its equivalence with
definition 6.17, not definition 6.9, but also because his definition ofB -conservativeness is slightly less
general (see appendix 6.11.1).
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from one function m that fulfillsΠmass to another. This is basically what motivates
strongB -determinacy as well: StronglyB -determined sentences are exactly those
whose truth value is invariant under any transformation of models of Π that
leaves their reduct toB invariant and the truth ofΠ invariant.
Claim 6.14. Assume B = {­,∗}, A = {m}, ΠA = Πmass, and the standard
interpretation for arithmetical terms (i. e., arithmetical terms are treated as logical
constants). Then a V -sentence σ is empirically meaningful according to definition 6.18
if and only if σ is about subject matterB .
Proof. Przełe˛cki (1974a, 349).
In claim 6.14, the interpretations of ‘+’ and ‘≤’ are assumed to be fixed by the
standard interpretation of arithmetical terms. Przełe˛cki (1974a, 347–348) assumes
that this is ensured by a semantic restriction on the possible structures. One could
also ensure the standard interpretation with the usual axioms in second order
logic, with ‘+’ and ‘≤’ as auxiliary terms.
Suppes’s conditions of adequacy determine admissible transformations for
mass measurements, which in turn determine meaningful sentences about mass.
Przełe˛cki’s result shows that for these sentences, empirical meaningfulness can
be defined equivalently without using admissible transformations. I now want to
show that this is also possible for general sentences about measurements.
Essentially following Suppes and Zinnes (1963), Roberts and Franke
(1976) define the general notion of meaningfulness just illustrated using the
concepts of relational systems, measures, and scales. A relational system is a
structure with p ki -ary relations (1 ≤ i ≤ p) and q binary functions. A mea-
sure µ is defined as a homomorphism from one relational system E = 〈|E| ,
{〈P1, PE1 〉, . . . , 〈Pp , PEp 〉},{〈◦1,◦E1 〉, . . . , 〈◦q ,◦Eq 〉}〉, sometimes called ‘empirical’,
to another relational system F = 〈|F| ,{〈Q1,QF1 〉, . . . , 〈Qp ,QFp 〉},{〈∗1,∗F1 〉, . . . ,
〈∗q ,∗Fq 〉}〉, sometimes called ‘formal’. A homomorphism (an element of hom(E,F))
is a function µ : |E| → |F| such that for all aE1 , . . . ,aEki ,aE, bE ∈ |E| with
i = 1, . . . , p and for all j = 1, . . . , q it holds that
PEi
 
aE1 , . . . ,a
E
ki

iff QFi
 
µ(aE1 ), . . . ,µ(a
E
ki
)

, (6.2a)
µ
 
aE ◦Ej bE

=µ(aE) ∗Fj µ(bE) . (6.2b)
The triple of an empirical relational system, a formal system, and a measure is then
called a scale. Roberts and Franke (1976) argue that for questions of meaningfulness,
the notion of an admissible transformation is (in my notation) best captured as
follows:
If 〈E,F,µ〉 is a scale, then an admissible transformation ψ relative to
E, F, and µ is any mapping of µ into a function ψ(µ) : |E| → |F| such
that ψ(µ) is also in hom(E,F).
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Their argument for this definition rests on the explication of ‘meaningfulness’ by
Suppes and Zinnes (1963, 66), who suggest that a
numerical statement is meaningful if and only if its truth (or fal-
sity) is constant under admissible scale transformations of any of its
numerical assignments[,]
where numerical assignments are measures.
The concept of a scale is defined by the relation between two structures. To
capture it, like Suppes (1959) does, in a single structure A, one can define A as
having the structures E and F as relativized reducts. In this case, let A have some
domain |A| ⊇ |E| ∪ |F| and a vocabularyA containing the vocabularies E of E
and F of F, a function symbol f interpreted by the measurement µ, and two
unary predicates E and F interpreted by |E| and |F|, respectively. The relativized
reduct A|EE :=A|EAE is the substructure of A|E whose domain is EA = |E|. The
relativization theorem then says that for every formula ϕ of E (or F ) and its
relativization ϕ(E) (or ϕ(F ), respectively) ofA , it holds that that E  ϕ (F  ϕ) if
and only if A  ϕ(E) (A  ϕ(F )) (Hodges 1993, Theorem 5.1.1).
Now, let Πscale determine the possible measurement scales, that is, the rela-
tivized reduct to F and F of every model of Πscale is isomorphic to the formal
structure F, and the class of relativized reducts to E and E of all models ofΠscale is
the class of possible empirical structures. Since I am not assuming partial functions,
but will need a substructure of A with the domain |E| ∪ |F|, define the extensions
of the functions in E to |A| so that their restrictions to |F| are full functions,
and analogously for the functions in F. This is nothing but a technically conve-
nient convention—since the values of a function gE can be freely chosen over |F|
(and vice versa), one can always choose the value of gE to be in |F| whenever its
arguments are in |F| (and vice versa).
Restricting the domain of µ = f A to |E| = EA results in a measure from E
to F if and only if, first, the range of µ is |F| = FA, and second, µ fulfills the
conditions of adequacy (6.2). This is the case if and only if A Πadeq with
Πadeq :={∀a(Ea→ F f a)}∪
p⋃
i=1
¦∀a1 . . .∀aki Ea1 ∧ · · · ∧ Eaki → Pi a1 . . .aki ↔Qi f a1 . . . f aki©
∪
q⋃
j=1
¦∀a∀b Ea ∧ E b → f (a ◦ j b ) = f a ∗ j f b© .
(6.3)
Πadeq is a generalization of the conditions of adequacy Πmass for mass measure-
ments, with the relativization of the quantifiers to physical objects made explicit.
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Again only to avoid partial functions, assume in the following that f A maps
any element of |F| to an element of |E| ∪ |F|. All in all, A is determined by a set
Πscale that entailsΠadeq, by the restrictions on F and possible empirical structures,
and by the additional restriction on the extensions of the functions in E and F
discussed above. Note that |A| can be a proper superset of |E| ∪ |F|, andA can
be a proper superset of E ∪F . This can ease the formalization of the relations
and functions in E and F by allowing, for example, the language and objects of set
theory.
By construction ofΠscale, anyA Πscale fulfills the admissibility conditions for
the relativized reduct A|EF EF f to EF f := E ∪F ∪{ f } and EF := λx(E x ∨F x)
(Hodges 1993, 203), so thatA|EF EF f exists. Because of the relativization theorem,
A|EF EF f Σ if and only if A Σ (EF ) for any EF f -sentenceΣ .17 DefiningΣA
to be the set theoretic conditions on the extensions of the terms in Σ that have
to hold for Σ to be true in A, one arrives at an equivalence between the truth
of sentences in A and the truth of set theoretic conditions for the scale 〈E,F,µ〉,
where by constructionA|EE =E andA|FF = F: For any setΣ of EF f -sentences,
A Σ (EF ) if and only if ΣA|EF EF f is true for the scale 〈E,F,µ〉.
The definition of admissible transformation argued for by Roberts and Franke
(1976) can now be paraphrased as follows:
Definition 6.19. If A Πscale, then an admissible transformation ϕ relative to A is
any mapping of f A into a function ϕ( f A) such that A[ f /ϕ( f A)] Πadeq.
The explication of ‘meaningfulness’ by Suppes and Zinnes (1963) assumes the
two concepts of a scale and an admissible transformation, and like the definition
of meaningfulness for mass measurements by Suppes (1959), demands that a
statement about 〈E,F,µ〉 be invariant under the admissible transformations of
any adequate measure. This can be generalized to all EF f -sentences (rather than
only their relativizations to EF ):
Definition 6.20. A set Σ of EF f -sentences is strongly invariant if and only if
for any A Πscale and any admissible transformation ϕ relative to A, it holds that
A Σ iff A[ f /ϕ( f A)] Σ .
The restriction of definition 6.20 to relativizations of EF f -sentences to EF
is indeed equivalent to the original definition by Suppes and Zinnes (1963):
Claim 6.15. A setΣ (EF ) of EF f -sentences is strongly invariant if and only if for any
scale 〈E,F,µ〉, ΣA|EF EF f with A Πscale, A|EE =E, A|FF = F, and f A||E| =µ as
constructed above is meaningful according to Suppes and Zinnes (1963).
Proof. ‘⇒’: Assume that Σ (EF ) is strongly invariant, that ΣA|EF EF f is true for
〈E,F,µ〉, and that ψ is an admissible transformation for 〈E,F,µ〉. Then, by
17A reminder: Σ (EF ) := {σ (EF ) | σ ∈Σ}, the set of the relativizations of the elements of Σ to EF .
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construction of A, A  Σ (EF ). Now, ψ is an admissible transformation for
〈E,F,µ〉 only if ψ f A||E| fulfills equations 6.3. And then some extension ϕ
of ψ with ϕ( f A)||E| = ψ

f A||E|

is admissible relative to A, so that by assump-
tion A[ f /ϕ( f A)]  Σ (EF ). Now A[ f /ϕ( f A)]  Πscale and A[ f /ϕ( f A)]|EE =
A|EE = E, A[ f /ϕ( f A)]|FF = A|FF = F, and f A[ f /ϕ( f A)]||E| = ϕ( f A)||E| =
ψ
 
f A||E|

= ψ(µ), so that ΣA|EF EF f is true for 〈E,F,ψ(µ)〉. By an analogous
reasoning, ΣA|EF EF f is false for 〈E,F,µ〉 only if it is false for 〈E,F,ψ(µ)〉, where
ψ is any admissible transformation for 〈E,F,µ〉.
‘⇐’: Assume that ΣA|EF EF f is meaningful for any scale, that A  Σ (EF ),
and that ϕ is an admissible transformation relative to A. By construction, if
A Σ (EF ), then ΣA|EF EF f is true for scale 〈E,F,µ〉 and, by assumption, for any
scale 〈E,F,ψ(µ)〉 with admissible ψ. Now, ϕ is admissible relative to A only if
ϕ
 
f A
||E| fulfills equations 6.3 and thus ψ with ψ  f A||E| := ϕ( f A)||E| is admis-
sible for 〈E,F,µ〉. Thus ΣA|EF EF f is true for 〈E,F,ψ(µ)〉. Now A[ f /ϕ( f A)] 
Πscale and A[ f /ϕ( f
A)]|EE = A|EE = E, A[ f /ϕ( f A)]|FF = A|FF = F, and
f A[ f /ϕ( f
A)]||E| = ϕ( f A)||E| = ψ
 
f A||E|

= ψ(µ), so that A[ f /ϕ( f A)]  Σ (EF ).
By analogous reasoning, A 6Σ (EF ) only if A[ f /ϕ( f A)] 6Σ (EF ), where ϕ is any
admissible transformation for A.
Relative to the analytic sentences Π , everyB -structure determines a set of
admissible transformations. Strong invariance universally quantifies on all possible
B -structures, and is therefore determined by the analytic sentences alone. Strong
invariance is thus a symmetry relative to the analytic sentences. Now Przełe˛cki’s
result can be generalized:
Claim 6.16. Assume B = E , F ∪ { f } ⊆ A , and Π = Πscale. Then a set Σ ofEF f -sentences is strongly invariant if and only if Σ is about subject matterB .
Proof. ‘⇐’: First, note that for any A  Πscale and any admissible transforma-
tion ϕ relative to A, there is some B  Πscale with B|B = A|B such that
B|B∪{ f } = A[ f /ϕ( f A)]|B∪{ f } (∗), which can be shown as follows: By defini-
tion 6.19, A[ f /ϕ( f A)] Πscale, and since f 6∈ B , A[ f /ϕ( f A)]|B =A|B . Then
chooseB :=A[ f /ϕ( f A)].
Now assume that for any A,B Πscale with B|B = A|B , A Σ iff B Σ .
Let C Πscale and ϕ be admissible relative to C. Then, because of (∗), there is some
D  Πscale with D|B = C|B and D = C[ f /ϕ( f C)]. Therefore, by assumption,
C[ f /ϕ( f C)] Σ iff C Σ .
‘⇒’: First, note that for any A Πscale,B Πscale withB|B =A|B , there is
some transformation ϕ admissible relative to A such thatB|EF f is isomorphic to
A[ f /ϕ( f A)]|EF f (∗∗), which can be shown as follows: Since, by construction of
Πscale, A|F is isomorphic toB|F , assume without loss of generality that A|F =
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B|F . Now choose ϕ so that ϕ(µ) = f B for every functionµ. Then ϕ is admissible
relative to A because A[ f /ϕ( f A)] = B  Πadeq, and since B = E , B|EF f '
A[ f /ϕ( f A)]|EF f .
Now assume thatB|B =A|B andB Πscale. By (∗∗), there is some admissible
ϕ such that B|EF f ' A[ f /ϕ( f A)]|EF f . Therefore, if Σ is strongly invariant,
B Σ iff A Σ .
Like strong invariance, strongB -determinacy is thus a symmetry relative to
the analytic sentencesΠ .
To arrive at a syntactic version of strongB -determinacy, it is helpful to look
at the line of reasoning that led to definition 6.9. There, a set of sentences is taken
to be about subject matterB if and only if its truth value is identical in any two
worlds that are exactly alike so far as subject matterB is concerned. In connection
with definitions 2.2 and 2.2, I described the difference between semantic and
syntactic criteria as that between isomorphism and syntactic equivalence ofB -
structures, which is borne out by claim 6.3 for falsifiability and claim 6.10 for
verifiability. To arrive at an analogous relation for strongB -determinacy, I thus
suggest
Definition 6.21. A set Γ of V -sentences determines a set Σ of V -sentences if and
only if Γ ∪Π Σ or Γ ∪Σ ∪Π ⊥.
Definition 6.22. A set Ω of B -sentences is maximal if and only if for every
B -sentence β, Ω ∪Π β or Ω ∪Π  ¬β.
Then one can formulate
Definition 6.23. A set Σ of V -sentences is strongly syntacticallyB -determined if
and only if it is determined by every possible and maximal set ofB -sentences.
As in the case of falsifiability and verifiability, the difference between syntactic
and semantic strongB -determinacy is that between isomorphism and syntactical
equivalence:
Claim 6.17. A set Σ of V -sentences is strongly syntacticallyB -determined if and
only if for any V -structures A,B  Π with A|B ≡ B|B , it holds that A  Σ iff
B Σ .
Proof. ‘⇒’: Let A,B  Π and A|B ≡B|B . Then A,B  Th(B|B ) = : Ω. It is
straightforward to show that Ω is maximal and possible. Thus, by assumption,
Ω ∪Π Σ or Ω ∪Σ ∪Π ⊥. Thus A Σ if and only ifB Σ .
‘⇐’: Assume Ω is possible and maximal. Then for any A,B Ω ∪Π , A|B ≡
B|B . Therefore, by assumption, A Σ iffB Σ and thus either all A Ω ∪Π
are models of Σ or none is. Thus Ω ∪Π Σ or Ω ∪Σ ∪Π ⊥.
This entails
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Claim 6.18. If a set Σ of V -sentences is strongly syntacticallyB -determined, then
Σ is strongly semanticallyB -determined.
Proof. From claims 6.13 and 6.17 because A|B =B|B only if A|B ≡B|B .
The relation of strongB -determinacy to falsifiability and verifiability is given
by
Claim 6.19. Let Σ be a set of strongly syntactically (semantically)B -determined
V -sentences. Then Σ is syntactically (semantically) falsifiable/verifiable if and only if
Σ is not analytically true/false.
Proof. ‘⇒’: Immediate.
‘⇐’: AssumeΠ 6Σ . Then for someA,A Π andA 6Σ . IfΣ is syntactically
B -determined, then Th(A|B ) ∪Σ ∪Π  ⊥ because Th(A|B ) ∪Π 6 Σ . Thus
Th(A|B ) falsifies Σ . If Σ is semanticallyB -determined, then for allB Π with
B|B =A|B ,B 6Σ . Thus A|B falsifies Σ .
The proofs for verifiability are analogous.
6.6 WeakB -determinacy
Since Przełe˛cki considers strong semanticB -determinacy too exclusive, he sug-
gests a straightforward weakening of definition 6.17:
Definition 6.24. A set Σ of V -sentences is weakly semanticallyB -determined if
and only if it is determined by a possibleB -structure.
The motivation for the criterion is clear: The truth value of a strongly se-
mantically B -determined sentence is fixed for any B -structure, but there are
many sentences whose truth values are fixed only for some structures. Przełe˛cki
considers this enough to be empirically significant.
A connection to ordinary language can be found again starting from Lewis’s
notion of sentences about subject matterB . The idea to take a sentence to be
partially about subject matter B if it partially supervenes on subject matter
B leads Lewis (1988b, §X) to a probabilistic notion of empirical significance,
but I want to argue that his justification more plausibly leads to weak semantic
B -determinacy. Lewis (1988b, 149) argues that
a statement is partly about a subject matter iff its truth value partially
supervenes, in a suitably non-trivial way, on that subject matter. Let
us say that the truth value of a statement supervenes on subject mat-
ter M within class X of worlds iff, whenever two worlds in X are
M -equivalent, they give the statement the same truth value. [ . . . ]
Supervenience within a [subclass X of all] worlds is partial superve-
nience.
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Lewis needs the restriction to “suitable partial supervenience” to avoid trivial-
ization, because if, say, it is possible for X to contain only one world, then any
sentence σ partially supervenes on any M . To exclude such classes, Lewis demands
that X contain a majority of the worlds in which σ is true and a majority of the
worlds in which σ is false. To explicate the notion of ‘majority’ for worlds, he
assumes that there is a suitable probability distribution over possible worlds and
states that the condition is satisfied if and only if Pr(X |σ)> 12 and Pr(X |¬σ)> 12 .
Under some additional assumptions, the notion of partial supervenience that
results is equivalent to the standard probabilistic criterion that σ is empirically
significant iff Pr(σ |β) 6= Pr(σ) for some basic sentence β (see definition 8.2).
Lewis’s notion of partial supervenience need not lead to a probabilistic cri-
terion of empirical significance. He introduces the majority condition to avoid
trivialization, but there is nothing in the concept of ‘partial supervenience’ itself
that suggests the supervenience has to hold for the majority of σ worlds and
¬σ worlds. It is much more in keeping with the goal of explicating empirical
significance to place only empirical restrictions on X . The minimal requirement
is thus that X be closed under empirical equivalence, such that for any world that
is in X , every B -equivalent world is also in X . This condition already avoids
trivialization, does not require a probability distribution over possible world, and
does not lead to complications when statements are taken to be expressed by sets
of sentences, which are not generally easily negated. To partially supervene on
subject matterB , Σ thus has to be assigned the same truth value by all members
of a set X closed under empirical equivalence.
Definition 6.25. A set Σ of V -sentences partly supervenes on subject matterB
if and only if there is some non-empty set X of possible V -structures such that
for any A ∈X , allB Π withB|B =A|B are in X , and for any A,B ∈X with
A|B =B|B ,B Σ iff A Σ .
As announced, this is the same as weak semanticB -determinacy:
Claim 6.20. A set Σ of V -sentences is weakly semanticallyB -determined if and
only if Σ partly supervenes on subject matterB .
Proof. If AB is possible and determines Σ , choose X as the set of possible expan-
sions of AB . If Σ partly supervenes on subject matter B , then any A|B with
A ∈X is possible and determines Σ .
Przełe˛cki (1974a, 347) points out that under his assumption that ΠA isB -
conservative with respect to ΠB , definition 6.24 has a very conspicuous for-
mulation: A V -sentence σ is weakly semanticallyB -determined if and only if
{σ}∪ΠA or {¬σ}∪ΠA is semanticallyB -creative with respect toΠB . However,
because not all sets of sentences are easily negated, this formulation is neither as
general nor as conspicuous as
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Claim 6.21. A set Σ of V -sentences is weakly semanticallyB -determined if and
only if Σ is semantically verifiable or semantically falsifiable.
Proof. Assume Σ is semantically verifiable or semantically falsifiable. This holds
iff there is a possible AB such that Σ is true in all structures B  Π with
B|B =AB or false in all of them, that is,Σ has the same truth value in all of these
structures. This is equivalent to Σ being weakly semanticallyB -determined.
With claims 6.5 and 6.8, this means that a sentence σ is weakly semantically
B -determined if and only if σ or ¬σ is semantically B -creative with respect
toΠ . This is Przełe˛cki’s claim, reformulated using the generalized definition of
B -conservativeness (see appendix 6.11.1).
Considerations analogous to those leading to the definition of strong syntactic
B -determinacy lead to
Definition 6.26. A set Σ of V -sentences is weakly syntacticallyB -determined if
and only if it is determined by some possible and maximal set ofB -sentences.
This definition relates to that of weak semanticB -determinacy in the usual
way:
Claim 6.22. A set Σ of V -sentences is weakly syntacticallyB -determined if and
only if there is some B -structure AB such that for all structures B,C  Π with
B|B ≡ C|B ≡AB , it holds thatB Σ iff C Σ .
Proof. ‘⇒’: Choose Ω := Th(AB ) and proceed as in the proof of claim 6.17.
‘⇐’: Choose some AB Ω and proceed as in the proof of claim 6.17
And analogously to the semantic case, the following holds:
Claim 6.23. A set Σ of V -sentences is weakly syntacticallyB -determined if and
only if Σ is syntactically verifiable or syntactically falsifiable.
Proof. ‘⇒’: Immediate.
‘⇐’: If Ω verifies or falsifies Σ , Ω is possible. Thus Ω ∪Π can be extended to
a possible and maximal set ofB -sentences.
As the disjunction of falsifiability and verifiability, weak syntactic B -
determinacy has occurred often in the history of philosophy, albeit repeatedly
sailing under false colors. The illicit reflagging often occurred with the help of the
prediction criterion of confirmation discussed in connection with Ayer’s trivial
definition 6.5 of indirect verifiability. For example, Carnap (1936, 435) calls the
confirmation of a sentence S “directly reducible to a class C of sentences” if “S is
a consequence of a finite subclass of C ” (complete reducibility of confirmation) or
“if the confirmation of S is not completely reducible to that of C but if there is an
infinite subclass C ′ of C such that the sentences of C ′ are mutually independent
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and are consequences of S” (direct incomplete reducibility of confirmation). This
definition is the first in a long chain that eventually leads to the requirement of
confirmability, which “suffices as a formulation of the principle of empiricism”
(Carnap 1937, 35). Carnap’s terminology makes it clear that, like Ayer, he assumes
the prediction criterion of confirmation (see also Gemes 1998b, §1.4).
Following the chain of definitions is tedious,18 but significantly simplified
when taking into account that it becomes trivial with the next link: Carnap (1936,
435) calls the confirmation of S
reducible to that of [a class of sentences] C , if there is a finite series
of classes C1,C2, . . . ,Cn such that the relation of directly reducible
confirmation subsists 1) between S and C1, 2) between every sentence
of Ci and Ci+1 (i = 1 to n− 1), and 3) between every sentence of Cn
and C .
It is then simple to prove
Claim 6.24. If the class C of sentences allows the direct incomplete reducibility of at
least one sentences γ , then the confirmation of every sentence σ is reducible to C .
Proof. For any sentence σ , if γ is directly incompletely reducible to C , so is γ ∧σ ,
which can therefore be in C1. Then σ can be completely reduced to C1 := {γ ∧σ}
because {γ ∧σ}  σ and {γ ∧σ} is a finite subset of itself. Thus the confirmation
of σ is directly reducible to C1, whose confirmation is directly reducible to C ,
and therefore the confirmation of σ is reducible to C .
If a language contains infinitely many constants {ci | i ∈ I } for points in
space-time, the sentence ‘It will always be everywhere cold’ is an incompletely
directly reducible sentence γ , since the temperature at each point in space-time is
logically independent from the temperature at any other and thus γ entails the
infinite set of logically independent sentences Ω∗ := {ðIt is cold at ciñ | i ∈ I }.
Since the reducibility of confirmation to a class of sentences is trivial, all other
definitions that build on it collapse, too: The confirmation of a sentence S is
reducible to a class ofB -predicates if the confirmation of S “is reducible [ . . . ]
to a not contravalid sub-class of the class which contains the full sentences of the
predicates of [B] and the negations of these sentences” (Carnap 1936, 435–436);
call such a sub-class a confirmation class. Full sentences are atomic sentences, and
a contravalid sentence is incompatible with the laws of nature (Carnap 1936,
432–434).19 Because of claim 6.24, if some confirmation class Ω allows the direct
incomplete reducibility of at least one sentence γ , the confirmation of any sentence
σ is reducible to Ω. (In the above example, Ω∗ is a confirmation class for γ if
18That this holds for most definitions in the article may explain why, as far as I know, no concept
introduced in “Testability and Meaning” besides that of reduction sentences has been used since.
19I will discuss the relevance of contravalidity in §6.8.2.
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{ci | i ∈ I }∪ {λx(It is cold at x)} ⊆B .) Thus the confirmation of any sentence σ
is reducible toB . In that case σ is also confirmable, because a “sentence S is called
confirmable [ . . . ] if the confirmation of S is reducible [ . . . ] to that of a class of
observable predicates” (Carnap 1936, 456). Since nothing was assumed about σ ,
the principle of empiricism is then met by any sentence whatsoever.
The triviality of Carnap’s general notion of reducibility leaves the direct
reducibility of S to full sentences ofB as the concept of confirmability, and this is
just the disjunction of falsifiability and verifiability restricted to the class of atomic
B -sentences and their negations.
As shown above, Ayer’s only non-trivial criterion of empirical significance
is essentially equivalent to falsifiability. But in his first informal description of
empirical significance, falsifiability and verifiability are on a par. Ayer (1936, 35)
writes:
We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if,
and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports
to express—that is, if he knows what observations would lead him,
under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or
reject it as being false.
Within the vagaries of natural language, and as far as deductive inference is con-
cerned, this is weak B -determinacy. Since Ayer (1936, 37–38) rejects the idea
that a sentence can be conclusively verified or falsified, he suggests his first defini-
tion of verifiability as a “weaker sense of verification”. If, plausibly, this “weaker
sense” is non-deductive, Ayer thus implicitly assumes the prediction criterion of
confirmation.
In an early work, Carnap (1928b, 327–328) avoids the prediction criterion by
leaving the concept of confirmation undefined. He writes:
If a statement p expresses the content of an experience E, and if the
statement q is either the same as p or can be derived from p and prior
experiences, either through deductive or inductive arguments, then
we say that q is “supported by” the experience E. [ . . . ] A statement p
is said to have “factual content”, if experiences which would support
p or the contradictory of p are at least conceivable, and if their
characteristics can be indicated.
Carnap’s examples indicate that quantified B -sentences describe conceivable
experiences, so that in my terminology, Carnap considers a sentence to have factual
content if and only if it is verifiable, falsifiable, confirmable or disconfirmable. In
contexts that allow only deductive inferences, Carnap thus suggests to consider a
sentence empirically significant if and only if it is weaklyB -determined.20
20In §8.7, I will argue that if confirmation is construed in terms of probabilities, the quote from
Carnap amounts to an endorsement of a Bayesian criterion of empirical significance.
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In a defense of criteria of empirical significance against the critique by Hempel
(1950), Rynin (1957, 53) also suggests that a sentence be taken as significant if and
only if it is either verifiable or falsifiable. For Rynin (1957, 51), this
might constitute a kind of axiom of semantics, or at any rate some sort
of adequacy requirement for a definition of ‘meaningful statement’; I
at any rate should consider it as self-evident that for a statement to be
cognitively meaningful it must be possible for it to be true or false,
that it have conditions of truth or falsity, hence necessary or sufficient
truth conditions.
Of course, much in the quote hinges on these “conditions of truth or falsity”. In his
criterion, Rynin speaks of “ascertainable” truth conditions, and when discussing
Hempel’s critique of criteria of empirical significance, he notes that
instead of talking of truth conditions [Hempel] prefers to formulate
the verifiability principle in terms of relationships holding between
the statements whose meaning is in question and what he calls “ob-
servation sentences”, which I think it fair to treat as true statements
affirming the occurrence of ascertainable states of affairs.—This differ-
ence in manner of formulation seems to me to be non-essential.
Apart from its restriction to molecular basic sentences (Hempel’s “observa-
tion sentences”), Rynin’s criterion is therefore equivalent to weak syntactic
B -determinacy.
Let me conclude this section with a puzzling observation that suggests that
Hempel was not overly diligent in his dismissal of the search for a criterion of
empirical significance. As mentioned above, Hempel (1965d, 122) considers the
conjunction of falsifiability and verifiability as a criterion of empirical significance
because it is symmetric under negation, but dismisses it as being too exclusive.
Surprisingly, he discusses Rynin’s article without mentioning Rynin’s criterion,
which is symmetric under negation and more inclusive than both falsifiability and
verifiability. That is, he ignores a criterion that is symmetric under negation and
more inclusive than the conjunction of verifiability and falsifiability (and even
more inclusive than verifiability and falsifiability individually).
6.7 Import of the relations
Using the definitions above, one arrives at the notable number of equivalences
and entailment relations shown in figures 6.1 and 6.2, with strong and weakB -
determinacy, falsifiability, and verifiability as the four major criteria of empirical
significance. With this overview, it is now easy to consider the implications of the
entailment relations and equivalences.
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stronglyB -determined
falsifiable
and verifiable
falsifiable⇔
non-analytic and
directly verifiable
⇔B -creative
verifiable⇔
negationB -creative
falsifiable or verifiable
⇔ weaklyB -determined
and analytically contingent
¬
Figure 6.1: Relations between the syntactic definitions. The equivalence holds for direct verifiability
and the negation of sets of sentences whenever the concepts are defined. A stronglyB -determined set
of sentences is also weaklyB -determined even if not analytically contingent. Criteria of empirical
significance typically also require that a set of sentences be analytically contingent.
6.7.1 Six comparative concepts of empirical significance
The entailment relations between the criteria show that there can be stronger and
weaker criteria of empirical significance, and suggest that there may be criteria
of comparative empirical significance. Hempel (1965c, 117) similarly states that
“cognitive significance in a system is a matter of degree”. He sees this as a reason
to dispose of the concept altogether, and “instead of dichotomizing this array
[of systems] into significant and non-significant systems” to compare systems of
sentences by their precision, systematicity, simplicity, and level of confirmation.
But this conclusion is unwarranted. For one, it is not clear what Hempel means
when he states that cognitive significance “is a matter of degree”. If cognitive
significance is an explicatum, then it is whatever one decides it to be. If it is an
explicandum, then deviating from it is not problematic. Perhaps Hempel intends
to say that the best explicatum is one in which cognitive significance is a matter
of degree, presumably because any dichotomy must be arbitrary. But this means
that there is an explicatum, only it is not a classificatory one. This is nothing to
be ashamed of, for Hempel (1952, §10) himself has argued that the move from a
classificatory to a comparative concept is often a sign of an investigation’s maturity
(see also Hempel and Oppenheim 1936), as the explication of ‘warm’ by ‘higher
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stronglyB -determined⇔
about subject matterB⇔
strongly invariant
falsifiable
and verifiable
falsifiable⇔
content partly about
subject matterB
⇔B -creative⇔
withB -content
verifiable⇔
negationB -creative
falsifiable or verifiable
⇔ partly supervenient
on subject matterB⇔
weaklyB -determined
and analytically contingent
¬
Figure 6.2: Relations between the semantic definitions. The equivalence holds for strong invariance,
empirical content, and the negation of sets of sentences whenever the concepts are defined. A strongly
B -determined set of sentences is also weaklyB -determined even if not analytically contingent. Each
of the nodes is entailed by its syntactic counterpart from figure 6.1. Criteria of empirical significance
typically also demand that set of sentences be analytically contingent.
temperature than’ illustrates (Carnap 1950b, §4, Hempel 1952, §10).21
As the split of strong and weakB -determinacy into falsifiability and verifia-
bility shows, a comparative explicatum for empirical significance will probably
have to be partial, in that not all criteria can be compared with respect to their
inclusiveness without further assumptions. Therefore I suggest
Definition 6.27. A setΣ of V -sentences is at least as syntactically (semantically) fal-
sifiable/verifiable/B -determined as a set Γ ofV -sentences if and only if every possi-
ble set ofB -sentences (possibleB -structure) that falsifies/verifies/B -determines
Γ also falsifies/verifies/B -determines Σ .
The partial order of the subset relation transfers to ‘being at least as falsifiable/
21Indeed, Hempel (1950, 211) seems to take just this stance towards comparative criteria of empirical
significance in an earlier work.
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verifiable/B -determined’, in both its syntactic and its semantic guise, for each set
Π of analytic sentences. ‘At least as syntactically falsifiable’ is called ‘falsifiability
of at least as high a degree’ by Popper (1935, §33), who also notes that this order is
partial (Popper 1935, §34).
There is a second reason why Hempel should not have dismissed the search
for criteria of empirical significance so easily. For each set Π , each relation in
definition 6.27 has natural greatest and, more importantly, least elements.
Claim 6.25. A setΣ ofV -sentences is analytically false/analytically true/analytically
false or analytically true if and only if Σ is at least as syntactically (semantically)
falsifiable/syntactically (semantically) verifiable/syntacticallyB -determined as any
other set of V -sentences.
Proof. ‘⇒’: Immediate.
‘⇐’: If Σ is not analytically false, it is not syntactically (semantically) at least
as falsifiable as ⊥. Analogously for verifiability and >.
If Σ is neither analytically false nor analytically true, there are a structure
A Π ∪Σ and a structure B Π with B 6Σ . Choose Γ := Ω := Th(A|B )∩
Th(B|B ). Then Ω determines Γ but not Σ .
This shows that the comparative notions connect fruitfully to analyticity.
Strong semanticB -determinacy connects very straightforwardly to ‘semantically
more determinate than’, because all and only sets of sentences semantically de-
termined by everyB -structure are at least as semanticallyB -determined as any
other:
Claim 6.26. A set Σ of V -sentences is strongly semanticallyB -determined if and
only if Σ is at least as semanticallyB -determined as any other set of V -sentences.
Falsifiability, verifiability, and weak B -determinacy are immediately con-
nected to their comparative counterparts:
Claim 6.27. A set Σ of V -sentences is not syntactically (semantically) falsifiable/
verifiable/weaklyB -determined if and only if Σ is at most as syntactically (semanti-
cally) falsifiable/verifiable/B -determined as any other V -sentence.
Proof. The claim holds for all criteria because only the empty set is a subset of
every set.
So the sentences that are not empirically significant according to the classical,
classificatory criteria are the least elements of the criteria’s comparative analogues.
Therefore, even if Hempel is correct that empirical significance is a matter of
degree, his conclusion that there cannot be an explicatum at all fails in two
respects. First, empirical significance can be explicated by comparative concepts.
Second, these comparative concepts have non-arbitrary least elements, so there
is a natural way to dichotomize the array of sets of sentences into empirically
significant and not empirically significant.
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6.7.2 The justifications and implications of the criteria
Many of the circumscriptions of the explicandum of the criteria and the defense
of the methodological presumptions in §5 and §6.1 provide arguments for the
feasibility of a criterion of empirical significance. The relations between the criteria
suggest that the criteria are already to a certain extent adequate.
For one, the equivalences of many of the criteria to falsifiability, verifiability,
orB -determinacy help to counter the charge of arbitrariness that Lewis (1988b,
127) and, presumably, Hempel (1965c, §4) have put forth. The equivalences suggest
that the explicated notions are robust under a change of formalism from predicate
logic to model theory to set theory, and a change of formulation within each
formalism. This provides an argument analogous to (though less spectacular than)
that for the successful explication of ‘computability’, in which the equivalence of
different definitions is cited as evidence for their adequacy and sometimes for the
truth of the Church-Turing thesis (Barker-Plummer 2011, Copeland 2008).
The equivalences also show that especially Lewis’s charge, that many criteria of
empirical significance have strayed too far from the explicandum, does not apply
to the criteria discussed here: Strong semanticB -determinacy is equivalent to
aboutness, semantic falsifiability is equivalent to partial aboutness of content, and
weak semanticB -determinacy is arguably equivalent to partial supervenience, all
of which are meant to capture the ordinary language notion of some claim being
partially about some subject matter. And although verifiability is not equivalent
to any of Lewis’s criteria, it occurs with falsifiability in the disjunction that makes
up weakB -determinacy (claim 6.23). It is thus at least the link connecting two
different notions of partial aboutness.
The close connection of the criteria to ordinary language may prompt another
criticism: that the criteria are of little use in the sciences, the way the ordinary
language notion of ‘fish’, which includes the likes of whales and dolphins, is of
little use in biology (cf. Carnap 1950b, §3). If the sciences are taken to include
mathematics, then the equivalence of falsifiability toB -conservativeness already
provides a rebuttal, for the notion of definition is essential in mathematics, and
B -conservativeness is essential for the notion of definition (cf. Belnap 1993). At
least for sentences, claim 6.9 shows the relevance of verifiability by its connection
to falsifiability through the negation of sentences, and claim 6.23 shows the rel-
evance of weakB -determinacy by its connection to both criteria through their
disjunction. Lest one argue that it is only falsifiability that is really needed, I
appeal to authority: Church (1949) only proves that every sentence or its negation
is empirically significant according to Ayer’s criterion of indirect verifiability.
Assuming that Church’s proof was the main reason for abandoning the criterion,
this means that any criterion of empirical significance is too inclusive if it includes
every sentence or its negation among the empirically significant sentences. Thus,
because of claims 6.9 and 6.23, falsifiability would already be too inclusive if every
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sentence was falsifiable or verifiable, that is, weaklyB -determined.22 Hence weak
B -determinacy is considered so closely related to falsifiability that the triviality
of the former suffices as a reason to abandon the latter.
Without relying on the importance of mathematics, one can argue that defi-
nitions are similarly important in the natural sciences. Additionally, claim 6.14
and claims 6.15 and 6.16 show that at least strongB -determinacy is important
for the concepts of measurement because it generalizes strong invariance. Its close
relation to weakB -determinacy suggests that the latter criterion is important
within measurement theory as well, in effect stating that a numerical statement
is weaklyB -determinate if and only if its truth value is for someB -structures
invariant under the admissible transformations (cf. Przełe˛cki 1974a, 350). Simi-
larly, one may demand that the statement be false or be true for all admissible
transformations, thus arriving at a special case of falsifiability or verifiability in
terms of admissible transformations and thus measurements.
Conversely, the equivalence to a special case of strongB -determinacy protects
strong invariance against the charge that it is ad hoc. There is always the possibility
of being mislead by the special conditions of a context, in this case the features of
measurements, but the equivalence shows that strong invariance is a special case
of a much more generally motivated criterion.
In conclusion, the criteria are neither too far from the ordinary language
notion, nor too far from the sciences. But there is also the more general charge
of irrelevance. For even if a criterion is close to some intuitive notion and a
generalization of some concept defined for scientific application, the intuitive
notion and the scientific concept may be applicable in their domain but irrelevant.
Such a charge becomes more difficult to sustain the more concepts rely on or
connect to the criterion. The relations shown in figures 6.1 and 6.2 suggest what
would be irrelevant as well if the criteria discussed here were irrelevant, and
it is doubtful that the notion of meaningfulness in measurement, the notion
of empirical content as explicated by the Ramsey sentence, and the notions of
aboutness and partial aboutness are all of no use.
Finally, there is the problem of past failures. I have already noted that not all
criteria have been shown to be trivial, and the equivalences between the criteria
discussed here make it easy to show that none of the criteria listed in figures 6.1 and
6.2 is trivial: AssumeB = {B , b},A = {A1,A2}, and Π = {∀x[B x ↔¬A1x]}.
Then A1b is strongly syntacticallyB -determined and analytically contingent, and
thus empirically significant according to all the criteria; and A2b is not weakly
semanticallyB -determined, and thus not empirically significant according to any
of the criteria. It is also notable that none of the criteria are amendments of Ayer’s
criteria (direct verifiability, definition 6.4, being only the first half of Ayer’s second
criterion, definition 6.5 being the second half). Hence it is not utterly surprising
that the induction on past failures itself fails when applied to the criteria discussed
22As I will show below, such a proof is impossible.
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here.
The equivalences also provide a positive justification rather than a defense,
because now the arguments in favor of each individual formulation turn out to be
arguments for the same criterion. Thus Przełe˛cki’s general argument and Suppes’s
measure theory-specific argument already lead to strong B -determinacy, and
Lewis’s argument for aboutness adds additional support. Lewis’s analysis of the
term ‘partly’ also provides a justification for the differences between the major
criteria: The underlying explicandum is ambiguous because ‘partly about subject
matterB ’ is ambiguous. Falsifiability is accordingly supported by one specific
disambiguation of ‘partly about’, but also by Ayer’s and Popper’s arguments,
and finally by the arguments in favor of the Ramsey sentence as explication of
‘empirical content’. My modification of Lewis’s analysis of partial supervenience
and Przełe˛cki’s argument for weakB -determinacy also support the same criterion.
Verifiability, while historically not often defended by itself, again receives some
justification through its role in weakB -determinacy.
Furthermore, the relations between the criteria suggest that the criteria fulfill
Carnap’s desiderata for explications (§5.1). They are certainly more precise than
the phrase ‘empirically meaningful’, and some of the formulations are fairly
simple—at least, they are not “page-long”, as Lewis (1988a, 127) feared. In fact,
the equivalences allow the application of different formulations according to
expedience. The equivalences to Lewis’s ordinary language notions23 suggest that
the criteria are similar to their respective explicanda “in such a way that, in most
cases in which the explicandum has been used, the explicatum can be used”.24
This leaves the central demand for fruitfulness, that is, for one, Hempel’s demand
for a comprehensive and sound theoretical system. The relations between the
comparative and classificatory notions of empirical significance (claims 6.25 and
6.27) and the relations listed above to counter the charge of irrelevance are steps
in that direction. The following section provides more evidence that the criteria
allow the development of a comprehensive theoretical system, for it shows how
they can be generalized with comparative ease. To be fruitful, an explicatum
should furthermore suggest new directions of research. I will discuss two of those
in §11 and §12.1.
6.8 Generalizations
The presumptions of the semantic criteria of empirical significance are comparably
strong: They assume predicate logic, a bipartition of the vocabulary and a setΠ
containing only analytic sentences. As already noted, the syntactic criteria of em-
23As argued in §2.4, Lewis’s purported ordinary language analyses are very likely themselves already
explications, although Lewis’s explicata are arguably fairly similar to their explicanda.
24See page 19. In §6.9, I discuss why the use of ordinary language intuitions may be tentatively
justified in this case.
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pirical significance can be defined with any distinguished set of basic sentences, and
the equivalence proofs at most rely on the set being closed under truthfunctional
composition. At least falsifiability has furthermore already been generalized to
all systems of logic for which conservativeness has been defined, and there seems
little reason to doubt that such a definition is always possible. In the following, I
will suggest two further generalizations by weakening the restrictions on the basic
sentences and the restrictions onΠ .
6.8.1 GeneralB -sentences and structures
As discussed in §5.1, if the basic terms are vague, some individualB -sentences
are themselves not empirically significant, and thus should not be allowed, for
example, for the empirically verification or falsification of other sentences. If
the basic terms are vague, the set of basic sentences in the criteria of empirical
significance therefore has to be restricted. Furthermore, many classical syntactic
criteria allow only finite sets of molecular or atomic B -sentences to falsify or
verify a V -sentence (Popper 1935, Hempel 1965c, Rynin 1957). Since there may be
infinitely many non-equivalent molecular or atomic basic sentences (so that their
union is infinite), this restriction cannot be captured by restricting the set of basic
sentences. To accommodate these restrictions and others, I suggest to consider
a set of sentences one of basic sentences if and only if it is in Ω, where Ω can be
determined as needed. Any element of Ω will be called ‘set of Ω-sentences’. This
allows the following
Definition 6.28. A set Σ of V -sentences is syntactically falsifiable/verifiable/
weakly determined in Ω if and only if there is a possible set of Ω-sentences that
falsifies/verifies/determines Σ .
If Ω contains all sets of B -sentences, definition 6.28 is equivalent to the
conjunction of definitions 6.2, 6.13, and 6.23. To achieve a similarly versatile
definition for semantic criteria of empirical significance, I suggest to use a set Ω of
sets of structures. Elements of Ω will be called ‘sets of Ω-structures’. Whether Ω
contains sets of structures or sets of sentences will be clear from context. For sets
of Ω-structures, the subset relation is the analogue of the entailment relation for
sets of sentences. In analogy to the compatibility of a set of sentences withΠ , a
set of V -structures is possible if and only if its intersection with the models ofΠ
is not empty. In other words, a set of V -structures is possible if and only if one of
its elements is possible according to definition 2.2. To define this notion also for
structures of proper subsets of V , I suggest
Definition 6.29. The possible subset of a set S of structures is the set of possible
structures in S. S is possible if and only if its possible subset is not empty.
This leads, in analogy to definitions 6.7, 6.14, and 6.16, to
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Definition 6.30. A set of structures determines (falsifies/verifies) a set Σ of V -
sentences in Ω if and only if all elements A and B (A) of its possible subset are
such that A Σ iffB Σ (A Σ / A 6Σ).
Finally, this suggests in analogy to definitions 6.8, 6.15, and 6.24
Definition 6.31. A set Σ of V -sentences is semantically falsifiable/verifiable/
weakly determined in Ω if and only if there is a possible set of Ω-structures that
falsifies/verifies/determines Σ .
If Ω contains all sets of B -structures, definition 6.31 is equivalent to the
conjunction of definitions 6.8, 6.15, and 6.24. It is also possible to define a general-
ization of strongB -determinacy:
Definition 6.32. A set Ω of Ω-sentences is maximal if and only if there is no
possible set Γ of Ω-sentences such that Γ ∪Π Ω and Ω ∪Π 6 Γ .
If Ω contains all sets ofB -sentences, definition 6.32 is equivalent to defini-
tion 6.22.
Definition 6.33. A set Ω of Ω-structures is maximal if and only if there is no
possible set Γ of Ω-structures such that the possible subset of Γ is a proper subset
of the possible subset of Ω.
As a generalization of definitions 6.17 and 6.23, I thus suggest
Definition 6.34. A set Σ of V -sentences is strongly semantically (syntactically)
determined in Ω if and only if it is determined by every possible maximal set of
Ω-sentences (Ω-structures).
If Ω contains all sets of B -sentences, this definition is equivalent to defini-
tion 6.23. If Ω contains all singleton sets ofB -structures, this definition is equiv-
alent to definition 6.17. Based on these concepts, one can construct generalized
notions of comparative determinacy, falsifiability, and verifiability:
Definition 6.35. A set Σ of V -sentences is syntactically (semantically) at least as
falsifiable/verifiable/determined in Ω as a set Γ of V -sentences if and only if every
possible set of Ω-sentences (Ω-structures) that falsifies/verifies/determines Γ in Ω
also falsifies/verifies/determines Σ in Ω.
Since Ω is not further determined, it is only possible to prove a simple weak
analogy to claim 6.25:
Claim 6.28. If a set Σ of V -sentences is analytically false/analytically true/
analytically false or analytically true, then Σ is at least as syntactically (semantically)
falsifiable/verifiable/determined in Ω as any other set of V -sentences.
In complete analogy to claim 6.27, the following holds:
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Claim 6.29. A set Σ of V -sentences is not syntactically (semantically) falsifiable/
verifiable/weakly determined in Ω if and only if Σ is at most as syntactically (seman-
tically) falsifiable/verifiable/determined in Ω as any other set of V -sentences.
Proof. The claim holds for all criteria because only the empty set is a subset of
every set.
Claims 6.28 and 6.29 show that the generalized comparative concepts, in
partial analogy to the more specific ones, relate fruitfully to their classificatory
counterparts. An exception is the notion of strong semantic determinacy in Ω.
Unlike strong semanticB -determinacy, but like strong syntacticB -determinacy,
it does not identify the greatest elements of its comparative counterpart. Thus
the generalizations of strong syntactic and semanticB -determinacy bring the
concepts closer together. That the relation between strongB -determinacy and
comparative B -determinacy disappears for their generalizations suggests that
the relation is something of a fluke, and that only claim 6.28, as weak as it is,
can be the basis of philosophical analyses. Fortunately, claim 6.27 generalizes
neatly to claim 6.29 and thus suggests that pace Hempel, the least elements of the
comparative notions provide fruitful criteria of empirical significance.
6.8.2 General background assumptions
With reference to Duhem (1914), Sober (2007, 5) notes that scientific theories,
“on their own, do not make testable predictions. One needs to add ‘auxiliary
propositions’ to the theories one wishes to test”. Typically, these supplementary
sentences25 are not taken to be just analytic sentences, and therefore the above
definitions would still exclude almost all scientific theories even though the criteria
are non-trivial. Gemes (1998b, §1.2) calls this “the challenge from holism” and
points out that the logical empiricists were acutely aware of it.26 Indeed, Carnap’s
considerations (discussed in §3.6.5) show how many other theories may have to
be considered to deriveB -sentences, depending on what terms are considered
basic. Looking at figure 3.1 on page 90, for example, it is clear that a claim about
electric fields leads to claims about colors one requires not only the theory of
electromagnetism, but also at least a theory of color perception like the Young-
Helmholtz trichromatic theory. Depending on the required detail of theB -claims,
one may even need elaborate theories about the functioning of retinal ganglion
cells or the influence of language on color perception (see, for example, Winawer
et al. 2007).
25In my terminology, ‘auxiliary sentences’ are A -sentences, so I will speak of ‘supplementary
sentences’ to avoid ambiguities.
26Gemes (1998b, §2) attempts to solve this problem for Ayer-type criteria with his concept of natural
axiomatization. As I will argue below, this attempt is unnecessary because Ayer-type criteria in general
are unnecessary.
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One simple way to meet the challenge from holism is to consider the empirical
significance of the union of the theory and the supplementary sentences. But this
approach does not always allow inferring the empirical (non-)significance of a
theory from the (non-)significance of the theory and its supplementary sentences.
For a subset of a falsifiable orB -determined set may itself not be falsifiable orB -
determined, respectively, and a subset of a non-verifiable or non-B -determined set
may itself be verifiable orB -determined, respectively. This is a problem because a
criterion of empirical significance is meant to determine whether a specific theory
is significant, while this approach determines only the empirical significance of
larger sets of theories, often spanning very disparate fields.
Ayer’s definition of indirect verifiability is an attempt at meeting this challenge
from holism in a different way, by defining empirical significance relative to a set
Π containing not only analytic sentences, but also other empirically significant
sentences. This kind of recursive definition27 is suggestive given its success in
the theory of definitions, for if a term A is definable inB -terms, then any term
definable inB -terms and A is also definable inB -terms alone, and if a set Σ of
sentences is translatable into a set ofB -sentences, then any sentence translatable
into a set of sentences containing onlyB -terms and Σ is also translatable into a
set ofB -sentences. The recursive definitions are thus equivalent to non-recursive
definitions.28 For strong syntacticB -determinacy, this equivalence holds as well,
because the truth value of aB -determined set Σ of sentences is a function of the
truth values ofB -sentences, and thus, if the truth value of any set of sentences is
a function of the truth values of Σ andB -sentences, it is also a function of the
truth values ofB -sentences alone. But for any of the weaker criteria of empirical
significance, this equivalence breaks down and thus the recursion brings with it
the danger of triviality.
The problem of past failures clearly does not allow the conclusion that all
criteria will fail. But the puncture-and-patch industry mentioned in §5 revolves
exclusively around recursive criteria, most recursive criteria suggested so far are
trivial, and no recursive criterion has been shown to be non-trivial. The correct
inference to draw from the problem of past failures may thus be that there is no
adequate recursive criterion of empirical significance.
Another reason to question the search for a recursive criterion is that recursive
criteria do not seem to address the challenge from holism. In a recursive criterion,
the supplementary sentences can contain any empirically significant sentence, even
those that are known to be false. But the challenge from holism consists in the
need for other true (or at least justified) sentences to evaluate a theory. Surprisingly
enough given the amount of work put into recursive definitions of empirical
significance, there have been few justifications of the assumption that a criterion
27As noted in connection with definition 6.5, Ayer’s definition needs to be amended slightly to
make it a proper recursive definition.
28Recursive definitions typically are (Moschovakis 1974, 1; Essler 1982, §16; Leivant 1994, §2.7), but
in the cases considered here, there is not even the need to go to a higher order of the language.
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of empirical significance should be recursive. In defense of his second criterion of
empirical significance, Ayer (1946, 12) states that only by taking supplementary
sentences into account can “hypotheticals” be rendered empirically significant.
But Ayer then simply chooses empirically significant supplementary sentences
without even considering justified supplementary sentences. As far as I know, this
is the only justification that has been provided for recursive criteria.
In contradistinction, Sober (2008, 151, §2.14) suggests a criterion that uses jus-
tified supplementary sentences. He points to the triviality of Ayer’s first criterion
(see page 226) and, with “some fear [of] stumbling into the same old quagmire”,
suggests instead:
Proposition P now has observational implications if and only if there
exist true auxiliary assumptions A, and an observation statement O,
such that (i) P ∧A entails O, but A by itself does not entail O, (ii) we
now are justified in believing A, and (iii) the justification we now have
for believing A does not depend on believing that P is true (or that it
is false), and also does not depend on believing that O is true (or that
it is false).
Sober argues for the requirement that A be justified independently of O as follows.
Let P be any sentence, and O a justified trueB -sentence. Then ¬P ∨O is true
and justified, and if the choice A := {¬P ∨O} were allowed by the definition, P
would have observational implications. In short, the criterion is trivial without
the restriction.29
Sober’s trivialization argument is incomplete because he assumes, but does not
prove, that ¬P ∨O 6O for some O. Lewis (1988a) notes that if ¬P ∨O O for
all O, then P is a logical truth. Hence the restriction on A is justified under the
assumption that not only logical truths should lack observational implications.
The argument is also no strict proof as long as ‘justification’ and ‘dependence of a
justification’ are not defined. Whether it is valid depends on whether, for example,
O justifies ¬P ∨O independently of ¬O, P , and ¬P for any P .
More problematic is that Sober’s criterion itself is arguably trivial: For, assume
that P is any sentence and Q a true non-B -sentence that entails O and is justified
independently of O, ¬O, P , and ¬P . Then, in analogy to Sober’s trivialization
argument, A := {¬P∨Q} is allowed by his definition, and thus, unless it is logically
true, P has observational implications. Unlike Sober’s trivialization argument,
this argument assumes that the justification for a sentence does not always have to
depend on all of theB -sentences it entails, but this is a rather weak assumption
about justification.
29This is an argument for the second conjunct of (iii). For the first conjunct, Sober (2008, 144–145)
provides a trivialization argument only for his explication of ‘P is testable against Q’, so its relevance
for the definition at hand is not immediately clear. Furthermore, I will argue in §8.3.1 that the argument
fails.
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Sober’s and my trivialization arguments rely on the same trick: Some sentence
(O or Q) is used to infer another (¬P ∨O or ¬P ∨Q) by irrelevant disjunction,
but only the inferred sentence is included in A. One way of avoiding this specific
trivialization is to disallow irrelevant disjunctions, for example by restricting
justificatory inferences to relevant deductions as developed by Schurz (1991). I
will suggest another way that is more suitable to the current case, starting from an
observation that Schurz (1991, §2.2, parenthetical remark in the original) makes
in his justification of relevant deduction. He notes that if one knows that A and
tells someone else that A∨B , one misleads the hearer because
in practical speech situations the hearer assumes that if the speaker
tells him a disjunction, say A∨ B , then the speaker’s knowledge Ks
about A and B is indeed incomplete, i. e. both ¬A and ¬B and thus
also A and B are possible in Ks [because, given Ks `L A∨B , Ks 6`L A/B
implies Ks 6`L ¬B/¬A, respectively]. [ . . . ] The irrelevant conclusion
together with this implicit assumption causes in the hearer an expec-
tation which is not only irrelevant but wrong—
namely that it is possible that ¬A.30 ‘`L’ here refers to deductive inference in
predicate logic.
My suggestion is to avoid this wrong expectation by disallowing the speaker
to tell the hearer that A∨B but not A, if he knows that A. If the speaker asserts
supplementary sentencesΠ , this leads to
Definition 6.36. Π is an honest set if and only if every ϕ ∈Π is a justified sentence,
andΠ also contains every sentence on which the justification of ϕ depends.
Somewhat less precisely, I will also speak of ‘honest supplementary sentences’
rather than ‘honest sets of supplementary sentences’. One might paraphrase this
requirement onΠ more intuitively as the demand thatΠ contain all supplemen-
tary sentences that are accepted, either actually or in some counterfactual situation
that is of interest. That is, an honest set is a set of sentences that, for all we know,
could have been our set of background assumptions: It describes which set of
justified beliefs we hold now (ifΠ is simply the set of all our currently justified
beliefs), or which set we could have held before we got to hold all our current
justified beliefs. The subjunctive here excludes false starts, that is, beliefs that at
one point were justified but later became unjustified. This is plausible, as it is of
little interest whether a theory is empirically significant under the assumption
that the world is different from the way it in fact is (as far as we know). In this
sense, an honest set is one step in the accumulation of our currently justified
beliefs. Note that an honest set of supplementary sentences can be finite, because
30Specifically, the speaker is “liable to mislead” by “quietly and ostentatiously” (Grice 1975, 49)
violating Grice’s first maxim of quantity: “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for
the current purposes of the exchange)” (Grice 1975, 45).
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analytic sentences do not need justifications, and some sentences may be justified
by entities that are not sentences (e. g. experiences). Coherentists may also argue
that the sentences in a finite set can justify each other without primitively justified
sentences.
To avoid trivialization of Sober’s criterion, I therefore suggest the following
modification:
Definition 6.37. A set Σ of V -sentences has basic implications if and only if Σ is
B -creative with respect to an honest set containing all analytic sentences.
It is clear that in the intuitive paraphrase of definition 6.36, the counterfactual
case is important because otherwise, an accepted theory could have no basic
implications at all since anything it entails would (I assume) be justified and
therefore inΠ .
Definition 6.37 is syntactic falsifiability, with Π taken to be an honest set
of justified or analytic sentences rather than just the set of analytic sentences.
All other definitions discussed above, including the generalizations in §6.8.1, can
be reinterpreted analogously. In the following, I will thus sometimes speak of
falsifiability, B -determinacy etc. relative to or given some set of sentences, in
which case Π is assumed to be that set. This generalization of Π also leads to a
generalization of all other concepts defined relative to Π , so that, for example,
possibility, analytic truth and falsity, and contingency becomes possibility, truth,
falsity, and contingency relative to or given Π (in which case I will obviously not
speak of analytic truth, contingency, etc.).
Sober’s definition and definition 6.37 differ beyond their restrictions on the
supplementary sentences. Unlike Sober’s criterion,B -creativity is defined for set
of sentences and includes sets that only allow new inferences from infinite sets
of basic sentences (in the case of higher order logic). I do not think that Sober’s
criterion was designed with this distinction in mind, however, so this modification
is only of a technical nature. Sober also does not assume that basic sentences are
determined by their vocabulary. But as noted, this restriction can be accommo-
dated in artificial languages, is not essential for the definition, and can be explicitly
avoided by using the generalizations in §6.8.1. Finally, the definition does not
include an explicit reference to the current point in time, because time dependence
follows implicitly from the definition’s dependence on justified supplementary
sentences. Since the set of justified supplementary sentences changes over time, so
does the set of sentences that areB -creative with respect to them.
Ignoring these rather formal differences, definition 6.37 is at least as exclusive as
Sober’s definition: Condition (ii) is entailed by the demand that the supplementary
sentences form an honest set. Condition (iii) for one excludes sentences P that
areB -creative relative to supplementary sentences whose justification depends
on P . In definition 6.37, those sentences lack basic implications because they are
already contained in the supplementary sentences, which therefore already entail
everything that their conjunction with P entails. Condition (iii) furthermore
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excludes sentences P that only entail basic sentences O on which the justification
of the supplementary sentences depends. In definition 6.37, these basic sentences
are also contained in the supplementary sentences, so that they are already entailed
by the supplementary sentences alone. There is also hope that definition 6.37 is
strictly more exclusive than Sober’s definition, and thus not trivial, for the use of
honest supplementary sentences blocks the trivialization arguments given above.
This is because in the arguments, ¬P ∨O and ¬P ∨Q are justified by O and Q,
respectively. If O or, respectively, Q are included inΠ ,Π alone entails O.
Historically, the interpretations ofΠ have been varied. Przełe˛cki’s definitions
explicitly assume Π to contain all and only analytic sentences. Rynin seems
to define his criterion with analytic sentences in mind, and, as argued above,
Ayer’s definition of direct verifiability relies on analytic inferences, too. Lewis’s
definitions rely on the concept of possible worlds, and whether these are the
models of the analytic sentences is up for discussion. Suppes is silent on the
matter. Carnap (1936, 443), on the other hand, considers basic sentences possible
only if they are compatible with the laws of physics, that is, only if they are not
contravalid. And in another passage, Carnap (1935b, 11) writes:
A proposition P which is not directly verifiable can only be verified
by direct verification of propositions deduced from P together with
other already verified propositions.
This is almost Ayer’s definition of indirect verifiability, except for one crucial
difference: The “other propositions” are not only required to be verifiable, but
actually verified. Unlike Ayer, Carnap does not define ‘verifiability’ recursively,
but rather relative to a set of justified propositions.31 Popper (1935, §3, emphasis
changed) is very explicit about the role of justified sentences in his conception of
falsification:32
[T]here is the testing of the theory by way of empirical applications
of the conclusions which can be derived from it.
[ . . . ] With the help of other statements, previously accepted, cer-
tain singular statements—which we may call ‘predictions’—are de-
duced from the theory [ . . . ]. Next we seek a decision as regards these
(and other) derived statements by comparing them with the results of
practical applications and experiments. [I]f the decision is negative,
or in other words, if the conclusions have been falsified, then their
falsification also falsifies the theory from which they were logically
deduced.
31If one assumes the prediction criterion of confirmation, however, Carnap’s definition is still trivial:
For any P and any twoB -sentences β 6` γ , where β is true, {(P → γ )∧β} `β and is thus verified by
β. Since {P, (P → γ )∧β} ` γ while (P → γ )∧β 6` γ , P is indirectly verifiable.
32Lakatos (1974, 106–107) also stresses that for Popper, falsifiability is relative to background
assumptions, and gives further references to Popper’s remarks on the topic.
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With the inclusion of previously accepted sentences in Π , the viability of
Popper’s criterion depends on the conception of acceptance, as do the viability of
definition 6.37 and Sober’s criterion. Indeed, apart from the specific restriction (iii)
on supplementary sentences, Sober’s criterion is essentially Popper’s falsifiability
criterion. But requirement (iii), if taken to be the only restriction on the set of
accepted sentences, trivializes Sober’s criterion. Therefore it seems fair to say that
Sober’s criterion, insofar as it is successful, is anticipated by Popper.
In a review, Nott (1959) concludes about Popper’s dissolution of the problem
of induction:
One cannot help feeling that if [The Logic of Scientific Discovery] had
been translated as soon as it was originally published[,] philosophy in
this country might have been saved some detours. Professor Popper’s
thesis has that quality of greatness that, once seen, it appears simple
and almost obvious.
This is the right conclusion, but the wrong thesis. It is doubtful that Popper’s
dissolution of the problem of induction is indeed simple and obvious (cf. Salmon
1967, §II.3). But the preceding analysis suggests that if Popper’s falsifiability crite-
rion, rather than Ayer’s, had been the basis of further research into the problem
of demarcation, philosophy might have been saved the “sorry history of unintu-
itive and ineffective patches” (Lewis 1988b, §I) that discredited the very idea of
empirical significance. Of course, Carnap’s verifiability criterion or his criterion
of direct reducibility would have been a good starting point as well. In the end, it
may have just been the technical allure of recursive definitions what sidetracked
philosophy for so long.
6.9 Conditions of adequacy
In §6.7.2, I relied on Lewis’s definition of partial aboutness to argue that the
criteria of empirical significance are similar to their explicandum. However, when
discussing Carnap’s condition of similarity (§2.3.1), I suggested that conditions
of adequacy should be used instead of Carnap’s condition that most uses of the
explicanda have to be captured by the explicata. Reliance on Lewis’s ordinary
language intuition may still be preliminarily justified, because there are very few
if any well-supported conditions of adequacy for criteria of empirical significance.
Lewis’s intuitions may therefore be tentatively used as a proxy, with the hope that
an explicatum that fits with the ordinary language intuitions is likely to meet the
conditions of adequacy that one would place on an explicatum.
An additional problem with the conditions of adequacy is that the intended
use for a criterion of empirical significance differs from author to author and from
time to time. The early logical empiricists, for example, intended the criterion to
identify meaningless sentences, while Popper intended his criterion to distinguish
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between empirical and non-empirical sentences, both of which can be meaningful
(Popper 1935, §4; 1963, §II).
The problems of considering criteria of empirical significance as criteria of
meaningfulness are illustrated by the well-known discussion by Hempel (1965b,
p. 102). He demands that “[i]f under a given criterion of cognitive significance
a sentence σ is non-significant, then so must be all truth-functional compound
sentences in which σ occurs nonvacuously as a component.”
Condition 2. If V -sentence σ is not empirically significant, then so is every
sentence that is logically equivalent only to sentences in which σ occurs.
The non-vacuous occurrence of σ in a sentence τ is here taken to mean that τ
is not logically equivalent to a sentence in which σ does not occur. Hempel states
that condition 2 has to be met because “if [σ] cannot be significantly assigned a
truth value, then it is impossible to assign truth values to the compound sentences
containing [σ].” Rynin (1957, 55) argues that this is incorrect, since in σ ∨ υ,
for example, υ may be true, and hence, since a disjunction is true if either of its
disjuncts is true, so is σ ∨ υ. Since a true sentence is significant, σ ∨ υ is therefore
significant.
Hempel could try avoiding Rynin’s conclusion by pointing out that Rynin
uses a very specific definition of the truth of a disjunction. If one takes the term
‘truth-functional’ literally, that is, assumes that the truth value of a disjunction is
determined by a function f : {true, false}× {true, false} → {true, false}, then the
truth value of σ ∨ υ is indeed undefined if the truth value of σ is undefined. It is
then unclear, however, what ‘logically equivalent’ means in condition 2. One can
take the position that two sentences τ and % are logically equivalent if and only
if they are syntactically deducible from each other. However, in that case Rynin’s
counterargument is applicable as well. For if syntactic deduction is defined for
all sentences, it holds that υ ` σ ∨ υ, so that from the truth of υ, the truth of
σ ∨ υ follows.33 More generally, if a sentence can be meaningful without being
empirically significant, most of the criticisms by Hempel (1965c) are unjustified
(Hempel 1965d; Sober 2008, 149–150), and thus I will ignore them henceforth.
An uncontroversial condition of adequacy, on the other hand, is
Condition 3. The concept of empirical significance is not trivial.
A trivial definition, one that includes all or no objects of the domain, cannot
be a good explicatum for a concept that is meant to include some, but not all
objects of the domain. At the very least, a trivial explicatum is uninformative. The
most effective criticisms of criteria of empirical significance have at their center
trivialization proofs. Most criticisms of Ayer-type criteria are of this kind. I have
already noted that Church’s criticism, the most famous one, does not show that
33This assumes that deductive inference is truth-preserving.
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every sentence is indirectly verifiable. Thus there can be plausible strengthened
conditions of adequacy that are similar to the exclusion of trivial criteria.
For one, there is already a partition of sentences into analytically determi-
nate and indeterminate ones. According to artificial language philosophy, the
analytically determined sentences are chosen to be so determined, and thus they
do not contain any empirical information. Accordingly analytically determinate
sentences were explicitly excluded from the set of empirically significant sentences.
If now a criterion where to render all analytically contingent sentences empiri-
cally significant, it would thus add nothing to this demand. Similarly, if some set
Π of sentences is accepted as an honest set, a criterion that renders empirically
significant all sentences that are neither entailed nor incompatible with Π adds
nothing to our assumption thatΠ is true. This suggests
Condition 4. Not all contingent sentences are empirically significant.
‘Contingent’ is here understood like ‘analytically contingent’ (definition 2.3),
except that Π may be an honest set of supplementary sentences. Lewis (1988a)
relies on the weaker demand that not all analytically contingent or analytically
false sentences are empirically significant.
The counterpart to analytically determined sentences are, in a sense, basic
sentences, because they are defined to be sentences whose truth value is empirically
determined. A criterion that includes only basic sentences in the set of empirically
significant sentences would thus again be uninformative, leading to
Condition 5. Not onlyB -sentences are empirically significant.
Pokriefka (1984), for example, relies on condition 5 to criticize his own cri-
terion. As pointed out in §6.2.1, Popper (1935, 85; cf. Hansson 2008b, §4.2) and
Ayer (1936, 97) argue for their criteria of empirical significance based on
Condition 6. All and only sets of sentences that assert basic sentences are empiri-
cally significant.
The assumption here is that—at least as far as deductive assertion is concerned—
a set of sentences asserts basic sentences if and only if it isB -creative. I will discuss a
similar consideration by Sober (2008) in §8.4. Quine (1951, 41) also thinks of “the
conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience
in the light of past experience”, which entails that every scientific theory, if it is to
be useful, must fulfill condition 6.
For deductive inference, syntactic and semanticB -creativity are a clear and
virtually undisputed criteria for the making ofB -assertions. Things are much
more complicated in the case of probabilistic inference. Given the need for com-
patible criteria of empirical significance for deductive and probabilistic contexts
(see §5.2), it will be helpful to keep the following in mind:
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Definition 6.38. Two sets of V -sentences Σ and Λ are deductively empirically
equivalent relative to supplementary sentencesΠ if and only if for every set Ω of
basic sentences and every basic sentence β, Ω ∪Σ ∪Π β iff Ω ∪Λ∪Π β.
This definition assumes that empirical states are described inB -sentences, not
B -structures. An analogous semantic definition is straightforward, but will not
be needed in the following. It is now easy to establish
Claim 6.30. Set Σ of V -sentences isB -conservative relative to Π if and only if Σ
and > are deductively empirically equivalent relative to Π .
Proof. Σ is deductively empirically equivalent to > if and only if for every set Ω
and sentence β either Ω ∪Σ ∪Π  β and Ω ∪Π  β, or Ω ∪Σ ∪Π 6 β and
Ω ∪Π 6β, that is, either Ω ∪Π β or Ω ∪Σ ∪Π 6β. This is the case if and
only if Σ isB -conservative relative toΠ .
As far as deductive assertions are concerned, one can thus reformulate condi-
tion 6 as follows:
Condition 7. All and only sets of sentences that are not empirically equivalent
to a tautology are empirically significant.
The hope is then that with a definition of probabilistic empirical equivalence,
condition 6 is equivalent to condition 7 as well. Flew (1950, 258) goes as far as
calling every sentence a tautology that does not deductively assert basic sentences,
but this is clearly to strong: ‘Borogroves are mimsy’ is not a tautology, but on
account of containing two undefined terms, does not make any basic assertions.
∗ ∗ ∗
Trivially, according to condition 6, and thus condition 7, B -creativity is up
to logical equivalence the only adequate criterion of empirical significance as
far as deductive assertions are concerned. If the negation of a basic sentence is
itself a basic sentence, claim 6.1 thus establishes that falsifiability is adequate as
well. B -creativity further fulfills the non-triviality condition 3, as established
in §6.7.2 using the analytic sentence Π = {∀x(B x ↔ ¬A1x)}, the B -creative
sentence A1b and the B -conservative sentence A2b . The example also shows
that B -creativity fulfills the stronger condition 4 because A2b is analytically
contingent, and condition 5 because A1b is not a basic sentence. It is fortunate
thatB -creativity fulfills all other conditions of adequacy as well (excluding the
disputed one by Hempel). For otherwise, there would be no concept with the
intended properties at all.
Definition 6.37 defines ‘having basic implications’ asB -creativity relative to
honest sets, and thus as an absolute (one-place) concept. Since in the example,Π
contains only (and for the purposes of the example all) analytic sentences, it is
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an honest set. Thus the example shows that definition 6.37 fulfills condition 5.
It is simple to show that no analytic sentence has basic implications, and thus
that condition 3 is met. Because of the reliance on the undefined term ‘justified’
in definition 6.36, however, it is impossible to disprove that there is for each
analytically indeterminate sentence σ some honest set Γ such that σ isB -creative
relative to Γ . Thus it cannot be shown that condition 4 is met, and the triviality
of Sober’s criterion might suggest that the new criteria will suffer the same fate
as Ayer’s. However, there are important differences between Ayer’s criterion
and the new ones. First, the criteria’s core ideas—falsifiability, verifiability, and
B -determinacy relative to a set Π—are not trivial. Therefore, in the case of a
trivialization proof, one can always fall back on falsifiability, verifiability, or
B -determinacy, and find a new restriction on the supplementary sentences Π .
(Without a criterion of justification, empirical significance can be defined in a
precise way only relative to a set Π , and it has to be decided on a case-by-case
basis whether Π is acceptable.) Second, and in keeping with my criticism of
recursive definitions of empirical significance,Π is not assumed to be determined
by the criterion itself. This blocks trivialization proofs that rely on recursive
definitions. From these two differences follows a third: Problems can only occur
with the definition of ‘honest set’, and amendments of the criteria can accordingly
be restricted to this definition. In this sense, falsifiability, verifiability, and B -
determinacy are already good criteria of empirical significance. What is missing is
a good criterion of justification for sets of sentences.
∗ ∗ ∗
Whether a set of sentences indeed has to assert basic sentences to be empirically
adequate is still a matter of discussion. For one, in some situations it may be suffi-
cient to establish that a sentences is true, even if it does not assert a basic sentence.
If, to take a somewhat frivolous example, the question is whether a bet is won
or lost, it can be enough if a sentence is verifiable.34 Thus verifiability and weak
B -determinacy may still have a role to play. In the end, the conclusion may well
be that empirical significance has to be split up into different concepts, depending
on their intended use. If, for example, the goal is prediction,B -creativity and
falsifiability are adequate criteria.
6.10 Conclusion
The belief that the search for a criterion of empirical significance has been a failure
is usually based on the problem of past failures. I have given an alternative view on
this search, mostly based on criteria that have not been shown to be trivial. I have
34There is, however, the question who would bet that the sentence is false if the best outcome would
be that the sentence is not shown to be true.
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already argued that the criteria successfully explicate their explicandum (§6.7.2),
specifically with respect to their fruitful connection to each other, comparative cri-
teria of empirical significance, Ramsey sentences, and concepts from measurement
and definition theory. This result counters the charge of arbitrariness.
More generally, the equivalences show that various different frameworks
(measurement theory, aboutness, Ramsey sentences, some semantic approaches,
some syntactic approaches) allow the definition of plausible criteria of empirical
significance. Because of the inferential relations between the criteria, it is easy to
see when an analysis or justification of one criterion transfers to another. The
relations also allow for a more informed search for generalizations of the criteria.
The generalization of the concepts ofB -sentences andB -structures suggested in
this article reduces the conceptual presumptions of the criteria, and thus allows
them to be applied in more circumstances. The generalization from analytic to
general supplementary sentences similarly allows the criteria’s application in more
contexts, thereby solving the problem of holism, and additionally shows a way to
avoid the problem of past failures.
6.11 Appendix
6.11.1 A generalization of Przełe˛cki’s definition of B -conser-
vativeness
Definition 6.6 of semantic B -conservativeness is slightly more general than
Przełe˛cki’s, who suggests
Definition 6.39 (Przełe˛cki). A set Σ of V -sentences is semantically B -
conservative with respect to ∆ if and only if for each B -structure AB  ∆
there is a V -structure C ∆∪Σ with C|B =AB .
Semi-formally, this can be paraphrased as
∀AB[AB ∆⇒∃C(C ∆∪Σ ∧C|B =AB )] , (6.4)
which is obviously restricted to B -sentences in ∆ due to ‘AB  ∆’ in the an-
tecedent of the implication. An equivalent reformulation is
∀AB[∃B(B|B ∆∧B|B =AB )⇒∃C(C ∆∪Σ ∧C|B =AB )] . (6.5)
If the restriction onB in ‘B|B ∆’ is dropped, ‘B ∆’ is defined for any set∆
of V -sentences, which leads to definition 6.6.
6.11.2 The relation of syntactic and semantic B -conservative-
ness
That syntacticB -conservativeness does not entail semanticB -conservativeness
in first order logic is known in model theory as the difference between elementary
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and pseudoelementary classes (Hodges 1993, §5.2). Elementary classes are simply
those whose members are models of a set Γ of first order sentences ({A |A  Γ }),
while pseudoelementary classes are those whose members are reducts, to a fixed
subvocabulary, of the members of an elementary class ({A|B | A  Γ }). Recall
that Λ|B is the set ofB -consequences of Λ, that is, the set ofB -sentences entailed
by Λ.
Claim 6.31. A set Σ of V -sentences is syntacticallyB -conservative relative to ∆
if and only if {AB | AB  ∆|B} = {AB | AB  (Σ ∪∆)|B}. Σ is semanticallyB -conservative relative to ∆ if and only if {A|B |A ∆}= {A|B |A Σ ∪∆}.
Proof. The proof for syntacticB -conservativeness follows from claim 6.3, the
proof for semanticB -conservativeness is immediate.
Mal’tsev introduced pseudoelementary classes in 1941 (see Hodges 1993, 207,
260). Przełe˛cki (1969, 52–53) was possibly the first to mention the distinction
between syntactic and semanticB -creativity in connection with philosophy of
science, specifically with respect to questions of concept formation and the theory
of definition. He does mention a proof, personally communicated by C. C. Chang,
that semanticB -creativity relative to the empty set does not entail syntacticB -
creativity relative to the empty set. Przełe˛cki and Wójcicki (1971, §1) reproduce a
proof by Łos´ (1955):
Proof of claim 6.4, second half. Let
AB := 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1〉 (6.6)
be the standard model of arithmetic and define ∆ := Th(AB ). ∆ is therefore
complete. DefineA := {P} for the predicate symbol P and
σ := P0∧∀x[P x→ P x + 1]∧∃x¬P x . (6.7)
{σ} ∪∆ is consistent, but there are models of∆, for example AB , that cannot be
expanded to a model of {σ} ∪∆.
Following Sneed (1971), subsequent discussions of the distinction were often
phrased in terms of the Ramsey-eliminability of theoretical terms (cf. Rynasiewicz
1983, §1; van Benthem 1978). With a reference to Przełe˛cki (1969), van Benthem
(1982, §2.1.3) gives a proof with a fairly intuitive natural language interpretation:
Proof of claim 6.4, second half. Let∆ be a complete axiomatization of the theory
of 0 and successor:
∆ :={¬∃x s x = 0,∀x∀y(s x = s y→ x = y),∀x(x 6= 0→∃y x = s y)}∪⋃
n∈N
¬∃x0∃x1∃x2 . . .∃xn−1∃xn
(s x0 = x1 ∧ s x1 = x2 ∧ · · · ∧ s xn−1 = xn ∧ s xn = x0)
	
.
(6.8)
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∆ can be understood as the theory that time proceeds without loops by a one-
to-one successor function s starting from 0. DefineA := {≺, E} with a ‘before’
relation, an ‘early’ predicate, and a set of sentences stating the following: 0 is early,
the successor of an early time is also early, each time is earlier than some late (not
early) time, and any time later than a late time is itself late:
σ := E0∧∀x(E x→ E s x)∧∀x∃y(x ≺ y ∧¬Ey)∧∀x∀y(x ≺ y ∧¬E x→¬Ey) .
(6.9)
Any finite subset of {σ}∪∆ has a model, and by compactness, {σ}∪∆ itself has a
model. However, 〈N, S, 0〉 is a model of∆ that cannot be expanded to a model of
{σ} ∪∆.
The difference between semantic and syntactic falsifiability was recently again
discussed in connection with Ramsey sentences by Ketland (2004, 297–299) and
Demopoulos (2011, §4).
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Chapter 7
Deductive criteria for terms
Because of the problem of past failures for deductive criteria for the empirical
significance of sentences, a number of philosophers have tried to define a deductive
criterion for terms,1 in the hope that a vocabulary of empirically significant terms
allows only the construction of empirically significant sentences. Carnap tried to
arrive at such a criterion in the Aufbau, “Testability”, and “Theoretical concepts”,
where this last attempt spawned its own short industry of punctures and patches
(Achinstein 1964, Berkowitz 1979, Van Cleve 1971, Kaplan 1975, Creath 1976).
Less well known are the criteria by Wójcicki (1966), Rozeboom (1962), and Luce
(1978). I will again show a variety of relations between he different criteria for
terms (summarized in figures 7.1 and 7.2), thereby countering the charge of
arbitrariness. I will also discuss the relation of the criteria for terms to the criteria
for sentences.
7.1 Preliminaries
7.1.1 Methodological presumptions
Many criteria in the following define empirical significance only for relations. I
have chosen not to generalize these criteria because, first, any set of sentences
containing functions and constants is definitionally equivalent to a set of sen-
tences containing only relations and sentences expressing appropriate uniqueness
conditions. Second, the exclusion of theoretical functions and constants avoids
technically important but philosophically less relevant complications.
While many criteria for the empirical significance of sentences have been
1In this chapter, it will be especially important to keep in mind that, in line with the tradition in
philosophy of science, but not logic, I use ‘terms’ synonymous with ‘non-logical constants’ (see §1.2).
Accordingly, relations are specific terms.
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defined relative to a set of analytic sentences, all criteria for terms have been
defined relative to a theory Θ, and thus heed the credo by Stegmüller (1973, 24)
“that is notorious insofar as it was not pronounced by any scholastic or early
modern philosophers, although it should have been pronounced a long time
ago: ‘termini sine theoria nihil valent’”2. Θ therefore takes over the role of the
supplementary assumptionsΠ , so that specifically, only set ofB -sentences that
are compatible with Θ are possible and only V -structures A Θ with A|B ∈MB
are possible, that is, are in M. MB is here again the set of possibleB -structures as
defined in §2.8.1. Analogous to definition 2.2 and claim 2.1, it then holds that a
structure is a model of Θ if and only if it is isomorphic to a structure that can be
expanded to a V -structure that is possible given Θ. In the following, I will silently
assume that Θ is consistent, such that at least one structure is possible, and also
not distinguish between isomorphic structures. Because of claim 2.1, this means
that I will call all structures with expansions to models of Θ ‘possible’.
7.1.2 The problem of the explicandum
Analogous to sentences, which can be meaningful because of their analytic content,
a term can be meaningful not only because of its connections to observational
terms, but also because of its connections (within Θ) to non-observational terms.
Some of the criteria below will be distinguished exactly on these grounds.
A variety of conditions of adequacy demand that empirically significant terms
stand in a specific relation to empirically significant sentences, for example that
any sentence that contains only empirically meaningful terms be itself empirically
meaningful. These conditions are problematic if, like Hempel (1965c, §3), one sees
a criterion for terms as a means to define a criterion for sentences. For then the
condition of adequacy is empty until one develops a criterion for the empirical
significance of sentences independently from the criteria for terms, at which point
the latter are not needed anymore to develop such a criterion. In fact, one of the
results of my discussion will be that the criteria for the empirical significance of
terms are sorely lacking a clear purpose. Carnap’s criterion specifically will turn
out to rely on a criterion for the empirical significance of sentences, which renders
it particularly unsuited as a basis for a criterion for sentences. In a final piece of
evidence that the criteria are solutions in search of a problem, the analysis of the
suggested criteria will lead to some suggestions on how to apply them.
7.2 Definability and its variants
In the heyday of criteria of empirical significance, Carnap (1928a, §38) suggested
that a term Ai ∈A is empirically significant (and, even stronger, meaningful) if
2Presumably: ‘Words mean nothing without a theory’, although ‘terminus’ is usually translated as
‘boundary’ or ‘end’.
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and only if it can be explicitly defined inB -terms.3 Carnap (1928a, §67, §122)
does not intend these definitions to follow from the meanings of the terms outside
of any empirical theory, but rather from the regularities that are described by
empirical theories (cf. Carnap 1967a, ix; 1963c, 945). In other words, he claims
that scientific theories entail these explicit definitions.4
Definition 7.1. A relation Pi is B -definable in Θ if and only if there is a B -
formula β such that
Θ  ∀x¯[Pi x¯↔β(x¯)] (7.1)
If all and onlyB -definable relations are considered empirically significant,
empirically significant theoretical relations are inessential for the formulation of
scientific theories in a very straightforward sense:
Claim 7.1. If σ is a V -sentence ofB -terms5 andB -definable relations, then σ can
be translated into a B -sentence by Θ, that is, there is a B -sentence β such that
Θ  σ↔β.
Proof. If Pi isK -definable in Θ, then for everyK ∪{Pi}-sentence σ there is aK -
sentence c such that Θ  σ↔ c (Essler 1982, 103). Therefore, if theA -relations
in σ are {Pi1 , . . . , Pik+1}, σ can be translated into aB ∪{Pi1 , . . . , Pik }-sentence σk ,
and for 1 ≤ l ≤ k, σl can be translated into aB ∪{Pi1 , . . . , Pil−1}-sentence σl−1,
with σ0 being aB -sentence.
Therefore, under the assumption of Θ, any sentence that contains onlyB -
definable theoretical relations orB -terms is but a paraphrase of aB -sentence.
Assuming with artificial language philosophy that onlyB -terms are directly inter-
preted,B -definability is the only criterion that ensures the precise interpretation
of any empirically significant relation:
Claim 7.2. A relation Pi isB -definable in Θ only if for all A,B Θ with A|B =
B|B , PAi = PBi . The converse holds in first order logic and for finitely axiomatizable
Θ—but not all infinite Θ—also in higher order logic.
Proof. ‘⇒’: If there is a B -formula β with Θ  {∀x¯[Pi x¯ ↔ β(x¯)]}, then the
extensions of Pi and β are the same in all models of Θ due to the definition of
satisfaction in a model.
3Carnap (1928a, §38) also discusses the need for “definitions in use”. As far as terms (i. e., non-
logical constants) are concerned, these are equivalent to explicit definitions because of the eliminability
theorems (cf. Gupta 2009, §2.3).
4The definitions of the definability of constant or function symbols additionally contain uniqueness
conditions for the constants and function values, respectively. The conditions are philosophically
interesting because they introduce restrictions on the sets of sentences in which constant and function
symbols can be defined (Essler 1982, §14, §15; Hodges 1993, 59), but also introduce technical subtleties
that would lead the current discussion to far afield.
5A last cautionary reminder: ‘Terms’ indeed means ‘non-logical constants’.
273
7 Deductive criteria for terms Criteria of Empirical Significance
‘⇐’: This holds in first order logic because of Beth’s theorem (Hodges 1993,
theorem 6.6.4). For higher order logic, substitute allA -relations P¯ in Θ(B¯ , P¯ ) by
variables. By lemma 2.4, ∀x¯[Pi x¯↔∃X¯
 
Θ(B¯ , X¯ )∧Xi x¯

] is an explicit definition
of Pi in B (cf. Shapiro 2000, §6.6.3; Tarski 1935, theorem 3). This procedure
is, assuming a language that does not allow infinite conjunctions, obviously not
possible for infinite sets Θ. Shapiro (2000, §6.6.3) shows that for some infinite Θ,
there are undefinable relations with unique expansions (cf. Leivant 1994, 258).
According to claim 7.2, then, demanding theB -definability of Pi amounts
to the requirement that there is aB -formula that is extensionally equivalent to
Pi in all models of Θ. Therefore, assuming that the models of Θ are the (possibly
counterfactual) contexts in which a theoretical relation Pi of Θ can be used, and
assuming that the extensional equivalence of two formulas in all (counterfactual)
contexts is the same as the intensional equivalence of the terms,B -definability
amounts to the intensional equivalence of Pi with aB -formula (cf. Belnap 1993,
135).
Against Carnap himself, Goodman (1963, 554–555) argues that Carnap’s
explicit definitions (Carnap 1928a) should be read extensionally, that is, as factually,
but not subjunctively true. As a criterion of empirical significance, this would
amount to the demand that a relation be equivalent to aB -formula in one specific
(the actual) model of Θ. Goodman points out that this reading would counter any
claims that Carnap’s approach is an extreme form of reductionism that could be
based on the intensional equivalence claims. Of course, there are other ways to
define empirical significance that avoid intensional equivalence. Luce (1978, §4),
for example, suggests to consider a relation Pi over the domain of a relational first
orderB -structure AB to be meaningful if and only if it is invariant under all of
AB ’s automorphisms. And he notes that in some cases, so invariant relations are
still notB -definable (Luce 1978, 6). As I am interested in theories, I will consider
Pi meaningful if and only if it is so invariant in all models of Θ (Luce’s definition
can be recovered if it is assumed that Θ determines AB up to isomorphism). Θ is
here assumed to contain only relations.
Definition 7.2. A relation Pi isB -symmetric in a relational first order theory Θ
if and only if for each A Θ, PAi is invariant under all automorphisms of A|B .
Luce connectsB -symmetry with dimensional invariance (roughly, he shows
under some additional assumptions that a law is dimensionally invariant if and
only if all its relations areB -symmetric). Its connection toB -definability can
be elucidated starting from a simple observation. For aB -definable relation Pi ,
there is oneB -formula that is equivalent to Pi in all models of Θ. Exchanging the
existential and the universal quantifier weakens the concept in a transparent way:
Definition 7.3. A relation Pi isB -definable in every model of Θ if and only if for
each A Θ there is aB -formula β such that A  ∀x¯Pi x¯↔β(x¯).
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A relationB -definable in every model of Θ is thus extensionally equivalent
to some (not necessarily the same) B -formula in every model of Θ, and this
is already a generalization of B -symmetry (since Θ is here not assumed to be
relational):
Claim 7.3. Let Θ be a relational first order theory in vocabularyB∪{Pi}. Then Pi
isB -definable in every model of Θ if and only if Pi isB -symmetric in Θ.
Proof. Hodges (1993, corollary 10.5.2).
A corollary of claim 7.3 further elucidates the relation ofB -definability in
each model (and thus ofB -symmetry) toB -definability.
Definition 7.4. A relation Pi is piecewiseB -definable in Θ if and only if there is
a set {β j }1≤ j≤n ofB -formulas such that
Θ 
n∨
j=1
∀x¯Pi x¯↔β j (x¯) . (7.2)
Claim 7.4. In first order logic, a relation Pi isB -definable in every model of Θ if
and only if Pi is piecewiseB -definable in Θ.
Proof. Hodges (1993, corollary 10.5.3).
Through claim 7.1,B -definability ensures translatability intoB -terms, which
can be taken to be a very strong criterion of empirical significance for sentences.6
B -definability in all models amounts to a slightly weaker criterion of empirical
significance for sentences.
Claim 7.5. If everyA -relation in the V -sentence σ isB -definable in every model
of Θ, then σ is strongly semanticallyB -determined by Θ.
Proof. AB -formula ϕ is true either in both or neither of any two models of Θ
with the sameB -reduct under the same variable assignment. For an induction
on the complexity of formulas, assume first that ϕ x¯ = Pi x¯. Then there is, for
every model of Θ, someB -formula β that is coextensive with ϕ x¯. Under the
same variable assignment, either both or neither of any two models of Θ with the
sameB -reduct are therefore models of ϕ x¯. Thus, for the inductive step, there is a
variable assignment under which ϕ x¯ is true in a model of Θ if and only if there
is a variable assignment (the same) under which ϕ x¯ is true in any other model
of Θ with the sameB -reduct. The inductive step for universal quantification is
analogous, and for the logical connectives immediate. Since σ is a formula without
free variables, variable assignments are irrelevant.
6Even if, for example following Carnap (1958, 273),B is assumed to be closed under definability,
claim 7.6 below establishes that translatability does not run afoul of condition of adequacy 5 in §6.9,
however.
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Because of claim 7.1, every sentence that contains only B -definable or B -
terms can be translated into aB -sentence. ThusB -definability provides a suffi-
cient condition for a strong connection of a sentence toB -sentences and thus also
B -structures. However, neitherB -definability norB -definability in a model
provide a necessary condition for translatability. Taking the non-vacuous occurrence
of Pi in a sentence σ to mean that σ is not logically equivalent to a sentence in
which Pi does not occur, it is easy to prove
Claim 7.6. There are sentences σ that can be translated into B -sentences by Θ
and in which relations occur non-vacuously that are neitherB -definable in Θ nor
B -definable in every model of Θ.
Proof. Choose Θ  {∀x(B x → Pi x)} and σ  B b ∧ Pi b . Then Pi is not B -
definable in every model and thus notB -definable, and σ is not logically equiva-
lent to a sentence in which Pi does not occur. But σ is equivalent to B b given Θ,
and can thus be translated into aB -sentence.
7.3 Reducibility and its variants
According to Carnap (1936, 440), explicit definability is too strict a criterion for
empirical significance because he claims (but does not prove) that disposition
concepts cannot be explicitly defined. To ensure the empirical significance of
disposition concepts, which he takes to be indispensable in science, Carnap (1935a,
§8) suggests to define empirical significance as reducibility.
Definition 7.5. Relation Pi is reducible toB in Θ if and only if there is someB -formula β such that
Θ 6 ¬∃x¯β(x¯) , (7.3)
as well as
Θ  ∀x¯[β(x¯)→ Pi x¯] (7.4)
or
Θ  ∀x¯[β(x¯)→¬Pi x¯] . (7.5)
In either case, I will call β a reduction formula for Pi , and the two conditions
(7.4) and (7.5) reduction sentences. It is far from clear that reducibility toB suf-
fices to analyze the meaning of disposition concepts (cf. Belnap 1993, 136–137;
Malzkorn 2001, §2.1). But meaning differs from empirical meaningfulness (see
§5.2), and since only the latter is explicated by empirical significance, reducibility
to B may still be a criterion of empirical significance. For one, it is obvious
that everyB -definable relation is also reducible toB (with the two reduction
formulas being contradictories and thus at least one of them fulfilling the existence
condition (7.3)). Reducibility is thus a straightforward weakening of a criterion of
empirical significance that is usually considered too strong.
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Wójcicki (1966, 84) proceeds from Carnap’s considerations towards another
criterion of empirical significance. He first suggests
Definition 7.6. The positive extension of Pi relative to Θ in aB -structure AB is
PAB ,Θ,+i =
⋂
PBi |B|B =AB andB Θ
	
. (7.6)
The negative extension of Pi relative to Θ in in aB -structure AB is
PAB ,Θ,−i =
⋂ûPBi |B|B =AB andB Θ	 . (7.7)
Since the positive and the negative extension of Pi relative to Θ are intersec-
tions of normal extensions of Pi , P
AB ,Θ,+
i and P
AB ,Θ,−
i are disjoint extensions of
the same type as Pi , and thus positive and, respectively, negative extensions in the
sense of Przełe˛cki (see §2.8.3). Accordingly, Wójcicki (1966, 87) draws attention to
the relation between empirical significance and first order vagueness. In extreme
cases of vagueness, a relation has empty positive and negative extensions.
Definition 7.7. A relation Pi is completely B -vague in Θ if and only if for all
A Θ, PA|B ,Θ,+i =∅ and P
A|B ,Θ,−
i =∅.
Claim 7.2 shows that no definable relation is completely B -vague. A first
relation between completeB -vagueness and reducibility is straightforward.
Claim 7.7. Pi is reducible toB in Θ only if Pi is not completely vague in Θ.
Proof. If Pi is reducible toB in Θ, then there is anB -formula β such that Θ 6¬∃x¯β(x¯) so that for some A Θ, βA is nonempty, and either Θ  ∀x¯[β(x¯)→
¬Pi x¯] or Θ  ∀x¯[β(x¯)→ Pi x¯]. In the latter case, for every B  Θ, βB ⊆ PBi .
Therefore, for any B  Θ with B|B = A|B , PBi 6= ∅. The proof for Θ ∀x¯[β(x¯)→¬Pi x¯] and ûPBi 6=∅ is analogous.
Claim 7.2 provides a semantic criterion forB -definability, and analogously,
claim 7.7 provides a semantic criterion for the reducibility to B . If Pi is B -
definable and Θ is finite, ∀x¯ Pi x¯↔∃X¯ [Θ(B¯ , X¯ )∧Xi x¯] is aB -definition of Pi ,
and is entailed by Θ (see the proof of claim 7.2). To arrive at an analogous result
for reducibility to B , one can use a suggestion by Martin (1966), who defines
Pi ’s Ramsey constant R
Θ
B ,Pi for finite Θ as ∀x¯
 
RΘB ,Pi x¯↔∃X¯ [Θ(B¯ , X¯ )∧Xi x¯]

.7
Even though Martin’s use of Ramsey constants is flawed (Scheffler 1968, 272–273;
Bohnert 1971b), the concept itself is not useless; for instance, for anyB -definable
relation Pi , R
Θ
B ,Pi is Pi ’s definiens in B . To arrive at reduction sentences for
7Technically, a Ramsey constant RΘB ,Pi can thus be seen as the generalized predicate λx∃X¯ [Θ(B¯ , X¯ )∧Xi x¯].
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Pi , define the reverse Ramsey constant R
Θ
B ,Pi by ∀x¯
 
RΘB ,Pi x¯↔∃X¯ [Θ(B¯ , X¯ )∧¬Xi x¯]

. That the concepts of the (reverse) Ramsey constant will figure in the
reduction sentences for Pi is suggested by the close relation between the positive
and negative extensions of Pi and its Ramsey constants:
Claim 7.8. For finite Θ and every A,
 ¬ RΘB ,Pi A = PA|B ,Θ,+i and  ¬RΘB ,Pi A =
PA|B ,Θ,−i .
Proof. ¬ RΘB ,Pi x¯  λx¯
 ∀X¯ [Θ(B¯ , X¯ ) → Xi x¯]. Thus, if A 6 Θ,  ¬ RΘB ,Pi A =
|A| = PA|B ,Θ,+i . If A  Θ, then
 ¬ RΘB ,Pi A = λx¯ ∀X¯ [Θ(B¯ , X¯ ) → Xi x¯]A =⋂
PBi | B|B = A|B andB  Θ
	
= PA|B ,Θ,+i by lemma 2.4. The proof for
¬RΘB ,Pi and P
A|B ,Θ,−
i is analogous.
From claims 7.2 and 7.8 it follows that if Pi isB -definable, then∀x¯
 
RΘB ,Pi x¯↔¬RΘB ,Pi x¯

. Claim 7.8 has a simple corollary:
Corollary 7.9. For finite Θ, a relation Pi is completelyB -vague in Θ if and only if
Θ  ∀x¯ RΘB ,Pi x¯ and Θ  ∀x¯RΘB ,Pi x¯ .
Proof. From definition 7.6 and claim 7.8.
The Ramsey sentence RB (Θ) of a finite theoryΘ entails the sameB -sentences
that Θ entails, and the negation of the reverse Ramsey sentence, ¬RB
 ¬∧Θ, is
entailed by the sameB -sentences that entail Θ (see §6.3). In a nice analogy, the
Ramsey constant of Pi entails the sameB -formulas as Pi when assuming Θ,8 and
the negation of the reverse Ramsey constant is entailed by the sameB -formulas
as Pi when assuming Θ:
Lemma 7.10. For finite Θ and anyB -formula β
Θ  ∀x¯[β(x¯)→ Pi x¯] if and only if  ∀x¯[β(x¯)→¬ RΘB ,Pi x¯] , (7.8)
and
Θ  ∀x¯[β(x¯)→¬Pi x¯] if and only if  ∀x¯[β(x¯)→¬RΘB ,Pi x¯] . (7.9)
Proof. I will prove the first conjunct of the lemma. The proof of the second
conjunct is analogous.
‘⇒’: Assume that the structure A and the variable assignment ν are such that
A, ν 6 ¬ RΘB ,Pi x¯. Then A, ν 6 ∀X¯

Θ(B¯ , X¯ )→Xi x¯

, that is, for someB Θ with
8Formula (7.9) gives the contrapositive of this claim.
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B|B =A|B it holds thatB, ν 6 Pi x¯. HenceB, ν 6β(x¯). Therefore, since β is aB -formula andB|B =A|B , it holds that A, ν 6β(x¯). By contraposition, every
A Θ is such that A  ∀x¯[β(x¯)→¬ RΘB ,Pi x¯].
‘⇐’: Assume that A and the variable assignment ν are such that A, ν β(x¯).
Then A, ν  ∀X¯Θ(B¯ , X¯ )→ Xi x¯, that is, for everyB Θ withB|B =A|B it
holds thatB, ν  Pi x¯. Hence, specifically, if A Θ, then A, ν  Pi x¯.
I can now give a necessary and sufficient condition for the reducibility toB :
Claim 7.11. For finite Θ, Pi is reducible to B in Θ only if Θ 6 ∀x¯ RΘB ,Pi x¯ or
Θ 6 ∀x¯RΘB ,Pi x¯ . If higher order sentences are also observational, the converse holds as
well.
Proof. ‘⇒’: Immediately from claims 7.7 and 7.9.
‘⇐’: In higher order logic, ¬ RΘB ,Pi x¯ is a B -formula. Since trivially∀x¯ ¬ RΘB ,Pi x¯ → ¬ RΘB ,Pi x¯, by lemma 7.10, Θ  ∀x¯ ¬ RΘB ,Pi x¯ → Pi x¯. And if
Θ 6 ∀x¯ RΘB ,Pi x¯, then Θ 6 ¬∃x¯¬ RΘB ,Pi x¯. Analogously for ¬RΘB ,Pi .
In their discussion of partial structures, Bueno (1997, 592–593) and French
and Ladyman (1999, 105) leave out the primary statements (the analogue of the
penumbral connections for vague terms, see definitions 2.4 and 4.11), the sentences
in the object language that have to be true in every A-normal structure, in part
to illustrate the irrelevance of the vocabulary for the representation of scientific
knowledge. As Bueno (1997, 593, n. 5) puts it, “the partial relations presented in
the [partial structure] seem to be enough to represent (relevant) aspects of our
knowledge of its domain”.9 Treating partial relations asA -relations, this suggests
Definition 7.8. A relation Pi is relevant in Θ if and only if for some A  Θ,
〈PA|B ,Θ,+i , PA|B ,Θ,−i 〉 6= 〈∅,∅〉.
The definition captures Bueno’s claim because without penumbral connec-
tions, a relation with empty positive and negative extensions can be interpreted
in any way whatsoever. It therefore does not represent any knowledge about the
domain. It is now trivial to prove
Claim 7.12. A relation Pi is relevant in Θ if and only if Pi is not completelyB -
vague.
Starting from Bueno’s assumption that all relevant scientific knowledge can
be represented in partial structures, the claims 7.11, 7.9, and 7.12 can be seen as
9Bueno further claims that if the primary statements turn out to be relevant, they could be
incorporated into the background assumptions. However, he does not specify how this would, formally,
differ from not leaving them out in the first place.
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a justification of Carnap’s criterion of empirical significance as given by defini-
tion 7.5. For they amount to the claim that an auxiliary relation is reducible only
if (in higher order logic also if) it can be represented in a partial structure. And
with Bueno’s claim that the partial relations suffice to represent relevant aspects of
our knowledge of a partial structure’s domain, they therefore entail that reducible
relations suffice to represent our relevant knowledge.
There is a possible objection to Carnap’s criterion, however: The relation
λxy(x = y) or, for that matter, λx(x = x) are not completely B -vague, but
are not in any interesting way related to observations. Thus Wójcicki (1966, 87)
suggests
Definition 7.9. In first order logic and for a relational theory Θ, relation Pi is
in ΘB -vague up to logical relations if and only if in all A  Θ, the positive and
negative extensions of Pi are invariant under all permutations of |A|.
This definition does not only include relations that, like identity and self-
identity, are permutation invariant in all models of Θ and thus logical constants
according to one line of thought (cf. MacFarlane 2009, §5). It also includes relations
that change under permutations in some models of Θ, but whose definite positive
and negative extension is permutation invariant.
Claim 7.13. For finite Θ, relation Pi is vague up to logical relations if and only if in
every model of Θ, RΘB ,Pi and R
Θ
B ,Pi can be defined by logical constants.
Proof. From claim 7.3, since a relation is in all models A of Θ invariant under all
permutations on |A| if and only if it is ∅-symmetric in Θ.
It is clear from claims 7.13 and 7.3 that someB -definable andB -symmetric
relations are vague up to logical relations. Since the converse holds as well, there is
no straightforward inferential relation between vagueness up to logical relations
and the other two criteria.
The relation between the criteria for terms of this section and the criteria
for sentences is complicated. For instance, a sentence σ whose terms meet the
criteria of this section can fail to meet the weakest deductive criterion of empirical
significance for sentences:
Claim 7.14. For some finite sets Θ of sentences and sentences σ whose relations are
reducible toB inΘ and not vague up to logical relations, σ is not weakly semantically
B -determined relative to Θ.
Proof. Choose B = {B , b}, A = {P1, P2, P3, P4}, Θ  {∀x(B x → P1x ∧ P2x),∀x(¬B x→ P3x∧P4x)} and σ  (P1b∧P3b )∨(¬P2b∧¬P4b ). Then all terms in σ
are reducible toB and not vague up to logical relations. But σ is not semantically
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falsifiable relative to Θ according to claim 6.7:
 ∀x[B x→ λy(y = y)x ∧B x]∧∀x[¬B x→ λy(y = y)x ∧B x]
∧  [λy(y = y)b ∧λy(y = y)b]∨ [¬B b ∧¬B b] (7.10a)
 ∃X¯  ∀x[B x→X1x ∧X2x]∧∀x[¬B x→X3x ∧X4x]
∧ [(X1b ∧X3b )∨ (¬X2b ∧¬X4b )]
 (7.10b)
 RB (Θ∪{σ}) . (7.10c)
σ is also not semantically verifiable relative to Θ according to claim 6.11:
 ∀x[B x→ B x ∧λy(y = y)x]∧∀x[¬B x→¬B x ∧λy(y = y)x]
∧ [¬B b ∨B b]∧ [λy(y = y)b ∨λy(y = y)b] (7.11a)
 ∃X¯  ∀x[B x→X1x ∧X2x]∧∀x[¬B x→X3x ∧X4x]
∧ [¬X1b ∨¬X3b]∧ [X2b ∨X4b]
 (7.11b)
 RB (Θ∪{¬σ}) . (7.11c)
By claim 6.21, σ is not weakly semanticallyB -determined relative to Θ.
Conversely, some sentences that contain exclusively relations that fail to meet
any of the criteria in this section are translatable intoB -sentences, and thus also
stronglyB -determined.
Claim 7.15. For some finite sets Θ of sentences and sentences σ whose relations are
not reducible toB in Θ and vague up to logical relations, σ can be translated into a
B -sentence by Θ.
Proof. Choose Θ  {∀x(P1x ↔ B x)∨∀x(P2x ↔ B x)} and σ  ∃x∀y(P1y →
y = x)∨∃x∀y(P2y→ y = x). Then P1 and P2 are not reducible and are vague up
to logical relations, but Θ  σ↔∃x∀y(By→ y = x).
The criteria in this section therefore provide neither a necessary nor a sufficient
criterion for any of the criteria for sentences, at least if the condition is to hold for
all sentences and if it is to be based solely on the status of the sentences’ terms.10
7.4 B -dependence and its variants
For aB -reducible term, there is at least one object in the domain that is in its
positive extension or its negative extension. But, for example, there is no such
object for an auxiliary term A connected to a basic term byΘ = {∀x(Ax↔ B x)∨
∀x(Ax↔¬B x)}, even though the extension of A cannot be freely chosen. That
10Cf. definition 7.19 below.
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there are such restrictions on the interpretation of terms necessitates penumbral
connections for vague terms. B -dependence and its variants are criteria that
determine whether there are any such penumbral restrictions on the extension of
a term. I will first review a criterion by Wójcicki (1966) and prove its equivalence
to a slight modification of a criterion by Carnap (1956b). Then I will compare
the two criteria to a slightly but crucially more inclusive criterion by Rozeboom
(1962).
7.4.1 Wójcicki
Wójcicki (1966, 94) gives a definition for the empirical significance of auxiliary
relations that can also be phrased for all auxiliary terms.
Definition 7.10. The set ofB -possible extensions of Vi ∈ V givenB -structure
AB and Θ is
Vi
AB ,Θ = {V Ci | C|B =AB and C Θ} . (7.12)
Definition 7.11. The term Ai ∈A isB -dependent in Θ if and only if there areB -structures AB andBB with |AB |= |BB | such that
∅ 6= AiAB ,Θ 6= AiBB ,Θ 6=∅ . (7.13)
Definition 7.11 can be simplified as follows:
Claim 7.16. A term Ai ∈A isB -dependent in Θ if and only if there are models
A,B Θ with |A|= |B| such that
ABi 6∈AiA|B ,Θ (7.14)
Proof. There are models A,B Θ with |A|= |B| and AAi 6∈AiB|B ,Θ iff there is
someD Θ withD|B =A|B such that AAi 6∈AiB|B ,Θ, and thus ∅ 6= AiD|B ,Θ 6=
Ai
B|B ,Θ 6=∅ for someD,B Θ with |D|= |A|= |B|.
The relation betweenB -dependence and vagueness up to logical constants is
given by
Claim 7.17. Let Θ be a relational first order theory. If Pi is not vague up to logical
relations, then Pi isB -dependent in Θ.
Proof. Let A  Θ. If Pi is not vague up to logical relations, then PA|B ,Θ,+i or
PA|B ,Θ,−i is different from both |A| and ∅. Without loss of generality, assume
that PA|B ,Θ,+i 6= |A| and PA|B ,Θ,+i 6= ∅. Choose c ∈ PA|B ,Θ,+i and d 6∈ PA|B ,Θ,+i ,
and choose B such that all its extensions are those of A, except that c and d
are systematically switched. Then B ' A and thus |A|= |B| and B  Θ. Since
c ∈ PAi , c 6∈ PBi . Therefore, since c ∈ PA|B ,Θ,+i =
⋂
Pi
A|B ,Θ, it holds that PBi 6∈
Pi
A|B ,Θ. By claim 7.16, Pi isB -dependent.
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However, there are relations that are notB -dependent even though they are
not completelyB -vague.
Claim 7.18. For some Θ and Pi , Pi is not completely B -vague but also not B -
dependent.
Proof. Choose Θ = {∀xP1x}, {B} =B . Then PA|B ,Θ,+1 = |A| for all A  Θ, so
that P1 is not completely vague. But Pi
A|B ,Θ = {|A|} for every A Θ, so that for
all A,B Θ with |A|= |B|, PBi = |B|= |A| ∈ {|A|}= PiA|B ,Θ.
For finite sets of sentences, Wójcicki’s definition has a simple formulation in
terms of Ramsey sentences that is based on
Lemma 7.19. Ai isB -dependent with respect to Θ if and only if for some A and
some B,C  Θ with B|B = A|B and C|{Ai } = A|{Ai }, there is no D  Θ such that
A|B∪{Ai } =D|B∪{Ai }.
Proof. Ai isB -dependent with respect to Θ iff for some E,C Θ with |E|= |C|,
Ai
E|B ,Θ 6= AiC|B ,Θ, that is, iff there is someB Θ,B|B = E|B such that for all
D Θ,D|B = C|B only ifD|{Ai } 6=B|{Ai }. This holds iff there are someB,C Θ
with |B|= |C| such that for noD Θ,D|B = C|B andD|{Ai } =B|{Ai }.
‘⇒’: For B and C as above, choose A|B = C|B and A|{Ai } = B|{Ai }. Then
there is no D  Θ with D|B = C|B = A|B and D|{Ai } =B|{Ai } = A|{Ai }, that is,
noD Θ withD|B∪{Ai } =A|B∪{Ai }.
‘⇐’: Let A be such that there are B,C  Θ with B|B = A|B and C|{Ai } =
A|{Ai }, and for allD Θ,D|B∪{Ai } 6=A|B∪{Ai }. Then |B|= |C|, and for allD Θ,
D|B 6= A|B or D|{Ai } 6= A|{Ai }, that is, there is no D Θ with D|B =B|B and
D|{Ai } = C|{Ai }.
Now it is straightforward to describe definition 7.11 in terms of Ramsey
sentences:
Claim 7.20. For finite Θ, Ai ∈A isB -dependent in Θ if and only if
RB (Θ)∧R{Ai }(Θ) 6 RB∪{Ai }(Θ) . (7.15)
Proof. From lemmas 7.19 and 2.4.
7.4.2 Carnap
Carnap (1956b) suggests a criterion that, roughly, demands that theA -term Ai
feature essentially in the derivation of an observation sentence. It seems to have
escaped notice that for his proof that the criterion is not too exclusive, Carnap
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assumes that Ai can be primitively interpreted. Using B -structures instead of
observation sentences, I will show that under this assumption, Carnap’s criterion
is equivalent toB -dependence.
The following is a special case of Carnap’s definition (Carnap 1956b, 51):
Definition 7.12. A term Ai is directly syntactically Carnap-significant with respect
toB andΘ if and only if the following holds: Ai ∈A and there are aB -sentence
β and an {Ai}-sentence αAi , such that
1. αAi ∧Θ 2⊥,
2. αAi ∧Θ β, and
3. Θ 2β.
Considering claim 7.22, Carnap-significance is very close to Rozeboom’s
definition 7.14: A relation is not given effective meaning if and only if, when
it occurs in aB ∪{Ai}-sentence that is semanticallyB -conservative relative to
the empty set, the sentence is also semanticallyB -conservative relative to Θ. A
relation is not Carnap-significant if and only if, when it occurs in an {Ai}-sentence
that is compatible withΘ, the sentence is also syntacticallyB -conservative relative
to Θ. Thus, instead of semanticB -conservativeness, specifically of aB ∪{Ai}-
sentence, Carnap-significance relies on syntactic conservativeness and consistency
with Θ.
One major problem with definition 7.12 as it is stated is that, in contradiction
to Carnap’s intent (Carnap 1956b, 53, see §3.1), it is not logically weaker than
definition 7.5. For assume
Θ = {∃x1x2[x1 6= x2 ∧∀y(y = x1 ∨ y = x2)], (7.16a)
∃x[B x ∧∀y(By→ x = y)], (7.16b)
∀x(P x↔ B x)} . (7.16c)
P is explicitly defined through aB -term, but the only sentences that contain only
P are either incompatible with Θ or are syntacticallyB -conservative relative to
Θ.
The solution to this apparent inconsistency in Carnap’s claims is that Carnap
treats mathematical constants as logical constants and allows for mathematical
constants to have physical meaning and appear as arguments of auxiliary relations.
When Carnap (1956b, 59, my notation) argues that definition 7.12 is not too
narrow, he considers a specific example in which one might think that it is too
narrow, and argues that in this case,
there must be a possible distribution of values of M for the space-
time points of the region a′, which is compatible with Θ [ . . . ]. Let
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‘F ’ be a logical constant, designating a mathematical function which
represents such a value distribution. Then we take the following
sentence as αAi : ‘For every space-time point in a
′, the value of Ai is
equal to that of F .’ This sentence αAi is compatible with Θ. [ . . . ]
Then αAi contains ‘Ai ’ as the only descriptive term [ . . . ]. [ . . . ] β
is logically implied [ . . . ], according to our assumption, [ . . . ] by
αAi ∧Θ.
Carnap thus assumes that all mathematical terms are logical terms and can be
identified with theoretical terms. This assumption seems to lead to a host of
problems. For one, if two theoretical terms have the same values, they are identified
with the same function and are thus identical, which may lead to trouble if they
are related to different observation terms. It may thus be difficult to individuate
theoretical terms, and may require a reformulation of many scientific theories
(assuming that such a reformulation is even possible).
Without looking at this specific assumption aboutA -terms, Carnap’s proof
relies on the possibility of giving an interpretation AAi to Ai so that every model
C with that interpretation is a model of β, that is, C 6 ¬β. Instead of observation
sentence ¬β, take a set of possible observation sentences, and assume that the
set can determine possibleB -structures up to isomorphism. Assuming further
that A also determines the domain of C allows moving from Carnap’s syntactic
definition to
Definition 7.13. A term Ai ∈A is directly semantically Carnap-significant with
respect toB and Θ if and only if there are structures A,B  Θ with |A|= |B|
such that for all C Θ with C|{Ai } =A|{Ai }, C|B 6=B|B .
Direct semantic Carnap-significance is equivalent toB -dependence:
Corollary 7.21. A term Ai ∈A is directly semantically Carnap-significant with
respect toB and Θ if and only if Ai isB -dependent with respect to Θ.
Proof. By claim 7.16, a term isB -dependent iff there are models A,B Θ with
|A|= |B| such that ABi 6∈AiA|B ,Θ. This holds iff for all C Θ with C|{Ai } =B|{Ai },
B|B 6=A|B , which holds iff for all C Θ withB|B =A|B , C|{Ai } 6=B|{Ai }.
7.4.3 Rozeboom
Rozeboom (1962, 354, postulate 7) gives
Definition 7.14. A term Ai ∈A is given effective meaning with respect toB by
a finite set Θ of sentences if and only if
∃X¯Θ(B¯ , X¯ ) 6 ∀Xi∃X¯−iΘ(B¯ , X¯ ) . (7.17)
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The following holds:
Claim 7.22. A term Ai ∈A is given effective meaning by a finite set Θ if and only
if
RB (Θ) 6 RB∪{Ai }(Θ) . (7.18)
Proof. ∃X¯Θ(B¯ , X¯ )  ∀Xi∃X¯−iΘ(B¯ , X¯ ) iff for all A with a B  Θ such that
B|B = A|B , it holds that for every C with C|B = A|B , C|B∪{Ai } = A|B∪{Ai }.
By lemma 2.4, this is the case iff RB (Θ)  RB∪{Ai }(Θ).
Since RB∪{Ai }(Θ)  RB (Θ), claim 7.22 establishes that Ai is not given effective
meaning if and only if it occurs vacuously in RB∪{Ai }(Θ), that is, there is a logically
equivalent formulation of RB∪{Ai }(Θ) that does not contain Ai . A term that is not
given effective meaning is of no use for the assertion of basic sentences, since adding
Θ as set of supplementary sentences does not lead to any new basic assertions:
Claim 7.23. If Ai ∈A is not given effective meaning by the finite set Θ, then anyB∪{Ai}-sentence σ that is semanticallyB -conservative relative to∅ is semanticallyB -conservative relative to Θ.
Proof. Since Θ is by assumption finite, σ is B -conservative relative to Θ iff
RB (Θ)  RB (Θ∧σ). Since Ai is not given effective meaning and σ is aB ∪{Ai}-
sentence, RB (Θ)∧σ  RB∪{Ai }(Θ∧σ). Since σ is semanticallyB -conservative
relative to ∅,  RB (σ). Thus by claim 2.3, RB (Θ)  RB
 
RB (Θ)
  RB RB (Θ)∧
RB (σ)
  RB RB (Θ)∧σ  RB RB∪{Ai }(Θ∧σ)  RB (Θ∧σ).
With claim 6.5, claim 7.23 states that for an Ai that is not given effective
meaning by Θ, aB ∪{Ai}-sentence σ is semantically falsifiable relative to Θ only
if σ is semantically falsifiable relative to no supplementary assumptions.
Definition 7.14 can be generalized to infinite theories Θ with the help of
B -possible extensions (definition 7.10). Let > be a tautology.
Definition 7.15. The term Ai ∈A isB -restricted by Θ if and only if there is a
model A Θ such that
Ai
A|B ,Θ 6= AiA|B ,> . (7.19)
A relation that is not B -restricted will be called B -unrestricted. Because
of claim 2.1, definition 7.15 could be equivalently rephrased by restricting the
structures A to elements of M.B -restrictedness indeed generalizes giving effective
meaning:
Claim 7.24. For finite Θ, the term Ai ∈A is given effective meaning by Θ if and
only if Ai isB -restricted by Θ.
Proof. From claim 7.22 and lemma 2.4.
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Lemma 7.19 provides the means to describe the relation between B -
dependence,B -restrictedness, and giving effective meaning via
Claim 7.25. Ai isB -dependent in Θ only if it isB -restricted by Θ. For finite Θ, Ai
isB -dependent only if it is given effective meaning by Θ.
Proof. In lemma 7.19, there is noD Θ withD|{Ai } =A|{Ai } = C|{Ai } andD|B =
A|B = B|B . Thus ACi 6∈ AiB|B ,Θ and hence AiA|B ,Θ 6= AiA|B ,>. The claim for
finite Θ follows from 7.24.
Giving effective meaning is a strictly more inclusive concept than not being
completely vague:
Claim 7.26. For finite Θ, if relation Pi ∈A is not completelyB -vague in Θ, then
Pi is given effective meaning with respect toB by Θ. The converse does not hold.
Proof. Assume that Pi is not given effective meaning with respect to B by Θ.
Thus every model A of RB (Θ) is also a model of RB∪{Pi }(Θ). Specifically, if
A Θ, then anyB withB|B =A|B is a model of RB∪{Pi }(Θ). Thus chooseB
such that PBi = ûPAi . Then there is a C  Θ with C|B∪{Pi } =B|B∪{Pi } and thus
PCi ∩ PAi = ûPCi ∩ ûPAi =∅. Thus PA,Θ,+i = PA,Θ,−i =∅ for any A Θ, and thus
Pi is completely vague.
Θ = {∀x¯(Pi x¯ ↔ B x¯)∨∀x¯(Pi x¯ ↔¬B x¯)} with basic term B and auxiliary
term Pi gives effective meaning to Pi even though Pi is completely vague.
Thus giving effective meaning and B -restrictedness are the most inclusive
criteria for the empirical significance of terms (see figure 7.1).
7.5 Sets of empirically significant terms
The idea that criteria of empirical significance have to be recursive has stayed
with philosophy of science at least since Ayer. Accordingly, Carnap attempted to
extend reducibility and Carnap-significance to include a recursion, even though
on the face of it, both criteria can be applied indiscriminately to any term that
occurs in Θ. In this section, I will first argue that Carnap’s recursive criteria are
too weak, and suggest instead a simple generalization ofB -dependence (and thus
direct semantic Carnap-significance) to sets of terms. NotB -dependent sets of
terms will turn out to have still some very slight relation to the interpretations
ofB -terms, a relation that is absent in sets ofB -isolated terms, which will be
introduced thereafter. AB -vacuous set of terms finally will be one that is not at
all restricted in its interpretations.
As a recursive definition of reducibility, Carnap (1935a, 446) gives
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B -definable
B -definable in every model
⇔B -symmetric⇔
piecewiseB -definable
not vague up to logical relations⇔
RΘB ,Pi or R
Θ
B ,Pi not ∅-definable
in every model
B -dependent⇔
directly semantically
Carnap-significant
reducible toB⇔
not completelyB -vague⇔
Θ 6 ∀x¯ RΘB ,Pi x¯ or Θ 6 ∀x¯RΘB ,Pi x¯⇔ relevant
given effective meaning
⇔B -restricted
Figure 7.1: Entailment relations between the deductive criteria for the empirical significance of terms.
Some of the relations hold only for special cases.
Definition 7.16. Relation Pi is chain-reducible to B in Θ if and only if there
are relations Pi1 , . . . , Pik with Pik = Pi such that for 1< l ≤ k, Pil is reducible toB ∪{Pi1 , . . . , Pil−1}, and Pi1 is reducible toB .
Since definition 7.16 is relative to a theory Θ, not all terms will be chain-
reducible to B , that is, the definition will not be trivial in the way that the
recursive criteria for sentences are. But there are good reasons to think that
definition 7.16 is much too weak:
Claim 7.27. Some Θ contain relations that are chain-reducible toB , but are not
reducible toB and are not given effective meaning.
Proof. Choose Θ= {∀x(B x→ P1x),∀x(¬B x ∧ P1x→ P2x)}. Then Θ 6 ¬∃x B x,
so that P1 is reducible toB , and Θ 6 ¬∃x(¬B x ∧ P1x), so that P2 is reducible toB ∪{P1} and thus chain-reducible toB . But P2 is not given effective meaning
with respect toB by Θ because
 ∀x[B x→ λy(By ∨ P2y)x]∧∀x[¬B x ∧λy(By ∨ P2y)x→ P2x] (7.20a)
 ∃X1[∀x(B x→X1x)∧∀x(¬B x ∧X1x→ P2x)] (7.20b)
 RB∪{P2}(Θ) . (7.20c)
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Therefore RB (Θ)  RB∪{P2}(Θ), and by claim 7.22, Pi is not given effective mean-
ing. By claims 7.26 and 7.7, Pi is also notB -reducible.
Since some terms that are not given effective meaning are chain-reducible, one
may have chain-reducible terms that are not restricted in their interpretation at
all. And thanks to claim 7.23, any sentence that is not alreadyB -creative does
not becomeB -creative either when its auxiliary terms are chain-reduced by the
introduction of a specially constructed Θ.
§7.4.2 contains only the first step of Carnap’s recursive definition of empirical
significance. The full definition is as follows (Carnap 1956b, 51):
Definition 7.17. A term Ai is syntactically Carnap-significant relative to the classK of terms with respect toB and Θ if and only ifK ⊆A , Ai ∈A , Ai 6∈ K ,
and there are aB -sentence β, an {Ai}-sentence αAi , and aK -sentence αK such
that
1. αAi ∪αK ∪Θ 2⊥,
2. αAi ∪αK ∪Θ β, and
3. αK ∪Θ 2β.
Definition 7.18. A term Ai is syntactically Carnap-significant with respect toB
and Θ if and only if there is a sequence Ai1 , . . . ,Ain−1 ,Ain = Ai ⊆A of relations
such that Ai1 is directly syntactically Carnap-significant and for every k , 1< k ≤ n,
Aik is syntactically Carnap-significant relative to {Ail | 1≤ l ≤ k} with respect toB and Θ.
Given that Carnap-significance was meant to be weaker than reducibility,
it is perhaps not surprising that relations that are not given effective meaning
can be Carnap-significant (with Carnap’s assumptions for his proof that Carnap-
significance is not too narrow):
Claim 7.28. Assuming that there is a term11 c so that Ac is still an {Ai}-sentence
for anA -term Ai , some Θ contain relations that are Carnap-significant, but are not
given effective meaning.
Proof. Choose B = {B1,B2, b}, A = {P1, P2}, and Θ = {∀x(P1x → B1b ) ∧∀x(P1x ∧ P2x → B2b )}. Then P1c ∧Θ  B1b and Θ 6 B1b , so that P1 is directly
syntactically Carnap-significant. Furthermore, P1c ∧P2c ∧Θ  B2b and P1c ∧Θ 6
B2b , so that P1 is syntactically Carnap-significant. But
 ∀x[λy(y 6= y)x→ B1b]∧∀x[λy(y 6= y)x ∧ P2x→ B2b] (7.21a)
 ∃X1[∀x(X1x→ B1b )∧∀x(X1x ∧ P2x→ B2b )] (7.21b)
 RB∪{P2}(Θ) , (7.21c)
11In this one case, the term is also a term according to logical terminology.
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so that P2 is not given effective meaning.
With a criterion of empirical significance for terms, Carnap defines a criterion
for the significance of sentences:
Definition 7.19. V -sentence σ is syntactically Carnap-significant relative to Θ if
and only if every term in σ is syntactically Carnap-significant or aB -term.
The following holds, however:
Corollary 7.29. There areB -conservative sentences relative to Θ that are syntac-
tically Carnap-significant relative to Θ andB -conservative sentences relative to Θ
that contain only terms that are chain-reducible relative to Θ.
Proof. From claim 7.23 and claims 7.27 and 7.28, respectively.
Carnap (1935a, theorem 7) proves a relation between chain-reducible relations
and the reducibility of sentences (see §6.6) containing them. Since his definition of
the reducibility of sentences is trivial, corollary 7.29 is not particularly surprising
as far as chain-reducibility is concerned.
In a response to Van Cleve (1971) and Kaplan (1975), Creath (1976) suggests
criteria of empirical significance for terms and sentences that are weaker than
syntactic Carnap-significance. Since it seems that Carnap-significance is already
to weak, I will not discuss his criteria. Considering the simplification of B -
dependence by claim 7.16, it seems more promising to generalizeB -dependence
by generalizing the concept of aB -possible extension of terms (definition 7.10) to
whole sets of terms:
Definition 7.20. The set ofB -possible I -structures givenB -structure AB and
Θ is
I AB ,Θ = C|I  C|B =AB and C Θ	 . (7.22)
UnlikeB -possible extensions,B -possible I -structures include the domain of
AB . But sinceB -possible extensions are defined relative to aB -structure AB as
well, this nothing but a technical convenience—definitions 7.15 and 7.11 as well as
claim 7.16, which rely onB -possible extensions, could also have been formulated
withB -possible {Ai}-structures. With definition 7.10 generalized,B -dependence
(as reformulated by claim 7.16) is also easily generalized:
Definition 7.21. The set I ⊆A of terms isB -dependent with respect toB and
Θ if and only if there are models A,B Θ with |A|= |B| such that
B|I 6∈ I A|B ,Θ . (7.23)
For finite sets Θ, definition 7.21 again has a neat formulation in terms of
Ramsey sentences:
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Claim 7.30. For finiteΘ, a set I ⊆A isB -dependent with respect toΘ if and only
if
RB (Θ)∧RI (Θ) 6 RB∪I (Θ) . (7.24)
Proof. Analogous to the proof of claim 7.20.
If a set I ofA -terms is notB -dependent, its interpretation in aB -structure
AB is thus solely restricted by Θ and |AB |, and not at all by the interpretation of
theB -terms. However, I may subsequently becomeB -dependent because of
changes in Θ that are not ostensibly about any term in I at all:
Claim 7.31. There is a setΘ of sentences and a setI of terms that is notB -dependent
in Θ, butB -dependent in Θ∪∆, where ∆ is a set of V −I -sentences.
Proof. Choose B = {B}, A = {A1,A2}, Θ = {∀x(A1x ↔ A2x)}, ∆ ={∀x(B x↔A1x)}, and I = {A2}.
Wójcicki (1966, definition 6) suggests a sufficient condition for empirical
non-significance for sets of terms where such a surreptitious restriction of the
interpretations is not possible:
Definition 7.22. A set I ofA -terms isB -isolated in Θ if and only if for any
two models A,B of Θ, every C with C|V −I = A|V −I and C|I =B|I is also a
model of Θ.
Claim 7.32. The set I ⊆A of terms is notB -isolated in Θ if and only if there are
models A,B Θ with |A|= |B| such that
B|I 6∈ I A|V −I ,Θ . (7.25)
Proof. Straightforward from definitions 7.22 and 7.20.
It is thus clear that noB -isolated set of terms isB -dependent. And unlike
in the case ofB -dependence, aB -isolated set I of terms can only cease to be
B -isolated because of changes in Θ that are explicitly about terms in I :
Claim 7.33. If I isB -isolated in Θ, then I isB -isolated in Θ∪∆ for any set ∆
of V −I -sentences.
Proof. Assume I isB -isolated in Θ and A,B Θ∪∆. Then A,B Θ and thus
C with C|V −I =A|V −I and C|I =B|I is a model of Θ. Since ∆ contains onlyV −I -sentences and C|V −I =A|V −I ∆, C Θ∪∆.
As was to be expected,B -isolation has for finite sets of sentences a paraphrase
in terms of Ramsey sentences:
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Claim 7.34. For finite Θ, a set I ofA -terms isB -isolated in Θ if and only if
RV −I (Θ)∧RI (Θ) Θ . (7.26)
Proof. Immediate from lemma 2.4.
Wójcicki further gives
Definition 7.23. A term Ai ∈A isB -isolated in Θ if and only if it is a member
of a set of terms that isB -isolated in Θ.
A relation betweenB -isolation andB -dependence is given by
Claim 7.35. If a relation isB -isolated, then it is notB -dependent.
Proof. Wójcicki (1966, proof of theorem 5.1).
B -isolation is related to sentences by
Claim 7.36. Assume I isB -isolated in Θ. If aB ∪I -sentence σ is semantically
B -conservative relative to ∅ and compatible with Θ, then σ is semantically B -
conservative relative to Θ.
Proof. Let AB be such that there is a B  Θ with B|B = AB . By assumption,
there is a C  Θ ∪ {σ}. Again by assumption, for D with D|B = B|B and
D|I = C|I ,D Θ∪{σ}. Thus AB can be expanded to a model of Θ∪{σ}.
Furthermore, the following holds:
Claim 7.37. SomeB -isolated terms areB -restricted.
Proof. Choose Θ = {∀xB x,∀xAx} withB = {B} andA = {A}. Since RB (Θ)  ∀xB x and RA (Θ)  ∀xAx, A isB -isolated by claim 7.34, butB -restricted by
claims 7.22 and 7.24.
To arrive forB -restrictedness at an analogue toB -isolation, I suggest
Definition 7.24. A set I occursB -vacuously (isB -vacuous) in Θ if and only if
for each Ai ∈I and A Θ,
Ai
A|V −I ,Θ = AiA|V −I ,> . (7.27)
That the relation between B -dependence and B -isolation is analogous to
the relation betweenB -restrictedness and definition 7.24 becomes clear when
comparing claim 7.20 with claim 7.34, and claim 7.22 with
Claim 7.38. For finite Θ, a set I ofA -terms isB -vacuous in Θ if and only if
RV −I (Θ) Θ . (7.28)
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B -dependent =⇒ notB -isolated =⇒ notB -vacuous
Figure 7.2: Entailment relations between the deductive criteria for the empirical significance of sets of
terms.
Proof. Similar to the proof of claim 7.22.
If (and only if) a set I of terms is B -vacuous in Θ, there is a set Θ′  Θ
of sentences that does not contain terms from I ; in other words, the terms of
I occur only trivially: Any set of terms can be so introduced into any set of
sentences simply by equivalent paraphrase. Clearly, every B -vacuous term is
B -unrestricted and alsoB -isolated. The relation to sentences is given by
Claim 7.39. Let I occurB -vacuously in Θ. If aB ∪I -sentence σ is semantically
B -conservative relative to ∅, then σ isB -conservative relative to Θ.
Proof. As the proof for claim 7.36, except without the assumption that σ is
compatible with Θ.
In summary (see figure 7.2), if a set I ofA -terms is notB -dependent, its
interpretation is not restricted by the interpretation ofB -terms, but only by the
domain and by Θ. If I isB -isolated, its interpretation is just as unrestricted, and
will even stay so if V −I -sentences are added to Θ. Finally, if I isB -vacuous, its
interpretation is only restricted by the domain. Of course, since the interpretation
of each term in aB -vacuous set I can be freely chosen, I can also be interpreted
in every domain. Having thus arguably reached the apex of irrelevance, it is time
to discuss the role these different criteria can play.
7.6 The points of the criteria
Most deductive criteria for the empirical significance of sentences were defined
relative to the set of analytic sentences. Ayer attempted to take non-analytic
sentences into account essentially by, first, defining empirical significance relative
to an arbitrary set Θ of sentences, and second, restricting the sentences that can be
members of Θ. It is this second step that resulted in the triviality of Ayer’s own
criterion and many of its successors. All criteria for terms that I know of, on the
other hand, define empirical significance relative to an arbitrary consistent set of
sentences. It thus seems that all criteria for terms are attempts to solve a problem
significantly simpler than the one the criteria for sentences were supposed to solve.
This mismatch becomes especially obvious in Carnap’s criterion (definitions 7.21,
7.17, and 7.18), in which Carnap (1956b, 49) assumes that the conditions 1–3 for αAi
ensure that αAi “makes a difference for the prediction of an observable event”. And
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the conditions are simply that αAi be compatible with and syntacticallyB -creative
relative to Θ, so that at the core of Carnap’s criterion lies the assumption thatB -
creativity is the correct deductive criterion of empirical significance for sentences.
But on the basis of his criterion for terms, Carnap then defines a new criterion for
sentences (definition 7.19), again relative to Θ. It is thus wholly unclear why one
cannot just keep syntacticB -creativity as a criterion for sentences.
Assuming with Hempel (1965c, §3) that all criteria for terms are meant to lead
to criteria for sentences via an analogue of Carnap’s definition 7.19, all the criteria
for terms therefore beg the question that Ayer’s recursive criterion was meant to
answer. And if the question is just what a criterion for sentences relative to some
given set of sentences looks like, then there are already good answers without the
detour over criteria for terms (as argued in §6.8.2).
Of course, a criterion for terms may still be used as a means to determine
whether some specific criterion for sentences is fulfilled. However, the criteria
for terms provide only necessary or sufficient conditions. A sentence that con-
tains onlyB -definable terms is translatable intoB , and a sentence containing
only terms definable in every model is strongly semanticallyB -dependent. But
there are sentences with terms neither definable nor definable in every model
that can be translated into B -sentences. Thus the strongest criteria for terms
provide sufficient but no necessary conditions for the empirical significance of
sentences according to the strongest criteria for sentences. The weakest criteria
provide necessary but no sufficient criteria for the weakest criteria for sentences:
A sentence containing only terms that are not given effective meaning is not
B -creative, but even sentences that contain onlyB -dependent terms can fail to
be weaklyB -determined. Reducibility and its variants provide neither necessary
nor sufficient conditions for any criterion for sentences.
Given this state of affairs, deductive criteria of empirical significance for terms
seem like solutions in search of a problem. A good start for finding out what the
criteria were meant to achieve in the first place should be their justifications when
first introduced, but these turn out to be mostly raw intuitions. When introducing
his last criterion, for example, Carnap (1956b, VI) relies on his description of
the explicandum and two criteria of adequacy that he does not defend. In his
discussion of reducibility, Carnap (1935a, 1936) stops at stating his definitions.
This, of course, does not mean that there cannot be a justification for any of
the criteria. For example, even though reducibility does not relate in an interesting
way to any of the criteria for sentences, it may be considered partly justified by
Peirce’s pragmatist maxim (Peirce 1878, II):
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bear-
ings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our
conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the
object.
And Peirce (1878, III) clarifies:
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Let us illustrate this rule by some examples; and, to begin with the
simplest one possible, let us ask what we mean by calling a thing hard.
Evidently that it will not be scratched by many other substances. The
whole conception of this quality, as of every other, lies in its conceived
effects.
Thus a concept consists of the effects that follow from the concept applying to
an object (cf. Hookway 2010, §2). If what one conceives based on a theory is
what is entailed by that theory, then an effect described by β belongs to a concept
P introduced by a theory Θ if and only if for an object c , Θ  P c → β. Since
the effect may depend on the object to which the concept applies, this means
Θ  ∀x¯[P x¯ → β(x¯)], so that, for example, it holds for every object x that x is
not scratched by many objects if x is hard. The formula also allows for concepts
relating different objects so that, for example, one may say for any x and y that x
scratches y if x is harder than y. Since the effect should not be trivially connected
to the concepts, one should demand that Θ 6 ∀x¯β(x¯).
Therefore a concept is non-empty only if condition (7.3) of the definition 7.5
of reducibility is met. From claim 7.10 and specifically formula (7.9), it follows
that the concept of a term P consists of its Ramsey constant RΘB ,P for finite Θ,
and from claim 7.11 it follows that a concept is non-empty only if Θ 6 ∀x¯RΘB ,P x¯.
Peirce’s justifications of the pragmatist maxim (cf. Hookway 2010, §2) thus amount
to a partial defense of Carnap’s criterion of reducibility. The problem with the
pragmatist maxim again seems to be that, as in the case of reducibility toB , some
sentences that contain only non-empty concepts have noB -implications, as the
example Θ  {∀x(P x→ B x)}, σ  ¬P b shows.
Given the dearth of justifications and the lack of need for a criterion for terms,
I expect it to be more fruitful to investigate the features of the criteria to find out
what they might be good for. Claim 7.20, for example, points to a somewhat subtle
difference. While a term that isB -unrestricted can be assigned any interpretation
whatsoever, a term that is not B -dependent can be assigned its interpretation
no matter what the interpretation of the B -terms is like. In other words, to
determine whether an interpretation fits a term that is not B -dependent, one
only needs to know the formalism Θ. To determine whether an interpretation fits
aB -unrestricted term, one does not need to know anything at all.
In this respect, the criteria for sets of terms are even more interesting. If a
set I of terms occursB -vacuously in Θ, there is, in a sense, absolutely nothing
gained by including I in the formulation of Θ. In fact, for any set J of terms
not already occurring in Θ, there is a new theory Λ  Θ in which the terms of
J occur vacuously. Specifically, in every model of Θ, every term in a vacuously
occurring set I can be interpreted in any way whatsoever. A set I ofB -isolated
terms, on the other hand, can be interpreted in any way whatsoever as long as the
interpretations respect the relations between the terms of I as determined by Θ.
In §4.1.3, corollary 4.7 was used to argue for the need for possible structures to
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connect sets of sentences to the world. Specifically, since a set of sentence alone can
never distinguish between isomorphic structures, any set of the right cardinality
can be made into a model of the sentences. In the case ofB -isolated terms, this
means that given any model A Θ and a single intended interpretationNV −I of
the V −I -terms, any bijection from |A| to NV −I  defines an interpretation of
the I -terms onNV −I . Put somewhat more precisely, if a V −I -structure A can
be expanded to a model of Θ at all, the interpretation of the I -terms is at best
determined up to permutations of
NV −I . An analogous result also holds for
sets of terms that are notB -dependent: If aB -structure NB can be expanded
to a model of Θ, the interpretations of the I -terms are at best determined up to
permutations of |NB |.
This discussion of B -isolated and not B -dependent sets of terms is very
reminiscent of Demopoulos’s argument against the Carnap sentence discussed in
§2.10.3. And while Demopoulos’s argument is invalid when applied toA -terms
in general, it can be applied verbatim to sets I of terms that areB -isolated or not
B -dependent. For Demopoulos (2003, 387, my notation) argues that for a single
intendedB -structureNB and any model A Θ, it is possible
to extend the partial interpretation [NB] to the theoretical vocab-
ulary of Θ [here: I ] by letting each predicate of its theoretical vo-
cabulary denote the image in N of its interpretation in A under any
one–one correspondence between A and N .
This construction is exactly the one given above. Demopoulos (2008, 381) further
argues that the Carnap sentence
is incapable of accurately representing the truth of theoretical claims
because it takes their truth to collapse into satisfiability in a suffi-
ciently large domain. This is hardly what we take the truth of theo-
retical claims to consist in, since we characteristically—and rightly—
distinguish them from those of pure mathematics.
And unlike forA -terms in general, Demopoulos’s criticism applies directly to
sets of terms that are notB -dependent and a fortiori toB -isolated sets of terms.
Thus such sets of terms should be considered mathematical.
According to claims 7.31, it is possible to render a setI of termsB -dependent
by adding sentences to Θ that do not contain any I -terms. And according to
claim 7.33, this is impossible forB -isolated sets of terms. Thus there can be two
kinds of mathematical terms in a theory—one that is and will always stay mathe-
matical absent direct reinterpretation, and one that may become non-mathematical
in the course of the development of the theory. It may be just this difference in
kind that has led to disagreements about the mathematical status of some concepts
in empirical theories.
In conclusion, it seems that the suggested criteria for the empirical significance
of terms are neither needed nor particularly helpful in determining whether some
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sentence is connected to basic sentences. On the other hand, it seems that almost
by chance, some of the criteria provide a means to identify and distinguish between
mathematical terms. For the further discussion of criteria of empirical significance,
criteria for terms thus do not seem relevant. However, I will come back to them
when discussing reduction and concept formation.
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Chapter 8
Probabilistic criteria for
sentences
Given the questionable status of deductive criteria for terms, I will not try to
develop probabilistic criteria for terms. As a starting point for my discussion
of probabilistic criteria for sentences, I will rely on the most recent previous
discussion, that by Elliott Sober. Over the last two decades, Sober (1990, 1999,
2007, 2008) has developed and defended a contrastive probabilistic criterion of
empirical significance called ‘testability’. To evaluate Sober’s criterion, I briefly
discuss his objections to falsifiability (§8.1.1) and to a Bayesian definition of empir-
ical significance (§8.1.2). To arrive at a precise and consistent definition of Sober’s
criterion, I discuss its implications, some of them unwanted (§8.2.1), and develop
an interpretation of inequalities between possibly undefined probabilities that
arguably follows from Sober’s assumptions (§8.2.2). I will then argue that one of
Sober’s restrictions is wholly unjustified, (§8.3.1) and, more importantly, the other
one is not strict enough to avoid a trivialization of the criterion (§8.3.2). In light of
these problems, I suggest two modified versions of Sober’s criterion, a relative one
that is provably non-trivial, and—on the basis of honest supplementary sentences
(definition 6.36)—an absolute one to which the trivialization proof for Sober’s
criterion does not apply (§8.3.3). However, even with these modifications, the
resulting criterion does not fulfill all the conditions of adequacy that Sober himself
endorses or relies on (§§8.4–8.5). Rather, the conditions uniquely determine a
non-contrastive criterion that is consistent with falsifiability when both criteria
can be applied (§8.6). Dropping a contentious condition of adequacy also allows
the Bayesian criterion (§8.7).
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8.1 Two criteria of empirical significance and their
problems
Sober (2008, 154) conjectures that his criterion is “a step forward from the failed
proposals of the logical positivists”, but this is misleading because the logical
positivists wanted to distinguish between meaningful and meaningless sentences
(cf. Carnap 1963c, §6.A). Sober (2010, 1), on the other hand, does not consider his
definition of testability to provide a criterion of empirical significance precisely be-
cause “ ‘[e]mpirical significance’ suggests that a sequence of terms has meaning iff
it is empirically testable”, a position to which he does not subscribe. Rather, Sober
(2008, 149–150) argues, meaningfulness is a semantic concept, while testability is
epistemic. And furthermore:
It seems clear that meaningfulness and testability are different. I sup-
pose that the sentence “undetectable angels exist” is untestable, but
the sentence is not meaningless gibberish. We know what it says,
what logical relations it bears to other statements, and we can discuss
whether it is knowable; none of this would be possible if the string of
words literally made no sense.
Therefore Sober is rather improving on the demarcation criterion by Popper, who
wanted to distinguish empirical from non-empirical statements (see §5.2). I will
follow Sober in the search for a demarcation criterion for empirical statements,
but not in his choice of terminology. I think that ‘empirical significance’ differs
from ‘meaningfulness’ enough to avoid confusion, and, as a technical term, is
clearly meant as a placeholder for a concept that is yet to be explicated.
8.1.1 Falsifiability
In line with his search for a demarcation criterion, Sober (2007; 2008, §2.8) in-
troduces his criterion as avoiding the problems of Popper’s falsifiability criterion.
One problem with falsifiability, Sober (2008, 130, cf. 151) notes, is that no purely
probabilistic statement is falsifiable: “Consider a simple example: the statement
that a coin has a probability of .5 of landing heads each time it is tossed [ . . . ] is
testable, but it does not satisfy Popper’s criterion”. To avoid this result, Popper
(1935, ch. VIII) generalizes his criterion, considering a theory Θ falsified even if an
event occurs that is possible but very improbable according to Θ∪Π , whereΠ
here are the supplementary sentences. But this generalization runs into problems
as well, as Sober (2002) explains: If a theory entails a basic sentence, then it allows
a deductive inference via modus ponens, ð{X ,X → Y }  Y ñ: The assumption of
the theory X and the fact that it implies Y entail Y . Popper justifies his criterion
of falsifiability by using the implication of a basic sentence in a modus tollens,
ð{¬Y,X → Y }  ¬X ñ. The justification of the probabilistic generalization of his
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criterion would thus have to rely on a probabilistic version of modus tollens, in
which a theory X is false or at the very least improbable if Pr(Y |X ) is high and
Y is false. But as Sober (2002, 69–70) points out (cf. Sober 2008, §1.4):
There is a “smooth [t]ransition” between probabilistic and deductive
modus ponens; the minor premiss (“X ”) either ensures that Y is true,
or makes Y very probable, depending on how the major premiss is
formulated. In contrast, there is a radical discontinuity between prob-
abilistic and deductive modus tollens. The minor premiss (“not-Y ”)
guarantees that X is false in the one case, but has no implications
whatever about the probability of X in the other.
Therefore, while Popper is right to infer from the fact that a theory entails a basic
sentence that the theory is falsifiable, he cannot infer the same from the fact that
it assigns a high probability to a basic sentence (and thus a low probability to
the sentence’s negation). Thus the generalization of falsifiability to probabilistic
theories has not been justified.
8.1.2 Bayesian empirical significance
A more successful criterion of empirical significance for probabilistic theories
has been suggested within Bayesianism, the position that non-deductive infer-
ences should follow the rules of the probability calculus, and specifically that the
confirmation of scientific theories should follow Bayes’s theorem,1
Pr(Θ |Ω ∪Π) = Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π)Pr(Θ |Π)
Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π)Pr(Ω |{¬∧Θ} ∪Π) . (8.1)
Pr(Θ |Π) is the probability of the theory given only the supplementary sentences,
that is, before the set Ω of basic sentences is taken into account, and thus called
the prior probability (of Θ). Pr(Θ |Ω ∪Π) is the probability of Θ after Ω is
taken into account, and hence called the posterior probability.2 Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) and
Pr(Ω |{¬∧Θ} ∪Π) are the likelihoods of Θ and {¬∧Θ}, respectively (for Ω).3
Here and in the following I will assume that for all theories Θ and supplementary
sentences Π it holds that Pr(Θ∪Π)> 0, and thus specifically that Θ and Π are
compatible (Θ∪Π 6⊥).
1I will assume that probabilities ‘Pr’ are assigned to sets of sentences, and in arguments for ‘Pr’
identify sentences and their singleton sets.
2Sober (2008, 8) calls Pr(Θ) the prior and Pr(Θ |Ω) the posterior probability and discusses Bayesian-
ism without supplementary sentences. But he also argues that Pr(Ω |Θ), which would be used to
determine Pr(Θ |Ω), is, unlike Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π), almost never defined. Prior and posterior probabilities
therefore have to be defined relative to supplementary sentences, lest Bayesianism be empty.
3If Θ does not have a finite axiomatization, one also has to find an axiomatization that expresses
that Θ is false (see n. 16 below.), and which can thus be substituted for ¬∧Θ.
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In Bayesianism, the confirmation of a theory Θ is defined as follows (Howson
and Urbach 1993, §7a; Sober 2008, 15):
Definition 8.1. Set Ω of basic sentences confirms Θ relative to Π in Bayesianism
if and only if
Pr(Θ |Ω ∪Π)> Pr(Θ |Π) . (8.2)
Ω disconfirms Θ relative to Π in Bayesianism if and only if
Pr(Θ |Ω ∪Π)< Pr(Θ |Π) . (8.3)
For Θ to be actually confirmed or disconfirmed, Ω has to be true. Ω then tests
Θ relative to Π in Bayesianism if and only if Ω confirms or disconfirms Θ relative
toΠ in Bayesianism.
Sober (1999, 48) states for any relation R:
If a set of observations provides a test of a proposition because it bears
relation R to that proposition, then a proposition is testable when it
is possible for there to be a set of observations that bears relation R to
the proposition. Testing is to testability as dissolving is to solubility.
Since definition 8.1 determines what it is to test a theory, it therefore also deter-
mines a criterion of testability (cf. Sober 2008, 150)4:
Definition 8.2. Basic sentences are relevant for theoryΘ relative to supplementary
sentencesΠ if and only if there is a possible set of basic sentences Ω such that5
Pr(Θ |Ω ∪Π) 6= Pr(Θ |Π) . (8.4)
The sense of ‘possible’ in this definition and in the rest of this and the follow-
ing three chapters (on intelligent design and confirmation) will be that a set of
sentences is possible if and only if it is compatible withΠ , whereΠ is the set of
supplementary sentences in the specific context.
Sober (2008, 150, 24–30) rejects the Bayesian definitions of confirmation,
disconfirmation, and testability. He argues that if Θ is, say, the theory of general
relativity, it is well-nigh impossible to assign a probability to Θ, or assess the
likelihood of {¬∧Θ}, so that Pr(Θ |Π), Pr(Ω |{¬∧Θ} ∪Π), and Pr(Θ |Ω ∪Π)
are often undefined. Bayes theorem (8.1) then becomes unusable, and definition 8.2
very questionable.
4Sober (2008, 144–145) does not mention supplementary sentences in his discussion (and rejection)
of the definition, but is very explicit about their relevance.
5I will always silently assume that for any occurring conditional probability Pr(Λ |Γ ), Pr(Γ ) 6= 0.
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8.2 Sober’s criterion of empirical significance
8.2.1 A precise formulation
Sober (2008, 152) suggests a criterion of empirical significance that avoids all of
the problems discussed so far. Unlike falsifiability, his criterion does not render
all probabilistic theories empirically non-significant and does not rely on a faulty
probabilistic generalization of modus tollens for its justification; unlike the Bayesian
criterion, it does not rely on the probabilities of whole theories or on likelihoods
of the negations of theories. The criterion is the following:6
Hypothesis Θ can now be tested against hypothesis Λ if and only if
there exist true auxiliary assumptionsΠ and an observation statement
Ω such that (i) Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π), (ii) we now are justified
in believingΠ , and (iii) the justification we now have for believingΠ
does not depend on believing that Θ is true or that Λ is true and also
does not depend on believing that Ω is true (or that it is false).
For the reason given in n. 25 on page 257, I will speak of ‘supplementary sen-
tences’ rather than ‘auxiliary assumptions’ in the following. Further, to identify
Sober’s notion of testability as a technical notion, I will refer to it as ‘contrastive
testability’.
Contrastive testability as defined in the above quote has some lacunae that I
will point out and amend in this section. For example, Sober (2008, 151) remarks
that in his definition of contrastive testability, the “word ‘now’ marks the fact
that whether a proposition has observational implications depends on the rest of
what we are justified in believing, and that can change”. However, the use of the
indexical ‘now’ does not define testability relative to time in general, but relative
to the specific time of the utterance. Thus ‘Θ can now be tested against Λ’ is
defined, but ‘Θ will be testable against Λ within a decade’ is not. ‘Within a decade,
the utterance “Θ can now be tested against Λ” will be true’, on the other hand,
is defined. To avoid such cumbersome formulations, one can define contrastive
testability as the three-place predicate ‘Θ can at time t be tested against Λ’. This
achieves Sober’s intention more explicitly.7
The other indexical term of the definition, ‘we’, is as crucial as ‘now’, as Sober’s
quote shows. Which beliefs are justified not only changes in time, but also changes
from group to group. For example, Sober (1999, 49) discusses at length the special
role that observations play in the justification of beliefs, and states: “The fact that
dinosaurs, in a sense, are observable entities, while quarks, in a sense, are not,
is irrelevant. The point is that we have actually observed neither”. Since what
has actually been observed differs from group to group and even from person to
6Here and in the rest of the chapter, I will always silently substitute my own notation in formulas.
7As in §6.8.2, I will suppress the reference to a specific time later on; but I want to note it explicitly
at least once.
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person, the term ‘we’ cannot be avoided in Sober’s definition. However, because
‘we’ occurs only in the definiens, Sober’s criterion for testability is technically
not a definition but rather a claim—and a false one at that. This is because the
criterion violates the demand that in an explicit definition, any free variable of
the definiens must also occur free in the definiendum, and thus Sober’s criterion
is creative (cf. Belnap 1993, 139): If for two theories Θ and Λ, one referent of
‘we’ fulfills the definiens at t , the definiendum applies to Θ and Λ at t . But then
the definiendum applies to Θ and Λ at t no matter the referent of ‘we’, and thus
any referent fulfills the definiens for Θ and Λ at t . Hence according to Sober’s
criterion, it holds for any Ω, Θ, Λ, andΠ that fulfill (i): If one group is justified in
believingΠ independently of Θ, Λ, Ω, and the falsity of Ω, then every group is.8
To avoid this unintended implication, testability must be defined as both relative
to time and relative to a group of people. It is thus a four-place predicate.
As it stands, restriction (iii) on the supplementary sentences sounds like the
demand that the justification ofΠ must not depend on the fact that the truth of
Θ,Λ or Ω or the falsity of Ω is content of our beliefs. But very few statements are
justified by the having of a belief, so that condition (iii) would be almost empty
if this was meant. The restriction is therefore probably better expressed as the
demand that the justifications forΠ must not depend on the fact that the belief in
the truth ofΘ,Λ, orΩ or the falsity ofΩ is justified. For convenience, I will mostly
drop the reference to beliefs in the following, and speak of justified sentences,
rather than justified beliefs in the truth of propositions expressed by sentences.
Finally, the condition (i) on the likelihoods of Θ and Λ needs to be elucidated,
given that Sober’s critique of the Bayesian criterion of empirical significance
assumes that some likelihoods are undefined. Prima facie, one would expect thatΘ
and Λ cannot be tested against each other if and only if Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) = Pr(Ω |Λ∪
Π) for all Ω andΠ that fulfill conditions (ii) and (iii). But this would mean that
the lack of contrastive testability is transitive for any theories that are not used
to justify their own or each other’s supplementary sentences. For assume that
Θ cannot be contrastively tested against Λ, and Λ cannot be contrastively tested
against ∆. Then for all Ω, Pr(Ω |Θ ∪Π) = Pr(Ω |Λ ∪Π) and Pr(Ω |Λ ∪Π) =
Pr(Ω |∆∪Π), so that for all Ω, Pr(Ω |Θ ∪Π) = Pr(Ω |∆∪Π). Thus Θ cannot
be contrastively tested against∆. This transitivity is incompatible with Sober’s
remark that it is not clear that intelligent design (ID, see §9) “can be tested against
the Epicurean hypothesis that a mindless chance process gave vertebrates their
eyes (or, for that matter, against the evolutionary hypothesis that the process of
evolution by natural selection did the work)” (Sober 2008, 148). Assuming that
the chance hypothesis can be tested against evolutionary theory (ET), if ID cannot
be tested against either one, the lack of testability is not transitive. The solution
8Keeping Sober’s indexical formulation, it holds for any Ω, Θ, Λ, andΠ that fulfill (i): If for one
group the claim ‘We are now justified in believingΠ independently of Θ, Λ, Ω, or the falsity of Ω’ is
true, then the claim is true for every group.
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to this puzzle is that Sober (2010, 2–3) interprets the inequality as true if and only
if both likelihoods are defined and different. This interpretation, however, plays
havoc with classical logic, for p 6= q  ¬ p = q . Therefore, if the likelihoods p
and q are defined and different, while the likelihood a is undefined, it follows
from Sober’s interpretation of the inequality that p = a and a = q , while p 6= q .
To avoid such inconsistencies, it is probably best to treat undefined likelihoods
separately in the definition.
Finally, Sober (2008, 148) assumes that the basic sentences that are relevant for
testability are those that are possible given our background knowledge (cf. Sober
1999, 48–49). These considerations lead to
Definition 8.3. Theory Θ is contrastively testable against theory Λ if and only
if there are supplementary sentences Π and a set of basic sentences Ω that are
possible given our background knowledge such that
(I) Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) and Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) are defined,
(II) Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π),
(III) Π is justified, and
(IV) the justification ofΠ
a) does not depend on Θ or Λ being justified and
b) does not depend on the belief or the disbelief in Ω being justified.
One could reformulate definition 8.3 to include a reference to times and
groups of people, that is, define ‘Θ can be tested against Λ at time t by group g ’
by relativizing ‘justification’ (and possibly ‘dependence’) to t and g . In similar
cases, especially when the supplementary sentences are simply the background
assumptions, these relativizations are typically suppressed because it is clear that
the background assumptions and generally the set of justified sentences can change
over time and from group to group. Thus I will do likewise.
Sober calls his criterion simply ‘testability’, but the qualifier ‘contrastive’
distinguishes it clearly from the ordinary language term and emphasizes that,
atypically, the empirical significance of one theory is defined relative to another. It
may seem problematic to explicate a one-place predicate like ‘makes observational
assertions’ by a two-place predicate like contrastive testability. Frege (1918, 291),
for example, objects to the explication of ‘truth’ as a correspondence relation
on the grounds that the first is a one-place, the second a two-place predicate.
However, many successful explications involve a change of the logical structure,
as the explication of ‘warm’ by ‘warmer than’ and finally ‘temperature’ illustrates
(Carnap 1950b, §4). As already noted, Hempel (1952, §10) argues that the move
from a classificatory to a comparative concept is often a sign of an investigation’s
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maturity, and his criticism of empirical significance (Hempel 1965c, 117) is best
seen as an argument for a comparative explicatum for empirical significance.
But unlike ‘warmer than’, contrastive testability is symmetric: The definiens
is invariant up to logical equivalence under exchange of Θ and Λ. Thus contrastive
testability does not provide a means to decide which of two theories is what could
be called ‘more empirically significant’. And this may be a problem. What is more,
in some passages Sober himself uses ‘testability’ like a one-place predicate. For
instance, he claims that ‘Undetectable angels exist’ is untestable and that ‘This
coin has probability of .5 of landing heads’ is testable, which is, strictly speaking,
meaningless for a two-place predicate like contrastive testability. And both claims
are important for Sober’s line of argument, since he relies on the first to argue
that testability is different from meaningfulness, and on the second to argue that
falsifiability is not an adequate criterion of empirical significance. Thus even Sober
seems to rely tacitly on a concept of empirical significance that is not captured by
contrastive testability. I will come back to this in §8.6.2.
8.2.2 Interpreting inequalities between probabilities
In the discussion of Sober’s interpretation of the inequality in his criterion (§8.2.1),
it has already become apparent that dealing with undefined probabilities is not an
entirely straightforward matter. And even though definition 8.4 treats the case of
undefined likelihoods explicitly, it still involves some lacunae. Specifically, if one
of the likelihoods is not defined, it is not obvious how to treat the inequality (8.6),
and not entirely obvious how to treat the whole definition. For the definition is
logically a conjunction with the inequality as a conjunct, and it is unclear whether
a conjunction with one undefined conjunct is undefined as well. It would thus be
desirable if the inequality were never undefined, so that the usual rules of logic
can apply. Luckily, Sober’s assumptions arguably entail just such an interpretation
of the inequality.
It is uncontentious that Pr(Σ |Θ) is defined when Θ assigns a real-valued
probability to Σ . But as Sober himself states when arguing for the need for
supplementary sentences, theories alone often do not assert anything, and thus
do not assign a real-valued probability to any basic sentence. And even with
supplementary sentencesΠ , no theory will make assertions about everything.9
Rather, Θ∪Π restricts the set of reals from the unit interval that can be assigned
to some set Σ of sentences to a subset of the unit interval, possibly to one specific
value x ∈ [0,1], while the set of reals for some other sets of sentences may remain
unrestricted. The conditional probability Pr(Σ |Θ ∪Π) can then either always
be read as the set of reals that Σ can be assigned under the assumption of Θ∪Π ,
9More precisely: For any even remotely plausible theory Θ, Θ ∪Π can be complete inB only
for very restricted vocabulariesB , where Θ is complete inB if and only if for all sets Ω of basic
sentences, Pr(Ω |Θ ∪Π) = x, x ∈ [0,1]. It is thus always possible to expandB by well-interpreted
basic terms so that Θ fails to be complete inB .
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Values of likelihoods Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π)
Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
x y T . . .
x x F . . .
x U T T T F F F U U U
U U T F U T F U T F U
Table 8.1: The nine possible interpretations of the inequality in definition 8.5 depending on the values
of the probabilities, where x, y with x 6= y are acceptable values for likelihoods, ‘T ’ stands for ‘true’,
‘F ’ stands for ‘false’, and ‘U ’ stands for ‘undefined’.
from [0,1] to proper subsets thereof down to the singleton set {x}, x ∈ [0,1]. Or
Pr(Σ |Θ∪Π) may be read as defined only when it is a set of some specific kind
considered acceptable (e. g., a proper sub-interval of [0,1] or a singleton set), and
undefined in all other cases.
Depending on the treatment of formulas that contain undefined terms, the
second reading of conditional probabilities leads to different interpretations of the
inequality (8.6), given in table 8.1. Sober seems to assume the validity of classical
logic, so that ¬σ is false if and only if σ is true and tautologies are always true.
This excludes some of the possible interpretations: Considering again the case
where p and q are defined and different, while a is undefined, it is clear that
interpretations 4–6 (5 being Sober’s) are inconsistent because they lead to p = a,
a = q , and p 6= q . When a is undefined, interpretations 1, 3, 7, and 9 do not render
a 6= a false, and thus they are also excluded. Interpretation 8 is excluded if one
demands that classical logic be truth-preserving and at least one disjunct of a true
disjunction be true. For then, if p and q are defined and identical, while a and b
are undefined, p = q and a = b are true, and entail a = p∨b 6= q , which according
to interpretation 8 has two undefined disjuncts. The remaining interpretation 2
can be seen as following from the introduction of the special value ‘undefined’ for
probability-terms.
Under these assumptions, there are thus two possible interpretations of the
inequality:
1. When all sets of reals are acceptable, the inequality is true if and only if the
two sets differ. Otherwise, it is false.
2. When some sets of reals are unacceptable, the inequality is true if and only
if its two sides are defined and different, or one side is defined and the other
one is not. Otherwise, the inequality is false. (Interpretation 2 in table 8.1)
It is clear that the inequality is true more often for interpretation 1 than for
interpretation 2, since in interpretation 1 it is true whenever the set on one side
differs from the set on the other side, but also when there is a difference between
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two sets that are unacceptable under the second reading of the likelihoods. It is
also clear that Sober does not subscribe to interpretation 1, since in that case,
there are no undefined likelihoods. In fact, he developed his concept of contrastive
testability under the assumption that only singleton sets are acceptable (Sober 2010,
3). With these two readings of probability and the corresponding interpretations
of the inequality, definition 8.3 is now indeed defined in all cases because the
inequality is always either true or false.
8.3 The restrictions on the supplementary sen-
tences
Definition 8.3 is formally correct, but is nonetheless problematic. Specifically,
I will argue that there are serious problems both with restriction IVa (that the
supplementary assumptions be independent of the tested theories) and IVb (that
the supplementary assumptions be independent of the basic sentences). Sober
(1999, 54) introduces supplementary assumptions into the definition because
“hypotheses rarely make observational predictions on their own; they require
supplementation by auxiliary assumptions if they are to be tested” (cf. Sober
2007, 5–6; Sober 2008, 144).10 But this “raises the question of which auxiliary
assumptions we should use to render a theory testable. What makes an auxiliary
assumption ‘suitable’?” (Sober 2008, 144). Restrictions IVa and IVb are answers to
these questions.
8.3.1 Dependence on the theories
Sober (2008, 145) at one point simply states that the need for restriction IVa is
obvious, and elaborates in another passage that without it, his criterion would
beg the question (Sober 2007, 6). But this, at least, is not obvious. Arguments
must not in general allow their conclusion among their premises (that is, beg the
question). For otherwise every claim could be shown to be true by including it in
the premises of the argument, and the concept of an argument would be trivial.
But even without restriction IVa, it is not possible to simply assume that Θ can be
tested against Λ when the criterion is applied. In fact, I want to show that IVa is
often ineffective or redundant, and in general lacks a justification.
There are a number of cases in which restriction IVa is ineffective. Obviously,
two theories that are not contrastively testable without IVa cannot be contrastively
testable with IVa. For if there are no supplementary sentences Π that fulfill
IVb, there are also no supplementary sentences that fulfill IVb and IVa. And the
converse usually also holds: Two theories that are contrastively testable without
10Since Sober does not use ‘prediction’ to refer exclusively to claims about the future, I will treat it
as synonymous with ‘assertion’.
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IVa usually do not fail to be so with IVa. It is typical, for example, that (i) theories
Θ and Λ are incompatible, and (ii) the supplementary sentences used to determine
the likelihoods of Θ at most depend on Θ, not on the competing theory Λ (and
vice versa). Now, for restriction IVa to do any work, there has to be a set Ω of
B -sentences such that there are no supplementary sentences that fulfill conditions
I–IV, but there are justified supplementary sentencesΠ that fulfill restriction IVb,
Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π), and both likelihoods are defined. By assumption
(ii), the supplementary sentences are of the formΠ  Π1∪Π2, whereΠ1 does not
depend on Λ andΠ2 does not depend on Θ. Thus
∧
Θ→∧Π1 and∧Λ→∧Π2
are justified without assumingΘ orΛ. Therefore,Π ′ := {(∧Θ→∧Π1)∧(∧Λ→∧
Π2)} fulfills restriction IVa, and since by assumption (i), Θ∪Π ′  Θ∪Π and
Λ∪Π ′  Λ∪Π , Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π ′) 6= Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π ′) so that Θ can be tested against
Λ.11
I have just argued that restriction IVa is often ineffective. Another problem
is that it is also redundant in the important cases.12 To see this, note that re-
striction III demands thatΠ be justified, and that a sentence whose justification
depends on another sentence B be justified only if B is justified. (Giving up this
relation between ‘justified’ and ‘depend’ would render Sober’s restriction IV alto-
gether empty.) Thus a supplementary sentence whose justification depends on Θ
fulfills the definiens of definition 8.3 only if Θ itself is justified, and analogously
for Λ. Typically, however, the question of empirical significance does not even
come up for theories that are already justified. Indeed, Sober assumes that a theory
is confirmed only if it has been tested, and this is possible only if it is testable.
Assuming that only confirmed theories are justified, restriction IVa therefore
goes beyond restriction III only when the question of empirical significance has
already been answered. Of course, one may want to justify or confirm an already
justified or confirmed theory further, but this is then not a question of contrastive
testability any more.13
This general argument is not countered by the example that Sober (2008, 145)
adduces to show the need for restriction IVa. In it, he envisions Jones being tried
for a murder, with a size 12 shoe print, cigar ash, and .45 Colt shells found at the
crime scene. When considering whether Smith may be the culprit instead, Sober
notes, one must not simply conclude that the evidence favors Smith over Jones on
11Since this inference relies on the sentences ‘
∧
Θ →∧Π1’ and ‘∧Λ→∧Π2’, it assumes that
Θ, Λ,Π1, andΠ2 are finite. The assumption can be somewhat alleviated in two ways. First, if Θ, Λ,
Π1, andΠ2 are not finite but can be axiomatized by the finite sets Θ
†, Λ†,Π†1 , andΠ
†
2 , respectively,
the sentences ‘
∧
Θ†→∧Π†1 ’ and ‘∧Λ†→∧Π†2 ’ can be used instead. Second, it may be possible to
equivalently reformulateΠ asΠ∗ ∪Π1 ∪Π2, whereΠ∗ does not depend on either Θ or Λ and can be
infinite. ThenΠ ′ can be defined asΠ∗ ∪{∧Θ→∧Π1} ∪ {∧Λ→∧Π2}.
12In those cases, it is thus irrelevant that it is ineffective.
13There is also the question how any theory or supplementary sentence could ever be justified
simpliciter, rather than confirmed contrastively against some other theory. I will come back to this
problem in §10.2.
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the basis of the assumption that Smith is a Colt-owning smoker with size 12 feet,
while Jones is not.
First note that in this example the question is which theory can be inferred
from the evidence, not which observations are asserted by the theory; that is, the
example revolves around a question of confirmation, not empirical significance.
More important in the following is that the belief about Smith’s shoe size would
be excluded from the supplementary assumptions even without restriction IVa.
This is because, first, the belief that Smith is the murderer (Θ) is itself not justified,
and thus cannot justify anything. Second, Smith’s murdering someone does not
allow any conclusion about her shoe size. This conclusion also requires the belief
that there was a size 12 shoe print at the crime scene (Ω). In other words, the
justification of the supplementary assumption cannot depend on Θ, for then it
would be excluded fromΠ by restriction III, and it is excluded by restriction IVb
anyway, because its justification depends on Ω.
Restriction IVa is included in definition 8.3 for more serious reasons than
fictitious murder trials with careless jurors. It is meant to address an argument in
defense of the contrastive testability of ID against ET that Sober (1999, 65, note
removed) describes as follows (cf. Sober 2008, 143–146):
[A]dvocates of the design argument should not be confident that they
know what characteristics God would have wanted to give to organ-
isms on earth if he had created them. Creationists may be tempted to
respond to this challenge simply by inspecting the life we see around
us and saying that God wanted to create that. After all, if life is the
result of God’s blueprint, can’t we infer what the blueprint said by
seeing what the resulting edifice looks like? [But you] can’t just as-
sume that God created organisms, and you also can’t assume that if
God created organisms he would have made them with such-and-such
characteristics.
Analogously to the murder trial, the justification of the supplementary sentence
about God’s intentions in the creationists’ argument depends both on the assump-
tion that God exists and the assumption of the basic sentence that life is as we see it
around us, like “that”.14 Therefore it is excluded fromΠ by restriction III because
it is not justified until the belief in God is justified. And if a description of life as
we see it around us is given as the basic sentence Ω for which the likelihoods of ID
and ET differ, then the supplementary sentence is also excluded by restriction IVb
for dependence on Ω.
8.3.2 Dependence on basic sentences
Sober (2008, 145, my notation) justifies restriction IVb as follows (cf. Sober 2007,
14In disanalogy to the murder trial, the question in this case is indeed which basic sentences the
theory asserts, not which theory the basic sentences confirm.
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6):
IfΩ is true, so is the disjunction “eitherΘ is false orΩ is true”. If you
use this disjunction as your auxiliary assumptionΠ1, then it turns out
that the conjunction
∧
Θ∧∧Π1 entails Ω. This allows Θ to make
a prediction about Ω even when Θ has nothing at all to do with Ω.
The same ploy can be used to obtain auxiliary assumptionsΠ2 so that
the conjunction
∧
Λ∧∧Π2 also entails Ω. Using propositions Π1
andΠ2 as auxiliary assumptions leads to the conclusion that the two
hypotheses Θ and Λ both have likelihoods of unity.
As it stands, this argument proves nothing about the relevance of restriction IVb
for the definition of contrastive testability, since it only shows that for one specific
supplementary assumption,Π  Π1 ∪Π2, both theories’ likelihoods are 1. But to
show that Θ cannot be tested against Λ, their likelihoods have to be identical for
all supplementary assumptions that fulfill restrictions III and IVa. (Furthermore,
if the goal was to arrive at the same likelihood for both theories, Π  Ω would
achieve the same result.)
But the ingenuity of the choice ofΠ1 is exactly that, if Θ and Λ are completely
unrelated to Ω, the likelihood of Θ ∪Π1 is 1, while the likelihood of Λ∪Π1 is
not. Reconceptualized in this way, Sober’s case for restriction IVb is a typical
trivialization proof, since it shows that without it, any two theories can be tested
against each other. The argument has four tacit assumptions, however. First, a
set σ of sentences (here: ¬∧Θ ∨∧Ω) logically entailed by a set Σ of justified
sentences (here: Ω) is also justified, since otherwise σ might be excluded by
restriction III. Second, σ depends for its justification only on Σ , for otherwise, σ
might be excluded by restriction IVa or, implausibly, for its dependence on ¬∧Ω
by restriction IVb. Third, Pr
 
Ω |Λ ∪ {¬∧Θ ∨∧Ω} 6= 1. Finally, Pr Ω |Λ ∪
{¬∧Θ∨∧Ω}must be defined, for otherwise condition I is not fulfilled.
The fourth tacit assumption is probably false, since neitherΘ nor Λ are related
to Ω. By considering additional supplementary sentences Π , however, one can
arrive at a modification of the proof that has plausible premises. LetΠ be such that
it is unrelated to Θ and Λ, and Pr(Ω |A) is defined. Then a plausible fourth tacit
assumption is that for any σ unrelated to Θ and Λ, Pr(Ω |Λ∪{¬∧Θ∨σ}∪Π) is
therefore defined as well: Conjoining Λ withΠ does not render the conditional
probability of Ω undefined, since Λ is not related to Ω. Conjoining ¬∧Θ ∨ σ
with Λ∪Π arguably does not render the conditional probability of Ω undefined,
either, because the inferences one can draw from ¬∧Θ∨σ are weaker than those
that one can draw from Θ, and Θ is already unrelated to Ω. Choosing σ =
∧
Ω
and incorporating Π in all premises now allows giving a corrected version of
Sober’s proof, which can also be recovered from the proof of claim 8.1 below.
Sober does not show why the reference to ¬∧Ω (the disbelief in Ω) in restric-
tion IVb is necessary, but his trivialization proof can be repeated for ¬∧Ω. Since
Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) = 1−Pr(¬∧Ω |Θ∪Π), and analogously for Λ instead of Θ,Π can
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be justified withΩ, while the likelihoods of Θ and Λ would differ for ¬∧Ω. This
proof assumes that the negation of a basic sentence is itself a basic sentence, which
is fairly uncontroversial. It is not only tacitly assumed by Popper (see claim 6.1)
and Sober (e. g. 1999, n. 14), but also fulfilled by the most common restrictions on
basic sentences: It holds if all and only sentences with a specific non-logical vocab-
ulary are basic (cf. Psillos 2000, 158–159), if all and only molecular sentences with
a specific vocabulary are basic (cf. Carnap 1937, §23), and if all and only sentences
are basic whose quantifiers are relativized to observable objects (as discussed by
Carnap 1956b, §II and assumed by van Fraassen—see §4.2). A sentence could also
be considered basic if and only if it is about subject matterB , and according to
Lewis (1988b, 140–141), if a sentence is about observations, so is its negation. All
these restrictions even entail that the set of observation sentences is closed under
truth-functional composition.
While restriction IVb is necessary to avoid trivialization of definition 8.3, it
is not sufficient. Specifically, any two theories can be tested against each other as
long as one of them can be finitely axiomatized:
Claim 8.1. Let Θ, Λ, Ω, and Π be sets of sentences and σ a sentence such that
1. Ω is a set of basic sentences,
2. σ Ω,
3. σ and Π are justified independently of Ω, the falsity of Ω, Θ, and Λ,
4. σ and Π are unrelated to Θ and Λ,
5. Pr(Ω |Π) is defined, and
6. Pr(Ω |Λ∪{¬∧Θ} ∪Π) 6= 1.
Given Sober’s tacit assumptions in the defense of restriction IVb, Θ and Λ can then be
tested against each other.
Proof. Choose Ω, σ , and Π such that conditions 1–6 hold. Since σ and Π are
justified, so isΠ∗  {¬∧Θ∨σ}∪Π by Sober’s first tacit assumption. It follows
from Sober’s second tacit assumption that, since the justifications of σ and Π
do not depend on Ω, its falsity, Θ, or Λ, neither does the justification of Π∗.
ThereforeΠ∗ fulfills restrictions III and IV of definition 8.3.
Now, from Pr(Ω |Λ∪{¬∧Θ} ∪Π) 6= 1 and σ Ω it follows that Pr Ω |Λ∪
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{¬∧Θ∨σ} ∪Π 6= 1:
Pr
 
Ω |Λ∪{¬∧Θ∨σ})∪Π=
Pr(Ω ∪Λ∪{¬∧Θ} ∪Π)+Pr(Ω ∪Λ∪{σ} ∪Π)−Pr(Ω ∪Λ∪{¬∧Θ∧σ})
Pr(Λ∪{¬∧Θ} ∪Π)+Pr(Λ∪{σ} ∪Π)−Pr(Λ∪{¬∧Θ∧σ} ∪Π)
=
Pr(Ω ∧Λ∪{¬∧Θ} ∪Π)+ c
Pr(Λ∪{¬∧Θ} ∪Π)+ c . (8.5)
The last term equals 1 if and only if Pr
 
Ω |Λ∪{¬∧Θ}∪Π= 1. Since Pr(Ω |Π) is
defined, Pr(Ω |Λ∪{¬∧Θ∨σ}∪Π) = Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π∗) is defined by the fourth tacit
assumption. Since furthermore Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π∗) = 1, it holds that Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π∗) 6=
Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π∗), where both probabilities are defined. Θ and Λ can therefore be
contrastively tested against each other.
Note that for Pr(Θ ∪Λ∪Π) = 0, condition 6 simplifies to ‘Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) 6=
1’. The corrected version of the trivialization proof that Sober uses to justify
restriction IVb can be recovered by dropping σ in condition 3 and choosing
σ  ∧Ω. Then condition 2 is trivially true, 3 amounts to Sober’s restriction IV,
4 and 5 are the antecedents of the fourth tacit assumption, and 6 is equivalent to
the third tacit assumption.
Conditions 1–3 are impossible to fulfill if a justification can proceed only
deductively from basic sentences, because then the justification of a sentence
depends on every basic sentence it entails. However, since Sober’s criterion is
meant to be applicable to inductive theories, it is plausible that supplementary
sentences can also be inductively justified. In that case, it is easy to find sentences
Ω, σ , and Π that fulfill all the requirements. For instance, let Π express that 1
out of 10 vases of some kind breaks when dropped from a specific height. Let
furthermore σ express that a specific vase of that kind does not break when
dropped a hundred times from a that height, and Ω express that the vase does not
break on the hundredth drop. Then σ is justified independently of Ω when the
vase is dropped 99 times without breaking, so that Ω, σ , andΠ fulfill conditions
1–6 for any two theories that are not related to vases. Since according to Sober
hypotheses rarely make observational predictions on their own, that includes
almost all theories. But even for two theories that make assertions about vases, it
should not be difficult to find other basic sentences that neither they nor their
negations assert with probability 1, but that can be asserted by enumerative
induction.
Considering the somewhat problematic status of the fourth tacit assumption,
the result of this section can be seen as a dilemma: Either the tacit assumptions
(especially the fourth) hold or they do not hold. If they do not hold, Sober’s
restriction IVb has not been justified. If they do, the restriction is to weak to avoid
trivialization.
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8.3.3 New definitions
Sober’s restriction IVa is unjustified where it is not redundant or ineffective, and
restrictions III and IV together are to weak to avoid trivialization. Clearly, the
search for general restrictions on the supplementary sentences poses a host of
subtle problems. To bracket these problems, I suggest
Definition 8.4. Theory Θ can be contrastively tested against theory Λ relative to
supplementary sentences Π if and only if there exists a set Ω of basic sentence
such that Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) and Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) are defined and
Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) . (8.6)
This definition is not trivial: ChooseΠ =∅, two non-basic, non-equivalent
sentences σ and σ ′, and, for some set Ω of basic sentences, Θ  {σ ,Pr(Ω) = p}
and Λ  {σ ′,Pr(Ω) = q} for some probabilities p and q . Then Θ and Λ are never
equivalent, and Θ can be contrastively tested against Λ if and only if p 6= q , so
that many contingent theories can and many contingent theories cannot be tested
against each other relative to Π . Definition 8.4 makes it necessary, however, to
decide on a case-by-case basis which supplementary sentences are suitable. This
may be a good preliminary strategy, because often the suitable supplementary
sentences are reasonably clear. For instance, often the suitable supplementary
sentences are those that could feature as background assumptions.
Eventually, of course, it would be helpful to have a general criterion for suitable
supplementary sentences and define absolute contrastive testability as contrastive
testability relative to suitable supplementary sentences. To this end, I suggest the
following. The proof of claim 8.1 is a modification of the trivialization proof for
Sober’s criterion of ‘having observable implications’ given in §6.8.2 and leads to
a similar diagnosis. Sober’s proof and that of claim 8.1 rely on the possibility of
including a sentence (¬∧Θ∨∧Ω or ¬∧Θ∨σ ) inΠ that is justified by another
one (
∧
Ω or σ) that is itself not included in Π . Both trivialization proofs can
therefore be blocked by explicating ‘suitable supplementary sentences’ as ‘honest
set of supplementary sentences’ (see definition 6.36). Note that this definition only
uses concepts that already occur in Sober’s definition 8.3 of contrastive testability.
Definition 6.36 allows a modification of Sober’s criterion of testability as
follows:
Definition 8.5. Theory Θ is absolutely contrastively testable against theory Λ if
and only if Θ can be tested against Λ relative to an honest set of supplementary
sentences containing all analytic sentences.
The proof that relative contrastive testability is not trivial also shows that
some theories are absolutely contrastively testable against each other, for ∅ is
an honest set according to definition 6.36, assuming that there are no relevant
analytic sentences. I will not attempt to prove that there are two sets of sentences
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that fail to be absolutely contrastively testable, because this would amount to
finding two sets that are not contrastively testable relative to any honest set. The
proof is immediate for equivalent sets of sentences, but impossible for other pairs
of sets without more precise notions of justification and dependence.15
Definition 8.5 is at least as exclusive as Sober’s definition 8.3, however. The
restriction of the supplementary sentences in definition 8.5 to honest sets entails
restriction III of definition 8.3. And while the restriction to honest sets does not
entail restriction IVb, it precludes all trivializations precluded by that restriction:
Two theories Θ and Λ fail to be contrastively testable because of restriction IVb
only if for any σ whose inclusion in Π would lead to differing likelihoods for
some Ω, the justification of σ depends on Ω or the falsity of Ω. In that case,
IVb ensures that Θ and Λ are not contrastively testable. The restriction of Π
to honest sets leads to the same result, because if the justification of σ depends
on Ω (or its falsity) and Π is honest, then Ω ⊆ Π (∆ ⊆ Π for some set ∆ of
sentences expressing the falsity ofΩ).16 Thus Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) = 1 = Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) (or
Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) = 0 = Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π)). As an example, take the sentence ¬∧Θ∨∧Ω
of Sober’s trivialization proof. Restriction IVb excludes ¬∧Θ∨∧Ω from the
supplementary sentencesΠ , so that the likelihoods ofΘ and Λ forΩ cannot differ
because of ¬∧Θ∨∧Ω. The restriction to honest sets, on the other hand, leads
to the inclusion of Ω in Π , so that the likelihoods do not differ, either. Unlike
restriction IVb, the restriction to honest sets also leads to identical likelihoods
if ¬∧Θ ∨ σ is justified by a sentence σ  Ω, thereby precluding the proof of
claim 8.1. Specifically, premise 6 will be false becauseΠ Ω.
Since it is not clear in which case restriction IVa is meant to preclude trivializa-
tion, or in general, which problem it is meant to solve, I cannot show that defini-
tion 6.36 can fulfill the role of restriction IVa. Given the restriction’s questionable
role and justification, this should not be considered a drawback of definition 8.5. If
there is a justification for restriction IVa, however, one can modify definition 8.5
by defining contrastive testability as contrastive testability relative to an honest
set that does not include Θ or Λ. This restriction entails restriction IVa.
That the notion of an honest set plausibly explicates the notion of possible
background assumptions (see §6.8.2) provides a justification of definition 8.5 that is
independent of the trivialization proofs: If relative contrastive testability is a good
explication of empirical significance, then absolute contrastive testability explicates
what it means for a theory to be empirically significant in our current epistemic
situation (as determined by our background assumptions) or a possible situation
on our way to our current epistemic situation. The independent justification of
definition 8.5 is not only relevant because the proof of claim 8.1 rests, like Sober’s
justification of restriction IVb, on somewhat contentious assumptions. More
15Equivalent sets are excluded from the conclusion of claim 8.1 because of premise 6 and the
assumption that for any conditional probability Pr(B |C ), Pr(C ) 6= 0 (see n. 5).
16If Ω is finite, then∆  {¬∧Ω}. In general,∆ has to be such that A ∆ if and only if A 6Ω.
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importantly, it justifies the hope that the definition is right, while the amendments
in light of the trivialization proofs at best allow the claim that the modified
definitions are not obviously wrong. Of course, definition 8.5 might still allow
the proof that any two non-equivalent theories can be absolutely tested against
each other. In response to such a proof, one can fall back on definition 8.4 until a
better explication of ‘suitable’ is found than definition 6.36. In general, any results
that determine which supplementary sentences are suitable, or which assumptions
are possible background assumptions, can be used directly as a substitute for
definition 6.36 (see §6.9).
8.4 Conditions of adequacy
Excluding the problematic conditions of adequacy postulated by Achinstein
(page 217) and Hempel (page 264), I have discussed the following conditions
of adequacy for deductive criteria (see §6.9):
Condition 3. The concept of empirical significance is not trivial.
Condition 4. Not all contingent sentences are empirically significant.
Condition 5. Not onlyB -sentences are empirically significant.
Condition 6. All and only sets of sentences that assert basic sentences are empiri-
cally significant.
Condition 7. All and only sets of sentences that are not empirically equivalent
to a tautology are empirically significant.
In this section, I will argue that Sober’s assumptions and his intended application
of the criterion lead to six conditions of adequacy. Many of these relate empirical
significance to concepts that rely on inferences and therefore have a deductive
and a probabilistic formulation. This is because deductive inference (entailment:
Σ  Φ) clearly does not generalize probabilistic inference. For instance, from
Pr(Σ) = 1 and Pr(Φ |Σ) = q , one can probabilistically infer that Pr(Φ) = q , and
this inference, related to Sober’s (Update)-rule discussed below, cannot be captured
by assigning truth values to Φ and Σ . But probabilistic inference also does not
generalize deductive inference. For assume that the domain has infinite cardinality.
Then it may be that Pr(Φ |Σ) = 1, but there are cases in which Σ is true and Φ
is false. This happens, for example, when the domain is the interval [0,2] with
a uniform probability distribution, Σ is ‘x ≤ 1’, and Φ is ‘x < 1’ (cf. Feller 1971,
33–34). This difference between the deductive and the probabilistic concept of
inference generally leads to differences between the deductive and probabilistic
formulations of the conditions of adequacy. I have discussed conditions of ade-
quacy for deductive criteria in §6.9. Here I will just discuss their probabilistic
counterparts and their relations to Sober’s positions.
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Condition 3 holds for deductive criteria just as it holds for probabilistic ones.
Since Sober intends to distinguish between theories that are worthy to be pursued
and theories that are not, his criterion must not be trivial, and he implicitly
relies on this condition of adequacy when arguing for restriction IVb. More
specifically, he relies on the condition that not all non-analytic sentences should
be empirically significant. Condition 4, that not all contingent sentences should
be empirically significant, can be considered to be a strengthening of this. This
condition is the basis for my claim in §8.3.3 that the proof of the non-triviality of
absolute contrastive testability needs more precise definitions of ‘justification’ and
‘dependence’, and an assumption behind claim 8.1 (see n. 15). Condition 5, that
not onlyB -sentences should be empirically significant is uncontroversial also for
probabilistic criteria, but will not be of importance in the following.
As noted, Ayer (1936, 97) argues for condition 6, the demand that all and only
empirically significant sets of sentences make basic assertions. Sober (2008, 130)
states that “a testable statement makes predictions, either by deductively entailing
that an observation will occur or by conferring a probability on an observational
outcome.” Thus for Sober empirical significance is a sufficient condition for
making basic assertions. Let this be condition (i). Sober also subscribes to the
converse of condition (i), as can be seen from his claims that “[t]he problem
with the hypothesis of intelligent design is [ . . . ] that it doesn’t predict much
of anything” (Sober 2008, §2.15) and that his “criticism of the design argument
might be summarized by saying that the design hypothesis is untestable” (Sober
2008, 148).17 Since Sober (2008, §2.12) infers the lack of empirical significance
from the lack of basic assertions, his criticism of ID relies only on condition (i).
However, Sober’s criticism of Popper’s falsifiability criterion does seem to rest on
the converse of condition (i) for probabilistic assertions: ‘This coin has probability
of .5 of landing heads each time it is tossed’ makes a probabilistic assertion, and its
lack of falsifiability is a reason for Sober to reject Popper’s criterion. This seems
to assume that every theory that makes probabilistic assertions is empirically
significant.
Sober (2008, 52, n. 29) further states two relations between deductive empirical
significance and the making of deductive basic assertions:
If a true observation sentence entails Θ [ . . . ] you can conclude with-
out further ado that Θ is true; this is just modus ponens. And if Θ
entails Ω and Ω turns out to be false, you can conclude that Θ is false
[ . . . ]; this is just modus tollens.
These are two sufficient conditions for empirical significance, namely (ii) entail-
ment by a basic sentence and (iii) entailment of a basic sentence. Condition (iii) is
17When Sober (1999, 54) states that “hypotheses rarely make observational predictions on their
own; they require supplementation by auxiliary assumptions if they are to be tested”, he similarly
seems to be treating testability and the making of observational assertions simply as synonymous.
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the converse of condition (i) for deductive assertions (cf. Sober 1999, 72, n. 14).
Therefore, according to Sober all and only theories that make basic assertions are
empirically significant.
Condition (ii), however, is incompatible with condition (i): For any sentence σ
and basic sentenceΩ,Ω Ω∨σ , that is,Ω∨σ is empirically significant according
to condition (ii). But let σ be such that it does not make basic assertions, that is, for
any basic sentenceΩ′, σ 6Ω′, and σ does not confer any probability onΩ′. Then,
as a matter of logic, Ω ∨ σ 6 Ω′, so Ω ∨ σ does not make deductive assertions.
Ω∨σ also does not confer a probability on any basic sentence, since the inferences
one can draw from Ω ∨σ are weaker then those that one can draw from σ , and σ
already does not allow assigning a probability to any basic sentence. Thus Ω ∨σ
does not make any basic assertions and is therefore not empirically significant
according to condition (i), which is incompatible with condition (ii). On pain of
inconsistency, Sober therefore has to choose whether all theories entailed by basic
sentences are empirically significant or whether all theories that are empirically
significant make basic assertions. Given that his core argument against ID is that
ID fails to make assertions, I take it that he would choose the latter.18
Claim 6.30 establishes that for deductive criteria, condition 6 entails condi-
tion 7, the demand that the criterion should exclude all theories that are empir-
ically equivalent to tautologies. This suggests that condition 7 is therefore also
a plausible demand for probabilistic criteria, especially since adding a tautology
to any set of sentences does not change the probabilities that can be assigned
to the other sentences in the set. Out of caution, one may treat the empirical
non-equivalence to a tautology as a necessary, but not as a sufficient condition for
empirical significance in the probabilistic case.
For Sober, probabilistic criteria of empirical significance also have some new
conditions of adequacy, for example
Condition 8. The criterion should not rely on the probabilities of whole theories
or likelihoods of the negations of whole theories.
Sober (2008, 24–30) argues that for many theoriesΘ the probabilities Pr(Θ |Π),
Pr(Θ |Ω ∪Π), and Pr(Ω |{¬∧Θ} ∪Π) are undefined (cf. Sober 1990, §III). A
criterion that relies on these probabilities would therefore be unusable in many
cases.
Condition 9. The criterion should be equivalent to an adequate Bayesian criterion
of empirical significance whenever all occurring probabilities are defined.
Since Bayesianism relies on probabilities of whole theories and likelihoods
of negations of whole theories, Sober rejects it as a general method of scientific
18Note that the claim “There is an intelligent designer” is equivalent to “There is a human designer
or there is a non-human designer” and thus analytically entailed by a basic sentence like “There are
humans who design”. Arguably, however, “There is a non-human designer” does not make an basic
assertion, so that “There is an intelligent designer” does not either.
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inference. With respect to likelihoodism, Sober (2008, 37) notes (cf. Sober 2008,
32):
The likelihoodist is happy to assign probabilities to hypotheses when
the assignment of values to priors and likelihoods can be justified by
appeal to empirical information. Likelihoodism emerges as a statistical
philosophy distinct from Bayesianism only when this is not possible.
Since there are criteria of empirical significance that have been developed within
Bayesianism, this suggests that a probabilistic criterion of empirical significance
should be equivalent to one of these Bayesian criteria whenever all probabilities
are defined. This Bayesian criterion should, of course, fulfill all criteria of adequacy
other than 8.
Condition 10. The probabilistic criterion should contain as a special case an
adequate criterion of deductive empirical significance that relies only on modus
ponens.
Sober (2002, 69–70) sees a smooth transition between probabilistic and deduc-
tive modus ponens. More specifically, Sober (2008, 50, my notation) points out the
following:
(Update) Prthen(Θ |Ω) is very high
Ω
Ω is all the evidence we have gathered between then and
now.
Prnow(Θ) is very high
This is nothing other than the rule of updating by strict condition-
alization. (Update) is a sensible rule, and it also has the property of
being a generalization of deductive modus ponens.
As argued above (page 316), (Update) is not, strictly speaking, a generalization
of modus ponens. But at least when all and only sentences with probability 1 are
certain, deductive and probabilistic inference coincide. This can be put more
precisely as follows. Each structure A of a language V of predicate logic assigns a
truth value to each sentence in V . If PrM is defined as the function that assigns 1 to
all sentences true inM and 0 to all sentence false inM, then PrM is a probability
assignment (see §8.9, claim 8.9). Call such probability assignments truth value-
like. For truth value-like probability assignments, probabilistic inferences and
deductive inferences coincide: The possible values of Pr(Σ |Φ) are restricted to 0
and 1, and Pr(Σ |Φ) = 1 for all probability distributions if and only if Φ Σ (as
always assuming that Pr(Φ) 6= 0; see §8.9, claim 8.11). Truth value-like probabilities
may be assigned by fiat, but they also occur more or less naturally when there are
no regularities whatsoever, so that no probabilities can be assigned to sentences
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that are not known to be true and thus have probability 1 or known to be false
and thus have probability 0.19
In this sense, then, there can be a smooth transition between probabilistic
and deductive inference. Given that all and only theories that make deductive or
probabilistic assertions must be empirically significant by condition of adequacy 6,
there must then also be a smooth transition between any criterion of probabilistic
empirical significance and a criterion of deductive empirical significance that
uses the implications of the theory only in a modus ponens. As I will say, the
probabilistic criterion must contain as a special case a deductive criterion that
relies only on modus ponens. Of course, the deductive criterion should fulfill all
those conditions of adequacy that also have purely deductive formulations, that
is, conditions 3, 6, and 7. To fulfill condition 6, it is enough for the deductive
criterion to include all and only theories that make deductive assertions, because it
is impossible that it could include theories that make only probabilistic assertions.
Analogously, it is enough if the criterion excludes all theories that are deductively
empirically equivalent to a tautology to meet condition 7.
Independently of any smooth transition in the case of modus ponens, it is clear
that the criterion of empirical significance simpliciter should be a generalization of
an adequate deductive criterion. Thus, when deductive and probabilistic inference
coincide, the probabilistic criterion must not include theories that the deductive
criterion excludes. For if it did, these theories would be included by the criterion
of empirical significance simpliciter, and thus this criterion would not generalize
the deductive criterion, but rather contradict it.
I have argued in §6.9 (page 266) that all and onlyB -creative sentences make de-
ductive observations. ThusB -creativity is, up to equivalence, the only deductive
syntactic criterion that meets all of Sober’s conditions of adequacy that apply to
deductive criteria. Since it furthermore relies only on modus ponens, condition 10
can be formulated as
Condition 11. When the probability assignment is truth value-like, the proba-
bilistic criterion should be equivalent toB -creativity.
It is thus especially fortuitous that syntactic B -creativity is equivalent to
Sober’s criterion of having observational implications when the question of suitable
supplementary assumptions is bracketed. Since I will assume in the following that
empirical claims are described by sets of sentences, ‘B -creativity’ will always be
short for ‘syntacticB -creativity’.
∗ ∗ ∗
While I have tried to mention supporting arguments for these conditions of
adequacy when possible, some of them remain controversial; especially condition 8
19This is arguably the case in Popper’s approach to induction (cf. Salmon 1967, §II.3).
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would be challenged by Bayesians. But these conditions all follow from Sober’s
basic assumptions or apply to Sober’s criterion because of its intended application.
Of course, it may be that these conditions of adequacy are incompatible, so that
some have to be given up. This is the case for conditions (i) and (ii) discussed under
condition of adequacy 6. But a criterion of empirical significance that is to be
applied as Sober intends should fulfill as many of these conditions as possible.
8.5 Contrastive testability and the conditions of ad-
equacy
By Sober’s own standards, a probabilistic criterion of empirical significance must
meet conditions of adequacy 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11. Condition of adequacy 4 is
that not all contingent sentences can be empirically significant, and Sober’s def-
inition 8.3 of contrastive testability does not meet this condition. As argued in
§8.3.3, however, definition 8.4 of relative contrastive testability and, arguably,
definition 8.5 or absolute contrastive testability (using honest sets) do.
Though non-trivial, contrastive testability fails to meet the two most impor-
tant conditions of adequacy, conditions 6 and 7. That some theories that do not
make probabilistic assertions and are probabilistically empirically equivalent to
tautologies are contrastively testable can be inferred from an example that Sober
(1999, n. 24) attributes, in a different context, to Greg Mougin:20
Let Θ = God created the eye, β = Jones is pregnant, Π = Jones is
sexually active, and Λ= Jones used birth control. It is possible to test
Θ against Λ; given independently attested background assumptions
Π , β favors Θ over Λ.
In the example, the basic sentenceβ is assigned one probability by the background
assumptions alone (since Θ is not about Jones at all), and another by the conjunc-
tion of the background assumptions and Λ. Now choose Θ  >. Then Θ does
not make any assertions and hence no basic ones, and it has trivially as much
empirical content as a tautology. But Θ can still be contrastively tested against Λ,
both relative toΠ and absolutely, since the justification ofΠ does not depend on
β, ¬β, Θ, or Λ.
By design, contrastive testability does not rely on prior probabilities or the
likelihoods of the negation of theories and thus meets condition of adequacy 8.
Contrastive testability fails to meet condition 9 simply because so far, no Bayesian
criterion of empirical significance has been suggested that is equivalent to con-
trastive testability when all occurring probabilities are defined. Specifically, relative
20Unlike in the example by Salmon (1971, 29–88), it is this time not John Jones who is using birth
control, but his wife.
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contrastive testability is not equivalent to the typical Bayesian criterion of empir-
ical significance, definition 8.2, as is clear from the logical structures of the two
concepts.
In principle, a probabilistic two-place predicate may contain a deductive one-
place predicate as a special case. For example, if the probability assignments
are truth value-like, ‘Pr(Ω |Θ) = .5 ∨ Pr(Ω |Λ) = 1’ is equivalent to ‘Λ  Ω’
because the first argument, Θ, becomes irrelevant. In this sense, the two-place
predicate of contrastive testability could therefore contain the one-place predicate
of falsifiability as a special case. But since contrastive testability is symmetric,
either both or neither of its two arguments are irrelevant for truth value-like
assignments and thus it cannot meet condition 11.
Θ can be tested against Λ if and only if their defined likelihoods differ for
at least one basic sentence. If only singleton sets of probabilities are acceptable
(as Sober (2010, 3) assumed when developing his criterion), this means that at
least with respect to one basic sentence, one of the two theories must be wrong.
Arguably, then, contrastive testability explicates what it means for two theories
to be probabilistically empirically incompatible for the special case that only
singleton sets of likelihoods are acceptable. This is borne out by the comparison
with
Definition 8.6. TheoriesΘ and Λ are deductively empirically incompatible relative
to supplementary sentencesΠ if and only if there is a set Ω of basic sentences and
a basic sentence β such that Ω ∪Θ∪Π β and Ω ∪Λ∪Π  ¬β.
Claim 8.2. LetΘ and Λ be deductive theories, let all probability assignments be truth
value-like, and let the set {0,1} be unacceptable as a value of a likelihood. Then Θ can
be tested against Λ relative to Π if and only if Θ and Λ are deductively empirically
incompatible relative to Π .
Proof. Θ can be tested against Λ if and only if there are Ω and β such that the
likelihood of one theory for β given Ω is 0, while the other one is 1. Without
loss of generality, assume Pr(β |Ω ∪Θ ∪Π) = 1 and Pr(Ω |Λ ∪Π) = 0, that
is, Pr(¬β |Ω ∪ Λ ∪Π) = 1. By claim 8.11 (see §8.9), this holds if and only if
Ω ∪Θ∪Π β and Ω ∪Λ∪Π  ¬β.
Thus, if only singleton sets are acceptable as values of likelihoods, then, as
demanded by condition of adequacy 11, contrastive testability contains as a special
case a criterion for deductive theories that relies only on modus ponens. However,
since it is notB -creativity, it is the wrong one.
8.6 Explicating probabilistic empirical significance
Contrastive testability does not meet all criteria of adequacy, but that might just
be because the criteria cannot all be met at once. I will argue that this is not so by
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suggesting a criterion of empirical significance that does meet all the conditions.
First, however, I want to discuss briefly an intuitively attractive but inadequate
criterion.
One may think of defining that a theory is not empirically significant if and
only if it cannot be tested against any theory. But this definition is inordinately
inclusive. For assume that Θ is not such that all assertions from suitable supple-
mentary sentences become undefined, that is, Pr(Ω |Π) and Pr(Ω |Θ ∪Π) are
defined (though possibly identical) for some Ω and some suitable Π . Then Θ
is empirically significant if there is any Λ such that Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) is defined and
different from Pr(Ω |Π). For if Pr(Ω |Π) = Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π), Θ can be tested against
Λ, and if Pr(Ω |Π) 6= Pr(Ω |Θ ∪Π), Θ can be tested against any tautology. The
premises of this argument are commonly true, for example, according to Sober,
if Θ is ‘God created the eye’, Ω is ‘Jones is pregnant’, andΠ is ‘Jones is sexually
active’, for then Λ can be ‘Jones used birth control’. Choosing Θ  {>}, the
argument shows that tautologies are empirically significant, which runs afoul of
conditions of adequacy 6 and 7. It is also straightforward to show that conditions
9 and 11 are not met.
8.6.1 Probabilistic empirical equivalence
A more promising path to a criterion of probabilistic significance leads through
the criterion of probabilistic empirically equivalence. To show that contrastive
testability (definition 8.3) does not fulfill condition 7 it was sufficient to produce
one contrastively testable theory that is probabilistically empirically equivalent to
a tautology. To arrive at a criterion of empirical significance that provably fulfills
7, however, it is necessary to define probabilistic empirical equivalence.
Luckily, it is possible to explicate condition of adequacy 7 in line with Sober’s
position, for he states that “empirically equivalent theories have identical like-
lihoods” for any observation (Sober 1990, 399). Treating the case of undefined
likelihoods explicitly, this leads directly to
Definition 8.7. Theories Θ and Λ are probabilistically empirically equivalent
relative to supplementary sentencesΠ if and only if for all basic sentences Ω,
(I) Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) and Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) are not defined or
(II) Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) and Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) are defined and Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) = Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π).
Note that condition I is redundant given the interpretations of sentences with
probabilities laid out in §8.2.2. As defined, probabilistic empirical equivalence
contains deductive empirical equivalence as a special case:
Claim 8.3. Let Θ and Λ be deductive theories and let all probability assignments be
truth value-like. Then Θ and Λ are probabilistically empirically equivalent relative to
Π if and only if Θ and Λ are deductively empirically equivalent relative to Π .
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Proof. If all probability assignments are truth value-like, then interpretation 1
and interpretation 2 of inequality (8.6) are equivalent, independently of whether
{0,1} is an acceptable set of probabilities. For if {0,1} is an acceptable set, the
interpretations are trivially equivalent; if {0,1} is not acceptable, the inequality is
false if and only if both likelihoods have the value {0}, {1}, or {0,1}/undefined.
Otherwise, the inequality is true. Therefore, it suffices to prove the claim for
interpretation 1.
‘⇒’: Ω ∪Σ ∪Π β iff Ω ∪ {¬β} ∪Σ ∪Π ⊥. By claim 8.10, this holds iff
Pr(Ω ∪ {¬β} ∪Σ ∪Π) = 0, that is Pr(Ω ∪ {¬β} | Σ ∪Π) = 0. By assumption,
0 = Pr(Ω ∪ {¬β} | Λ ∪Π) = Pr(Ω ∪ {¬β} ∪ Λ ∪Π), that is, by claim 8.10,
Ω ∪Λ∪Π β.
‘⇐’: Pr(Ω |Σ ∪Π) = 0 iff Pr(Ω ∪Σ ∪Π) = 0 and thus, by claim 8.10, iff
Ω∪Σ∪Π ⊥. Since⊥ is aV -sentence, this holds by assumption iffΩ∪Λ∪Π ⊥,
and thus by claim 8.10 iff Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) = 0. By claim 8.11, Pr(Ω |Σ ∪Π) = 1 iff
Σ ∪Π Ω, which holds iff for every β ∈Ω, Σ ∪Π β. This is by assumption
the case iff for every β ∈Ω, Λ∪Π β, that is, Λ∪Π Ω and thus by claim 8.11
iff Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) = 1.
Another reason to consider definition 8.7 a good explication of probabilistic
empirical equivalence is that, if all occurring probabilities are defined, it bears the
same relation to the Bayesian criterion of empirical significance given in defini-
tion 8.2 as the criterion of deductive empirical equivalence bears to falsifiability: If
two theories are deductively empirically equivalent, then either both or neither
are deductively empirically significant (see claim 8.12). Analogously, the following
holds:
Claim 8.4. If all occurring probabilities are defined and Θ is probabilistically empiri-
cally equivalent to Λ relative to supplementary sentences Π , then, relative to Π , basic
sentences are relevant for Θ if and only if basic sentences are relevant for Λ.
Proof. If Ω is any set of basic sentences for which Pr(Ω |Θ∧A) = Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π),
then Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) = Pr(Ω |Π) if and only if Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) = Pr(Ω |Π). Therefore
Pr(Θ |Π) = Pr(Λ |Ω ∪Π) if and only if Pr(Λ |A) = Pr(Λ |Ω ∪Π) (claim 8.13).
Thus basic sentences are relevant for both Θ and Λ or for neither.
8.6.2 Probabilistic basic assertions
According to claim 6.30, a theory isB -creative, that is, makes deductive basic
assertions, if and only if it is not deductively empirically equivalent to a tautology.
This suggests that conditions of adequacy 6 and 7 are in fact equivalent, so that a
theory makes probabilistic basic assertions relative to supplementary sentences
Π if and only if it is not probabilistically empirically equivalent to a tautology
relative toΠ according to definition 8.4. This leads to
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Definition 8.8. Theory Θ makes probabilistic basic assertions relative to Π if and
only if there exists a set Ω of basic sentences such that
(I) exactly one of Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) and Pr(Ω |Π) is defined or
(II) Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) and Pr(Ω |Π) are defined and Pr(Ω |H ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω |Π).
Again, condition I is redundant given the interpretations of sentences with
probabilities laid out in §8.2.2. In the following, I will not state explicitly condi-
tions that immediately follow from these interpretations explicitly in the follow-
ing.
Claim 8.5. Θ makes probabilistic basic assertions relative to Π according to defini-
tion 8.8 if and only if Θ is not probabilistically empirically equivalent to a tautology
relative to Π according to definition 8.7.
Proof. Let ðB xñ stand for ðx is a set of basic sentencesñ, ðD xyñ stand for
ðPr(x | y ∪Π) is definedñ, and ðE xy zñ for ðPr(x | y ∪Π) = Pr(x | z ∪Π)ñ. Then
it is straightforward to prove that
∃x B x ∧ [(D xy↔¬D x z)∨ (D xy ∧D x z ∧¬E xy z)]
 ¬∀x B x→ [(¬D xy ∧¬D x z)∨ (D xy ∧D x z ∧ E xy z)] . (8.7)
Since Pr(Ω |>∪Π) = Pr(Ω |Π), the claim follows.
With the help of definition 6.36 of an honest set, one can give
Definition 8.9. Theory Θ makes probabilistic basic assertions if and only if Θ
makes probabilistic basic assertions relative to an honest setΠ of supplementary
sentences.
It may be considered problematic that a theory Θ makes basic assertions if
assuming Θ makes it impossible to assign a probability to a basic sentence that
otherwise would be assigned a probability by the supplementary sentences. To
render such theories empirically non-significant, the biconditional in condition I
of definition 8.8 could be made into a conjunction. However, it is very plausible
that for a theory Θ that makes no predictions, Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) is defined whenever
Pr(Ω |Π) is defined. For one, if Pr(Ω |Π) is defined and asserts a specific frequency
of events, then, givenΠ , one should expect that frequency. But if Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) is
undefined, one should expect that there is no such frequency, and this expectation
is plausibly a basic assertion. An example would be the prediction that under
specific circumstances, some law fails that was assumed to hold universally. But
even if Pr(Ω |Π) is not asserting a frequency but a single case probability, there is
a significant pragmatic difference between being able to assign a probability to an
event and not being able to do so. For the former case demands decisions under
risk, while the latter demands decisions under uncertainty.
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Definitions 8.8 and 8.9 rely only on concepts that Sober uses himself, and
should therefore be conceptually unproblematic for him. He does not discuss the
domains of applicability of the concepts, but with one exception, the domains
can just be assumed to be the same for definitions 8.8 and 8.9 as they are for
contrastive testability. The exception is the term Pr(Ω |Π). Sober could argue
that the concept of a likelihood cannot be applied to tautologies because the
supplementary sentences themselves assign probabilities to no or too few basic
sentences. Sober (2008, 29–30) in fact briefly discusses Pr(Ω), but not in connection
with supplementary sentences. The discussion therefore does clearly not apply
to definition 8.8, and it does not apply to definition 8.9 because Θ is testable if
there are some, not necessarily tautological, suitable supplementary sentencesΠ
such that Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) differs from Pr(Ω |Π). Sober’s original definition 8.3 and
definition 6.36 of an honest set put no restrictions on individual elements ofΠ
except that they be justified (in Sober’s definition, independently of a specific basic
sentence and two specific theories). Therefore whole theories can be included in
the supplementary sentences. Since Sober introduces supplementary sentences to
allow for actual scientific practice, and assertions made by scientific theories in
fact often rely on other scientific theories as supplementary sentences, such an
inclusion obeys letter and spirit of Sober’s criterion. Since scientific theories Θ
are supposed to make basic assertions, Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) will often be defined. And
the inclusion of Θ into the supplementary sentences is then just the notational
change to Pr(Ω |Π∗) withΠ∗  Θ∪Π .
It now follows from condition of adequacy 6 that all and only theories that
fulfill definition 8.9 (8.8) are probabilistically empirically significant (relative to
supplementary sentencesΠ). Without any basic conceptual problems, a theory
can then be defined to be empirically significant (relative toΠ) if and only if it it
makes basic assertions (relative toΠ), that is, if and only if it makes probabilistic
basic assertions (relative toΠ) or it makes deductive basic assertions (relative to
Π).
As argued in §6.9, B -creativeness fulfills all appropriate conditions of ade-
quacy demanded by Sober. I now want to show that definition 8.8 of probabilistic
empirical significance does, too. That it is non-trivial and thus meets condition
of adequacy 3 is easily shown since sentences without any terms that occur in
basic sentences are not testable relative to ∅. And in the example with Jones’s
pregnancy, the theory that Jones uses birth control (Λ) has a different likelihood
in conjunction with the supplementary sentenceΠ that Jones is sexually active
thanΠ alone, and therefore Λmakes probabilistic assertions relative toΠ . This
example also shows that there are positive instances of sentences that make abso-
lute probabilistic assertions. As in the case of absolute falsifiability, it is impossible
to prove that there is a non-tautological theory that makes no probabilistic asser-
tions relative to any honest set without more precise notions of justification and
dependence; thus the non-triviality of definition 8.9 cannot be shown at present.
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As discussed in §6.9, this is primarily a problem of the notion of justification,
and for probabilistic criteria of empirical significance, this means that even if
definition 8.9 turns out to be inadequate, any adequate definition of ‘suitable set
of supplementary sentences’ can be used to turn definition 8.8 into an absolute
notion.
That analogues of restrictions III and IV of definition 8.3 cannot be substituted
for the restriction to honest sets can be shown as follows:21 Let the basic sentence
Ω and the supplementary sentences Π be such that Pr(Ω |Π) is defined. For
instance,Π might again express that 1 out of 10 vases break when dropped and Ω
that a specific vase does not break. Let again σ be justified without Ω, but entail
Ω. Then Ω, σ , andΠ again fulfill conditions III and IV for any theory that is not
related to vases. Since σ andΠ are justified independently of Ω, the falsity of Ω,
and Θ, so isΠ∗  {¬∧Θ∨σ} ∪Π . Since Pr(Ω |Π∗) 6= Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π∗), Θ would
make predictions if restrictions III and IV of definition 8.3 were substituted for
the restriction to honest sets.
Luckily, definition 8.9 is stricter than it would be with analogues of restrictions
III and IV. The restriction of the supplementary sentences in definition 8.5 to
honest sets entails restriction III. And while the restriction to honest sets does not
entail restriction IVb, it precludes all trivializations precluded by that restriction:
A theory Θ fails to make probabilistic assertions because of restriction IVb only
if for any σ whose inclusion in Π would lead to Pr(Ω |Θ ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω |Π) for
some Ω, the justification of σ depends on Ω or the falsity of Ω. In that case, IVb
ensures that Θ makes no probabilistic assertion. The restriction ofΠ to honest
sets leads to the same result, because if the justification of σ depends on Ω (or its
falsity) andΠ is honest, then Ω ⊆Π (or some set∆ expressing the falsity of Ω).22
Thus Pr(Ω |Θ ∪Π) = 1 = Pr(Ω |Π) (or Pr(Ω |Θ ∪Π) = 0 = Pr(Ω |Π)). Unlike
restriction IVb, the restriction to honest sets also leads to identical likelihoods
if {¬∧Θ ∨ σ} ∈ Π is justified by a sentence σ  Ω, thereby precluding the
trivialization proof in the previous paragraph. The restriction to honest sets also
precludes any trivialization that restriction IVa could preclude, for if an element
ofΠ depends on Θ, Θ ⊆Π , so that Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) = Pr(Ω |Π) for all Ω.
Definitions 8.8 and 8.9 trivially fulfill condition of adequacy 6. Because of
claim 8.5, they meet condition 7 as well. Since condition 7 only states that em-
pirical equivalence to a tautology is a sufficient condition for empirically non-
significance, 7 is also met if the biconditional of condition I in definition 8.8 is
substituted by a conjunction, so that more theories are empirically non-significant.
By design, definitions 8.8 and 8.9 fulfill condition of adequacy 8. Condition of
adequacy 9 is met because of
Claim 8.6. If all occurring probabilities are defined, thenΘ makes probabilistic basic
assertions if and only if basic sentences are relevant for Θ.
21The analogues of the restrictions feature only one theory Θ rather than two theories Θ and Λ.
22See note 16.
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Proof. For all sets Ω of basic sentences, Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω |Π) if and only if
Pr(Θ |Ω∪Π) 6= Pr(Θ |Π) (claim 8.13). Therefore there is anΩ such that Pr(Ω |Θ∪
Π) 6= Pr(Ω |Π) if and only if there is anΩ such that Pr(Θ |Ω∪Π) 6= Pr(Θ |Π).
Definition 8.8 fulfills condition of adequacy 11, because it generalizes B -
creativity (see definition 6.3):
Claim 8.7. Let Θ be a deductive theory and let all probability assignments be truth
value-like. Then Θ makes probabilistic basic assertions relative to Π if and only if Θ
is contingent andB -creative relative to Π .
Proof. Since interpretation 1 and interpretation 2 of the inequality in condition (II)
are equivalent, it suffices to prove the claim for interpretation 1. Θ does not make
probabilistic assertions relative toΠ if and only if for every setΩ of basic sentences
and every basic sentence β, Ω ∪Θ∪Π restricts the probability for β to the same
set of values asΠ . This is the case if and onlyΩ∪Θ∪Π restricts the probability to
1 iffΩ∪Π does. By claim 8.11, this holds if and only ifΩ∪Θ∪Π andΩ∪Π entail
the same basic sentences for every Ω, that is, if and only if Θ isB -conservative
relative toΠ . IfΘmakes probabilistic basic assertions, it is by assumption possible
and thus, since it is alsoB -creative, contingent.
Note that the proof also holds if the biconditional of condition I in defini-
tion 8.8 is substituted by a conjunction, because then Θ makes no basic assertions
if and only if for all Ω and β, Ω ∪Θ∪Π restricts the probabilities to the same set
of values as Ω ∪Π , or Ω ∪Π restricts the probabilities more than Ω ∪Θ∪Π . But
the latter is impossible since Ω ∪Π restricts the probabilities of a basic sentence
to {0} or {1} only if Ω ∪Θ∪Π does. If the suitable supplementary sentences for
falsifiability are given by honest sets, condition 11 is also fulfilled by definition 8.9.
Therefore, definition 8.8 and arguably definition 8.9 fulfill all conditions of ad-
equacy that Sober wants a criterion of empirical significance to meet. Additionally,
they also make it possible to evaluate one theory, ID for example, independent
of another one like ET. Finally, the claims in which Sober uses testability as a
one-place predicate (see §8.2.1) are not only meaningful, but also correct: ‘Unde-
tectable angels exist’ arguably makes no basic assertions relative to any honest set
of sentences, and ‘This coin has a probability of .5 of landing heads each time it is
tossed’ makes basic assertions, for it assigns a probability of .5 to a basic sentence
relative to ∅.
8.7 Bayesian relevance
The conclusion thatB -creativity and ‘making probabilistic assertions’ are the only
two adequate criteria of empirical significance rests crucially on the assumption
that only those criteria are adequate that identify all and only sets of sentences
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that make deductive or probabilistic basic assertions. I have noted in §6.9 that
one may also be content with a criterion that identifies those sets Θ of sentences
that can be confirmed or disconfirmed. For deductive criteria, this leads to weak
syntacticB -determinacy. To arrive at a criterion of empirical significance, I had
suggested to include the demand that Θ be contingent relative toΠ . The resulting
deductive criterion relies only on modus ponens and is a special case of Bayesian
relevance (definition 8.2):
Claim 8.8. Let Θ be a deductive theory and let all probability assignments be truth
value-like. Then basic sentences are relevant for theory Θ relative to supplementary
sentences Π if and only if Θ is contingent and weakly syntacticallyB -determined
relative to Π .
Proof. B -sentences are relevant for Θ iff for some set Ω of basic sentences that is
possible relative toΠ (i) Pr(Θ |Π) 6= 1 and Pr(Θ |Ω ∪Π) = 1 or (ii) Pr(Θ |Π) 6= 0
and Pr(Θ |Ω ∪Π) = 0. By claim 8.11, (i) holds for some such Ω iff Π 6 Θ and
Ω ∪Π  Θ (and hence Π ∪Θ 6 ⊥), which is the case iff Θ is contingent and
verifiable relative to Π . By claim 8.10, (ii) holds for some such Ω iff Θ∪Π 6⊥
and Ω ∪Θ∪Π ⊥. This holds iff Θ is falsifiable relative toΠ and furthermore
contingent: Otherwise, sinceΩ is possible relative toΠ ,Ω∪Π  Ω∪Θ∪Π ⊥.
By claim 6.23, Θ is contingent and either verifiable or falsifiable relative toΠ
iff Θ is contingent and weakly syntacticallyB -determined relative toΠ .
Thus in the probabilistic case, the choice between theories that predict and
theories whose truth or falsity is empirically accessible amounts to the choice
between theories that make probabilistic basic assertions (definition 8.8) and
theories for which basic sentences are relevant (definition 8.2). Which of the two
criteria one chooses will, of course, depend on their intended application.
In §6.6, I have quoted an informal elucidation by Ayer (1936, 35) according
to which a sentence is factually significant if and only if it can be confirmed or
disconfirmed, and an informal definition by Carnap (1928b, 327–328) according
to which a sentence has factual content if and only if it can be confirmed or discon-
firmed. In the context of deductive inference, this meant that such sentences have
to be weaklyB -determined; but both Ayer and Carnap meant their descriptions
to apply to non-deductive inference as well, in which case their descriptions lead
to Bayesian relevance. Later, Carnap (1963c, §5) presented as a thesis of empiricism
the
Principle of confirmability. If it is in principle impossible for any con-
ceivable observational result to be either confirming or disconfirming
evidence for a linguistic expression A, then expression A is devoid of
cognitive meaning.
With reference to Carnap (1963c, §5), Skyrms (1984, 14–15) suggests the following:
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A confirmability theory of empirical meaningfulness might hold
that a proposition has empirical meaning if and only if some evidence
weighs for or against it; i. e., if its credibility on that evidence is greater
than or less than its credibility unconditionally.
Note that unlike Carnap, Skyrms is very explicit about explicating empirical
meaningfulness, not meaningfulness simpliciter. Since Skyrms assumes the stan-
dard probabilistic explication of confirmation and disconfirmation (definition 8.1),
he describes Bayesian relevance as a criterion of empirical significance. Skyrms
(1984, 14) then uses Bayes’s theorem (8.1) to state that by “Bayes’ theorem, a bit
of evidence is relevant to the hypothesis if and only if the hypothesis is relevant
to the evidence in the same sense (positive or negative).” This reformulation is
only allowed if all occurring probabilities are defined, and by claim 8.6 leads to
the position that all and only sentences that make probabilistic basic assertions
are empirically significant.
Although sometimes mentioned in connection with Bayesian relevance,23
Reichenbach’s use of probabilities to define empirical significance differs radically
from it. Reichenbach (1938, 54, emphasis removed) states the
First principle of the probability theory of meaning: a proposition
has meaning if it is possible to determine a weight, i. e., a degree of
probability, for the proposition.
Thus for Reichenbach, Sober’s claim that many theories of science cannot be
assigned probabilities would entail that these theories have no meaning. Specif-
ically, according to Reichenbach, the Bayesian relevance criterion of empirical
significance cannot even be applied to a sentence that has no meaning.
8.8 Conclusion
Contrastive testability fails as a criterion of probabilistic empirical significance
because it fails to meet four criteria of adequacy that follow from Sober’s position
and the intended application of contrastive testability. Given that contrastive
testability is not an adequate criterion of empirical significance, I have suggested
to consider a theory empirically significant if and only if it makes basic assertions,
because this definition fulfills all six of Sober’s conditions of adequacy, and in
particular contains both B -creativity and the Bayesian criterion of empirical
significance as special cases. The criterion could be called a synthesis, as it is
acceptable for falsificationists, Bayesianists, and likelihoodists alike. If one does
not consider it necessary that a theory make basic assertions, however, one can use
the Bayesian criterion even when not all probabilities are defined. This criterion
contains weakB -determinacy as a special case.
23For Sober (2008, 150, n. 26), it warrants a ‘cf.’, Skyrms (1984, 122, n. 21) calls it a “somewhat
different” formulation.
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8.9 Additional proofs
Claim 8.9. For every languageL and every M, PrM :PL → {0,1},PrM(Σ) =
1⇔M Σ is a probability assignment.
Proof. Show that for all Σ ,Ξ ∈L and anyM it holds:
1. PrM(Σ)≥ 0,
2. PrM(>) = 1, and
3. ifΣ andΞ are finite andΣ∪Ξ ⊥, PrM(
∧
Σ∨∧Ξ) = PrM(Σ)+PrM(Ξ).
1 and 2 are immediate. 3 holds because for Σ ∪Ξ  ⊥, M 6 Σ or M 6 Ξ , so
that PrM(
∧
Σ ∨∧Ξ) = 1 if and only if eitherM Σ orM Ξ but not both,
which holds if and only if PrM(Σ) = 1 or PrM(Ξ) = 1 but not both, that is,
PrM(Σ)+PrM(Ξ) = 1.
Claim 8.10. For any sets Ξ ,Σ of V -sentences, Ξ ∪Σ ⊥ if and only if for allM,
PrM(Ξ ∪Σ) = 0.
Proof.
Ξ ∪Σ ⊥⇔∀M(M 6Ξ ∪Σ) (8.8)
⇔∀M(PrM(Ξ ∪Σ) = 0 (8.9)
Claim 8.11. For any sets Ξ ,Σ of V -sentences, Ξ  Σ if and only if for all M it
holds: If PrM(Ξ) 6= 0 then PrM(Σ |Ξ) = 1.
Proof.
Ξ Σ⇔∀MM Ξ⇒M Σ (8.10)
⇔∀MPrM(Ξ) = 1⇒ PrM(Σ) = 1 (8.11)
⇔∀M

PrM(Ξ) 6= 0⇒ PrM(Σ |Ξ) =
PrM(Σ)
PrM(Σ ∪Ξ)
= 1

(8.12)
Claim 8.12. If the negation of a basic sentence is again a basic sentence, and Θ
is deductively empirically equivalent to Λ relative to Π , then, relative to Π , Θ is
B -creative if and only if Λ isB -creative.
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Proof. Assume that for all basic sentences β and sets of basic sentence Ω, Θ∪Ω ∪
A β if and only if Λ∪Ω ∪A β. Then, for all Ω and β, Θ ∪Ω ∪A β and
Ω ∪A 6β if and only if Θ∪Ω ∪Aβ and Ω ∪A 6β. Thus there are Ω and β
such that Θ∪Ω ∪Aβ and Ω ∪A 6β if and only if there are Ω and β such that
Θ ∪Ω ∪Aβ and Ω ∪A 6β. This means that Θ isB -creative relative to Π if
and only if Λ isB -creative relative toΠ .
Claim 8.13. If Pr(Θ |Π) is defined, then Pr(Θ |Ω ∧A) = Pr(Θ |Π) if and only if
Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) = Pr(Ω |Π).
Proof. The claim follows immediately from
Pr(Θ |Ω ∪Π)
Pr(Θ |Π) =
Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π)
Pr(Ω |Π) . (8.13)
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Applications

Chapter 9
Intelligent Design
With the results of part II, I can now tackle problems that rely on the demarcation
of empirically significant sets of sentences. One such problem is the question
of the status of the theory of intelligent design (ID), specifically as a competitor
of evolutionary theory (ET). The current discussion of this problem is logically
related to the discussion about theism and its empirical significance. This is because
according to some, the statement ‘God exists’ may be translated as ‘[T]here exists
necessarily a person without a body (i. e., a spirit) who necessarily is eternal,
perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and the creator of all
things’ (Swinburne 2004, 7),1 which entails but is not entailed by ‘An intelligent
designer exists’. Analogously, ‘God created the biological organisms’ entails but is
not entailed by ‘An intelligent designer created the biological organisms’.
The view that God is a specific designer is controversial (Diamond 1975a,
39–43; Diamond 1975b), but has a long tradition. Mackie (1982, 1), for example,
uses Swinburne’s definition verbatim, and Sobel (2004, §6) suggests that the central
properties of God according to the “common conception of traditional theology”
are “omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, and being the Creator and
Sustainer of the universe”.2 An exception is Tooley (1975, 483), who, although he
discusses traditional theism, defines God as “the one person who, though he can act
within the world and can communicate with man, is neither dependent upon the
world nor simply a part of it, but rather transcends the realm of human existence,
and who, in addition, is morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, and
incorporeal”. Since Tooley does not define God to actually act or have acted in this
world, according to his definition the existence of God arguably does not entail the
1With a reference to his discussion of the trinity, Swinburne adds in a footnote: “In understanding
God as a person, while being fair to the Judaic and Islamic view of God, I am oversimplifying the
Christian view.”
2Nielsen (1966, 13) lists further definitions according to which God is a designer.
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existence of a designer. Of course, the statement that God created the biological
organisms still entails that an intelligent designer created the biological organisms.
Theological positions that do not construe theism as having any empirical impact
or factual content of course do not easily relate to ID.
Many proponents of ID claim that the adaptations of biological organisms are
evidence for the existence of an intelligent designer. This inference is weaker than
the classic version of the teleological argument for the existence of God, also called
the argument for (or to) design or, somewhat misleadingly, the argument from
design (Mackie 1982, 133). This version, by Paley (1802), relies mostly on the adap-
tations of biological organisms as evidence, but concludes both that an intelligent
designer exists (Paley 1802, §XXIII) and that the designer has the properties of God
(Paley 1802, §§XXIV–XXVI). While the evidence for some of these properties are
of an astronomical or chemical nature (Paley 1802, §§XXI–XXII), the conclusions
that Paley draws from the biological evidence alone go far beyond the existence of
some designer. Since Paley’s conclusion is logically stronger than the conclusion of
the ID argument, it is in greater danger of disconfirmation. The omnipotence and
benevolence of God, for example, are in tension with the existence of evil (Mackie
1982, §9; Sobel 2004, §XII) and the maladaptations found in biological organisms
(Mackie 1982, 138; Sobel 2004, §7.1). The existence of an intelligent designer is not
disconfirmed by such evidence, since a not further specified intelligent designer
may fall short in power or benevolence.
On the other hand, there are two challenges to theism that are at least as and
generally more urgent for logically weaker theories, and thus for ID. According
to the falsifiability challenge, theism makes no assertions whatsoever because it is
compatible with any consistent empirical statement. According to the translatabil-
ity challenge, there is a set of empirical statements with the same cognitive content
as theism, and since empirical statements cannot contain references to God, any
such reference is devoid of cognitive content. However, even assuming that theism
is intended to be an empirical theory, it does not have to meet the challenges in
their current form, for both rely on assumptions that are controversial, to put it
mildly. In §9.1, I will therefore review the falsifiability challenge and argue that its
controversial assumptions can be avoided if theistic utterances are directly charged
with lack of empirical assertions. I will review the translatability challenge in §9.2
and argue that its problematic assumptions are avoided by a related challenge,
according to which theism cannot replace a competing non-theistic theory if
the competing theory has not been disconfirmed, and makes all the empirical
assertions of theism, but not vice versa. ID then faces both of these challenges as
well.
As already discussed, Elliot Sober (1999, 2007, 2008) argues that for proba-
bilistic theories, the criterion of falsifiability should be replaced by contrastive
testability, and he charges ID with a lack of contrastive testability. In §9.3.1, I
show that according to Sober’s own claims, ID is testable because it is falsifiable.
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I will then argue that Sober’s argument for ID’s lack of contrastive testability is
invalid, and that ID is in fact contrastively testable (§9.3.2). Sober’s challenge to
ID, I suggest, inconsistently combines the modified falsifiability challenge with
the modified translatability challenge. In the next step, I aim to assess whether
ID in fact meets either of the modified challenges by first elucidating a variety
of different and incompatible suggested definitions of ID (§9.4). Under one very
plausible definition, ID succumbs to the modified falsifiability challenge, and this
entails that it is analytically false under other definitions (§9.5.1). Under yet an-
other definition, ID succumbs to the modified translatability challenge (§9.5.2).
The modified falsifiability challenge is a plausible necessary condition for scien-
tific theories, and the modified translatability challenge is a plausible necessary
condition for scientific research. In §9.6, I show that an argument by Laudan that
there can be no criterion for ‘being scientific’ is not valid.
9.1 The falsifiability challenge
The falsifiability challenge (the name is due to Tooley 1975, 485) is motivated by
the impression that theism has suffered the “death by a thousand qualifications”,
where a “fine brash hypothesis” is weakened until it fails to assert anything (Flew
1950, 258). Statements like ‘God created the world’ and ‘God loves us as a father
loves his children’ (Flew 1950, 258), for example, seem to assert, among other
things, that there are no maladaptations in organisms and nothing bad will ever
happen to us (unless, maybe, we deserve it). But even though these assertions are
false, many theists do not give up the original statements, and rather claim that
God’s creation and love differ from human creations and love. These modifications
qualify the original statements to an extent that it becomes unclear whether the
statements assert anything at all. For Flew (1950, 259), this suggests a challenge to
his fellow disputants:
I therefore put to the succeeding symposiasts the simple central ques-
tion, ‘What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for
you a disproof of the love of, or of the existence of, God?’
Flew (1950, 258–259) justifies the challenge by arguing that to assert a statement is
to deny its negation, so that someone who does not deny any statements also does
not assert any.
Nielsen (1966, 15) points out that every statement meets the falsifiability
challenge if there is no restriction on which statements one may deny, and suggests
that Flew has to assume a restriction to “non-religious, straightforwardly empirical,
factual statements”, which thus play the role of the basic sentences. Flew (1975,
274) claims that Nielsen’s restriction is too exclusive, and suggests a restriction
to “anything which happens or which conceivably might happen in the ordinary
world”. This restriction is arguably too vague, since one may think, pace Tooley
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(1975, 483), that God exists in the ordinary world. I will just call the statements
that the restriction allows ‘observation statements’, which is traditional. Their
exact nature will not be important until later, and Nielsen’s remarks may serve as
a guide until then.
Thus the falsifiability challenge rests on the assumption that a theory makes
an assertion only if it is incompatible with an observation statement. But this
is debatable because some assertions may just not be observational, and it is
manifestly false for probabilistic theories. Thus there is no reason to assume that
only falsifiable theories make observational assertions, and no reason why a theory
would have to meet the falsifiability challenge.
Tooley (1975, §III) suggests to modify the falsifiability challenge so that pro-
ponents of a theory are not challenged to show its falsifiability, but rather its
testability, that is, its confirmability or disconfirmability. Confirmation and dis-
confirmation here rely on some concept of induction to be specified. But Tooley’s
strategy confuses an indicator (falsifiability) with the property it indicates (making
assertions). Generalizing falsifiability to testability makes sense only if this at
the same time generalizes the criterion from an indicator of theories that make
deductive assertions to an indicator of theories that make deductive or probabilis-
tic assertions. Otherwise, the original motivation for the challenge is lost. Flew
motivates the falsifiability challenge by noting that, although theistic statements
prima facie make assertions, many theists use common words in an uncommon
way, thereby weakening the theistic statements. Flew’s challenge is accordingly
a question about the personal beliefs of his fellow disputants, and the goal is to
elucidate what assertions the theistic statements make according to them, and ac-
cordingly what the words ‘create’ and ‘love’ mean according to them when it comes
to God. It is an interesting psychological point that it may be easier for humans
to identify a theory’s assertions when they are asked to think about what the
theory denies rather then what it asserts. But as far as a statement is independent
of the vagaries of the human psyche, such a reformulation is not necessary. If the
question is whether a statement makes assertions, it is enough to find a criterion
that determines just that. Thus Flew’s falsifiability challenge is but the demand
that theistic claims beB -creative, reformulated with the help of claim 6.1.3 When
generalizing the falsifiability challenge, one thus has to generalizeB -creativity,
not falsifiability.
That a statement makes an assertion only if it makes an observational assertion
is a very controversial assumption, but as Nielsen’s consideration shows, some
restriction to the assertions is necessary to arrive at a non-trivial challenge. Since
according to some, theism is not meant to make observational assertions (cf.
Diamond 1975b), theism may not have to meet any challenge that demands them.
ID, on the other hand, is meant to be an empirical theory, and thus has to make
3Flew hence motivates the falsifiability challenge to theism in the same way that Popper motivates
his falsifiability criterion in general (see page §225).
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observational assertions. WithB -sentences as observational sentences, ID thus
has to beB -creative or make probabilistic basic assertions. Call this the modified
falsifiability challenge.
With definitions 6.3 and 8.9, the falsifiability challenge can be modified to
allow for probabilistic theories without giving up on its basic idea: The challenge
for ID is to make observational assertions (simpliciter), that is, either deductive
or probabilistic ones. This challenge is justified because it is plausible that every
empirical theory must make some observational assertions. Laudan (1983b, 37)
claims to have given a counterexample of a respectable scientific theory that
makes no observational assertions, but the relevant passage of the article he
refers to (Laudan 1982, 17) contains only the point that theories often rely on
supplementary sentences for their observational assertions. Since definitions 6.3
and 8.9 allow for supplementary sentences, this is not an objection to the modified
falsifiability challenge.
While Ayer and Popper consider the making of observational assertions to be
a necessary and sufficient condition for being a scientific theory (see §6.9), Laudan
(1982, 18) and Rothbart (1982, 95) note that this is clearly too strong. ‘Anne got
her head stuck in a drainpipe’ makes an observational assertion, but is no scientific
theory in that the statement does not, for example, offer the systematic economy
or heuristic fertility that Hempel (1965g) expects from a theory.4 This feature of
scientific theories also poses a problem for the translatability challenge.
9.2 The translatability challenge
Tooley (1975, 489–490) provides both the name ‘translatability challenge’ and its
most explicit formulation—the formulation by Ayer (1936, 114–120), although
the basis of Tooley’s, is comparatively freewheeling. Assuming that only the set
of analytic statements is suitable as the set Π of supplementary sentences, the
argument is roughly as follows: Only a statement that makes deductive observa-
tional assertions has cognitive content, and two statements that in conjunction
withΠ entail the same observation statements have the same cognitive content.
It follows that if a theological statement Θ has cognitive content, the set Ω of
observation statements entailed by Θ∪Π has some, namely the same cognitive
content as Θ. Since the term ‘God’ in any theological statement Θ is intended to
refer to something that is not observational, ‘God’ does not occur inΩ. Therefore
a theological statement Θ either has no cognitive content at all, or the specific
theological content of Θ, the reference to God, is not cognitive.
There are a number of problems with this argument, for example the apparent
irrelevance of Θ having any cognitive content, and the problem of explicating the
notion of ‘reference’. I want to restrict my discussion to the simple point that it is
4I have not explicated ‘theory’, but Hempel’s demand is plausible in that it suggests, for example,
that a theory can provide understanding, psychologically understood (cf. de Regt 2009).
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doubtful that two theories that entail the same observation statements have the
same cognitive content. For one, the theories may assign different probabilities
to some observation statement without entailing it.5 Furthermore, it is doubtful
that Θ ∪Π can be replaced by Ω without cognitive loss. Hempel (1965g, 222),
for example, argues that non-observational statements are necessary for “induc-
tive explanatory and predictive use and [ . . . ] systematic economy and heuristic
fertility”. Niiniluoto (1972) and Tuomela (1973) give overviews of the discussion
about the need for non-observational statements, essentially supporting Hempel’s
conclusion. Thus there is no reason why theism would have to meet the translata-
bility challenge, because it is implausible that a theory can be replaced without
significant loss by the observation statements it entails.
On the other hand, a theory may be replaced by another theory without losing
the theoretical virtues that can come with the use of non-observational statements.
Such a replacement clearly comes with a cognitive loss, however, if the replaced
theory is not disconfirmed and makes all the observational assertions of its replace-
ment, while the replacing theory does not make all the observational assertions of
the replaced theory. For then, the replacement would result in the systematization
of fewer observations. Call this the modified translatability challenge. Rothbart
(1982, 99) suggests that a necessary condition for being scientific is to be worthy of
experimental testing, which entails that a “hypothesis must encapsulate its rival’s
successes”. Taking the successes to be the observational assertions of a theory that
has not been disconfirmed, this is the modified translatability challenge. Rothbart’s
notion of ‘scientific’ shifts the focus from individual theories to sets of theories:
Theories are scientific relative to other theories, so that a theory may become
unscientific if a new theory is developed. Considering Rothbart’s motivation (that
a theory is scientific when it is worth testing), one may want to see the modified
translatability challenge not as a criterion for scientific theories, but rather as a
criterion for scientific research. The pursuit of a theory that only makes empirical
assertions that a more general theory also makes is arguably not scientific.
Many contemporary theistic theories do not construe God’s existence as
competing with any empirical theories (cf. Mackie 1982, §8; Sobel 2004, §VII),
so that they are not intended as replacements. ID, on the other hand, is meant
to replace evolutionary theory (ET), and since ET is not disconfirmed, this is
impossible if ET makes all the observational assertions of ID, while ID fails to
make all the observational assertions of ET.
This modification of the translatability challenge does not rely on any con-
troversial assumptions about the cognitive content of theories, but does need a
concept of ‘making all the observational assertions of’. Deductively, this can be
expressed by
5As with the falsifiability challenge, Tooley (1975, 505–506) uses an intentionally underspecified
notion of testability to account for probabilistic inferences. And as in the case of the falsifiability
challenge, this confuses the indicator of a property (being tested by the same observation statements)
with the property itself (making the same observational assertions).
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Definition 9.1. Theory Θ makes all the deductiveB -assertions of Λ relative toΠ
if and only if for all possible sets Ω of observation sentences and all observation
sentences β
Ω ∪Λ∪Π β only if Ω ∪Θ∪Π β . (9.1)
The following holds:
Claim 9.1. Theory Θ makes all the deductiveB -assertions of Λ relative to Π if and
only if Θ is at least as syntactically falsifiable as Λ.
Proof. ‘⇐’: Assume Ω ∪Λ∪Π β. Then Ω ∪{¬β}Λ∪Π ⊥. By assumption,
Ω ∪{¬β} ∪Λ∪Π ⊥. Thus Ω ∪Θ∪Π β.
‘⇒’: Assume Ω ∪Λ ⊥. Since ⊥ is aB -sentence, Ω ∪Θ ⊥ by assumption.
The proof only assumes that the negation of a B -sentence is again a B -
sentence. The probabilistic version is given by
Definition 9.2. Theory Θ makes all the probabilisticB -assertions of Λ relative to
Π if and only if for all sets Ω of observation sentences
Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) = Pr(Ω |Π) or Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) = Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) . (9.2)
Claim 9.2. Let Θ and Λ be deductive theories and let all probability assignments be
truth value-like. Then Θ makes all probabilisticB -assertions of Λ relative to Π if
and only if Θ makes all deductiveB -assertions of Λ relative to Π
Proof. ‘⇐’: Pr(Ω |Λ ∪Π) = 1, Pr(Ω |Λ ∪Π) = 0, or Pr(Ω |Λ ∪Π) = {0,1}/
Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) is undefined. Without loss of generality, assume that in the last case,
Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) is undefined. Proof by cases:
If Pr(Ω |Λ ∪Π) = 1, then by claim 8.11 Θ ∪Π  Ω and by assumption
Θ∪Π Ω. Thus by claim 8.11, Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) = 1 = Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π).
If Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) = 0, then Pr(Ω∪Λ∪Π) = 0 and by claim 8.10Ω∪Λ∪Π ⊥.
Since ⊥ is aB -sentence, by assumption Ω ∪Θ∪Π ⊥. by claim 8.10, Pr(Ω |Θ∪
Π) = 0 = Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π).
If Pr(Ω |Λ ∪Π) is undefined, Pr(Ω |Λ ∪Π) 6= 1 and Pr(Ω |Λ ∪Π) 6= 0. By
claims 8.11 and 8.10, Λ∪Π 6Ω and Ω ∪Λ∪Π 6⊥. Therefore Λ∪Π 6Ω and
Λ∪Π ∪Ω 6⊥. By claims 8.11 and 8.10, Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) 6= 1 and Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) 6= 0,
so that Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) is undefined as well.
‘⇒’: If Ω ∪Λ∪Π  β, then Ω ∪ {¬β} ∪Λ∪Π  ⊥. By claim 8.10, Pr(Ω ∪
{¬β} |Λ ∪ Π) = 0, hence by assumption Pr(Ω ∪ {¬β} |∪Π) = 0 or Pr(Ω ∪
{¬β} |Θ∪Π) = 0. By claim 8.10, Ω ∪ {¬β} ∪Π ⊥ or Ω ∪ {¬β} ∪Θ∪Π ⊥
and thus Ω ∪{¬β} ∪Θ∪Π ⊥ and Ω ∪Θ∪Π β.
Thus making all the probabilisticB -observations can be considered the prob-
abilistic generalization of being at least as falsifiable. It is another justification of
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definitions 9.1 and 9.2 that they relate to probabilistic and deductive empirical
equivalence (definitions 6.38 and 8.7) as expected:
Claim 9.3. TheoryΘ is deductively/probabilistically empirically equivalent to theory
Λ relative to Π if and only if Θ makes all the deductive/probabilisticB -assertions of
Λ and Λ makes all the deductive/probabilisticB -assertions of Θ relative to Π .
Proof. Directly from the definitions.
The absolute conceptions of empirical equivalence are given by
Definition 9.3. Theory Θ is deductively/probabilistically empirically equivalent
to theory Λ if and only ifΘ is deductively/probabilistically empirically equivalent
to theory Λ relative to an honest setΠ .
The modified translatability challenge differs fundamentally from the modified
translatability challenge in its structure. A theory Θ is not evaluated on its own,
but rather compared to another theory Λ, the theory it is meant to replace. Their
relation is given by
Claim 9.4. If Θ makes deductive/probabilisticB -assertions while Λ does not, then
Θ makes all the deductive/probabilisticB -assertions of Λ, and Λ does not make all
the deductive/probabilisticB -assertions of Θ relative to Π .
Proof. Immediate from the definitions.
Since ET makes observational assertions, the modified translatability challenge
is harder to meet for ID than the modified falsifiability challenge.
9.3 The testability of Intelligent Design
Since Sober, like Tooley, aims to generalize falsifiability to testability, he modifies
the falsifiability challenge. The main difference to Tooley’s approach is that Sober
gives a definition of ‘testing’ (definition 8.2).
What role contrastive testability could play in a criticism of ID is somewhat
unclear, however, because the definition is symmetric: The definiens is invariant
up to logical equivalence under exchange of Θ and Λ. If ID turned out not to be
testable against ET, this would therefore be prima facie bad for ID if and only if it
would be bad for ET. ID may have further properties that distinguish it negatively
from ET, but the question would then still be what role contrastive testability
can play. Of course, that question only has to be answered if ID is in fact not
contrastively testable against ET. As noted, Sober (2007, 3) considers a minimal
version of ID to show that ID cannot meet the testability challenge:
The single thesis of what I will call mini-ID is that the complex adap-
tations that organisms display (e. g., the vertebrate eye) were crafted
by an intelligent designer.
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Sober’s general strategy is to argue that ID cannot be tested against ET because
ID “does not predict much of anything” (Sober 2008, §2.15). I will consider this
argument in §9.3.2. Surprisingly, Sober first argues that ID is deductively testable.
9.3.1 The deductive testability of Intelligent Design
Although the designer in ID is not specified and thus has wholly mysterious inten-
tions (Sober 1999, 65; Sober 2007, 6; Sober 2008, 128, n. 14), Hartwig and Meyer
(1993, 160) argue that ID is still falsifiable. For “the concept of intelligent design
predicts that complex information, such as that encoded in a functioning genome,
never arises from purely chemical or physical antecedents”. Against this, Sober
(2007, 6, 5; 2008, 130) first points out that probabilistic theories are not falsifiable
and falsifiability therefore cannot be a good criterion of testability. Second (im-
plicitly assuming that a not purely chemical or physical antecedent is always an
intelligent designer), he argues that the argument is invalid because the statement
‘Somewhere on the causal chain leading up to “complex information” there is an
intelligent designer at work’ is not falsifiable. This is because ‘somewhere’ may
refer to a point outside of space and time, and because the intelligent designer may
be unobservable, so that ID does not make an observational assertion (Sober 2007,
6–7).
The second point is well-taken, and echos Nielsen’s remark that every theory
is falsifiable if it only has to be incompatible with some statement. A falsifiable
theory must be incompatible with an observation statement, and that something
“causes” or (metaphorically) “arises from” something else is not observational. Even
if it usually was, the antecedents that cause complex information, or from which
complex information arises, can be unobservable; they could be God or some
other unobservable designer, for example. And the statement that some two-place
relation holds is not generally observational if one of the relation’s arguments is
not observable. This is especially clear for an otherwise observational relation like
‘is standing next to’. However, the point is also a red herring because Sober (2008,
148; cf. 2008, 130; 2007, 4) himself considers it “perfectly clear” that ID deductively
entails the observation sentence ‘Organisms display complex adaptations’ (‘ADAP’
in the following), so that ID is falsifiable according to claim 6.1. Hartwig and
Meyer have only chosen the wrong statement to argue their case.
This is important because Sober’s first point, his dismissal of falsifiability,
is mistaken according to his own claims: While falsifiability is not a necessary
condition for deductive testability, it is a sufficient condition. For Sober (1999, 72,
n. 14) states:
The thesis that testing is contrastive requires that prediction be prob-
abilistic; otherwise, hypotheses could be falsified without any con-
trastive alternative having to play a role. If H∧A deductively entails O ,
and A is known to be true, then, if we observe ¬O, we can conclude
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that H is false.
And in another passage, Sober (2008, 52, n. 29) states:
There are two exceptions to the thesis that testing is always contrastive.
If a true observation statement entails H , there is no need to consider
alternatives to H ; you can conclude without further ado that H is
true; this is just modus ponens. And if H entails O and O turns out to
be false, you can conclude that H is false, again without needing to
contemplate alternatives; this is just modus tollens.
I have argued in §8.4 that Sober cannot allow verifiability as a sufficient condition
for empirical significance because some verifiable sentences do not make observa-
tional assertions. But it is clear that Sober accepts and should accept falsifiability as
a sufficient condition for testability. Hence, since ID entails ADAP, it is falsifiable
and thus testable simpliciter.
9.3.2 The contrastive testability of Intelligent Design
Sober (2008, §2.12) argues that the “problem with the hypothesis of intelligent
design” is that “it doesn’t predict much of anything” (Sober 2008, §2.15). (The
qualifier ‘much of’ is necessary because according to Sober, ID does assert ADAP.)
And since for “ID to be testable, it must make predictions” (Sober 2007, 7), “the
design hypothesis is untestable” (Sober 2008, 148; cf. Sober 1999, 66–67). This
conclusion is false because ID is falsifiable, so that Sober’s claim at least has to
be weakened to the claim that ID is not contrastively testable against ET. Sober
claims that ‘The complex adaptations were crafted by an intelligent designer’ and
‘The complex adaptations are the result of natural selection’ both entail ADAP, so
that Pr(ADAP | ID∪Π) = 1 = Pr(ADAP |ET∪Π). More generally, there may be a
set ADAP of sentences (not very many, since ID “doesn’t predict much”) whose
probabilities are related to that of ADAP, and Pr(ADAP′ | ID∪Π) = Pr(ADAP′ |ET∪
Π) for each ADAP′ ⊆ ADAP.6 Therefore ADAP may be the reason for ID being
falsifiable, but it cannot be the reason for ID being contrastively testable against
ET. I will now argue that ID is nonetheless contrastively testable against ET.
First, note that Sober’s argument that ID cannot be tested against ET relies
on a hidden premise: Sober claims that ID does not make observational asser-
tions besides those in ADAP. Thus Pr(Ω | ID ∪Π) = Pr(Ω |Π) whenever both
probabilities are defined and Ω 6⊆ ADAP. Furthermore, if ID cannot be tested
against ET, Pr(Ω |ET ∪Π) = Pr(Ω | ID ∪Π) whenever both probabilities are de-
fined. Therefore, Sober’s argument is valid only if for any Ω 6⊆ ADAP such that
Pr(Ω |ET ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω |Π) and both probabilities are defined, Pr(Ω | ID ∪Π) is
undefined. But ET makes predictions, and, more specifically, there are many Ω′
6Sober never spells out precisely which observational assertions ID makes besides ADAP.
344
Applications The testability of Intelligent Design 9.3
with Ω′ 6⊆ ADAP such that Pr(Ω′ |ET ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω′ |Π) and both probabilities
are defined.7 Then, since Pr(Ω′ |Π) is defined, by definition 8.9 Pr(Ω′ | ID ∪Π)
is defined as well. Thus the hidden premise is false. And since Pr(Ω′ |ET∪Π) 6=
Pr(Ω′ |A) = Pr(Ω′ | ID∪Π), where all probabilities are defined, ID can be tested
against ET.
This inference relies on the possibly contentious component of definition 8.8
according to which, if ID makes no probabilistic assertions, Pr(Ω | ID∪Π) is al-
ways defined when Pr(Ω |Π) is defined. I will now argue that even under a weaker
assumption, ID can be tested against ET. That Pr(Ω | ID∪Π) is at least sometimes
defined when Pr(Ω |Π) is defined follows from Sober’s example with Jones’s birth
control (cf. §8.5). With Θ = {‘God created the eye’}, β = ‘Jones is pregnant’,
Π = {‘Jones is sexually active’}, and Λ = {‘Jones used birth control’}, Sober
(1999, n. 24) states that Pr(β |Π) = Pr(β |Θ∪Π)> Pr(β |Λ∪Π). Since for Sober
(1999, 62, 65), Θ here stands for ID, Pr(Ω | ID∪Π) is defined for some sets Ω of
observation sentences with Ω 6⊆ ADAP, for example {‘Jones is pregnant’}. It is
thus not clear why exactly for those Ω 6⊆ ADAP with Pr(Ω |ET∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω |Π),
ID should render the probability for Ω undefined.
It is thus very plausible that at least for one Ω∗ with Ω∗ 6⊆ ADAP for which
Pr(Ω∗ |ET∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω∗ |Π) and both probabilities are defined, Pr(Ω∗ | ID∪Π)
is defined as well. This very weak assumption is also independently plausible:
Take the statement that the eye of some organism has a specific feature. Based
on our background knowledge about the ratio of the occurrence of this feature
in other organisms’ eyes, we might be able to assign a specific probability p to
the occurrence of this feature, and based on our background knowledge and ET,
we might be able to assign a different probability. But based on our background
knowledge, we can also infer that if that eye was created by a designer, this designer
had the intention and ability to create an eye with that feature with probability
p. In conjunction with ID, the probability for the occurrence of the feature then
does not become undefined, but rather keeps the value p. Under this very weak
assumption, ID can be tested against ET. For then Pr(Ω∗ |ET∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω∗ |Π) =
Pr(Ω∗ | ID∪Π), where all probabilities are defined.
∗ ∗ ∗
Sober suggests contrastive testability as an improvement over falsifiability, and
argues that ID is not contrastively testable because it does not assert “much of
anything”. This all sounds as if he claimed that ID fails to meet a modification of
the falsifiability challenge. However, when it comes to the observational assertion
that organisms display complex adaptations, Sober argues that ET makes the same
assertion, and thus ID is still not contrastively testable. This sounds as if Sober
7This assumes that ADAP does not contain all probabilistic assertions of ET. This is clearly what
Sober assumes, for otherwise ID would make all probabilistic empirical assertions of ET, and thus it
would hold that ET “doesn’t predict much of anything”.
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claimed that ET fails to meet the modified translatability challenge. A theory
that fails to meet the modified falsifiability challenge indeed fails the modified
translatability challenge against almost any other theory, but a theory that makes
almost no observational assertions still makes some.
Sober presumably treats the three challenges as one because he assumes that
a theory that does not make observational assertions renders all likelihoods un-
defined. It is surprising that Sober never argues for this claim. Since it is false, it
is unsurprising that it leads to inconsistencies. Given such confusions, the inad-
equacy of contrastive testability given Sober’s own conditions of adequacy, and
since it is not clear how a symmetric relation between theories can provide a
reason to prefer one theory over another, it is safe to consider it irrelevant whether
ID meets the testability challenge against ET.
Whether ID meets the modified falsifiability or translatability challenge de-
pends on whether Sober is right in arguing that ID makes only one observational
assertion, and right in his exposition of ID. Sober claims that ‘The complex adapta-
tions were crafted by an intelligent designer’ and ‘The complex adaptations are the
result of natural selection’ both entail ADAP. But, it seems, so does ‘The complex
adaptations are the result of circles being round’, which gives Sober’s inference the
air of hocus-pocus. Thus, while the status of the three criteria is reasonably clear,
the status of ID still requires investigation.
9.4 What is the theory of Intelligent Design?
To determine whether ID fails either of the two modified challenges, it is necessary
to know more or less precisely what the theory of intelligent design is. Sober
(2007, 3) considers the minimal version of ID according to which “the complex
adaptations that organisms display [ . . . ] were crafted by an intelligent designer”.
Since a theory is more likely to fail either of the two challenges the weaker it
is, this formulation is unfairly minimal: For instance, while Sober only refers to
complex adaptations of organisms, Hartwig and Meyer (1993, 160) refer to any
kind of complex information (see §9.3.1). The technical term in the ID literature
is ‘complex specified information’ (‘CSI’).8 Thus ID should be taken to be the
statement that the objects with CSI were caused by an intelligent designer.
Although according to Sober “it is perfectly clear” that ID entails the existence
of objects with CSI (in his version of ID, the existence of complex adaptations),
it depends on the interpretation of the definite article whether this is so. Under
a suggestion by Sharvy (1980, 615), who follows Russell (1905), Sober’s version
of ID is to be paraphrased as “There is a collection of objects with CSI such that
all collections of objects with CSI are its parts, and this collection of objects with
8In this section, it suffices to rely on an intuitive notion of CSI: New York, brains, and computer
chips have it, Kazimir Malevich’s “Black square”, rocks, and sweat do not.
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CSI was caused by a designer”. 9 If there are no objects with CSI, there cannot be a
collection of them, so that in this paraphrase, ID entails the existence of objects
with CSI. The same holds for a suggestion by Brogaard (2007, 164), which leads to
the paraphrase “There are objects with CSI that were created by a designer and all
objects with CSI are some of them”. Brushing over the subtleties of the natural
language formulation, both paraphrases can be formulated as ‘There are objects
with CSI and all objects with CSI are caused by an intelligent designer’. Letting, for
any x and y, ðDyñ stand for ðy is an intelligent designerñ and ðC y xñ stand for
ðy caused xñ, this leads to the following paraphrase of Sober’s definition of ID:
ID 1. There are objects with CSI, and for all objects x with CSI,
∃y(Dy ∧C y x) . (9.3)
Russell’s definition of the definite article is not the only plausible one. Ac-
cording to Strawson, the definite article indicates that the existence of the objects
in its scope is presupposed, that is, a background assumption (cf. Ludlow 2009,
§4.2). Assuming that ‘CSI’ is an observational term, ‘There are objects with CSI’
is justified by observations. The sentence can thus be an honest supplementary
sentence, so that ID can be defined as follows:
ID 2. For all x with CSI,
∃y(Dy ∧C y x) . (9.4)
ID 1 entails but is not entailed by ID 2. Hartwig and Meyer (1993, 160) arguably
have ID 2 in mind when they claim that ID entails that CSI never arises from
purely chemical or physical antecedents without claiming that ID entails the
existence of objects with CSI. Dembski (2006, emphasis removed) states that
“[p]roponents of intelligent design, known as design theorists, [ . . . ] claim that a
type of information, known as specified complexity, is a key sign of intelligence.”
If ‘key sign’ means ‘sufficient condition’, then proponents of intelligent design
claim that all complex specified information is caused by an intelligent designer,
that is, ID 2.
Sober’s version of ID is not the only one suggested. Some definitions differ
radically in their logical structure from ID 1 and ID 2: According to the Discovery
Institute (Anonymous 2010a),10
[t]he theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the
universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause,
not an undirected process such as natural selection.
Two sections below (Anonymous 2010b), the “certain features” of the universe
and living things are further specified:
9The substitution of ‘caused’ for ‘created’ is meant to align the paraphrase with the definitions of
ID proponents discussed below.
10I thank Casey Luskin for helpful discussions about this definition.
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Intelligent design begins with the observation that intelligent agents
produce complex and specified information (CSI). Design theorists
hypothesize that if a natural object was designed, it will contain high
levels of CSI. Scientists then perform experimental tests upon natural
objects to determine if they contain complex and specified informa-
tion. One easily testable form of CSI is irreducible complexity, which
can be discovered by experimentally reverse-engineering biological
structures [ . . . ].
Thus it is claimed that, starting from the observed relation between intelligent
agents and CSI, ID theorists conjecture that all natural objects caused by an intelli-
gent designer contain CSI and go on to search for natural objects with CSI.11 Note
that the ID theorists only conjecture that in our world, the material implication
from an intelligent cause of an object to the occurrence of CSI in that object is
true, which is a statement of factual co-occurrence. It is another step to the claim
that an intelligent cause explains the occurrence of CSI (see the discussion in con-
nection with ID 3 and §9.5.1). The further assumption that undirected processes
do not explain CSI or are unlikely to do so (critically discussed, for example, by
Häggström (2007a,b)) then leads to the Discovery Institute’s definition of ID.
Thus the Discovery Institute’s definition can be paraphrased as follows:
The theory of intelligent design holds that those features of the uni-
verse and of living things with CSI are best explained by an intelligent
cause, not an undirected process.
Since living things are in the universe, their mention is redundant.12 Since an
intelligent cause (a designer) is claimed to explain features with CSI best, it is
claimed to explain the features better than any process without an intelligent cause.
In the following I will call any such process ‘undirected’. Finally, the explanation
of a feature F by a cause C only makes sense if C is the cause of F . The definition
can thus once more be paraphrased as
The theory of intelligent design holds that for all x with CSI, the
statement that x was caused by an intelligent designer explains the
CSI of x better than any statement according to which x was caused
by an undirected process.
The further discussion of the Discovery Institute’s definition will rely on
the explication of ‘explanation’. This is a notoriously difficult subject, and for
11 This is somewhat puzzling because the conjecture does not seem to be inductively supported by
the observations and, in fact, false: Even many objects intentionally produced by intelligent agents, for
example the “Black Square”, anvils, and (sometimes) sweat, do not show CSI. Note that the conjecture’s
converse is just ID 2, and thus cannot be assumed to be inductively supported without begging the
question (cf. Sober 2008, 176).
12Logically redundant, that is. Mentioning living things puts an emphasis on the main application
of ID, irreducible complexity in organisms.
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this reason, few if any scientific theories rely on the concept as a primitive.13
For a definition of ID, there are good reasons not to connect explanation to the
psychological concept of understanding, for one because then a good explanation
for one person is not always a good explanation for another who may, for example,
lack specific background knowledge. Furthermore, if explanation is connected
to understanding, ID becomes a theory that is at least in part about human
psychology rather than objects with CSI.
The classic non-psychological explication of ‘explanation’ relies on deductive
inference (cf. Hempel 1965a), so that, roughly, given our background assumptions
Π ,Θ explainsΩ better thanΛ explainsΩ ifΘ∪Π Ω andΛ∪Π 6Ω. Likelihoods
provide another way to explicate what it means to be a better explanation, by
stipulating that Θ explains Ω better than Λ if Pr(Ω |Θ ∪Π) > Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π).14
Using the abbreviations from ID 1 and further letting, for any x, ðCSIxñ stand for
a description of the CSI of x, the Discovery Institute’s version of ID is captured by
ID 3. Given our background assumptionsΠ , for all x with CSI and any undirected
process u,
∃y(Dy ∧C y x)∪Π  CSIx and C u x ∧A 6 CSIx (9.5)
or
Pr(CSIx | ∃y(Dy ∧C y x)∪Π)> Pr(CSIx |C u x ∪Π) . (9.6)
Background assumptions are almost always needed to assign probabilities to
or infer observation statements, and background assumptions should be honest,
which I will assume in the following. Since explanation is such a difficult concept,
one may treat ID 3 simply as one (central) conjunct of the Discovery Institute’s
natural language definition of ID. For it is arguably a necessary condition for a
better explanation of Ω by Θ than by Λ that Θ either entails Ω, while Λ does not,
or Θ’s likelihood for Ω is higher than Λ’s. Thus explanation may consist of more
than just entailment or higher likelihood. Giving up both of these components
would render explanation altogether elusive, given that one cannot assume the
psychological connection to understanding.15 If the disjunction of (9.5) and (9.6)
is taken as a necessary condition for ‘explanation’, ID 3 becomes a necessary
condition for the truth of the full theory of intelligent design: If intelligent design
is true, so is ID 3.
ID 3 states a logical or probabilistic relation between design and CSI relative
to our background assumptions. This makes ID 3 a rather odd theory: It is not a
13Of course, it is claimed of many theories that they explain some phenomenon or other, but that
does not mean that the theory itself uses the concept of explanation.
14Like Hempel’s explication, this explication of explanation is extremely implausible if explanation
is considered as a psychological phenomenon. But taken as a technical concept, it is arguably at least as
good as the deductive one.
15I will argue below that ID 3 is analytically false, and thus too strong. Hence the use of the
disjunction in the definition of ID 3 is a charitable reading, and so is the focus on just one necessary
condition.
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statement that in fact relates to specific observable phenomena as a matter of logic
or probability theory, but it postulates that some other statement does so relate.
One may argue that ID 3 is just the result of a too literal reading of loose language,
and that the original quote mixes a description of ID with a meta-theoretic claim
about ID, namely that ID explains CSI best. In that case, ID boils down to the claim
that all things with CSI are caused by an intelligent designer, that is, ID 2.16
In an elaborate discussion of ID, Monton (2009, §2) suggests multiple im-
provements to the Discovery Institute’s definition that also avoid the problematic
concept of explanation. He conjectures that ID proponents “wouldn’t take much
solace in the knowledge that their appeal to an intelligent cause is the best explana-
tion, if we’ve established that their explanation is a false one”. Monton (2009, 38,
emphasis removed) therefore suggests a preliminary improvement:
The theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the
universe and of living things are the result of an intelligent cause, not
an undirected process such as natural selection.
Keeping in mind that the certain features are those with CSI and that a feature
cannot be the result of both an intelligent cause and an undirected process, this
paraphrase amounts to ID 2. Since ID 2 differs radically from ID 3 in its logical
structure, the justification for this modification is somewhat wanting.
In “a bit of charitable speculation”, Monton (2009, 38) suggests that ID propo-
nents speak of an intelligent designer as the best explanation because one of the
“key ideas behind intelligent design is that their theory is scientific, and one can
get scientific evidence for the existence of the intelligent designer”. Therefore “the
actions of the intelligent cause [must not be] completely hidden from us”. Monton
(2009, 38, emphasis removed) thus suggests another preliminary definition (∗):
The theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the
universe and of living things provide evidence for the existence of
an intelligent cause, and provide evidence against the doctrine that
the features are the result of an undirected process such as natural
selection.
The exact nature of ID then depends on how ‘providing evidence for’ is explicated.
Monton (2009, 100) assumes that the evidential relationship is to be explicated by
probability theory, that is, by by Bayesian confirmation. Definition 8.1 then leads
to
ID 4. Given our background assumptionsΠ , for all x with CSI and any undirected
process u,
Pr
 ∃y[Dy ∧C y x] CSIx ∪Π> Pr ∃y[Dy ∧C y x] Π (9.7)
16Following the principle of charity, one should take ID to be the most plausible of the possible
definitions given in this section. Excluding ID 3 from the discussion would thus not help the case of ID.
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and
Pr(C u x |CSIx ∪Π)< Pr(C u x |Π) . (9.8)
Of course, there are other conceptions of confirmation. In likelihoodism, for
example, Sober’s definition of contrastive confirmation would lead to the claim
that observation statement ðCSIxñ contrastively confirms ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñ and
disconfirms ðC u xñ against each other if and only if Pr(CSIx | ∃y(Dy∧C y x∧A)>
Pr(CSIx |C u x ∪Π) (see §10.1). This explication of confirmation and disconfirma-
tion leads to the second disjunct (9.6) of ID 3.
Monton’s second modification (∗) of the Discovery Institute’s definition brings
his own definition again closer to the original (and to ID 3), since (∗) again claims
a probabilistic relation between a designer and CSI. His argument for the second
modification may indeed provide the reason for the Discovery Institute’s definition
of ID, but it is an odd one nonetheless: Rather than trying to develop a theory
involving a designer that is scientific, that explains something, or that can be
supported by evidence, ID theorists, according to Monton’s argument, simply
postulate as part of their theory that for any x with CSI, ð∃y(Dy∧C y x)ñ is scientific,
explains something, or is supported by evidence. I will discuss the implications of
this move in §9.5.1.
Monton (2009, 38) charges that both the Discovery Institute’s definition of
ID and his preliminary definition (∗) are trivially true, because in a crucial point,
Monton’s interpretation of the Discovery Institute’s definition of ID differs from
the one assumed in ID 3 and ID 4. This becomes clear when Monton (2009, 72)
discusses the assertions of ID:
I would say that intelligent design proponents are making a prediction:
they are claiming that, if one looks, one will find evidence that there
is a designer.
I have read ‘certain features’ in the Discovery Institute’s definition as a placeholder
for ‘instances of CSI’. Monton instead reads ‘certain features’ as ‘some features’,
so that ID becomes the claim that there are features that are best explained by an
intelligent cause, not by an undirected process. Under this reading, it is indeed
indisputably and almost trivially true that there are certain features of the universe
that provide evidence for a designer and against the claim that they are the result of
an undirected process. Monton (2009, 16, 23) gives the Petronas Towers in Kuala
Lumpur and Sarah Watson’s muscular arms as examples of such features.
I have argued above for my interpretation, and it also fits better with Hartwig
and Meyer’s claim about the impossibility of CSI arising from purely physical or
chemical antecedents, the central role that CSI and irreducible complexity play
in the exposition of ID by Dembski and Wells (2008), and specifically Dembski’s
claim that “if there is a way to detect design, specified complexity is it” (Dembski
2002, 116). The lengths to which Monton has to go to avoid the almost trivial truth
of ID provide another argument against his interpretation. His final definition is
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this (Monton 2009, 39, emphasis changed):
The theory of intelligent design holds that certain global features
of the universe provide evidence for the existence of an intelligent
cause, or that certain biologically innate features of living things
provide evidence for the doctrine that the features are the result of the
intentional actions of an intelligent cause which is not biologically
related to the living things, and provide evidence against the doctrine
that the features are the result of an undirected process such as natural
selection.
Except for the change from a conjunction to the disjunction (here emphasized), all
the modifications are attempts at avoiding the almost trivial truth of ID (Monton
2009, 17–26). None of the modifications are necessary under the interpretation
defended here, since it does not render ID almost trivially true, and renders the
mention of living things in the Discovery Institute’s definition redundant.17
It is furthermore doubtful that Monton avoids triviality or something close
to it. If, for example, the hypothesis of a designer asserts a certain feature F in
all organisms, while no undirected process does, the existential quantification
allows including all and only those organisms with feature F in the evidence. If
the hypothesis of a designer, but no undirected process, asserts a specific ratio of
F , the existential quantification allows for picking out a set of organisms that has
this very ratio as long as there are enough organisms with and enough organisms
without the feature to assemble the set. Therefore, as long as the hypothesis of the
designer makes any such assertion, ID is true under Monton’s definition.18
9.5 The two challenges to Intelligent Design
The previous section has resulted in four versions of ID. ID 1 is Sober’s own
clarification of his definition, using Russell’s paraphrase of the definite article.
ID 1 entails ID 2, which itself is a clarification of Sober’s definition that relies on
Strawson’s paraphrase of the definite article. The Discovery Institute’s definition
can be clarified as ID 3. Finally, while Monton’s final definition of ID is flawed,
his preliminary definition (∗) suggests ID 4 if Bayesianism is used as a criterion of
confirmation, and the probabilistic disjunct of ID 3 if likelihoodism is used.
17Note that neither ID 3 nor ID 4 exclude the alleged fine-tuning of cosmological constants as
evidence for an intelligent designer (which is a focus of Monton’s discussion): Dembski (2002, xiii)
claims that the fine-tuning is an instance of CSI.
18Monton (2009, 35, 109) also seems to existentially quantify over all designers, as he rather freely
chooses the designer’s intentions (to let an atom decay at one specific moment or to have as much
intelligent life as possible, for example). Strictly speaking, Monton is thus not dealing with the question
whether there could be any evidence ðCSIxñ for ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñ, but with the question whether
there could be a y such that there could be any evidence ðCSIxñ for ðDy ∧C y xñ.
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In this section, I will discuss which of these versions of ID meets which of
the two remaining challenges. For this discussion, I will assume that ‘CSI’ is
an observational term. This assumption is charitable because either challenge is
easier to meet the more terms in a theory are observational, and because CSI is
observational only if it is well-defined, which is disputed, for example, by Elsberry
and Shallit (2009, §§4–6). In general, I will make the charitable assumption that
only sentences in which ‘designer’ or ‘cause’ occur are not observational. With
this assumption, I thus avoid the problem of determining precisely the set of
observational sentences.
9.5.1 The modified falsifiability challenge
According to Swinburne (2004, 7), ‘God’ is synonymous with ‘A necessarily
existing person without a body who necessarily is eternal, perfectly free, omnipo-
tent, omniscient, perfectly good, and the creator of all things’. This synonymy is
therefore a justified supplementary sentence, which allows inferring from God’s
existence that all objects, and hence all objects with CSI, are caused by a person
(and hence a designer). Any explanation of a phenomenon by this theory is, ac-
cording to Swinburne (2004, 47–49), a personal explanation, and as such it relies
essentially on the intentions and abilities of the designer, in this case God. ID 2 is
a personal explanation as well and therefore entails an observation (for example
the description of the CSI of some object x) only in conjunction with two specific
supplementary sentences. The first states that any designer who caused an object
x with CSI has specific intentions ix and abilities ax , that is, with ðI yixñ standing
for ðy has intention ixñ and ðByaxñ standing for ðy has ability axñ:
For all x with CSI: ∀y(Dy ∧C y x→ I yix ∧Byax ) . (9.9)
The second states that a designer who caused x, with intentions ix and abilities ax ,
brings about the observation Ωx :
For all x with CSI: ∀y(Dy ∧C y x ∧ I yix ∧Byax →Ωx ) . (9.10)
If some x has CSI, observation Ωx then follows because for all x with CSI,
∃y(Dy ∧C y x)∧∀y(Dy ∧C y x→ I yix ∧Byax )∧
∀y(Dy ∧C y x ∧ I yix ∧Byax →Ωx ) Ωx . (9.11)
For probabilistic assertions, the likelihoods of ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñ can be given
through generalizations of the deductive premises. Instead of claiming that if x
was designed by y, y has intention ix and ability ax , it is enough to assert that if x
was designed, the probability that it was designed by some y with intention z and
ability w has the probability pxy zw :
pxy zw = Pr
 
Dy ∧C y x ∧ I y z ∧Byw | ∃y(Dy ∧C y x) . (9.12)
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The second deductive auxiliary assumption (9.10) can be relaxed to the claim that
if a designer y of x has intention z and ability w, then an observation Ω has
probability qxy zwΩ :
qxy zwΩ = Pr(Ω |Dy ∧C y x ∧ I y z ∧Byw) . (9.13)
The probability for Ω for any x with CSI can then be written as19
Pr
 
Ω | ∃y(Dy ∧C y x)=∑
y zw
pxy zw qxy zwΩ . (9.14)
In the theistic theory, the abilities of the designer are known within the
precision of natural language: God is omnipotent. The intentions of God are also
known within the precision of the word ‘good’.20 ID 2 differs from the theistic
theory in this respect: The designer who caused an object with CSI is only specified
as being intelligent. Leaving the problem of the level of intelligence aside, Sober
argues in a number of ways that the intentions of the designer are unknown.
Among them is his point that the designer could be an extraterrestrial, which
would give no indication about the intentions. But ‘designer’ is even less specific
than ‘extraterrestrial designer’, and thus would give even fewer indications of the
intentions (Sober 1999, 65–66). And sometimes, the problem of evil is solved by
claiming that the intentions of God are unknowable. This answer entails that
the intentions of a less specific designer are also unknowable (Sober 2008, §2.17).
Sober (1999, 74, n. 25; 2007, 6; 2008, 128, 154, n. 29) also gives lists of proponents
of ID who state that the intentions of the designer cannot be known.
In general, for any designer with the intentions and the abilities to do some-
thing, one can without inconsistency think of another designer without those
intentions or abilities. Thus the first supplementary sentence (9.9) of the deductive
assertion of Ωx (9.11) is unjustified for any intention and ability, with (arguably)
one exception. If one observes Ωx for some x, then one can plausibly infer that if
there is a designer of x, the designer had the intention to bring about Ωx . With
the further plausible assumption that having the intention and ability to bring
about Ωx , a designer would bring about Ωx , one can infer Ωx . But then, for the
supplementary sentence to be honest, they have to contain assumption Ωx if they
contain the first supplementary sentence. Therefore, ID 2 in conjunction with
honest supplementary sentences entailsΩx only if the auxiliary assumptions alone
already entail Ωx , and thus ID 2 makes no deductive observational assertions.
ID 2 makes a probabilistic assertion, that is, assigns a probability to some
observation Ω, only if the sum (9.14) is defined. The sum in turn is defined only if
19The condition in equation (9.13) for term qxy zwΩ does not need to contain the conjunct ð∃y(Dy∧
C y x)ñ, as this is entailed by ðDy ∧C y xñ for any y.
20This assumes that ‘good’ has its usual meaning in theistic statements. The contrary assumption
led to the original falsifiability challenge (see §9.1).
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the conditional probabilities (9.12) and (9.13) are defined, again because ID 2 relies
on personal explanations. But analogously to the deductive case, for any designer
who would have some intention and ability with one probability, one can, without
flouting the laws of probability, think of another designer who has that intention
and ability with any other probability. Thus the first auxiliary assumption (9.12) is
undefined for almost all intentions and abilities. Similar to the deductive case, the
exceptions are those cases in which observation Ω can be assigned a probability
s independently of assuming a designer. For some Ω and x, one can then maybe
justify the assumption that if a designer caused x, the designer must have had the
intention and ability to bring about Ω with probability s . (It is here not obvious
what values the probabilities in the two auxiliary assumption have to have, only
that the sum of their products has to be s forΩ.) But if Pr(Ω) = s is used to justify
the auxiliary assumptions, it has to be in the auxiliary assumptions as well if they
are honest. Thus, ID 2 only assigns probability s to Ω if the auxiliary assumptions
do, too. Therefore ID 2 makes no probabilistic observational assertions either, and
thus succumbs to the modified falsifiability challenge.
As already noted, the problem with ID 3 and ID 4 is that, rather than make
observational assertions, they postulate deductive or probabilistic relations be-
tween the existence of an intelligent designer and observations. Given the results
so far, one can see that the postulates are, in fact, false: ID 3 is true only if, given
our background assumptionsΠ , equation (9.5) or equation (9.6) is true for every
x with CSI. Equation (9.5) states that for each x, ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)∪Πñ entails a
description of the CSI of x, while ðU x ∪Πñ does not. But ID 2 makes no observa-
tional assertions for any honest auxiliary assumptions, and for each x with CSI,
ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñ is a logically weaker claim than ID 2. Since CSIx is assumed to
be an observation statement, and our background assumptions are specific honest
auxiliary assumptions, ð∃y(Dy∧C y x)ñ therefore asserts no description of the CSI
of x. Hence equation (9.5) is false for all x, and ID 3 is false unless equation (9.6)
is true for all x. This holds only if for all x with CSI, the probability for the CSI
of x given ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñ is higher than its probability given any undirected
process u, and thus specifically ET. Sober (2008) has argued extensively that the
complex adaptations we observe can be explained by ET, and thus are certainly
not less probable under the assumption of ET than they are given our background
assumptions. Therefore equation (9.6) is true only if the probability for the CSI of
x given ID 2 is higher than given our background assumptions. But again, since
ID 2 and thus ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñmake no observational assertions, this is false. ID 3
is therefore analytically false, because it postulates an inferential relation that does
not exist. And if ID 3 is only taken to be a necessary condition for the truth of the
full theory of intelligent design, that theory is false as well by modus tollens.
ID 4 is true only if all undirected processes, and thus also ET, are disconfirmed
and ð∃y(Dy ∧ C y x)ñ is confirmed by each x with CSI given our background
assumptions. Sober (2007, 2008) has documented at length that ET has not been
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disconfirmed by each such x and thus ID 4 is false independently of the status of
ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñ because equation (9.8) is false. But ID 4 would be wrong even
if ET were disconfirmed by each x with CSI: Purportedly, there are objects for
which the designer cannot be directly observed and which show CSI. For those
objects, ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñ has to be confirmed by observations other than those of
the designer. This holds if and only if equation (9.7) holds, which is equivalent to
Pr
 
CSIx | ∃y(Dy ∧C y x)∪Π

> Pr(CSIx |Π) . (9.15)
But this inequality cannot be true for the same reason that equation (9.6) cannot
be true, namely because ID 2 makes no observational assertions. This leaves ID 1,
Sober’s definition, which meets the modified falsifiability challenge.
9.5.2 The modified translatability challenge
ID 1 clearly makes the deductive observational assertion that there are objects
with CSI. But ID 1 is equivalent to the conjunction of this existence claim and
ID 2, and I have argued in §9.5.1 that also in conjunction with honest auxiliary
assumptions, ID 2 makes no observational assertions. Under the assumption that
‘CSI’ is a well-defined observational concept, it is a justified and hence honest
auxiliary assumption that there are objects with CSI.21 Therefore ID 1 entails only
observation statements that are also entailed by this existence claim, and assigns
the same probabilities as this existence claim.
ID 1 fails to meet the modified translatability challenge against ET if ET makes
all the observational assertions of ID 1, but ID 1 does not make all the observational
assertions of ET. Sober (2008, §2.9) argues that if the existence of objects with
CSI (or, in his discussion, of complex adaptations of organisms) is to be explicitly
included in ID, it should also be included in ET. This is plausible, as the definite
article should be interpreted in the same way, no matter whether the statement is
‘The objects with CSI were caused by an intelligent designer’ or ‘The objects with
CSI are the result of natural selection’. This is also in keeping with the description
of ID by the Discovery Institute that led to ID 3, because it refers to the intelligent
cause and undirected processes in the same way.
With both ID 1 and ET entailing the existence of objects with CSI (call this
ADAP again), ET makes all the deductive observational assertions of ID 1. Un-
less there is an observation Ω such that Pr(Ω |{ADAP} ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω |Π) and
Pr(Ω |{ADAP} ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω |{ADAP} ∪ ET ∪Π), that is, ADAP alone makes a
probabilistic observational assertion different from ET, ET also makes all the
probabilistic observational assertions of ID 1. Then, since ET makes observational
assertions besides ADAP, ID 1 does not meet the modified translatability challenge.
But even if ADAP alone makes a probabilistic observational assertion different
from ET, ID 1 fails to meet the modified falsifiability challenge against many other
21Again because one can observe many objects that, intuitively, have CSI: Miami, eyes, etc.
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statements: ADAP itself makes all the observational assertions of ID 1, and, for
example, the claim ADAP+ that there are organisms with eyes makes more.
9.6 Intelligent Design as a science
If every version of ID fails one of the modified challenges or is analytically false,
what does this mean for the status of ID beyond the obvious that ID is false, makes
no observational assertions, or makes fewer observational assertions than ET? Of
specific contemporary interest is the question whether ID can still be science.22
While some consider criteria for the demarcation of science from non-science an
important topic of research (Hansson 2008a), others doubt that such a demarcation
criterion is possible at all. A number of proponents of the latter view, for example
Monton (2009, 49) and Leiter (2010, 6–12), endorse and rely on an influential
article by Laudan (1983a). I will argue that the article relies on a non-sequitur and
actually suggests the opposite of its purported conclusion.
Laudan places five demands on a criterion for the demarcation of science. First,
it would be “a grave drawback for any demarcation criterion” if it did not respect
the paradigmatic cases of science and non-science (Laudan 1983a, 117–118). Second,
a philosophically significant demarcation criterion should “identify the epistemic
or methodological features which mark off scientific beliefs from unscientific ones”
(Laudan 1983a, 118). Third, it should have “sufficient precision that we can tell
whether various activities and beliefs whose status we are investigating do or do
not satisfy it” (Laudan 1983a, 118). Fourth, it should specify “a set of individually
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions” for something to be scientific (Laudan
1983a, 118). Finally, because of the far-reaching practical implications of any
demarcation criterion, it should be supported by arguments that are “especially
compelling” (Laudan 1983a, 120).
Laudan (1983a, 120–124) argues that none of the demarcation criteria suggested
in the 20th century is a“necessary and sufficient condition for something to count
as ‘science’, at least not as that term is customarily used”, that is, the criteria
fail to fulfill either his fourth or first demand. 23 The same holds, he argues, for
criteria suggested before the 20th century (while those based on the notion of
scientific methodology also fail to fulfill his third demand) (Laudan 1983a, §2).
This is the main result of Laudan’s paper. Because of the “epistemic heterogeneity
of the activities and beliefs customarily regarded as scientific”, Laudan (1983a, 124)
further suggests that his second demand can never be satisfied.
22This section has been published under the title “On an allegedly essential feature of criteria for the
demarcation of science” (Lutz 2011d). I thank J. Brian Pitts, Antje Rumberg, and three anonymous
referees for helpful comments.
23Shortly after publication of his article, Laudan (1986, 120) would criticize Carnap’s notion of
explication for requiring “in effect, that the methodological theories of the philosopher must, to a very
large degree, capture the pre-analytic uses of methodological terminology”, thus effectively dropping
his first demand (see §3.8.1, n. 60).
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In objection to Laudan, a number of proponents of demarcation criteria
have contested his fourth demand without, however, addressing the argument
that Laudan (1983a, 118–119) provides in support of it (e. g., Thagard 1988, 159;
Derksen 1993, 20; Pennock 2011, 183). According to Laudan’s fourth demand, a
demarcation criterion must provide a set of conditions {χi}i∈I for any x to be a
science (S x) that are jointly sufficient, ∀x∧i∈I χi (x)→ S x, and individually
necessary,
∧
i∈I ∀x[S x → χi (x)]  ∀x

S x → ∧i∈I χi (x). This means that
there is one necessary and sufficient condition,
∧
i∈I χi (x). According to Laudan
(1983a, 118), this demand is justified because “it seems unlikely” that “something
less ambitious would do the job” of a demarcation criterion: With a criterion
that provided only a necessary condition ψ, ∀x[S x → ψ(x)], one could never
determine that something is a science, and with a criterion that provided only a
sufficient condition ϕ,∀x[ϕ(x)→ S x], one could never determine that something
is not a science (Laudan 1983a, 118–119). In other words (Laudan 1983a, 119):
Without conditions which are both necessary and sufficient, we are
never in a position to say ‘this is scientific: but that is unscientific’.
But Laudan’s claim is false: To be able to say that a is scientific (Sa) while
b is not (¬S b ), all that is needed is one sufficient condition ϕ that is fulfilled
by a, ϕ(a), and one necessary condition ψ that is not fulfilled by b , ¬ψ(b ).
That is, the criterion can provide a condition of the form σ  ∀x[ϕ(x) →
S x]∧∀x[S x→ψ(x)], where, for σ to be conservative, ∀x[ϕ(x)→ψ(x)] must
be a logical truth. However, Laudan’s demand that the converse must also hold,
so that ∀x[ϕ(x)↔ ψ(x)] (and ∀xψ(x)↔ ∧i∈I χi (x)), is supererogatory.
Hedging his claim with “it seems unlikely”, Laudan suggests that any condition
logically weaker than a necessary and sufficient one is either only necessary or
only sufficient. But, if χ is conservative without fulfilling Laudan’s supererogatory
demand, then χ is weaker than any necessary and sufficient condition and still
“does the job” of determining a but not b to be a science.
Without the demand for a single necessary and sufficient condition for scien-
tific theories, Laudan’s argument actually suggests the opposite of what he intends
to show. He states that, given his first demand, the criteria suggested in the 20th
century are implausible as necessary and sufficient conditions, and that “in most
cases, these are not even plausible as necessary conditions” (Laudan 1983a, 123,
my emphasis). But this suggests that some criteria do provide plausible necessary
conditions {ψ j } j∈J that fulfill his first demand. Assuming that the criteria identify
important epistemic or methodological features, the resulting necessary condition
λx
∧
j∈J ψ j (x) also fulfills Laudan’s second demand. Furthermore, Laudan (1983a,
117–118) states in connection with his first demand that “there is a large measure
of agreement at this paradigmatic level” and in fact gives examples of paradigmatic
sciences. Thus there is a sufficient condition for scientific theories after all, if only
by enumeration of the paradigmatic sciences. If now these paradigmatic sciences
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have any epistemic or methodologically relevant feature ϑ in common, its con-
junction with the necessary condition, λx

ϑ(x)∧∧ j∈J ψ j (x), fulfills Laudan’s
first and second demand and logically entails the necessary condition.
Whether the resulting criterion with one necessary condition and a differ-
ent sufficient condition fulfills Laudan’s third demand will depend on what is
being investigated, but without the fourth demand, a rather weak criterion may
already determine some cases and provide a starting point for stronger criteria.
For example, the two modified challenges can plausibly be construed as necessary
conditions. For a theory should probably not be considered empirical if it fails
the modified falsifiability challenge, and even the statement ‘There are complex
organisms’ may not be enough for ID to qualify as a proper theory. And the pursuit
of ID may not be considered a scientific one if ID fails the modified translatability
challenge. Of course, both challenges also have to meet Laudan’s fifth demand.
But the demand cuts both ways: Given the important practical implications, one
should neither adopt nor dismiss a criterion for the demarcation of science based
on arguments that are not especially compelling.
9.7 Conclusion
Probably the most important result of the elaboration of ID in §9.4 is that ID
is woefully underspecified, leading to different explications with vastly different
properties.24 ID 2 makes no observational assertions and thus fails to meet the
modified falsifiability challenge, ID 1 makes fewer observational assertions than
ET and in fact the simple claim that there are organisms with eyes, and thus fails to
meet the modified translatability challenge. ID 3 and ID 4 are wrong, not because
of incorrect observational assertions, but rather because they make incorrect
logical or probabilistic claims.
A rather stark example from ID proponents is the difference between two
textbook expositions of ID: According to Davis and Kenyon (1993, 99–100) ID
“means that various forms of life began abruptly through an intelligent agency,
with their distinctive features already intact—fish with fins and scales, birds with
feathers, beaks, and wings etc.” It seems like more than a mere adjustment of details
when in a recent textbook, Dembski and Wells (2008, 109) claim that ID “neither
requires nor excludes speciation—even speciation by Darwinian mechanisms.
ID is sometimes confused with a static view of species, as though species were
designed to be immutable. [ . . . ] ID precludes neither significant variation within
species nor the evolution of new species from earlier forms”. Thus even accepting
modifications of theories over time, ID is not plausibly construed as a single theory
like quantum mechanics or even evolution. It rather has to be considered a class of
24This problem is exacerbated by the fact that ID is also often formulated with so little precision
that even charitable interpreters (which I take Monton and me to be) can arrive at fundamentally
incompatible conclusions about its content.
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related theories with radically different logical structures. The theories may indeed
only be related by their common abstraction that there is at least one designer.
As to the abrupt beginning of life, biologists have found overwhelming evi-
dence for common descent, and thus even with the addition of Davis and Kenyon’s
version to the superabundance of varieties of ID, the conclusion stays the same: ID
fails, because it is disconfirmed by the evidence, because it makes false inferential
claims, because it fails the modified falsifiability challenge, or because it fails the
modified translatability challenge. In all these cases, it is furthermore plausible that
either the pursuit of ID given our state of knowledge or ID itself is not scientific.
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Chapter 10
Confirmation
Having applied empirical significance directly in the last chapter, I now want to
spell out some of the implications for related areas, the most obvious of which
may be the concept of confirmation.1 Contrastive testability, making probabilistic
basic assertions, and the Bayesian criterion of empirical significance have all been
proposed in the context of theories of confirmation. In this chapter, I will put the
cart before the horse and try to arrive at criteria of confirmation starting from
probabilistic criteria of empirical significance.
As a first step, I will discuss a criticism of Sober’s criterion of testability that
will turn out to be rather a criticism of Sober’s notion of contrastive confirmation
(§10.1). And while this criticism fails, I will give a different criticism of contrastive
confirmation, showing that the problem for contrastive testability also applies
to contrastive confirmation (§10.2). The two probabilistic criteria of empirical
significance found in §8, on the other hand, will lead to viable candidates of
confirmation (§10.3). Neither of these candidates, however, provide a complete
account of theory acceptance, as I will argue in §10.4.
10.1 Boudry and Leuridan on supplementary sen-
tences
Boudry and Leuridan (2011, §3.6) agree with Sober that testing is contrastive,
but they criticize his conception of suitability as too restrictive.2 Specifically,
they argue that restriction IVb of definition 8.3, the demand that supplementary
1Parts of this chapter have been presented at the conference of the Eastern Division of the American
Philosophical Association on December 30, 2011. I thank my commentator Wesley van Camp and the
audience for helpful discussions.
2I thank Maarten Boudry and Bert Leuridan for their comments on this section and helpful
discussions. Formal notations in this section are changed to fit mine.
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sentences be independent of the observation that contrastively tests the theories,
does not allow for certain intuitively valid inferences. With respect to ID, they
argue that some of these intuitively valid inferences would render ID testable, but
disconfirmed.
Remember that Sober (2008, 145) argues that not every set of supplementary
sentences is suitable by giving the example of the careless juror who just makes up
supplementary sentences to conclude that Smith is a murderer (page 310). I have
noted in §8.3.1 that in this example, the question is one about confirmation, not
testability. The tacit switch relies, first, on the definition of ‘testing’ via confirma-
tion and disconfirmation: Ω tests Θ relative to suitable supplementary sentences
if and only if Ω confirms Θ or disconfirms Θ relative to suitable supplementary
sentences. Thus if a stipulated supplementary sentence is not suitable for con-
firming a hypothesis (such as that Smith is the murderer) or disconfirming it by
confirming its competitor, it is also not suitable for testing it. Second, Sober (1999,
48) relies on his postulated relation between testing and testability (see §8.1.2):
If a set of observations provides a test of a proposition because it bears
relation R to that proposition, then a proposition is testable when it
is possible for there to be a set of observations that bears relation R to
the proposition. Testing is to testability as dissolving is to solubility.
To be precise, he implicitly uses the converse of this relation for the tacit switch, so
that a stipulated set of supplementary sentences is not suitable for the testability of
two hypotheses because it is not suitable for the testing of two hypotheses. Sober
thus assumes that Θ is testable if and only there is some Ω that tests Θ relative to
suitable supplementary sentences.
Combining the two tacit assumptions, Θ can thus be tested against Λ if and
only if there is a possible Ω such that Ω confirms Θ against Λ or Ω disconfirms
Θ against Λ relative to suitable supplementary sentences. Sober’s definition of
testability (page 303) can be summarized as
Hypothesis Θ can now be tested against hypothesis Λ if and only
if there exist true [and suitable] auxiliary assumptions Π and an
observation statement Ω such that [ . . . ] Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω |Λ∪
Π),
where ‘suitable’ has to be interpreted by Sober’s restrictions III and IV on the sup-
plementary sentences. Through the relation between testability and confirmation,
one thus arrives at
Definition 10.1. Ω contrastively confirms hypothesis Θ against hypothesis Λ
if and only if there exist true and suitable supplementary sentencesΠ such that
Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π)> Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π).
This criterion of confirmation is equivalent to Sober’s definition ofΩ favoring
Θ over Λ (Sober 2008, 32), except that it takes supplementary sentences into
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account. Sober himself in fact starts out with his definition of confirmation and in-
troduces his definition of testability later. Boudry and Leuridan (2011) tacitly rely
on definition 10.1 when they criticize Sober’s conception of suitability by arguing
that, in some cases, ID is intuitively confirmed but not contrastively confirmed
according to definition 10.1. Like Sober and Boudry and Leuridan (2011), I will
therefore assume this criterion in this section.3 The problem with contrastive testa-
bility, Boudry and Leuridan (2011) claim, lies with Sober’s definition of suitability.
To liberalize the conception, they suggest an additional sufficient condition for
suitability based on simplicity and unification.
In this section, I will argue that Boudry and Leuridan (2011) misconstrue both
Sober’s criterion of testability and the version of ID that Sober claims cannot be
tested against ET.4 As a result, the inferences they claim to be intuitively valid
either are not, or can be accommodated by Sober’s criterion. And while Boudry
and Leuridan (2011) do not spell out their sufficient condition for suitability
explicitly, in its most plausible interpretations, it trivializes contrastive testability
and contrastive confirmation.5
10.1.1 Contrastive testability and valid inferences
Boudry and Leuridan (2011) argue against Sober’s claim that ID “cannot be tested
against evolutionary theory, at least at present” (Sober 1999, 66–67; cf. 2008, 148).
More generally, they argue that many examples of intuitive confirmation are not
examples of contrastive confirmation. I will discuss each of their four examples in
turn.
Excursion or Murder?
Boudry and Leuridan (2011, 562) suggest to change Sober’s example of the murder
case so that the evidence additionally includes blood stains and broken glass in
the bedroom but no body, the supposed victim (a landlord) is a non-smoker who
neither owns a gun nor has size twelve feet, and the investigating detective has to
decide between
Θ The landlord was murdered.
Λ The landlord is alive and left for an unexpected walk.
3I will argue in §10.4 that the criterion and the two tacit assumptions that led to it are incorrect:
For confirmation, one must take the maximal set of suitable supplementary sentences into account.
Since the following discussion will be about whether specific supplementary sentences can, not should
be included, this will not make a difference.
4This is not too surprising, since in contradiction to their conclusion, Sober’s definition of suitabil-
ity is too wide (see §8.3.2).
5Boudry and Leuridan’s condition for suitability alone already trivializes contrastive confirmation.
Sober’s own trivializing definition is not needed.
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Ξ The landlord killed himself and was then dragged away.
Boudry and Leuridan (2011, 562) claim:
If the detective favors the murder hypothesis, we submit that she is
justified in making the additional assumption that the hypothesized
murderer, whoever it was, wears a size 12 shoe, smokes cigars, and
used a Colt .45 [Π1]. This would be a matter of sound detective work,
not of accusing Smith or Jones without basis.
This is probably correct, but also irrelevant because the question was not whether
the detective can infer the anatomy, smoking habit, and possessions of a hypo-
thetical murderer, but whether Θ, Λ, or Ξ is confirmed by the evidence. Sober’s
definition of suitability does not lead to a problem in this case. For one, given
that even unexpected walks tend not to involve gun shells, shattered glass, and
profuse bleeding, all of which are more probable in case of a murder, Θ is con-
trastively confirmed against Λ by the evidence. Thus Sober’s notion of suitability
is not too exclusive for Θ to be contrastively confirmed against Λ. It is also fairly
plausible that Θ is contrastively confirmed against Ξ because it is arguably more
probable that someone breaks a window when illegally entering a bedroom than
when dragging a body. In any case, it is not obvious that the evidence intuitively
confirms Θ against Ξ either, so there is no counterexample.
Of course, Boudry and Leuridan are not interested in the confirmation of Θ,
but ofΠ1.
6 They give what I take to be meant as a rephrasing of Θ:
Ω A size 12 shoe print, cigar ash, and shells from a Colt .45 revolver were
found in the bedroom.
Θ The landlord was murdered by X .
Π1 X wears a size 12 shoe, smokes cigars, and owns a Colt .45.
Boudry and Leuridan (2011) note that any plausible set of supplementary sen-
tences Π2 that we may justify independently of the evidence at hand does “not
warrant our adoptingΠ1. Only the conjunction ofΠ2 with Ω and Θ does”. But
again, the question should not be whether Π1 is confirmed, but whether Θ is
confirmed. Boudry and Leuridan have switched the roles of the hypothesis and
the supplementary sentences: In their informal description, Boudry and Leuridan
(2011, 562) state that the detective favors Θ, that is, counterfactually assumes Θ
to be justified, and can thus infer the anatomy, smoking habit, and possessions
of the hypothetical murderer. Thus Θ is the set of supplementary sentences and
Π1 is the theory to be tested. If the competing hypothesis is, for example, ‘X
does not wear a size 12 shoe, smokes cigars, or owns a Colt .45’, one can see that
6They assume that the detective “tentatively favors” Θ and want to determine whetherΠ1 can be
justified (Boudry, personal email from June 18, 2011).
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the evidence contrastively confirmsΠ1 when we help ourselves to some supple-
mentary sentences that are justified independently of the evidence at hand (e. g.
the general frequency of other people’s cigar ash, shells, and footprints found in
private bedrooms).
Motivated expert or lazy dilettante?
Moving on to ID, Boudry and Leuridan (2011, 564) consider a situation in which
“William Paley, reflecting on the origin of the human eye, constructed the following
design hypothesis, conjoined with two additional assumptions”:
Θ The human camera eye was created by an intelligent designer.
Π1 The designer is interested in creating camera eyes.
Π2 The designer is capable of designing something as complex as the camera
eye.
Boudry and Leuridan (2011, 565) claim that the “adoption of both Π1 and Π2
seems reasonable enough since their negation is completely uninteresting, in the
sense of being very unlikely to yield [Ω]”, which asserts the existence of camera
eyes.7 Specifically, they state that
the likelihood of both Θ and ¬∧Π1 and Θ and ¬∧Π2, namely,
Pr(Ω |Θ∪{¬∧Π1}) and Pr(Ω |Θ∪{¬∧Π2}) is extremely low. If we
follow Sober’s approach, however, this gives us no reason for adopting
Π1 andΠ2, because, in the absence of background knowledge about
the designer, the independence rule is violated.
This argument for the intuitive confirmation is somewhat questionable, since
Pr(Ω |Θ ∪Π1 ∪Π2) can be low for some Ω, Θ, Π1, and Π2 even if Pr(Ω |Θ ∪{¬∧Π1}) and Pr(Ω |Θ∪{¬∧Π2}) are low as well. More importantly, it miscon-
strues the situation: Paley has developed the hypothesis Λ  Θ ∪Π1 ∪Π2, and
Boudry and Leuridan claim that, because Ω is extremely improbable under the
assumption of Θ∪{¬∧Π1} and Θ∪{¬∧Π2}, Λ is intuitively confirmed. Now,
since by construction Pr(Ω |Λ) is high, Ω also contrastively confirms Λ against
Ξ  Θ∪{¬∧Π1} ∪ {¬∧Π2}, because, presumably, Pr(Ω |Ξ) is very low.8
7Strictly speaking, due to the use of the descriptive phrase, Θ either entails the existence of the
human eye (in Russell’s paraphrase), or presumes its existence (in Strawson’s paraphrase). Θ should
rather be ‘All camera eyes were created by an intelligent designer’ or similar. Similarly, Π1 and Π2
should be preceded by “If there is exactly one designer, . . . ”.
8In a footnote, Boudry and Leuridan (2011, §3.3, n. 4) further argue against restriction IVb of
definition 8.3 on the basis that “there do not seem to be many ways of justifying the introduction of
an auxiliary except by taking the observations into account which we set out to explain. [ . . . ] Take for
example:Π∗1 = ‘Naive set theory suffers from Russell’s paradox.’ [T]here is no use incorporating it
as an auxiliary, because it has no bearing on our observations in any way.” This confuses justifying a
statement with justifying its inclusion in the set of supplementary sentences that one considers. Sober
does not restrict the latter.
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This response does not show that Sober’s claim that ID cannot be tested against
ET is mistaken, however, for Sober (2007, 3; cf. 1999, 62; 2008, 132) expressly
considers a minimal version of ID:
The single thesis of what I will call mini-ID is that the complex adap-
tations that organisms display (e. g., the vertebrate eye) were crafted
by an intelligent designer.
Thus Sober considers neither Λ norΞ , and in fact repeatedly notes that he assumes
that the designer’s intentions are unknown because the designer itself is not
specified in any way (see §9.3.1).
This also defuses another criticism: Boudry and Leuridan (2011, §3.4, n. 7)
claim that in Sober’s approach, it is not clear how to “separate the central hy-
pothesis from auxiliary assumptions”. Since Sober is considering the contrastive
testability of mini-ID, every other assumption must be a supplementary sentence.
Otherwise, definition 8.3 (which is not restricted to specifically “central” hypothe-
ses) has been misapplied. Design hypotheses different from mini-ID can of course
be contrastively testable against ET (cf. Sober 1999, 61).
This points to a core misunderstanding of Sober’s criterion. Boudry and
Leuridan (2011, §3.3) take the role of the supplementary sentences to consist
in “fleshing out a hypothesis”, that is, they consider supplementary sentences to
somehow become conjuncts of the hypothesis. They rest this interpretation on
Sober’s claim that supplementary sentences are “used to bring the hypotheses
[ . . . ] into contact with the observation”Ω (Sober 2008, 145). But this is mistaken,
for Sober (1999, 54; 2007, 5–6; 2008, 144) introduces supplementary sentences
to address Duhem’s point that hypotheses (whether “fleshed out” or not) rarely
make observational assertions on their own, and rely on other hypotheses and
individual facts to get “into contact” with observations. As I have noted in §6.8.2,
the supplementary sentences can originate from completely different theories, and
it would, for example, be problematic to consider the use of sociological theories
about color perception to be a “fleshing out” of electrodynamics.
A designer with little choice
Boudry and Leuridan (2011, 567) consider the possibility to “view the goals and
abilities of the designer as the adjustable parameters of the model” and imagine a
situation in which (Boudry and Leuridan 2011, 569)
only a few ‘parameters’ in the design hypothesis [ . . . ] provide an
elegant explanation for phenomena that resist any conceivable natu-
ralistic explanation [ . . . ]. The fact that the choice of auxiliaries about
the designer’s intentions and attributes (pi1, . . . ,pim) would depend
on the observations we set out to explain (β1, . . . ,βn), without the
support of independent background knowledge, would then be of
little concern.
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m is here assumed to be much less than n.9 But then, assuming that each ob-
servation determines one parameter, it is enough to make m observations to
determine all parameters, at which point the remaining observations follow
from the model. Thus, for example, Pr({βm+1, . . . ,βn} | ID ∪ {β1, . . . ,βm}) >
Pr({βm+1, . . . ,βn} |ET∪{β1, . . . ,βm}), because, I assume, ET would be a “natural-
istic explanation”. Since furthermore {β1, . . . ,βm} has not been justified by assum-
ing {βm+1, . . . ,βn}, ¬(βm+1 ∧ · · · ∧βn), ET, or ID, it holds that {βm+1, . . . ,βn}
contrastively confirms ID against ET.10
Again it has to be kept in mind that the version of ID that Boudry and
Leuridan are considering in the example is not mini-ID. In fact, Sober (2008, §2.19)
states explicitly that, since the designer is not specified, mini-ID has enough free
parameters (in form of the possible intentions and abilities implicit in the concept
of a designer) to accommodate any sequence of observations, that is, m ≥ n.
A designer who writes on animals
Boudry and Leuridan (2011, 569–570) consider a scenario in which verses of the
Hebrew Bible are observed on beetles, and consider the following hypothesis and
supplementary sentences:
Θ Beetles are created by an intelligent designer.
Π1 The intelligent designer has the ability to create beetles, is inordinately fond
of them, and he has used their bodies to inscribe his Word.
Boudry and Leuridan state that it is doubtful that there is a naturalistic explanation
of the observations. However, even if all animals displayed bible verses, there were
no maladaptations, and no evidence for ET whatsoever, an “adherent of Sober’s
approach [ . . . ] would remain unmoved [ . . . ], because the adoption of auxiliary
Π1 (the properties of the Judeo-Christian God) still depends upon looking at
β1, . . . ,βn (without independent background knowledge)” (Boudry and Leuridan
2011, 570). Thus, while intuitively theB -sentences clearly confirm ID, they do
not confirm ID contrastively.
It is clear that the observation that beetles (or all animals) have bible verses
inscribed on them (β1, . . . ,βn) contrastively confirms the hypothesis Λ  Θ∪Π2
against ET, because even without supplementary sentences, the likelihood of Λ for
{β1, . . . ,βn} is higher than the likelihood of ET. Thus Λ (which is again different
from mini-ID) is contrastively confirmed and provides no counterargument to
restriction IV.
Boudry and Leuridan (2011, 572) modify their example and consider the
scenario in which each bible verse is written on exactly one species, and some bible
9Boudry (personal email from June 18, 2011).
10It is here important to remember that, unlike logical independence, the independence of justifica-
tion is not symmetric.
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verses are missing from the animal kingdom as catalogued so far. They state that
in this case, Λ could predict the existence of the remaining bible verses on some
species. Boudry and Leuridan use the example to consider Sober’s restriction IV
of suitability anew:
In the (novel) prediction case, the observation Ω that we use to test
our competing hypotheses cannot enter into our considerations for
choosing auxiliariespi1, . . . ,pin , because, by definition,Ω has not been
observed yet. In what sense is the “independence” of pi1, . . . ,pin to be
understood? Is it acceptable if our justification of pi1, . . . ,pin depends
on other observations that are already known? If so, why does Sober
not leave room for such cases of predictive success in setting up his
intrinsic argument against design?
The answers are fairly straightforward: First, since restriction IV does not dis-
tinguish between observations in the past and the future, ‘independence’ is to
be understood as in the previous cases. Therefore, second, the supplementary
sentences may depend on observations already known. The third question can be
answered by combining the previous reply and the reply to Boudry and Leuridan’s
example of ID as a model with intentions as parameters. While some intentions
pi1, . . . ,pin can be determined by previous observationsβ1, . . . ,βn , the hypothesis
that Sober considers, (i. e., mini-ID) contains so many parameters (one intention
for each observation) that Ω still cannot be assigned a probability. Thus there is
no predictive success.
10.1.2 Boudry and Leuridan’s supplementary sentences
Since they consider Sober’s definition of suitability to be too restrictive, Boudry
and Leuridan (2011, 559) suggest “an alternative and more lenient account of
auxiliary assumptions, based on the explanatory virtue of unification”. Unfortu-
nately, they leave the notions of unification and simplicity (which also features
in their account) and their exact role in a sufficient condition for suitability11 on
an intuitive level. A very strict sufficient condition that plausibly still captures
Boudry and Leuridan’s intention is given by
Definition 10.2. The setΠ of supplementary sentences is suitable for Θ, Λ, and
Ω ifΠ are justified and Θ∪Π as well as Λ∪Π are simple and unifying.
One could further liberalize this condition by (i) dropping the demand that
Π be justified, or (ii) changing the ‘as well as’ into an ‘or’. However, even the
most restrictive of these sufficient conditions trivializes contrastive testability.
To show that any two hypotheses Θ and Λ can be tested against each other, let pi∗
11Boudry and Leuridan allow other sufficient conditions, e. g. Sober’s, as well (Boudry, personal
email from Mai 21, 2011).
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be any justified sentence (for example some correct hypothesis) that is simple and
unifies some true basic sentences Ω, assigning them a high probability. Assume
the analogous for pi† and Ω′. Let further Θ and Λ be independent from the basic
sentences, pi∗, and pi†. ThenΠ  ¬∧Θ∨pi∗,¬∧Λ∨pi†	 is justified because it
is entailed by pi∗ ∧pi†. Now Θ∪Π  Θ∪ pi∗,¬∧Λ∨pi†	 is almost as simple as
Θ∪{pi∗} and Θ∪{pi†},12 and it unifiesΩ. Since the analogous holds for Λ∪Π ,Π
is a set of suitable supplementary sentences. But similar to Sober’s trivialization
proof (see §8.3.2), it now holds that Pr(Ω |Θ ∪Π) > Pr(Ω |Λ ∪Π), so that Ω
contrastively confirms Θ against Λ. (It also follows that Θ is contrastively testable
against Λ.)
If definition 10.2 is liberalized as in (i), the assumption about pi∗ and pi† can be
weakened accordingly. For liberalization (ii),Π can be defined as
¬∧Θ∨pi∗	,
which puts less strict demands on what can be called ‘almost as simple as’. Similarly,
if definition 10.1 of contrastive confirmation itself is changed to allow for different
supplementary sentencesΠ1 for Θ andΠ2 for Λ,
13 thenΠ1  
¬∧Θ∨pi∗	 and
Π2  {∀x(x = x)} are enough to show that Θ can be confirmed against Λ. In
this case, as in (ii), one can even demand that the supplementary sentences must
unify the very basic sentences used in their justification. Thus with Boudry and
Leuridan’s sufficient condition for suitability, contrastive confirmation is trivial.
10.2 Confirmation in likelihoodism
Boudry and Leuridan argue against Sober’s definition of suitability under the
assumption that it makes it impossible to contrastively confirm or disconfirm ID.
Now I want to show that this assumption is false independently of the definition
of suitability. In likelihoodism, relative confirmation is defined as follows (Sober
2008, 32):
Definition 10.3. SetΩ of basic sentences contrastively confirms theoryΘ against
theory Λ relative toΠ if and only if
Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π)> Pr(Ω |Λ∪Π) . (10.1)
Because of the different logical structure, it is clear that contrastive confir-
mation is not continuous with Bayesian confirmation. More generally, since
likelihoodism defines the confirmation of a theory only in contrast to another
theory, likelihoodism on its own requires a fundamental revision of all concepts
that rely on confirmation and are commonly not defined contrastively, such as
12Similarly, according to Boudry and Leuridan (2011, §3.4) the hypothesis that the disappeared
landlord staged the crime scene to fake his own death and go underground is arguably “not far more
complex” than the hypothesis that he was murdered. Furthermore, unless there are restrictions on the
language, it may be possible to introduce new vocabulary that simplifiesΠ .
13This is in fact what Boudry and Leuridan assume (Boudry, personal email from May 21, 2011).
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the notion of probabilistic empirical significance. Likelihoodism therefore also
requires the modification of claims that rely on these concepts, including the
claim (made by Sober himself) that a theory that does not make basic assertions
is not empirically significant. I have argued in §8.5 that the contrastive notion of
empirical significance in likelihoodism is inadequate, and argued in §9.3.2 that in
likelihoodism, there are theories (for example ID) that do not make basic assertions
but are nonetheless contrastively empirically significant. I will now argue that
the concept of contrastive confirmation developed in likelihoodism is inadequate
as well, and that in likelihoodism, ID and other theories that do not make basic
assertions can be confirmed by criticizing a competing theory, absent further
assumptions about the theories’ relation. This conclusion contradicts Sober’s own
claims about the confirmation of ID.
Assuming likelihoodism, Sober (2007, 7) criticizes a common argument for
the confirmation of ID as follows:
Defenders of ID often claim to test their position [ . . . ] by criticizing
the theory of evolution. Behe (1996) contends that evolutionary pro-
cesses cannot produce “irreducibly complex” adaptations; since we
observe such traits, evolutionary theory is refuted, leaving ID as the
only position standing. [T]his argument does nothing to test ID. For
ID to be testable, it must make predictions. The fact that a different
theory makes a prediction says nothing about whether ID is testable.
Going from bottom to top, Sober’s argument amounts to the following: Since
ID does not make predictions, it is not testable. Therefore, it is not confirmed
by observations of irreducibly complex adaptations (this is a trivial proof given
definitions 8.3 and 10.3, assuming the supplementary sentences for contrastive
confirmation and testability are the same). Elsewhere, Sober (1999, 66–67) points
out that there may be other theories besides ID which predict traits that are
improbable according to ET, and continues:
[T]he defect in this argument that I’m now pointing to is different.
[ . . . ] The worst-case scenario for Darwinism is that the theory, with
appropriate auxiliary assumptions, entails that what we observe was
very improbable. However, this, by itself, isn’t enough to reject Dar-
winism and opt for the hypothesis of intelligent design. We need to
know how probable it is that the features would exist, if they were the
result of intelligent design. Both hypotheses must make predictions if
the observations are to help us choose between them.
Sober here directly infers that because ID does not make predictions, a trait that is
improbable according to ET does not test, and therefore also does not confirm, ID.
That a low likelihood of ET cannot confirm ID is also a common position outside
of likelihoodism (cf. Pennock 2011, 188).
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But as in the case of testability, Sober’s conclusion is false if there is only
one observation Ω∗ such that Pr(Ω∗ |ET ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω∗ |Π), Pr(Ω∗ | ID ∪Π) =
Pr(Ω∗ |Π), where all probabilities are defined. Under this very weak assumption
(see §9.3.2), ID can be contrastively confirmed against ET. For let∆∗ express that
Ω∗ is false.14 Then Pr(Ω∗ |ET∪Π) = 1−Pr(∆∗ |ET∪Π), so that either Pr(∆∗ |ET∪
Π)< Pr(∆∗ |Π) = Pr(∆∗ | ID∪Π) or Pr(∆∗ |ET∪Π)> Pr(∆∗ |Π) = Pr(∆∗ | ID∪
Π), where all probabilities are defined. Thus the real worst-case scenario for ET
is that it assigns a true observation statement Ω∗ a lower probability than the
auxiliary assumptions alone. And if Behe were to prove this for some true Ω∗, he
would thereby show that ID is contrastively confirmed. Like the argument in the
case of testability, this argument can be repeated for any two theories that fulfill
the very weak assumption: A tautologous theory can be contrastively confirmed
against quantum physics, for instance, and the nonsense theory ‘Foo is bar’ can be
contrastively confirmed against plate tectonics.
Of course, a contrastive disconfirmation of ID is more likely, assuming that
for most Ω∗ with Pr(Ω∗ |ET ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω∗ |Π), it holds that Pr(∆∗ |ET ∪Π) <
Pr(∆∗ |Π). Thus contrary to Boudry and Leuridan, contrastive testability allows
the disconfirmation of ID. The problem, however, is that contrastive testability
also allows the disconfirmation of ‘Foo is bar’ against the claim that this section
contains a formula.
∗ ∗ ∗
It may be possible to amend likelihoodism and avoid the contrastive confirmation
of ‘Foo is bar’. It is another question whether the resulting definition of contrastive
confirmation allows a consistent reformulation of other concepts that rely on
confirmation. This question is very much open, for one because even likelihood-
ism itself (at least in Sober’s version) still contains concepts that implicitly rely
on non-contrastive confirmation. I have already noted in §8.2.1 that in his infor-
mal arguments, Sober sometimes relies on a non-contrastive notion of empirical
significance. More importantly, Sober’s definition of testability, and thus of con-
firmation, seems to rely implicitly on a non-contrastive notion of confirmation.
For he defines suitable supplementary sentences as being justified (independently
of specific observations and theories), but leaves open the definition of ‘justifi-
cation’.15 Very plausibly, any such definition that would be acceptable to Sober
would have to involve confirmation, so that the resulting definition would be
recursive (presumably with observation sentences as supplementary sentences in
the recursion base). But if confirmation is contrastive, then each step from the
recursion’s base up to the contrastive confirmation of the two theories under
investigation will involve a confirmation of supplementary sentences relative to
some other sentences. Thus, if the question is the confirmation of Θ against Λ, and
14See §8.3.3, n. 16.
15See §8.3.1, n. 13.
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Θ and Λ are included in the nth iteration of the recursive step,Θ will be confirmed
or disconfirmed against Λ relative to n + 1 different sets of sentences. How such a
conception of confirmation can be practically applied, consistent, or even properly
spelled out is unknown. Given the other problems of contrastive confirmation,
the development of such a conception may not be worth the trouble. It may thus
be time to find not only a better criterion of testability, but also a better criterion
of confirmation.
10.3 New ways to old criteria
In §10.1, I have shown how Sober relies on the converse of his postulated relation
between testing and testability to argue for restrictions on the supplementary
sentences. Sober thus has to take the relation between testing and testability as
a necessary and sufficient condition. I will follow Sober in this regard, so that
taking definition 8.8 as criterion of testability entails that a set Ω tests Θ relative
toΠ if and only if Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π) 6= Pr(Ω |Π). Further assuming with Sober that
testing amounts to confirming or disconfirming, this allows for two definitions of
confirmation (one with a ‘less-than’, one with a ‘greater-than’ sign), one of which
is, unlike contrastive confirmation, continuous with Bayesian confirmation:16
Definition 10.4. Set Ω ofB -sentences relevantly confirms Θ relative to Π if and
only if
Pr(Ω |Θ∪Π)> Pr(Ω |Π) . (10.2)
This definition is equivalent to the Bayesian definition 8.1 whenever the
theory can be assigned a probability, but, like Sober’s definition 10.3, does not
presume that this is possible. It has also frequently been defended as a criterion of
confirmation (cf. Mackie 1969) under the name ‘relevance criterion’.
The question is now what an absolute criterion of confirmation, independent
from some not further specified set of supplementary sentences, should be like.
As discussed in §10.1, Sober relies on his postulate for relation between testing
and testability even for his absolute criterion, which leads to definition 10.1 of
confirmation. But the definition states that Ω contrastively confirms Θ against Λ
as long as there is any honest set of supplementary sentences relative to which Θ’s
likelihood is greater than Λ’s, and analogously for the relevance criterion. And
this has at least two problematic implications. First, since different honest sets
may lead to different conditional probabilities for an observation, a theory may be
both confirmed and disconfirmed against another by some observations. Second,
the definition allows for ignoring any justified sentence one is inclined to. And
this is incompatible with Carnap’s principle of sufficient evidence, which “says
that you must use all the relevant evidence you have” (Sober 2008, 44), and which
Sober (2008, 41–46, §2.10) endorses.
16It is also only this one that is the least bit plausible.
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The problem, I conjecture, lies with Sober’s description of the relation between
testing and testability, which should be formulated relative to the supplementary
assumptionsΠ . That is, if Ω tests Θ relative toΠ if and only if R(Ω,Θ,Π), then
(and only then) it holds that Θ is testable relative to Π if and only if there is
some possible set Ω of basic sentences such that R(Ω,Θ,Π). This also describes
the relation between definition 10.4 and definition 8.8. To arrive at an absolute
concept of testability, one has to existentially generalize on the supplementary
assumptions as well: If Ω tests Θ relative to Π if and only if R(Ω,Θ,Π), then
(and only then) it holds that Θ is testable if and only if there is some honest setΠ
of supplementary sentences and some possible set Ω of basic sentences such that
R(Ω,Θ,Π).17 This relation leads, for example, fromB -creativity (see definitions
6.3 and 6.6) to falsifiability (definitions 6.2 and 6.8).
With this amended relation between testing and testability, one can now
explicate ‘confirmation by Ω’. The principle of total evidence again provides a
guide, since the confirmation should be relative to as many justified sentences inΠ
as possible. Given definition 10.4, this information must not containΩ orΘ, since
then confirmation would be almost trivial: Whenever Ω is justified, Ω ⊆Π , and
thus Ω cannot confirm anything relative toΠ . Whenever Θ is justified, Θ ⊆Π ,
and thus nothing can confirm Θ relative toΠ . I therefore suggest
Definition 10.5. A set Π is maximally honest (excluding set Σ ) if and only if Π
is honest (and Π ∩Σ = ∅) and there is no honest set Γ of sentences such that
Π ⊂ Γ (and Γ ∩Σ =∅).
Definition 10.5 does not presume that there is a unique maximally honest
set of sentences, but if the set of all justified sentences is honest, it is maximally
honest. This allows
Definition 10.6. Set Ω of B -sentences relevantly confirms Θ if and only if Ω
relevantly confirms Θ relative to a maximally honest set excluding Ω ∪Θ.
Note that, like making probabilisticB -assertions, this criterion of confirmation
does not presume that theories can be assigned probabilities. If the starting posi-
tion is the Bayesian notion of probabilistic empirical significance (definition 8.2),
definition 10.5 and the relation between empirical significance and confirmation
lead to
Definition 10.7. Set Ω of basic sentences confirms Θ in Bayesianism if and only if
Ω confirms Θ in Bayesianism relative to a maximally honest set excluding Ω ∪Θ.
This criterion of confirmation presumes that theories can be assigned proba-
bilities. Thus, with two different probabilistic criteria of empirical significance
on offer, and assuming the relation between testability and testing postulated by
17If ‘honest set’ turns out not to be a good explicatum for ‘suitable set’, a new explicatum can be
substituted.
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Sober, one can arrive at two criteria of confirmation. As is the case for the criteria
of empirical significance, the two criteria of confirmation are equivalent whenever
all probabilities are defined.
Since definition 10.5 does not ensure the uniqueness of a maximally honest
set, it is under both definition 10.6 and definition 10.7 in principle still possible
that some observation both confirms and disconfirms a theory. Since the set of
maximally honest sets in most cases is a proper subset of the set of honest sets, the
danger does not seem overwhelming, however. Furthermore, if there are indeed
two incompatible maximally honest sets with this feature, this suggests a more
general problem with the system of beliefs under consideration.
∗ ∗ ∗
A side note: One may wonder whether the relation between probabilistic empirical
significance and confirmation should not be as follows: If Ω tests Θ relative to
Π if and only if R(Ω,Θ,Π), then (and only then) it holds that Θ is testable if
and only if there is some maximally honest set Π of supplementary sentences
and some possible set Ω of basic sentences such that R(Ω,Θ,Π). This relation,
however, has the unwanted effect of rendering every theory Θ untestable that is
in a strong sense reducible to another theory Λ (see §11). Assuming that Θ can
be derived from Λ, every assertion Θ makes can also be derived from Λ. But Θ is
not needed to justify Λ, and thus a maximally honest set excluding Θ would still
include Λ (unless Λ is incompatible with other justified sentences). Thus Θ is not
probabilistically empirically significant. This is the case for statistical mechanics,
for example, if it is reducible to quantum mechanics. It also holds for the theory
of selection if, as Matthen and Ariew (2002, 68–69) argue,
selection is a formally characterized phenomenon, a statistical prop-
erty of physical substrates that possess certain metrical properties.
The causally active physical properties that lie beneath this metric are
different from, or even incommensurable with, the properties that
form the subject matter of the theory of selection.
If this is a correct interpretation of the theory of selection, then defining prob-
abilistic empirical significance relative to a maximally honest set would put the
theory of selection, and indeed any reducible theory, on a par with ID. It would
also mean that a theory Θ can cease to be empirically significant, for example if a
new theory is accepted to which Θ can be reduced.
10.4 Beyond likelihoods
So far, I have looked only on the influence one set of observations can have on
the status of a theory. In Carnap’s terms, I have analyzed different explications of
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the increase in firmness of a theory (Carnap 1962, xv–xvii). It is clear that this is
not enough, for the simple reason that one often needs to now whether, given a
maximally honest set of supplementary sentences, one should believe in or accept
a theory, that is, in Carnap’s terms, whether a theory is firm. Such a categorical
concept of acceptance is necessary even for the definition of ‘honest set’ (and
Sober’s definition of contrastive testability), since the notion of a justified belief is
a categorical one. I now want to point out briefly that any definition of firmness
that relies solely on likelihoods does not allow ampliative inferences, and is thus
of questionable pragmatic value.
Boudry and Leuridan (2011, §§1,3.2) consider Sober’s restriction IV a means
to avoid gerrymandering of the supplementary sentences to fit the observations
(which they themselves try to avoid by demanding that the supplementary sen-
tences be unifying (Boudry and Leuridan 2011, §2.1)). And while their examples
do not show that the definition is too restrictive, there is a vital problem with
contrastive confirmation that, although it has nothing to do with restriction IV,
may lie at the core of their unease. The gerrymandered supplementary sentences
can be conjoined with the hypothesis of a designer to form a new hypothesis
(cf. Sober 2008, 131–133), because Sober’s criterion of confirmation contains no
restriction whatsoever on the choice of hypotheses to be compared. This poses no
problem for contrastive testability, since there seems to be no problem with the
testability of a gerrymandered hypothesis against non-gerrymandered hypotheses.
A gerrymandered hypothesis may even be confirmed against its competitor by
some observation Ω, if confirmation is understood as increase in firmness. How-
ever, the situation is different for the contrastive confirmation of a theory against
another if confirmation is understood as firmness. Following the principle of total
evidence, a theory has to be confirmed in this sense in light of all observations.
But for many a hypothesis Θ and many of its observational assertions β, one
can construct another (gerrymandered) hypothesis Λ that differs from Θ only in
that it asserts ¬β instead.18 Θ and Λ assign the same probabilities to any set Ω of
observations with β 6∈Ω. Therefore, for any definition of categorical confirma-
tion that relies only on likelihoods, Θ and Λ are either both confirmed or both
disconfirmed. This means specifically that neither contrastive confirmation nor
the relevance criterion of confirmation as given in definition 10.6 can lead to a
criterion of firmness that allows for a distinction between Θ and Λ.
The Bayesian criterion of confirmation given by definition 10.7 by itself also
does not obviously solve the problem of gerrymandered theories, since the prob-
ability of Λ can be increased just as the probability of Θ. But definition 10.7
presumes that theories can be assigned probabilities. Thus, according to Bayesian-
ism, Θ and Λ may differ in their prior probabilities, so that one may be more
likely than the other. Proponents of inference to the best explanation may instead
18This is often a non-trivial problem to solve formally, as it essentially involves an independence
proof. Informally, the above description seems sufficient, however.
375
10 Confirmation Criteria of Empirical Significance
opt for one of the theories because it explains better. Boudry and Leuridan might
argue that the more simple and unifying theory should be preferred. Contrastive
confirmation and relevant confirmation, however, provide no reason to prefer
one hypothesis over the other. Thus, considering that β can be ‘The world will
end tomorrow’, contrastive and relevant confirmation may be less discerning than
desirable.
∗ ∗ ∗
In summary, Sober’s postulate about the relation between testing and testability
has to be reformulated to take supplementary sentences into account. When this
is done, it leads from criteria of testability relative to supplementary sentences to
criteria of confirmation relative to supplementary sentences. The principle of total
evidence then further suggests absolute criteria of confirmation. These criteria
have to be taken as criteria for the increase of firmness of a theory. And if such a
criterion relies solely on likelihoods, it cannot support ampliative inference.
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Chapter 11
Reduction
The discussions of intelligent design and confirmation relied on the original
interpretation ofB -terms being empirically easily accessible, andA -sentences
being possibly non-empirical. In this chapter and the following, I will discuss
applications of the formalism of the criteria of empirical significance in new areas.
This chapter will cover relations between a basic theory Θ in vocabularyB and
an auxiliary theory Λ that may have terms in common with Θ (C -terms), but
also may have some proprietary vocabulary A with A ∩B = ∅. Thus Λ is
formulated inA ∪C , withC ⊆B . The supplementary sentencesΠ may further
connectB -terms toA -terms.
Criteria of empirical significance, both for sentences and terms, can be seen
as determining whether there is some connection between A -terms and A -
sentences on the one hand, and B -terms and B -sentences on the other hand.
Much of the discussion around reduction essentially revolves around the same
subject, and thus it is to be expected that criteria of empirical significance relate to
criteria of reduction. I will review four kinds of reduction, suggested by Nagel,
Kemeny and Oppenheim, Fodor, and Nickels, in this respect. Two more apropos
discussions, of the status of bridge laws and of structural realism, follow thereafter.
11.1 Nagel
The distinction between a B -vocabulary belonging to one theory and an A -
vocabulary proprietary to another is essentially that presumed by Nagel (1951,
330). He sees “the conditions under which one science can be reduced to some
other one” as
the logical and empirical conditions which must be satisfied if the
laws and other statements of one discipline can be subsumed under,
or explained by, the theories and principles of a second discipline.
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Nagel (1951, 330) gives the following conditions for a reduction:
Omitting details and refinements, the two conditions which seem to
be necessary and sufficient for such a reduction are briefly as follows.
Let S1 be [ . . . ] the “primary discipline,” to which a second science,
S2, for example biology, is to be reduced. Then (i) every term which
occurs in the statements of S2 [ . . . ] must be either explicitly definable
with the help of the vocabulary specific to the primary discipline
[ . . . ] or well-established empirical laws must be available with the
help of which it is possible to state the sufficient conditions for the
application of all expressions in S2, exclusively in terms of expressions
occurring in the explanatory principles of S1. [ . . . ] Though the label
is not entirely appropriate, this first conditio will be referred to as the
condition of definability. (ii) Every statement in the secondary disci-
pline, S2, and especially those statements which formulate the laws
established in S2, must be derivable logically from some appropriate
class of statements that can be established in the primary science, S1
[ . . . ]. This second condition will be referred to as the condition of
derivability.
It is a matter of considerable discussion what Nagel’s final notion of reduction
was precisely (cf. van Riel 2011). In my rather ahistorical discussion, I will focus on
the technical aspects of the notion of reduction suggested by the quote above. I
will take science S1 to be circumscribed by Θ’s vocabularyB , and science S2 byA ∪C . The definitions or empirical laws referred to in condition (i) I will callΠ .
Nagel (1951, 330) gives an example for howΠ is to “state the sufficient conditions
for the application of all expressions in S2”:
For example, it must be possible to state the truth-conditions of a
statement of the form ‘x is a cell’ by means of sentences constructed
exclusively out of the vocabulary belonging to the physico-chemical
sciences.
If ‘x is a cell’ is, plausibly, taken to be a formula, and the truth conditions are stated
by giving aB -formula with the same extension in every model ofΠ , this entails
that everyA -term must beB -definable (Gupta 2009, §2.3). Thus the above quote
plausibly leads to
Definition 11.1. A science phrased inA ∪C is N-reducible to a science phrased
inB if and only if there is a setΠ of well-established sentences such that (i) every
A -term isB -definable givenΠ and (ii) every well-established theory Λ inA is
verified by a well-established theory Θ inB givenΠ .
Note that according to definition 11.1, Λ is an omission from Θ given the
background assumptionsΠ . N-reducibility achieves the two goals of a reduction
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that Nagel (1951, 330) lists. Condition (i) ensures that all “statements of one
discipline can be subsumed under [the] principles of a second discipline”, since
everyA∪C -sentence can be translated into aB -sentence by claim 7.1. Condition
(ii) ensures that “the laws [ . . . ] of one discipline can be [ . . . ] explained by the
theories [ . . . ] of a second discipline ” if one takes an explanation to be a derivation
from a scientific theory.
Nagel (1949, 330) adds that it is “evident that the second condition cannot be
fulfilled unless the first one is, although the realization of the first condition does
not entail the satisfaction of the second one”. Given claim 7.6, some sentences that
contain notB -definable terms can be translated intoB -sentences, and thus there
are a fortiori verifiable sentences with terms that are notB -definable. Thus the
first conjunct of this statement is false, and Kemeny and Oppenheim (1952, 10)
point out that so is the second conjunct. For ifΠ contains explicit definitions for
all terms in Λ, then Λ can be translated intoB according to claim 7.1. If further
Λ and Π are well-established, the translation of Λ intoB is well-established as
well, and thus the translation itself is a theory Θ that verifies Λ givenΠ . Thus the
following holds:
Claim 11.1. If a set of sentences entailed by a set of well-established sentences is itself
well-established, then a science phrased inA is N-reducible to a science phrased inB
if and only if there is a set Π of well-established sentences such that everyA -term is
B -definable given Π .
Thus, taken literally, Nagel-reducibility is the strongest deductive criterion
for the empirical significance of terms. There is another, more speculative way
to read Nagel, however. For if Nagel considers definability to be necessary for
derivability, he may have seen the derivability condition as the important one,
and condition (i) as a restriction on the possible setsΠ : A definition of anA -term
inB -terms isB -conservative, which is important to not trivialize the notion of
reduction. For if Π could be any set, it could be chosen to be identical to Λ, so
that Λ is trivially derivable fromΘ∪Π . But condition (i) could be weakened from
the demand that all terms must be definable inB -terms givenΠ to the demand
thatΠ beB -conservative. This would lead to the following
Definition 11.2. A science phrased inA ∪C is idiosyncratically N-reducible to
a science phrased in B if and only if there is a set Π of well-established, B -
conservative sentences such that every well-established theory Λ in A ∪C is
verified relative toΠ by a well-established theory Θ inB .
Definition 11.2 is weaker than definition 11.1, but achieves that the laws of one
discipline can be derived from the laws of the other. While it has the disadvantage
of not taking account of Nagel’s demand that all statements of one discipline be
subsumed under the other, it avoids the irrelevance of the derivability condition.
Definition 11.2 could be strengthened to demand thatΠ must be such that every
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well-established theory inA ∪C is translatable into a well-established theory in
B . Since according to claim 7.6, some sentences that can be translated intoB
contain terms that are notB -definable, this strengthening would still be weaker
than N-reducibility.
11.2 Kemeny and Oppenheim
Kemeny and Oppenheim (1952, 13–15) consider claim 11.1 a reason to develop
a new account of reduction, Red(Θ,Λ), that they use to proof the following
(Kemeny and Oppenheim 1952, 15, my notation):
Red(Θ,Λ) if and only if (1)A ∪C contains terms not inB , (2) every
observational statement implied by Λ is also implied by Θ, and (3) Θ
is at least as well systematized as Λ.
Let observational statements be C -sentences. Assuming that the implication
of a C -sentences may rely on justified supplementary assumptions Π , every
observational statement implied by Λ is implied by Θ if and only if Θ makes
all the deductive C -assertions of Λ relative toΠ according to definition 9.1. By
claim 9.1, this leads to
Definition 11.3. Λ is K-O-reducible to Θ if and only if (1)A 6= ∅, (2) Θ is at
least as syntactically falsifiable as Λ (with C as basic terms), and (3) Θ is at least as
well systematized as Λ.
Note that ‘at least as falsifiable as’ here does not take into account implications
in higher order logic with infinite additionalC -sentences as premises (see page 224).
Note also that Λ is reducible to Θ only if Λ’s abstraction in C -terms omits from
Θ’s abstraction in C -terms. Apart from the demand on the vocabularies and the
systematization of the theories, K-O-reducibility is thus a comparative criterion
of empirical significance. Claims 9.1 and 9.2 furthermore suggest that substituting
definition 9.2 of making at least as many probabilistic observational assertions for
being at least as falsifiable as leads to a probabilistic version of K-O-reducibility.
Finally, it is trivial to show that if a theory Λ is deductively or probabilistically
K-O-reducible to some other well-supported theory Θ, then abandoning Θ in
favor of Λ is not scientific according to the modified translatability criterion.
11.3 Fodor
Fodor (1974, 97–98) attempts to develop a weaker kind of intertheoretic relation
than that of reduction:
[T]he assumption that the subject-matter of psychology is part of the
subject-matter of physics is taken to imply that psychological theories
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must reduce to physical theories, and it is this latter principle that
makes the trouble. I want to avoid the trouble by challenging the
inference.
Thus Fodor intends to develop an account of ðx is part of subject matter yñ that
is weaker than ðx is reducible to yñ. His first step is to introduce the notion of
a “natural kind” into the discussion by way of a definition (Fodor 1974, 102, my
notation):
If I knew what a law is, and if I believed that scientific theories consist
just of bodies of laws, then I could say that P is a natural kind predicate
relative to [theory] S iff S contains proper laws of the form P x  
α(x) or α(x)  P x;
‘S1   S2’ is a law and “intended to be read as something like ‘all S1 situations bring
about S2 situations’” (Fodor 1974, 98). Since the universal quantification is implied
(Fodor 1974, 111), ‘P x   α(x)’ probably has to be read as ‘For all x, P x brings
about α(x)’. This can be written more generally as Θ(P ), that is, a theory Θ that
contains the predicate P . In short, then, a natural kind predicate is one that occurs
in a theory, probably non-vacuously.1
Now Fodor (1974, 98) characterizes the notion of reduction as follows: He
assumes “that a science is individuated largely by reference to its typical predicates”,
so thatB can be the vocabulary of the reducing andA the proprietary vocabulary
of the reduced science. A necessary and sufficient condition of the reduction of a
science inA ∪C to a science inB is that for all theA ∪C -laws Λ(V ), there is a
B -lawΘ(B) such that V x ¡ B x, where V x ¡ B x is called a ‘bridge law’ (Fodor
1974, 98–99). Since Fodor (1974, 99) interprets bridge laws as identity statements,
one can generalize his account of reducibility to
Definition 11.4. A science in A ∪C -terms is F-reducible to a science in B -
terms if and only if for allA ∪C -laws Λ(V¯ ) there are aB -law Θ(B¯) and a law
Π = {V¯ = B¯}.
Note that every F-reducible science is also N-reducible, but not vice versa,
since anA -term may be definable inB -terms without being identical to any of
them.
Fodor (1974, 103–107) argues that there can be no natural kind terms in physics
that are identical to natural kind terms in the special sciences, say, psychology or
economics, so that there are no F-reducible special sciences. Instead of bridge laws,
Fodor (1974, 108) suggests, one should allow true empirical generalizations of the
form S x ¡ P1x ∨ P2x ∨ · · · ∨ Pn x, which are enough for a (liberalized) concept of
1There is much hidden in the phrase ‘brings about’. Fodor would presumably not say that Pa
brings about Pa ∨Qa, but it is not clear how to spell out those subtleties explicitly.
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reduction.2 In a slight generalization, one can thus give
Definition 11.5. A science inA ∪C -terms is liberalized F-reducible to a science
in B -terms if and only if for each law Λ(P1, . . . , Pn) in A ∪C and for each
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there are ki B -terms Bi1 , . . . ,Biki that occur non-vacuously in B -
laws, and there are true empirical generalizations

∀x¯

Pi x¯↔
ki∨
j=1
Bi j x¯
  1≤ i ≤ n . (11.1)
Fodor (1974, 109) himself points out the central problem with liberalized
F-reducibility: From Λ(P1, . . . , Pn) and the empirical generalizations (11.1) (which,
like a bridge law, is taken to be an identity), one can infer Λ
 
λx¯[B11 x¯∨ . . .∨B1k1 x¯],
. . . ,λx¯[Bn1 x¯ ∨ . . . ∨ Bnkn x¯]

, which is a law. This is analogous to Kemeny and
Oppenheim’s observation with respect to N-reducibility. Since Fodor phrases his
discussion in terms of natural kind terms, he further infers that for each 1≤ i ≤ n,
λx¯(Bi1 x¯ ∨ · · · ∨ Biki x¯) is a natural kind term and thus in B , which makes the
empirical generalizations (11.1) bridge laws in the sense of F-reducibility, and
thus liberalized F-reducibility is the same as F-reducibility. Incidentally, using the
newly defined terms, one has found an abstraction of theB -theory Λ λx¯[B11 x¯ ∨
. . .∨B1k1 x¯], . . . ,λx¯[Bn1 x¯ ∨ . . .∨Bnkn x¯]

in terms of P1, . . . , Pn .
In response, Fodor (1974, 109–110) argues that the inference is invalid because
‘it’s a law that ’ is not truth-functional. For otherwise,
one gives up the possibility of identifying the natural kind predicates
of a science with those predicates which appear as the antecedents
or the consequents of its proper laws. [ . . . ] One thus inherits the
need for an alternative construal of the notion of a natural kind, and
I don’t know what that alternative might be like.
However, if this the only problem with treating ‘it’s a law that ’ as truth-
functional, there seems to be no good reason to give up truth-functionality. For
one, the price of giving up truth-functionality is steep: It means disallowing
equivalent reformulations of laws, so that the ideal gas law PV = nRT (R is the
gas constant, P the volume, V the pressure, T the temperature, and n the molar
number of the gas) is a law, but its equivalent reformulation p = nRT /V may not
be. Or, if the latter formulation is a law, the original formulation may not be one.
2This is indeed Fodor’s terminology: He supposes “that it is enough [ . . . ] that every law of the
special sciences should be reducible to physics by bridge statements which express true empirical gener-
alizations” (Fodor 1974, 108, my emphasis). Thus according to Fodor, the following definition 11.5 is a
case of reduction.
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It is furthermore not clear whether antecedents of laws would be in general
acceptable as natural kind terms to Fodor himself. For P , V , and T may be
intuitively satisfying natural kinds, but when phrased as an implication, the ideal
gas law looks like this:
∀xy [I x ∧ P x ·V x = y→ n(x) ·R ·T (x) = y] , (11.2)
where I stands for ‘is an ideal gas’. Thus the antecedent relation is λxy(I x ∧
P x ·V x = y), which makes for an odd natural kind term. If the equivalent
reformulation of the ideal gas law given above is the real gas law, another natural
kind term results. Or one could introduce uncountably many natural kind terms
λx(I x ∧ P x ·V x = c), one for each c ∈R≥0.
It is thus doubtful that Fodor succeeds in avoiding the collapse of liberalized F-
reducibility into F-reducibility. But even if he did, liberalized F-reducibility is still
much stronger than N-reducibility, since N-reducibility allows any explicit defini-
tion ofA -terms, while liberalized F-reducibility demands an explicit definition of
A -terms with disjunctive definientia. Fodor thus has by no means weakened the
standard notion of reduction, but rather introduced his own, stronger notion, and
weakened that—but not enough. If all that was needed was a notion of reducibility
weaker than F-reducibility, N-reducibility would be adequate.
While Fodor is unsure about the nature of laws, the concept of a natural kind
is similarly unclear. Given the above considerations, it is by no means obvious
how one would go about identifying one. But it may be possible to use Nagel’s
comparatively weak notion of reduction to save Fodor’s intuition that “the subject-
matter of psychology is part of the subject-matter of physics” without thereby
having “psychological theories [ . . . ] reduce to physical theories” (Fodor 1974,
97–98). Relying on Lewis’s notion of aboutness (definition 6.9), one can state that
psychological laws are about the subject matter determined byB , whereB is the
vocabulary of physics. By claim 7.5, it is enough for the terms of psychology to be
definable in every model for all sentences of psychology to be about the subject
matter of physics. The models here could be those of the theories of physics Θ
and the bridge lawsΠ . Since definability in every model is strictly weaker than
definability, this results in psychology being about the physical world, but not
N-reducible to physics.
If a relation Pi in first order logic is definable in every model of Θ∪Π , it is
piecewiseB -definable by claim 7.4:
Θ∪Π 
 ki∨
j=1
∀x¯ Pi x¯↔βi j x¯  1≤ i ≤ n , (11.3)
where each βi j is aB -formula. The crucial difference to liberalized F-reducibility
is that there is no explicit definition of Pi by a disjunction ofB -formulas, but a
383
11 Reduction Criteria of Empirical Significance
disjunction of explicit definitions of Pi byB -formulas. For one-place predicates,
Humberstone (1998) shows that piecewise B -definability is equivalent to the
supervenience of Pi overB , defined as
Θ∪Π 

∀xy
 ki∧
j=1
(Bi j x↔ Bi j y)→ (Pi x↔ Pi y)
  1≤ i ≤ n (11.4)
for some {Bi j } j≤ki ⊆ B . Since Lewis considers his definition of aboutness to
be an explication of supervenience, non-reductive reduction can be defined as
the supervenience of sentences or the supervenience of terms onB . Therefore
Fodor’s intuition about the relation of psychology and physics can be described
as follows: The sentences and terms of psychology supervene on the language of
physics without being N-reducible to physics.
Through the relation of supervenience and definability in each model, super-
venience without N-reducibility entails that a complete description of the physical
world (aB -structure) provides definitions for all supervening concepts. On the
other hand, the laws of physics themselves may not, for they do not necessarily
determineB -structures up to isomorphism. In Fodor’s terms (Fodor 1974, 104):
[A]n immortal econophysicist might, when the whole show is over,
find a predicate in physics that was, in brute fact, coextensive with ‘is
a monetary exchange’. If physics is general—if the ontological biases
of reductivism are true—then there must be such a predicate. But (a)
[ . . . ] nothing but brute enumeration could convince us of this brute
co-extensivity, and (b) there would seem to be no chance at all that the
physical predicate employed in stating the coextensivity is a natural
kind term, and (c) there is still less chance that the coextension would
be lawful (i.e., that it would hold not only for the nomologically
possible world that turned out to be real, but for any nomologically
possible world at all).
Given the above discussion about natural kind terms and laws, claim (b) seems false.
But it is also irrelevant since N-reducibility can be weakened without recourse to
natural kinds. Through the relation between definability in a model and Lewis’s
notion of aboutness, supervenience can be seen as one way to explicate the idea that
“the natural facts include all the facts that a complete science will acknowledge”,
which itself is one way to explicate the position of substantive naturalism (Feldman
2008, §4).3
3See §2.5.
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11.4 Nickles
In his analysis of different types of reduction of a theory Λ to a theory Θ, Sklar
(1967, 111) notes that often, “[w]hat can be derived from the reducing theory is
an approximation to the reduced”. Typically, approximations will be of a certain
degree ", and in a specific domain (described by some one-place formula ϕ), so
that one can give
Definition 11.6. Theory Λ is approximately reducible to theoryΘ in domain ϕ to
degree " if and only if there is a theory Λ′ such that Λ′ ≈" Λ(ϕ) and Λ′ is reducible
to Θ(ϕ).
Λ(ϕ) is here again the set of relativizations of all elements of Λ to ϕ. One can
then use verifiability, K-O-reducibility, supervenience, or even translatability as
an explicatum for the reducibility of Λ′ to Θ(ϕ). How two theories Λ and Λ′ can
be identical to degree ", Λ ≈" Λ′, can be further elucidated with the help of an
account by Nickles (1973), which purportedly describes a new type of reduction.
Nickles defines this new type of reduction as pertaining when a theory Θ
is transformed by some operation into another theory Λ. The only operation
that he spells out, though, is the limit operation limc→0Θ(c) = Λ. In the case
of special relativity and Newtonian mechanics, c could be vmax/c , that is, the
maximal velocity vmax becomes arbitrary small compared to the speed of light
c . In this case, Nickles speaks of a reduction of special relativity to Newtonian
mechanics. This gives the following
Definition 11.7. Θ L-reduces to Λ if and only if for some c,
lim
c→0Θ(c) =Λ . (11.5)
But limc→0Θ(x) =Λ is not a very precise way of describing the situation. At
least in the case of special relativity, Nickles’s type of reduction amounts to a
restriction of the maximal absolute speed V x of all objects x. Special relativity and
Newtonian physics are thus restricted to the domain λx(V x ≤ vmax) and identified
in the limit of a maximal speed infinitely close to 0.4 The limit procedure is well-
defined only if there is a space of theories with a distance measure d( . , . ), namely
by the contextual definition
lim
c→0Θ(c) =Λ if and only if
∀" > 0∃δ ∀c≤ δ : dΘ(λx[F x≤c]),Λ(λx[F x≤c])≤ " , (11.6)
4Mathematically, this identification is similar to identifying the two theories in the limit of an
infinite speed of light. But while the latter is usually more tractable, it is of course not at all what is
happening physically.
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where F may in principle be a symbol for any function to the real numbers.
The existence of a distance measure between sets of sentences is thus presup-
posed by Nickles, and leads to the possibility of giving a precise definition of
‘approximation of Λ by Λ′ to degree "’:
Definition 11.8. Λ′ approximates Λ to the degree ", that is, Λ′ ≈" Λ, iff
d(Λ′,Λ)≤ " . (11.7)
I will also speak of Λ′ being approximately identical to Λ to the degree ". With
this definition, the following holds:
Claim 11.2. Θ L-reduces to Λ only if for each " there is a domain ϕ such that Λ is
approximately reducible to Θ in domain ϕ to degree ", with ‘reducible’ interpreted as
‘identical’.
Proof. Choose Λ′ = Θ(ϕ) and ϕ = λx(F x ≤ c). The claim follows from for-
mula (11.6) for c= δ.
Given that Batterman (2002, 5) claims (without proof) that L-reduction is a
necessary condition for every “philosopher’s reduction”, it is noteworthy that
Nickles’s reduction is not the most general type of approximate reduction. For
one, identity is a stronger demand than even translatability. But even indepen-
dently from the interpretation of ‘reduction’, Nickles’s criterion also relies on a
strengthening of ‘approximation’. For even if for some ", there are a domain ϕ
and a theory Λ′ ≈" Λ(ϕ), this does not entail that there are such a domain and a
theory for every degree ". Thus to prove that there cannot be a reduction between
two theories, it is not enough to show that L-reduction fails. This holds all the
more true for generalizations of definition 11.8 of approximation. For instance,
one could introduce a total order ­ over pairs of sets of sentences, and let one
specific pair 〈∆,Σ〉 play the role of " in definition 11.8. This leads to
Definition 11.9. Λ′ generally approximates Λ to the degree 〈∆,Σ〉 if and only if
〈Λ′,Λ〉­ 〈∆,Σ〉 . (11.8)
Of course, not every order is appropriate. The specific order may very well
depend on the context (for an example, see Lutz 2011b).
11.5 On the status of bridge laws
I now want to take a look at the status ofΠ for the special case of N-reducibility.
One could argue that, since the reduced theory Λ already consists to a great
extent of empirically established statements, it is no qualitatively new step to
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allow further empirical research to establish additional connections betweenA -
terms andB -formulas. This is plausible, but brushes over an important point:
The empirical research that is necessary to connect the two theories consists
in research within Θ and Λ, not some overarching theory containing both. In
short, this is because each theory is considered sufficiently interpreted by itself,
without the need for the respective other theory. The individual interpretations
determine the sets of possible models for each theory, and these sets of intended
models can be compared without further empirical research. On the basis of this
comparison, one may then additionally introduce meaning postulates, which are
wholly non-empirical.
It is clear that there has to be some comparison of the possible structures of
two theories when considering their common vocabulary C . For to ensure that
not only the C -terms but also their possible structures are identical, the set of the
possible C -structures of Λ has to be compared to the set of possible C -structures
of Θ. Let then C contain all the terms that the two theories share and whose
interpretation MC can thus be determined independently of each of the two
theories individually. The sets ofB andA ∪C -structures that are possible given
the two theories are then given by
MB =

AB |AB |C ∈MC and AB Θ
	
(11.9)
and
MA∪C =

BA∪C |BA∪C |C ∈MC andBA∪C Λ
	
. (11.10)
It may be, of course, that neither Θ nor Λ determines MC up to isomorphism,
and thus there can be empirical research that determines the two theories’ sets
NB and NA∪C of intended structures more precisely. Such empirical research,
however, can again be pursued without ever considering the conjunction of the
two theories.
Barring additional empirical information, there are now two relevant possible
relations of anA -term A to aB -formula β. For one, the possible interpretations
of the term and the formula may be identical in every possible structure. In that
case,Θ∪Λ A=β, and an N-reduction has been achieved. Or the sets of possible
structures may be such that the set of possible interpretations of theA -term is
not disjoint from the set of possible interpretations of theB -formula. Expressed
with the help of definition 7.10, this means that for each C -structure AC that
is possible given Θ and Λ, the sets of C -possible extensions of β given Θ and
of A given Λ are not disjoint: AAC ,Θ ∩βAC ,Λ 6= ∅. In this second case, there
are then two ways that A and βmay become identified. First, further empirical
research may restrict the set of intended C -structures NC more than both Θ and
Λ. This is simply empirical research that can be undertaken independently from
both Θ and Λ and leads to empirical laws expressed by a set Γ of C -sentences.
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Second, one can introduce C -conservative bridge laws Π , V -sentences which
restrict the expansions fromC to V . It is only at this point that both vocabularies
are needed at once, andΠ only describes language conventions. Thus bridge laws,
connections betweenB -terms andA -terms that do not already follow from the
two theories separately or from empirical research independently of either theory,
are analytic.
This view, it seems, is contrary to much of the discussion in the philosophy of
science. Witness Sklar (1967, 118), who says about the classic discussion by Nagel
(1961, ch. 11):
He assumes, as I shall, that the concepts appearing in the reduced
theory but absent from the reducing theory are not eliminable in
terms of the concepts of the reducing theory by linguistic investi-
gation alone. If such were the case, [ . . . ] then the reduction would
constitute a matter of linguistic insight and perhaps clever logical
inference, but it would hardly require experimental justification and
observational confirmation. But the reduction of, say, physical op-
tics to electromagnetic theory is not of this sort, but is instead an
important factual discovery of empirical science.
It is indeed true that the reduction between two theories is often an important em-
pirical discovery, but the discovery stems from empirical investigation within each
science individually: The interpretation of each science’s terms are determined
with higher accuracy, for example by determining under what experimental se-
tups specific phenomena occur, that is, arriving atC -sentences Γ . The increased
accuracy of the interpretation then allows a reduction of one theory’s term to
another theory’s formula without further empirical research. It is true that scien-
tific practice does not clearly distinguish between research within a science and
research done to reduce one theory to another, but from this, one cannot infer
that, logically, both theories are needed to do the empirical research. Questions
of reduction may motivate specific experiments, but the results can be phrased
independently within each theory.
It is another matter that empirical results Γ may suggest the identification of
someA -term and aB -formula. But the choice to indeed identify the two is then
again a matter of convention, given in a setΠ of meaning postulates. Note also
that this result does not rely on semantic empiricism: If one assumes that each
theory’s possible structures can be determined directly for its whole vocabulary,
then the comparison of the interpretations of the theories’ terms and formulas
determines the bridge laws directly. And again, all that is needed is research into
each theory individually, but not in the relation of the two theories. For the
comparison of the theories’ possible structures is a purely formal exercise once
the possible structures are determined.
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11.6 A note on structural realism
Going back to a suggestion by Maxwell (1970), it has often been suggested that,
first, the factual content of a theory is given by its structure, and second, this
structure is expressed by the theory’s Ramsey sentence. I want to argue briefly
that the second claim is false and that the first claim, called structural realism, is
best expressed in terms of reduction.
The idea of using the Ramsey sentence RB (Θ) to express the structure of
theory Θ(B¯ , A¯) is intuitively appealing. For the resulting sentence ∃X¯Θ(B¯ , X¯ )
contains no references to auxiliary terms, but still seems to contain the same
logical structure that the auxiliary terms had. I have already argued in §2.9 that the
problem with this idea is that a theory’s Ramsey sentence does not say anything
over and above the theory’s basic implications. Allowing sentences of higher
order logic as basic sentences, this is illustrated nicely by claim 6.7: A theory
that is not semantically falsifiable also has no empirical content according to the
Ramsey sentence. Another problem is that if the structural content of a theory
is identified with the relations between the existentially generalized variables X¯ ,
the structural content is not invariant under equivalence transformations of the
theory. Trotting out once more the fate of ‘pain’ in Papineau’s toy theory of pain
(2.14), an equivalent transformation (2.15a) can make its associated variable and
all the relations that come with it disappear.
Looking at the standard semantics of the situation, these problems are unsur-
prising. In §2.9, I already noted for a special case that the existentially generalized
variables do not generally correspond to elements of the models of the Ramsey
sentences. For the models of Θ are structures A of the type 〈|A| ,BA1 , . . . ,BAm ,AA1 ,
. . . ,AAn 〉. The models of RB (Θ), on the other hand, are structures AB of the type〈|A| ,BA1 , . . . ,BAm 〉. The referents of all auxiliary terms, and with them their struc-
tural relations, have disappeared.5 It is thus rather puzzling to claim (Ladyman
2009, §3.2) that
it is a mistake to think that the Ramsey sentence allows us to eliminate
theoretical entities, for it still states that these exist. It is just that they
are referred to not directly, by means of theoretical terms, but by
description, that is via variables, connectives, quantifiers and predicate
terms whose direct referents are (allegedly) known by acquaintance.
Assuming that equivalent transformation is allowed, the Ramsey sentence states
that the referents of the auxiliary terms exist only insofar ∃x(x = x) states that
there are at least two of such referents. For ∃x(x = x)  ∃X1X2(∃xX1x∧¬∃xX2x).
It seems that the Ramsey sentence approach looks for structure in all the wrong
5If A is a model of Θ, it is also a model of RB (Θ), but only trivially so. So is 〈|A| ,BA1 , . . . ,BAm ,CA1 ,
. . . ,CA
k
〉 for any k and Ci , 1≤ i ≤ k.
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places.6 The core idea of structural realism is that a theory’s structure is real, and
that the objects that occur in the structures are, in one way or another, less so. In
other words, the factual content of a theory abstracts from the objects of theories.
This suggests that when one (approximately true) theory Θ replaces another
theory Λ (which may be approximately true to a lesser degree), Λ’s structure can
be recovered from Θ (possibly with the help of supplementary sentencesΠ). To
achieve that, the reducts of the models ofΘ∪Π to the vocabularyA∪C ofΛmust
be the models of Λ or at least a subset thereof, since Θ may be logically stronger
than Λ, and especially make stronger assertions in their common vocabulary C .
Thus Θ verifies Λ relative toΠ , and Λ either is the abstraction of Θ inA ∪C , or
omits from it.
This explication of structural realism may seem just like realism, since some
of the original structures of Λ remain, with their original domains. But this
impression is mistaken because verification and abstraction are defined for higher
order logic as well; thusΘmay contain the objects of the domains of Λ as relations.
For instance, it may be thatΛ, say, rigid body mechanics, asserts that two objects in
its domain (rigid bodies) cannot be co-located,Λ  ∀xy(Rx∧Ry∧x 6= y→¬C xy).
Θ, say, condensed matter physics, then may contain a higher order relation R
that identifies specific first order relations between the objects of its domain as
rigid body relations, and assert that non-identical rigid body relations cannot have
a property that corresponds to co-location, Θ  ∀X Y (RX ∧ RY ∧X 6= Y →
¬C X Y ). Thus what is an object in Λ is a relation in Θ, and the objects of Θ do
not occur in Λ.
In principle, the relation variables X and Y can range over the superset of the
Cartesian product of any domain whatsoever, as long as the abstraction ofΘ to the
vocabulary {R,C } results in Λ or a stronger theory. Since in Θ, R and C may also
apply to sets of relations (and thus be at least of third order), X 6= Y →¬C X Y
may also state that there are no relations of the same equivalence class that are co-
located. This fits nicely with the discussion of the bridges of Königsberg in §2.12.4,
where the bridges can also vary widely in their microstructure without ceasing
to be the same bridges, and without the problem of how to cross them losing its
structure. The bridges can be seen as equivalence classes of microstructures, and
the problem be phrased in terms of relations between the equivalence classes.
The objects in the domain of Λ’s models are thus indeed irrelevant, since
they can always turn out to be nothing but relations of an underlying theory
with different objects in its domain. This, I take it, is also Carnap’s idea in the
Aufbau, §30, where he considers different types of higher order logic to be about
different object spheres (see also §3.3). Especially Carnap’s discussion of the
difference between ‘containing’ (in the sense of a part-whole relationship) and
‘being constructed out of’ (in the way some definienda have only lower types in
their definientia) should fit with structural realism (Carnap 1928a, §35–§38).
6But not for the reasons that Cei and French (2006) are considering.
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11.7 Conclusion
There are two main results to this chapter. The first one is that many criteria
of empirical significance are closely connected to different definitions of reduc-
tion. Even a comparably recent definition like that of Nickles has at its core a
strengthening of the concept of translatability, and in fact can be used to gener-
alize older concepts like those of Nagel or Kemeny and Oppenheim to include
approximation.
The second main result is that the criteria of empirical significance used
in most definitions of reduction are not always the strongest ones. Specifically,
idiosyncratic N-reducibility relies on verifiability and K-O-reducibility relies on
the comparative criterion of falsifiability. It is thus not obvious why so many
discussions about reduction revolve around much stronger concepts, namely
definability and supervenience. It would be interesting to investigate what goals
exactly definability and supervenience achieve that verifiability fails to achieve.
The same question also arises, of course, for (liberalized) F-reducibility and L-
reducibility.
The prominent role of weaker criteria of empirical significance also suggests
looking not at the strongest possible end result of scientific research, but rather
at the beginning: If there is some—possibly very weak—law in psychology, how
would one go about verifying it starting from physics or neurobiology? Or how
would one determine whether a law in physics is more falsifiable than a law in
psychology? These questions are arguably also the conceptually more important
ones, since they require providing a first relation between the proprietary A -
terms of the to-be-reduced theory and theB -terms of the to-be-reducing theory.
It is at this point that the weakest criteria of deductive empirical significance for
sentences and for terms become of interest.7 Once this first step of a conceptual
relation is made, the move to the verification of all psychological laws or the
complete definition of all psychological terms may be more of the same.
7It remains to be seen how probabilistic relations between sentences can contribute to the meaning
of the sentences’ terms.
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Chapter 12
Concept formation
In this chapter, my discussion will come full circle. I have started with a chapter
outlining and defending artificial language philosophy, and on this basis have
analyzed and developed criteria of empirical significance. Now I want to use
criteria of empirical significance to further analyze and develop a core assumption
of artificial language philosophy, the need for and possibility of conventional
concept formation.
The core idea of artificial language philosophy is that the analytic component
of a set of postulates is conventional, and that the remaining component is empiri-
cal. However, given an arbitrary postulate ϑ, it is not always obvious what the
empirical (synthetic) component of ϑ is, and what the analytic component is. The
most famous and most analyzed technical solution to this problem is that of the
Carnap sentence, mentioned in §2.8.2.1 The Carnap sentence approach defines
the analytic component of ϑ as its Carnap sentence
CB (ϑ) = RB (ϑ)→ ϑ . (12.1)
Since ϑ’s Ramsey sentence can be considered its synthetic content Syn(ϑ), and
RB (ϑ)∧CB (ϑ)  ϑ, Carnap (1963c, §24.D) suggests ϑ’s Carnap sentence as its
analytic content An(ϑ).
The relation between semantic falsifiability and Ramsey sentences suggests
that the criteria of empirical significance discussed here are indeed criteria of
empirical meaningfulness, not meaningfulness simpliciter. For the Carnap sentence
approach can be applied to any sentence and never classifies a component as
meaningless. Rather, a semantically non-falsifiable sentence is wholly analytic.
Since this also holds for ostensibly metaphysical sentences, it suggest a view of
metaphysics not as meaningless but as engaged in language choice, just as I argued
1Since I will focus on the Carnap sentence approach, which applies only to single sentences, I will
not assume a set Θ of postulates but a single postulate ϑ.
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in §2.7: Assuming that metaphysical claims are not falsifiable, they can be chosen
to be true. Thus there is no problem with non-synthetic sentences per se; the
problem rather lies in the treatment of non-synthetic sentences as synthetic. If
used as synthetic sentences, non-synthetic sentences are pseudo-synthetic (Diamond
1975a, 16–20), but in the same vein, non-analytic sentences that are used as if they
were analytic are pseudo-analytic. Thus in the dispute over the role of a criterion
of empirical significance between Popper, who intended to demarcate empirical
sentences (see §5.2) and Carnap, who intended to demarcate meaningful sentences,
(see §8.1), Carnap’s own account of analyticity speaks in favor of Popper.
However, the notion of analyticity may have to be refined, for a non-falsifiable
sentence may still be verifiable. Thus while one can choose it to be true without
the possibility of being mistaken, one may not be able to choose it to be false
without the possibility of being mistaken. Therefore the Carnap sentence of a
sentence, and other non-falsifiable sentences as well, may be verified at some
point. Indeed, the Carnap sentence CB (ϑ) is verified simply by ¬RB (ϑ). If, in the
terminology of Peacocke (1986, 47), the Ramsey sentence RB (ϑ) is akin to the
“canonical commitment of the content that” ϑ, then the negation of the reverse
Ramsey sentence ¬RB (¬ϑ) (see §6.3) is akin to the “canonical ground for the
content that” ϑ. Only a sentences that has neither commitment nor ground, that
is, is neither falsifiable nor verifiable, and thus not weaklyB -determined, allows
the choice of either truth value. I will not explore this line of thought further,
however. Instead, I will assume that the empirical content of a sentence is given by
its Ramsey sentence and focus on possible liberalizations of the Carnap sentence.
12.1 The analytic component of sentences
RB (ϑ) and CB (ϑ) fulfill three conditions of adequacy that Carnap (1963c, 965)
suggests for any split of a sentence ϑ into an analytic component An(ϑ) and a
synthetic component Syn(ϑ). In my terminology, they are the following:
1. An(ϑ)∧ Syn(ϑ)  ϑ.
2. Syn(ϑ) and ϑ are deductively empirically equivalent relative to the empty
set.
3. Only An(ϑ) containsA -terms; An(ϑ) has noB -content relative to the
empty set.
Winnie (1970, theorem 4) shows that for a consistent sentence ϑ in a first order
language without identity, only tautologicalA -sentences are analytic if CB (ϑ)
is taken as the analytic component of ϑ (cf. Williams 1973, theorem 5). Under
the same condition, Winnie (1970, theorem 5) shows further that beyond CB (ϑ),
CB (ϑ)∧RA (ϑ) also fulfills the conditions for An(ϑ) (cf. Williams 1973, 404–408).
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In other words, instead of treating only tautologicalA -sentences as analytic, one
can also treat all of ϑ’sA -consequences as analytic.
Winnie (1970, 294–296) and Demopoulos (2007, V) consider this result some-
thing of a confirmation of the Quinean charge that the distinction between analytic
and synthetic sentences is arbitrary (cf. Quine 1951). As a defense of Carnap’s
approach, Winnie (1970, 296–297) suggests, with agreement of Demopoulos (2007,
V), an additional condition of adequacy on An(ϑ), based on
Definition 12.1. σ is observationally vacuous in ϑ if and only if ϑ  σ and for
anyB -sentence β and V -sentence τ with ϑ  τ, τ ∧σ β only if τ β.
Winnie (1970, 296–297) and Demopoulos (2008, 371) justify definition 12.1
as similar to the notion ofB -conservativeness relative to an empty set in first
order logic,2 and point out that an observationally vacuous sentence can never
contribute to the inference of aB -sentence (Winnie 1970, 297; Demopoulos 2007,
259). This, of course, is shorthand for the claim that an observationally vacuous
sentence can never contribute to the inference of aB -sentence from a sentence
entailed by ϑ. In fact, σ is observationally vacuous in ϑ if and only if, first, it is
entailed by ϑ, and second, it isB -conservative relative to every sentence entailed
by ϑ. This is quite obviously a much stronger condition than, for example,B -
conservativeness relative to ϑ. Indeed, it is so strong that one might suspect that
no sentence at all is observationally vacuous in ϑ, since for anyB -sentenceβ and
V -sentence σ entailed by ϑ, ϑ  σ→β. Since σ ∧ (σ→β) β, σ therefore fails
to be observationally vacuous unless σ → β  β. And this holds if and only if
 (σ→β)→β, that is,  ¬β→ σ and thus ¬β  σ . In other words, a sentence
is observationally vacuous only if it is entailed by ϑ and by everyB -sentence
that falsifies ϑ. Since a B -sentence falsifies ϑ if and only if it is incompatible
with RB (ϑ), σ is observationally vacuous only if ¬RB (ϑ)  σ and ϑ  σ , that is,¬RB (ϑ)∨ϑ  σ , or simply CB (ϑ)  σ . Winnie (1970, corollary 12) also proves
the converse, so that the following holds:
Claim 12.1. CB (ϑ)  σ if and only if σ is observationally vacuous in ϑ.
Since Winnie demands that An(ϑ) be observationally vacuous in ϑ, he thus
shows that only the Carnap sentence is an adequate explication of the analytic
component of ϑ. Winnie’s and Demopoulos’s justification for observational vacu-
ity shows at best that the criterion is not too wide. Given the comparative strength
of the criterion, however, it is much more interesting whether, first, it is too nar-
row and second, whether it is needed at all. Winnie and Demopoulos claim that
without the demand for observational vacuity, the analytic-synthetic dichotomy
is arbitrary. But this is a tendentious formulation, since Syn(ϑ) is uniquely deter-
mined, and An(ϑ) is somewhat, but not completely vague (allB -creative sentences
2Demopoulos (2007, n. 12) also calls observational vacuity a “special case” ofB -conservativeness;
but this is misleading, since the former is stronger than the latter.
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are in its negative extension, and all sentences that are observationally vacuous are
in its positive extension). On the other hand, the set of analytic sentences is even
more vague than Winnie and Demopoulos let on, since from a formal point of
view, any theory ϑ is as good as any other theory τ as long as RB (ϑ)  RB (τ), so
that even if An(ϑ) were uniquely determined by ϑ, the analytic sentences could
nonetheless be different, namely An(τ). And once one accepts that the truth of
B -conservative sentences is a matter of choice, then there is no obvious reason
to demand that if a theory ϑ is given, there must be no more choice with respect
to An(ϑ), for example between CB (ϑ) and strongerB -conservative implications
of ϑ. But if one were to demand that An(ϑ) has to be fixed by ϑ, CB (ϑ) seems
like the wrong criterion to determine the dichotomy, because for every sentence
ϑ, some of its analytic implications will become non-analytic if our empirical
knowledge increases in any way:
Claim 12.2. For two compatible theories ϑ and τ, CB (ϑ ∧τ)  CB (ϑ) if and only
if τ has no empirical content relative to ϑ.
Proof. CB (ϑ ∧ τ)  CB (ϑ) iff RB (ϑ ∧ τ)→ ϑ ∧ τ  RB (ϑ)→ ϑ. This holds iff¬RB (ϑ ∧τ)  RB (ϑ)→ ϑ and ϑ ∧τ  RB (ϑ)→ ϑ, where the latter is logically
true. The former holds iff ¬RB (ϑ ∧τ)  ¬RB (ϑ) or ¬RB (ϑ ∧τ)  ϑ. The first
disjunct is true iff RB (ϑ)  RB (ϑ ∧ τ), that is, iff τ has no empirical content
relative to ϑ. The second disjunct is true iff RB (¬ϑ)  RB (ϑ ∧ τ), which is
logically false.
On the Carnap sentence approach, the introduction of any sentence into our
system of beliefs that contains new empirical information thus renders some
previously analytic sentence non-analytic. Mathematics, for instance, cannot be
analytic for long because mathematical theories are axiomatized by auxiliary
sentences. And once an auxiliary sentence α is conjoined with an empirical theory
ϑ, α ceases to be analytic, since CB (α∧ϑ)  RB (α∧ϑ)→ α∧ϑ; if RB (α) is a
tautology and contains no terms of ϑ, CB (α∧ϑ)  RB (ϑ)→ α∧ϑ. In conclusion,
if for every sentence ϑ, there has to be a unique analytic component An(ϑ), it
will have to be CB (ϑ)∧RA (ϑ). For otherwise, one could always introduce RA (ϑ)
as lone auxiliary sentence, which would become non-analytic with the addition
of any empirical theory. In a sense then, the Carnap sentence approach leads
to contradictory results when the gain of empirical knowledge is taken into
consideration.
Since there is no obvious reason to treat all auxiliary sentences of all theories
as analytic, there cannot be a unique set An(σ) for every sentence σ . Therefore, as
the conventionality of the choice between ϑ and τ with RB (ϑ)  RB (τ) suggests,
and as Przełe˛cki and Wójcicki (1969, 386) note, it is another conventional choice
which sentence σ that fulfills Carnap’s conditions of adequacy one chooses to be
analytic. I now want to look at a historically important case that will turn out to
be still relevant.
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12.2 Reduction pairs
In definition 7.5 of reducibility, Carnap (1936, §8) introduces the concept of
a reduction sentence, which is simply a necessary or sufficient condition for
relations. The problem with pairs of reduction sentences is that they are not
generallyB -conservative. The conjunction of a general reduction pair
∀x[ϕ(x)→ P x] (12.2a)
∀x[ψ(x)→¬P x] , (12.2b)
where P ∈A and ϕ and ψ areB -formulas, entails what Carnap (1936, 451) calls
the “representative sentence”
∀x¬[ϕ(x)∧ψ(x)] . (12.3)
That this is also the onlyB -consequence of the reduction pair can be seen by
comparison with Papineau’s toy theory of pain (2.14). The reduction pair’s repre-
sentative sentence is thus its synthetic component. As argued above, there will be
different possibilities for the analytic component.
Unsurprisingly, Carnap (1963c, 964–966) suggests the Carnap sentence of the
general reduction pair as its analytic component,3 that is,
∀x[ϕ(x)→¬ψ(x)]→∀x[ϕ(x)→ P x]∧∀x[ψ(x)→¬P x] . (12.4)
This is equivalent to the Carnap reduction pair
∀x ∀y[ϕ(y)→¬ψ(y)]∧ϕ(x)→ P x (12.5a)
∀x ∀y[ϕ(y)→¬ψ(y)]∧ψ(x)→¬P x . (12.5b)
The same result can be achieved with the Ramsey and the reverse Ramsey constant,
although not immediately.
Claim 12.3. For ϑ  ∀x[ϕ(x)→ P x]∧∀x[ψ(x)→¬P x],
∀x¬ RϑB ,P x↔  ∀y[ϕ(y)→¬ψ(y)]→ ϕ(x) (12.6)
∀x¬RϑB ,P x↔  ∀y[ϕ(y)→¬ψ(y)]→ψ(x) . (12.7)
Proof. I will prove the first conjunct; the proof of the second is similar. Assume for
any x that ¬ RϑB ,P x and hence ∀X
 ∀y[ϕ(y)→Xy]∧∀y[ψ(y)→¬Xy]→X x.
When substituting λy
 ∀z[ϕ(z) → ¬ψ(z)] ∧ ϕ(y)x for X , the antecedent of
the implication is a logical truth, so that ∀y[ϕ(y) → ¬ψ(y)] → ϕ(x) ∧ ¬ψ(x)
3Maybe somewhat surprisingly, since Carnap suggested this solution before he found the general
formalism of the Carnap sentence.
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holds. Assuming for the converse that ∀y[ϕ(y)→¬ψ(y)]→ ϕ(x)∧¬ψ(x) and
∀y[ϕ(y) → Xy] ∧ ∀y[ψ(y) → ¬Xy] for an arbitrary X entails ∀y[ϕ(y) →
¬ψ(y)], hence ϕ(x) ∧ ¬ψ(x), and finally X x. Since X is arbitrary, this entails
∀X  ∀y[ϕ(y) → Xy] ∧ ∀y[ψ(y) → ¬Xy] → X x  ¬ RϑB ,P x. Since x is arbi-
trary as well, the two formulas are equivalent. Finally, ∀y[ϕ(y) → ¬ψ(y)] →
ϕ(x)∧¬ψ(x)  ∀y[ϕ(y)→¬ψ(y)]→ ϕ(x).
Thus, if ¬ RϑB ,P x was used as a sufficient condition for P and ¬RϑB ,P x was
used as a sufficient condition for ¬P , their conjunction would beB -creative, since
both ¬ RϑB ,P x and ¬RϑB ,P x apply to all objects in the domain whenever RB (ϑ) is
false. To arrive at the Carnap reduction pair, the case in which RB (ϑ) is false has
to be excluded:
Corollary 12.4. For ϑ  ∀x[ϕ(x)→ P x]∧∀x[ψ(x)→¬P x],
∀x[RB (ϑ)∧¬ RϑB ,P x→ P x] (12.8)
∀x[RB (ϑ)∧¬RϑB ,P x→¬P x] (12.9)
are equivalent to the Carnap reduction pair for ϑ.
Proof. Immediately from claim 12.3.
These results hold in general; as in claim 12.3, the Ramsey and reverse Ramsey
constant are in general conditional on the Ramsey sentence:
Claim 12.5. For any sentence ϑ and any auxiliary relation Pi ,
 ∀x¯ ¬RϑB ,Pi x¯↔ RB (ϑ)→¬RϑB ,Pi x¯ (12.10)
and
 ∀x¯ ¬ RϑB ,Pi x¯↔ RB (ϑ)→¬ RϑB ,Pi x¯ . (12.11)
Proof.
¬RϑB ,Pi x¯↔¬∃X¯

ϑ(B¯ , X¯ )∧¬Xi x¯

(12.12a)
↔¬ ∃X¯ϑ(B¯ , X¯ )∧∃X¯ [ϑ(B¯ , X¯ )∧¬Xi x¯] (12.12b)
↔¬RB (ϑ)∨¬RϑB ,Pi x¯ (12.12c)
↔ RB (ϑ)→¬RϑB ,Pi x¯ (12.12d)
The proof for ¬ RϑB ,Pi x¯ is analogous.
398
Applications Reduction pairs 12.2
To arrive at aB -conservative reduction pair, it thus has to be assumed that
the Ramsey sentence of the theory is true. Call
∀x¯RB (ϑ)∧¬ RϑB ,Pi x¯→ Pi x¯ (12.13)
∀x¯RB (ϑ)∧¬RϑB ,Pi x¯→¬Pi x¯ (12.14)
the Martin reduction pairs for ϑ and Pi , since Martin (1966) has suggested the
notion of the Ramsey constant. Martin reduction pairs are entailed by a theory’s
Carnap sentence:
Claim 12.6. For any sentence ϑ and any auxiliary relation Pi , CB (ϑ) entails the
Martin reduction pair for every auxiliary relation Pi .
Proof. Trivially, ∀x¯ ¬ RϑB ,Pi x¯ → ¬ RϑB ,Pi x¯, and thus by lemma 7.10, ϑ ∀x¯ ¬ RϑB ,Pi x¯→ Pi x¯. Therefore RB (ϑ)→ ϑ  RB (ϑ)→ RB (ϑ)∧∀x¯ ¬ RϑB ,Pi x¯→ Pi x¯  ∀x¯ RB (ϑ)→ [RB (ϑ)∧¬ RϑB ,Pi x¯→ Pi x¯]  ∀x¯[RB (ϑ)∧¬ RϑB ,Pi x¯→
Pi x¯]. The proof for R
ϑ
B ,Pi x¯ is analogous.
When allA -terms of a sentence ϑ are relations, the conjunction of all their
Martin reduction pairs with RB (ϑ) is not always equivalent to ϑ, and thus the
Martin reduction pairs cannot always be the only analytic components of a sen-
tence. But this is, of course, no argument against taking the Martin reduction pairs
as analytic.
Instead of Carnap reduction pairs, Przełe˛cki (1961b, 136) suggests the stronger
Przeł˛ecki reduction pair
∀x [ϕ(x)∧¬ψ(x)]→ P x (12.15a)
∀x [ψ(x)∧¬ϕ(x)]→¬P x , (12.15b)
because together with ϑ’s Ramsey sentence, they meet all of Carnap’s conditions
of adequacy for the analytic component of a sentence and, in contradistinction to
Carnap’s solution, allow the relation P to stay reducible even if the representative
sentence of the general reduction pair (12.2) turns out false.4 Intuitively, ϕ becomes
and indicator for P that is defeasible by ψ, and ψ becomes and indicator for ¬P
that is defeasible by ϕ. Przełe˛cki reduction pairs can thus be useful in cases where
a theory turns out false, but its concepts are still considered to be at least in part
helpful.
A particularly intuitive way of arriving at the Przełe˛cki reduction pair is to
think of it as a restriction of the concepts of a theory to the domain in which the
theory is true. Even if ∀x¬[ϕ(x)∧ψ(x)] is false, there may be some objects a
4Since Przełe˛cki reduction pairs are logically stronger than Carnap reduction pairs, they cannot
fulfill Winnie’s condition of adequacy.
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in the domain for which ¬[ϕ(a)∧ψ(a)] is true. The restriction to these objects,
that is, the relativization of the general reduction pair (12.2) to λx¬[ϕ(x)∧ψ(x)]
results in
∀x [¬ϕ(x)∨¬ψ(x)]→ [ϕ(x)→ P x] (12.16a)
and
∀x [¬ϕ(x)∨¬ψ(x)→ [ψ(x)→¬P x] , (12.16b)
which is equivalent to the Przełe˛cki reduction pair. In some contexts, Przełe˛cki
reduction pairs are a significant improvement over Carnap reduction pairs, as the
following case study from ethics shows.
12.3 Przełe˛cki reduction pairs in ethics
Mark Alfano (2009) argues that the response-dependence theory of Prinz and
others and the fitting-attitudes theory first articulated by Brentano are false because
they imply empirically false statements. He further concludes that these statements
cannot be avoided by revising the definitions of the terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’ used in
the two theories. In this section, I strengthen Alfano’s first conclusion by arguing
that the two theories are false even if they imply empirically true but analytically
contingent statements, and show how, contrary to his second conclusion, the
theories can avoid both empirically false and analytically contingent implications.5
12.3.1 The case against response-dependence and fitting-atti-
tude semantics
An empirical inconsistency
Response-dependence and fitting-attitude theory contain explicit definitions for
‘good’ and ‘bad’. In response-dependence theory, something is good (bad) if and
only if someone is disposed to have a positive (negative) attitude towards it upon
careful reflection (Alfano 2009, 3); in fitting-attitude theory, something is good
(bad) if and only if it would be fitting to take an approbative (disapprobative)
attitude towards it (Alfano 2009, 8). Since ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are polar predicates,
they are contraries, that is, nothing is both good and bad.
The two theories share a structure with all theories that contain explicit
definitions of contraries. It can be expressed as the simple theory η (Alfano 2009,
1):
∀x[F x↔β(x)] (12.17)
∀x[un-F x↔ω(x)] (12.18)
¬∃x(F x ∧un-F x) . (12.19)
5A slightly different version of this section has been published in the Journal of Ethics and Social
Philosophy (Lutz 2010). I thank an anonymous referee for the journal for helpful comments.
400
Applications Przełe˛cki reduction pairs in ethics 12.3
Postulates (12.17) and (12.18) are simply the explicit definitions of ‘good’ (F )
and ‘bad’ (un-F ). Postulate (12.19) is the claim that the two defined terms are
contraries.
If the definientia of the two terms are not themselves contraries, then the
world can turn out to be such that they are co-instantiated. The core of Alfano’s
article (Alfano 2009, 4–7, 9–10) is a defense of the claim that the definientia in
both theories are indeed co-instantiated, that is, for both theories it holds
∃x[β(x)∧ω(x)] . (12.20)
This claim is incompatible with η; η is therefore empirically false.
Alfano further argues that none of the six possible responses to the discovery
of the inconsistency is tenable:
(I) Dialetheism is too high a price to pay (Alfano 2009, 2).
(II) Giving up postulate (12.19) means that some things are both good and bad,
which is not better for an ethical theory than outright dialetheism (Alfano
2009, 7).
(III) Giving up postulate (12.17) or (12.18) results in an ethical theory that has
nothing to say about both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (Alfano 2009, 7).
(IV) Changing the definitions so that the empirical claim (12.20) seems false leaves
the ethical theory at least in principle vulnerable to empirical refutations
(Alfano 2009, 2).
(V) One could make one of the two defined terms into a trouser-word, that is,
introduce a new definition
∀x F x↔ [β(x)∧¬un-F x] (12.21)
or a new definition
∀x un-F x↔ [ω(x)∧¬F x] , (12.22)
but the choice between them is arbitrary and therefore ad hoc: There is no
plausible argument for ‘good’ being prior to ‘bad’ or vice versa (Alfano
2009, 8).
(VI) Changing one of the two definitions to yield contradictories, that is,
change postulate (12.17) into ∀x(F x ↔ ¬un-F x) or postulate (12.18)
into ∀x(un-F x ↔¬F x) is even less plausible than the introduction of a
trouser-word (Alfano 2009, 7).
Thus Alfano can conclude that neither theory can be saved.
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A conceptual inconsistency
Alfano’s rebuttal IV suggests a way of strengthening his argument that the two
theories are false. Specifically, it is not necessary to establish that (12.20) is true,
only that its contradictory,
¬∃x[β(x)∧ω(x)] , (12.23)
is analytically contingent. It may be only an empirical (but not an analytic) truth,
for example, that the disposition to have a positive sentiment is contrary to a
disposition to have a negative sentiment. Similarly, it might not be an analytic
truth that a fitting approbative attitude is contrary to a fitting disapprobative atti-
tude.6 So while definitions (12.17) and (12.18) ensure that (12.23) entails (12.19),
one could argue analogously to a consideration by Rabinowicz (2008, 40) that
these definitions are not satisfactory as complete reductions of F and un-F because
they would reduce the analytic truth (12.19) to the non-analytic truth (12.23).7
But the problem is more severe. For assume that (12.23) is not analytically true.
Response-dependence and fitting-attitudes theories are meant to capture the con-
cepts good and bad; in other words, definitions (12.17) and (12.18) are analytically
true. Since postulate (12.19) is analytically true and, in connection with (12.17)
and (12.18), entails (12.23), (12.23) is analytically true as well, which contradicts
the assumption.8
∗ ∗ ∗
Alfano’s argument against response-dependence and fitting-attitude theory con-
sists of the identification of an empirical implication of η, the argument that
this implication is false, and the claim that the concepts F and un-F cannot be
changed to avoid empirical implications. On this abstract level, his argument can
be connected to the preceding discussion of reduction pairs.
6Note that Alfano (2009, §3) argues that it is sometimes fitting to have both an approbative and a
disapprobative attitude, even though for his argument, he only needs to establish that it is sometimes
both fitting to have an approbative attitude and fitting to have a disapprobative attitude. The latter
claim is the correct paraphrase of Alfano’s formula (20) (Alfano 2009, 9); the former is Alfano’s
paraphrase.
7I thank an anonymous referee for Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy for pointing out this
problem and its discussion by Rabinowicz.
8Since all and only analytic truths are analytically necessary, the argument can be expressed
(using “” for “it is analytically necessary that”) as follows: {∀x[F x ↔ β(x)],∀x[un-F x ↔
ω(x)],¬∃x(F x∧un-F x)} ¬∃x[β(x)∧ω(x)], which contradicts ¬¬∃x[β(x)∧ω(x)], i. e., the
assumption that (12.23) is not analytically necessary. Since for analytic necessity ∃x[β(x)∧ω(x)] 
¬¬∃x[β(x)∧ω(x)] and ¬¬∃x[β(x)∧ω(x)] 6 ∃x[β(x)∧ω(x)] hold, the assumption is weaker
than what Alfano needs to establish for his argument.
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12.3.2 Isolating the empirical content of ethical theories
η can be equivalently rewritten as a necessary and a sufficient condition for F
∀x[β(x)→ F x] (12.24a)
∀x [¬β(x)∨ω(x)]→¬F x , (12.24b)
and a necessary and a sufficient condition for un-F :
∀x[ω(x)→ un-F x] (12.25a)
∀x [¬ω(x)∨β(x)]→¬un-F x . (12.25b)
As Alfano’s objection to response V shows, he assumes that β and ω do not
contain F or un-F ; the conditions (12.24) and (12.25) are therefore reduction
pairs. Both reduction pairs’ representative sentence is just the negation of Alfano’s
empirical claim (12.20). If the analytic component of η had to be its Carnap
sentence, the story would end here, since (assuming Alfano is right) η is false,
and thus F and un-F are completely undetermined by their respective Carnap
reduction pairs. Przełe˛cki reduction pairs, however, still determine F and un-F up
to a point. Applied to the two reduction pairs (12.24) and (12.25), the Przełe˛cki
reduction pairs are
∀x [β(x)∧¬ω(x)]→ F x (12.26a)
∀x[¬β(x)→¬F x] (12.26b)
and
∀x [ω(x)∧¬β(x)]→ un-F x (12.27a)
∀x[¬ω(x)→¬un-F x] . (12.27b)
By design of Przełe˛cki’s general solution, neither of the new reduction pairs has
empirical implications, and together with the representative sentence (12.23) of
the original reduction pairs (12.24) and (12.25), these new reduction pairs are
equivalent to (12.24) and (12.25), and therefore to η.
In the discussion above, the new postulates (12.26) and (12.27) for F and un-F
were obtained by first equivalently reformulating η so that un-F does not appear
in the postulates for F and vice versa, and then applying Przełe˛cki’s solution to
both polar predicates. But there are different ways to equivalently reformulate the
theory, and another one leads to the explicit definitions
∀x F x↔ [β(x)∧¬ω(x)] (12.28)
and
∀x un-F x↔ [ω(x)∧¬β(x)] (12.29)
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conjoint with η’s empirical claim (12.23). Since explicit definitions are B -
conservative (Belnap 1993), they do not have empirical implications. They also
entail (12.19) (the postulate that F and un-F are contraries) and the reduction pairs
(12.26) and (12.27), so the conjunctions of (12.19) with the new definitions and
(12.19) with the new reduction pairs do not have empirical implications either.
Note that this solution is only possible because η already entails explicit def-
initions for F and un-F , and that, for instance, the original explicit definitions
(12.17) and (12.18) cannot be used in the same way. This is a very good example
of how the choice of the analytic sentences within a theory (η in this case) has
to be dependent on factors outside the pure formalism of the theory, and a nice
illustration of van Fraassen’s point (van Fraassen 1980, §3.5) that equivalent axiom-
atizations of a theory can be very different when it comes to the generalization of
concepts (see §4.1.1).
12.3.3 New postulates for ‘good’ and ‘bad’
The new reduction pairs (12.26), (12.27) and the new definitions (12.28), (12.29)
avoid all of Alfano’s criticisms: First and foremost, the postulates do not have
any empirical implications, that is, neither are they incompatible with Alfano’s
core claim (12.20), nor can they be shown false by any other empirical result
(response IV). The postulates do not assume dialetheism (response I) because they
are compatible with each other and with the claim (12.19) that F and un-F are
contraries. Specifically, the postulates do not give up postulate (12.19) (response II).
They do not force an arbitrary choice between taking ‘good’ to be prior to ‘bad’
or vice versa (response V) because the postulates for F do not contain un-F and
vice versa; furthermore, the changes to the original definitions are analogous for
the two predicates. The postulates also do not make the polar predicates into
contradictories (response VI).
One might criticize the new reduction pairs (12.26), (12.27) for failing to fully
address rebuttal III. This is because for some objects, it is not defined whether
they are F or not F (un-F or not un-F )—or in this case, good or not good (bad
or not bad). There are two responses. The first is to bite the bullet and accept
that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are vague; just as some things are good, some are bad, and
some are neither, some things are clearly good, some things are clearly not good,
and for some things, it is not clear whether they are good or not good. This may
just be a fact about the predicates, but it may also be a lack of knowledge: Alfano
objects to a simple switch to definientia β and ω for which postulate (12.20) is
false (response IV) because such a change may lead to empirical objections in the
future. In light of this worry, it may simply be cautious to keep the predicates
undefined for cases in which not enough is known.
For response-dependence theory, this response means that it is either a fact of
language or of our knowledge that whenever someone is disposed to have a positive
attitude towards x and someone is disposed to have a negative attitude towards x,
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it is not clear whether x is good, bad, not good, or not bad. For fitting-attitude
theory, this situation occurs if it would both be fitting to take an approbative
and be fitting to take a disapprobative attitude towards x. In this response, β and
ω become defeasible indicators of goodness and badness, respectively. When the
indicators for goodness and badness both apply to the same instance, all bets are
off.
The first response is unsatisfactory if fitting-attitude and response- dependence
theories are intended to provide complete reductions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ because
the two reduction pairs do not entail that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are contraries, and there-
fore the purported reductions fail to reproduce all of the predicates’ properties.
This problem is solved by the second response, which consists in using the explicit
definitions (12.28) and (12.29) instead of (12.26) and (12.27). This response leads
to a very exclusive notion of ‘good’ and ‘bad’. In response-dependence theory, it
means that if anyone is disposed to have a negative sentiment toward x, it is not
good, and if anyone is disposed to have a positive sentiment toward x, it is not bad.
The situation in fitting-attitudes theory is analogous.
The new postulates also avoid the conceptual inconsistency to which the
original definitions (12.17) and (12.18) give rise if claim (12.23) is not an an-
alytic truth. The new definitions (12.28) and (12.29) logically entail postulate
(12.19) independently of the status of (12.23); this makes (12.19) an analytic truth,
as intended. The reduction pairs (12.26) and (12.27) do not entail (12.19), but
are consistent with (12.19) being analytically true while (12.23) is analytically
contingent, because the conjunction of (12.19), (12.26) and (12.27) is conserva-
tive. On the other hand, claim (12.23) entails ∀x [β(x)∧¬ω(x)]↔β(x) and
∀x [ω(x) ∧ ¬β(x)]↔ ω(x). So if (12.23) is analytically true, then for all x,
β(x)∧¬ω(x) is equivalent to β(x) andω(x)∧¬β(x) is analytically equivalent
to ω(x). Therefore substituting the new postulates for the original definitions
(12.17) and (12.18) does not lead to a change of the analytic truths.
∗ ∗ ∗
Without the assumption of Alfano’s empirical claim (12.20), the argument of this
section works as follows: Response-dependence and fitting-attitudes theories have
a structure η that entails (12.23), which either is or is not an analytic truth. If
(12.23) is not an analytic truth, then the original definitions (12.17) and (12.18)
cannot both be analytic truths. Since response-dependence and fitting-attitudes
theories claim the analytic truth of (12.17) and (12.18), they are false. The new
reduction pairs (12.26) and (12.27) and the new definitions (12.28) and (12.29) can
be analytically true even if (12.23) is not, and insofar as they avoid all of Alfano’s
rebuttals I–VI, they are acceptable substitutes for the original definitions (12.17)
and (12.18). If (12.23) is an analytic truth, substituting the new postulates for
the original definitions does not amount to a change of the meaning postulates.
In either case, then, substitution of the new postulates is acceptable. In some
405
12 Concept formation Criteria of Empirical Significance
cases, it may even save response-dependence and fitting-attitudes theories from
contradiction.
Alfano concludes that response-dependence and fitting-attitudes theories are
false because they have false empirical implications, and that neither theory can
be salvaged. I have argued instead, first, that both theories are false if these implica-
tions are analytically contingent (even if they are in fact true), and second, that the
two theories can be saved. Specifically, by adopting new postulates for the polar
predicates ‘good’ and ‘bad’ that either entail or are consistent with the postulate
that the two predicates are contraries, the theories can avoid any non-analytic
implications. Therefore, even if the theories are false in their current formulation,
the conclusion should not be that they are completely misguided, but only that
their postulates for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ require modification.
The specific case discussed here points to some general strategies for developing
postulates for value notions. If all postulates can be expressed as reduction pairs,
empirical and analytic inconsistencies can be precluded by ensuring that the
representative sentences are tautologies. In general, postulates for value notions
must be B -conservative if the B -terms are empirical. If value notions are to
be completely reduced, then the analytic truths holding between them must be
entailed by the reducing postulates (whether they are explicit definitions, reduction
pairs or of some other form).
12.4 Concluding remarks on language choice
The discussion of the two ethical theories also points to a meta-philosophical
conclusion: The success of the methods I have employed to arrive at new postulates
for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ shows that some results from the theory of concept formation
are applicable outside of their original domain. This is unsurprising, for the
theory of definition has long been considered to be analogous to the theory of
inference (see, for example Belnap 1993), and so methods to improve concepts,
just as methods to improve arguments, should be expected to be useful in a wide
variety of cases.
In particular, the discussion in this chapter has shown how valuable criteria of
empirical significance are when they are understood as tools for concept formation.
Here, even the criteria for terms can have applications, in spite of their lack of
justification as demarcation criteria for sentences with empirical import. The
discussion has also shown once more that synthetic claims do not determine
analytic claims, but that they can suggest them. Whether, for example, general
reduction pairs are madeB -conservative using Carnap or Przełe˛cki reduction
pairs is a matter of choice, but will be influenced by the truth or falsity of the
Ramsey sentence of the general reduction pair. The choice between the different
reduction pairs is only a special case of the more general choice for postulates for
auxiliary terms.
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However, the choice may not be quite as unrestricted as I have made it out
to be in this chapter. For the Carnap sentence approach to analyticity is built on
the assumption that there is no empirical difference between theories with the
same Ramsey sentence. But I have also shown that the Ramsey sentence, first,
only determines what a theory asserts, not what can verify the theory. Second,
the Ramsey sentence only determines what a theory asserts deductively, not
probabilistically. Therefore sentences that do not differ in their Ramsey sentences
can differ in their deductive verifiability or in their probabilistic assertions or
probabilistic verifiability. I have mentioned in §9.2 Hempel’s point that non-
observational statements are necessary for “inductive explanatory and predictive
use and [ . . . ] systematic economy and heuristic fertility” (Hempel 1965g, 222).
And while systematic advantages of one set of meaning postulates over another
may already show in deductive settings (I have given possible examples in §2.9),
the analysis of the inductive advantage of one set of sentences over another will
in all probability require a probabilistic approach. A truly analytic sentence may
thus have to lack falsifiability, verifiability, probabilistic relevance, and Bayesian
confirmability.9 I hope that the analysis of the different criteria of empirical
significance presented here will contribute to the development of corresponding
criteria of analyticity.
However, even though I do expect the set of analytic sentence to be smaller
than the set of non-falsifiable ones, I doubt that all sentences in theories will turn
out empirically significant. For one, a first connection has to be made betweenB
andA terms, and this connection will at least be in part free of assertions and also
be unverifiable. Thus I expect the search for a criterion that distinguishes between
metaphysics and science to never recover. But I also think that there would be fewer
debates about pseudo-synthetic sentences if the distinction between synthetic and
analytic sentences was considered more thoroughly (and accepted in the first
place).
I want to end with a by now hopefully obvious note on maybe the most perse-
verant criticism of all criteria of empirical significance, that they show their own
meaninglessness. There are two conjuncts to the reply. The first is that the criteria
I have discussed here are formulated in one language, and a criterion for sentences
about that object language will be a new criterion in a metalanguage. The second
conjunct is that a criterion in the metalanguage should show that the criteria in
the object language are not empirically significant, since as explications, they are
suggestions for a language choice. This is essentially the answer given by Popper
(cf. Horgan 1996, 38–39),10 and Carnap (Stein 1992, 278–279; cf. Reichenbach
1951, 48–49).
9Raatikainen (2011) provides a somewhat more detailed argument that the Carnap sentence cannot
be taken as a theory’s analytic content when the context allows inductive inferences.
10Horgan’s account is neither entirely clear nor entirely trustworthy, however (cf. Hoffman 1998).
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Epilogue
Criteria of empirical significance have always been linked to the notion of ana-
lyticity, for example by the definition of meaningless sentences as being neither
empirically significant nor analytic. I have done my best to strengthen this link
by arguing for the definition of analytic sentences as empirically non-significant.
My discussion was restricted almost entirely to languages of predicate logic and
probability theory, and while generalizations to other formal languages will be
straightforward in some cases, the step to natural language will be, without a
doubt, difficult. Nonetheless, just as the study of formal inference can improve
one’s precision in natural language arguments (many of the informal proofs in the
preceding chapters in fact grew out of more cumbersome formal proofs), it may be
possible to improve one’s ability to spot non-empirical claims by studying formal
criteria of empirical significance, and even arrive at some good explicit indicators
(cf. Bohnert 1963, 421–422). Unclear cases will have to be resolved by conscious
language choice, which may sometimes involve straightforward formalization of
the respective concepts. In the end, then, there does not seem to be a principled
problem with empirical significance, analyticity, or artificial language philosophy
in general. Says Mates (1951, 533–534):
I do not find, in the considerations set forth by Quine [(1951)] and
White [(1950)], any basis for pessimism about the explicability of
‘analytic’. The task is difficult, but progress has certainly been made
by Carnap and others; in any case, a difficult task is not necessarily
an impossible one. There is great value in the searching criticism
which White and Quine have devoted to the notion of analyticity; all
distinctions and terminology should undergo this treatment regularly.
Experience shows that our favorite philosophical concepts usually
do not stand up very well under such scrutiny. At the same time,
it is wise, even in the face of adverse results, to be hesitant about
exchanging our old notions and distinctions for new ones which may
be even less satisfactory. In the present case, despite all the unclarity
connected with the term ‘analytic’ and its various associates, namely
‘true’, ‘valid’, ‘necessary’, ‘synonymous’, and others, it is difficult
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to see what is to be gained by exchanging these for the business-
man vocabulary of pragmatism. How, for example, are we to decide
whether a belief “pays” or is “expedient” or is “fruitful”? What does it
mean to say that experience is “recalcitrant” to our system of beliefs,
or that this latter is “a man-made fabric which impinges on experience
only along the edges”?
Of course, artificial language philosophy also relies on the notions of expedience
and fruitfulness, but only for statements whose truth or falsity cannot be decided
in any other way. It could be said to be an attempt at arriving at objective, or
at least intersubjective, decision procedures for as many questions as possible
(empirical and formal ones), while acknowledging a remainder of questions that
can only be answered by fiat. Those answers, however, are not ascribed to any
ineffable sense of truth or intuition, but to simple choice.
Quine in essence argued that there was something fundamentally wrong with
this view, which would justify his introduction of comparably hazy concepts like
man-made fabrics impinging on experience—a hazy concept is still better than a
fundamentally wrong one, or one based on a fundamentally wrong idea. Luckily,
Stein (1992, 278–279) reports a discussion between Carnap and Quine on exactly
this topic:11
Carnap’s summary of the issue between Quine and himself was on
the following lines: “Quine”, he said (I am not quoting verbatim, but
giving the gist as I remember it), “and I really differ, not concerning
any matter of fact, nor any question with cognitive content, but rather
in our respective estimates of the most fruitful course for science
to follow. Quine is impressed by the continuity between scientific
thought and that of daily life—between scientific language and the
language of ordinary discourse—and sees no philosophical gain, no
gain either in clarity or in fruitfulness, in the construction of distinct
formalized languages for science. I concede the continuity, but, on the
contrary, believe that very important gains in clarity and fruitfulness
are to be had from the introduction of such formally constructed
languages. This is a difference of opinion which, despite the fact that
it does not concern (in my own terms) a matter with cognitive content,
is nonetheless in principle susceptible of a kind of rational resolution.
In my view, both programs—mine of formalized languages, Quine’s of
a more free-flowing and casual use of language—ought to be pursued;
and I think that if Quine and I could live, say, for two hundred years,
it would be possible at the end of that time for us to agree on which
of the two programs had proved more successful”.
11The occasion was Quine’s presentation of his unpublished paper “Ontology and Analyticity” at
the University of Chicago in February 1951 (Creath 1991, 364).
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[A]s I recall, Quine happily assented to Carnap’s diagnosis. [ . . . ] I
have never understood why Quine continued to argue his case against
Carnap with no suggestion that the issue concerned the fruitfulness
of a program, and not the tenability—or intelligibility—of a doctrine.
Quine’s seeming reversion to an out-and-out critical stance towards artificial
language philosophy suggests that this discussion was another instance of the
“persuasive and holistically critical” style of philosophical argument that Roze-
boom identified (§3.10). Once the possibility of choosing between two programs is
recognized, however, the possibility for collaboration becomes obvious.
I have already argued that traditional and ordinary language philosophy can be
captured in artificial language philosophy, and that naturalized and experimental
philosophy can provide suggestions for language choice (§2.7). I now want to point
out that Quine’s metaphor of the “totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs”
as a “a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges” can
be explicated (or even precisified) by taking the experiences to be expressed in basic
terms or, more generally, by basic sentences. Then ‘impinging on experience’ may
be precisified as empirical significance, and ‘man-made fabric’ as the postulates
expressing our beliefs. Quine (1960, 35–36) would later suggest, roughly, that
experiences are expressed in occasion sentences. On this basis, Quine (1960, 64)
argues:
The significant trait of [non-occasion] sentences is that experience is
relevant to them largely in indirect ways, through the mediation of as-
sociated sentences. Alternatives emerge: experiences call for changing
a theory, but do not indicate just where and how.
As a feature of non-basic sentences, this can be read directly off the Carnap sen-
tence: If a theory’s basic assertions are false, its auxiliary vocabulary is completely
undetermined. And whether the analytic component of a theory is to be taken as
stronger than its Carnap sentence is not determined by the theory itself. Arguably,
then, Quine’s stance is that of artificial language philosophy.
It is thus unsurprising that the two effects that according to Quine (1951,
20) come from abandoning the dogma of an analytic-synthetic distinction, the
“blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural
science” and the “shift toward pragmatism” are also effects of embracing the
distinction: I have argued at length for the importance of pragmatic considerations
in concept formation (§2.3). And if the sciences rely on the same methodology
as artificial language philosophy (§2.10) and artificial language philosophy can
capture the practices of traditional philosophy (§2.7), the distinction between
traditional philosophy and science becomes blurred. Specifically, the position of
ontological naturalism becomes ill-defined (§2.13).
In artificial language philosophy, the final arbiter between different empirically
equivalent methodologies is their fruitfulness. I have found artificial language
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philosophy as suggested by Carnap and the formalism suggested by Przełe˛cki to
be a flexible and enlightening method of thinking about philosophical problems,
analyzing other people’s solutions, and coming up with my own. I hope the
preceding results show this, and thus provide a cumulative argument for artificial
language philosophy, syntactic approaches, the Received View, and the different
criteria of empirical significance.
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V vocabulary 4
B set of basic terms 18
A set of auxiliary terms 18
Pi relation symbol 4
F j function symbol 4
ck constant symbol 4
x¯ string or tuple 5
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σ (ϕ) relativization of sentence σ to ϕ = λxϕ(x) 192
Σ (ϕ) {σ (ϕ) | σ ∈Σ} 192
A model theoretic structure: A= 〈|A| ,I 〉 4
|A| domain of A 4
I interpretation: I : V −→I (V ) 4
AI structure in vocabulary I 5
A|I reduct of A to I 41
A|EI relativized reduct ofA to vocabularyI and
domain E ⊆ |A|
58
Aˆ pure structure 174
〈A,a,≺〉 representative of a pure structure 174
A˜ partial structure 199

P A˜,+i , P
A˜,−
i , P
A˜,◦
i

partial relation 199
' isomorphism 4
≡ syntactical equivalence between structures 216
Th(A) theory of A: {σ |A  σ} 216
` syntactic inference (deduction) 5
 semantic inference (entailment) 5
> tautology
⊥ contradiction
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Symbol Interpretation Page
Θ|S S -consequences of Θ 75◦ function concatenation 5
û complement 75
card(A) cardinality of A 181
Φ Φ(Σ) := {S |S Σ} 168
Ψ Ψ(S) := {ϕ |S  ϕ for allS ∈ S} 169
Π set of meaning postulates (analytic sen-
tences)
21
Π set of supplementary sentences 257
ΠB set of meaning postulates in B (analyticB -sentences)
40
M class of possible V -structures 41
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43
RI (Σ) RI (
∧
Σ) 43
CI (σ) Carnap sentence: CI (σ)→ σ 43
CI (Σ) CI (
∧
Σ) 43
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An}
43
Θ(B¯ , A¯) Θ(B1, . . . ,Bm ,A1, . . . ,An) 43
RΘB ,Pi Ramsey constant: ∃X¯ [Θ(B¯ , X¯ )∧Xi x¯] 277
RΘB ,Pi reverse Ramsey constant: ∃X¯ [Θ(B¯ , X¯ ) ∧¬Xi x¯]
278
Syn(ϑ) synthetic component of ϑ 393
An(ϑ) analytic component of ϑ 393
P+i positive extension of Pi 44
P−i negative extension of Pi 44
P ◦i neutral extension of Pi 44
F +◦j non-negative extension of F j 45
c+◦
k
non-negative extension of ck 45
PAB ,Θ,+i positive extension of Pi relative toB and
Θ in AB
277
PAB ,Θ,−i negative extension of Pi relative toB and
Θ in AB
277
W (Pi , F j , ck )i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K penumbral connections 45
A vagueness set 45
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Symbol Interpretation Page
{Tn}n∈N theory (as defined by van Fraassen) 190
En set of empirical substructures of Tn ∈{Tn}n∈N
190
P set of appearances 190
CΣ content of Σ 231EF f E ∪F ∪{ f } 240
EF λx(E x ∨ F x) 240
A|EF EF f relativized reduct to EF f and EF 240
Ω set of observation sentences 255
Ω set of sets of observational structures 255
Vi
AB ,Θ set ofB -possible extensions of Vi 282I AB ,Θ set ofB -possible I -structures 290
  bringing about by law 381
ET evolutionary theory 304
ID intelligent design 3
ADAP ‘Organisms display complex adaptations’ 343
CSI complex specific information 346
“. . . ” quotation 3
‘. . . ’ name of phrase between the marks 4
ð. . .ñ quasi-quotation 4
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A -term, see term, auxiliary
about subject matterB , 230
part of content, 231
partial supervenience, see partial su-
pervenience
abstraction, 75, 185–186, 380, 382, 390
ADAP, 343, 344, 346, 356
ADAP, 344
admissible transformation, 240
analytically false, see false, analytically
analytically true, see true, analytically
analyticity, 393–396
appearances, 190
approximation, 198, 386, see true, ap-
proximately
general, 386
armchair philosophy, 52
artificial language philosophy, 9, 18–22,
35–70
asserting basic sentences, 265
at least as semantically determined, 250
in Ω, 256
at least as semantically falsifiable, 250
in Ω, 256
at least as semantically verifiable, 250
in Ω, 256
at least as syntactically determined, 250
in Ω, 256
at least as syntactically falsifiable, 250,
341, 380
in Ω, 256
at least as syntactically verifiable, 250
in Ω, 256
auxiliary term, see term, auxiliary
B -conservative
semantically, 228
syntactically, 224
B -content, 232
B -creative
semantically, 228
syntactically, 224
B -definable, 273
piecewise, 275
B -dependent
set of terms, 290
term, 282
B -isolated
set of terms, 291
term, 292
B -possible extension, 282
B -possible structures, 290
B -restricted, 286
B -symmetric, 274
B -term, see term, basic
B -vacuous, 292
bad, 400, 404–405
basic implication, see having basic impli-
cations
basic term, see term, basic
bridge laws, 386–388
canonical commitment, 394
canonical ground, 394
Carnap sentence, 43, 47–52, 165, 393,
395
Carnap-significant
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directly semantically, 285
directly syntactically, 284
syntactically, 289
chain-reducible, 288
challenge from holism, 257–258
circular definition, see definition, circu-
lar
completelyB -vague, 277
complex specified information, 346,
348, 353
concatenation, 5
concept, 4
mathematical, 62–63, 295–296
concept formation, 18, 21, 41–44
in the Received View, 93, 99, 132–
133, 147, 156–157
in the sciences, 52–61, 65–67
confirmation
contrastive, see contrastive confir-
mation
in Bayesianism, 302, 373
relevant, 373
relative, 372
confirmation class, 246
contingent
analytically, 42
relative, 261
continuity thesis, 28
contrastive confirmation, 370–372
contrastive testability, 305
and intelligent design, 344–346
relative, 314
correspondence rules, 85, 88–94, 96–99,
115–132
corresponding constant, 4
corresponding function, 4
corresponding relation, 4
criteria of empirical significance, see em-
pirically significant
recursive, 226–227, 258–259
CSI, see complex specified information
deduction, 5
deductively empirically incompatible,
322
definable, seeB -definable
definable in every model, 274
definition, 273
circular, 20, 46
recursive, 227, 258, 263
determined
analytically, 42
by a set of structures, 256
by a structure, 236
by sentences, 242
dissolution of a problem
in artificial language philosophy,
11, 22
in ordinary language philosophy,
17
distortion, 71
effective meaning, see given effective
meaning
elementary equivalence, 216
elementary extension, 62
embedding, 191
approximate, 198
empirical, 191
embedding of pure structures, 175
empirical adequacy, 190, 192, 199
idiosyncratic, 191
empirical substructure, 190
empirically equivalent
deductively, 265, 342
probabilistically, 323, 342
empirically meaningful, 237
empirically significant, 213–332, 393–
394, see falsifiability challenge
end of the world, 376
entailment, 5
analytic, 42
entirely about subject matter B , see
about subject matterB
essential factor, 77
ET, see evolutionary theory
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evolutionary theory
and contrastive confirmation, 369–
371
expansion, 41
experimental analysis, 28
experimental descriptivism, 28
experimental philosophy, 11, 27–30
experimental restrictionism, 28
explanation, xiii, 14, 348–349, see infer-
ence to the best explanation
and abstraction, 78–82
personal, 353–354
explicandum, 19
explication, 9, 18–20, 142–145
explicatum, 19
extension
negative, 44
relative, 277
neutral, 44
non-negative, 45
positive, 44
relative, 277
F-reducible, 381
liberalized, 382
false, 40, 46
analytically, 42
relative, 261
falsifiability challenge, 337–338
modified, 338–339
falsifiable
relative, 261
semantically, 229
in Ω, 256
syntactically, 224
in Ω, 255
falsification by sentences, 224
falsification by sets of structures, 256
falsification by structures, 229
firmness, 375
increase, 375
fitting-attitude theory, 400
given effective meaning, 285
God, 335–336
Goethe, 90, 92
good, 400, 404–405
havingB -content, 232
having basic implications, 261
hempel-minded, xi
homomorphism
partial structures, see partial homo-
morphism
relational systems, 238
honest set, 260
maximally, 373
hunch, 15
IBE, see inference to the best explanation
ID, see intelligent design
idealization, 75
induction, 74, 168, 217, 263, 361–376,
407, see projectible term
inference, 5
ampliative, see induction
semantic, see entailment
syntactic, see deduction
inference to the best explanation, 16, 32,
375
intelligent design, 346–352
intended V -structure, 44
intendedB -structure, 41
intended structure, 44
intuition, xii–xiii, 11–16, 30–35
trans-empirical, 14
isomorphism, 4
partial structures, see partial iso-
morphism
pure structures, 176
syntactic, see syntactic isomor-
phism
K-O-reducible, 380
L-reducible, 385
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labeled structure, 173, see structure
linguistic philosophy, 9–11
logical notation, see notation, logical
making all theB -assertions of
deductive, 341
probabilistic, 341
making probabilistic basic assertions,
325
relative, 325
Mal’tsev, 269
Malevitch, 346
mathematics, 78–82, 396, see concept,
mathematical
maximal set of sentences, 242
meaning postulate, 4, 21
measure, 238
measurement, 129–133, 237–239
and abstraction, 77–78
model
analogical, 136
in the narrower sense, 133, see
model, analogical
in the Received View, 133–140
in the Semantic View, 133–134,
136, 138–140
in the wider sense, 133
of a theory, 190, 197
theoretical, 135
model theoretic notation, see notation,
model theoretic
model theoretic structure, see structure
N-reducible, 378
idiosyncratically, 379
naturalism
cooperative, 26
ontological, 26, 83, 411
replacement, 26–28
substantive, 26, 384
naturalized philosophy, 11, 26–30
non-logical constant, see non-logical
symbol
non-logical symbol, 4
A˜-normal, 200, 201
notation
logical, 4
set theoretic, 4
observational adequacy, 195
observational terms, 85
observationally vacuous, 395, 396
omission, 71, 378, 380
ordinary language philosophy, 9, 16–17
partial homomorphism, 200, 203, 207
partial isomorphism, 200, 202, 207
partial structure, 199
partial supervenience, 244
partly about subject matter B , see
about subject matterB
penumbral connections, 45, 201, 279
phase space, 92, 111–113
philosophy
artificial language, see artificial lan-
guage philosophy
experimental, see experimental phi-
losophy
ideal language, see artificial lan-
guage philosophy
naturalized, see naturalized philos-
ophy
ordinary language, see ordinary lan-
guage philosophy
traditional, see traditional philoso-
phy
possibility
relative, 261
possible V -structure, 41
possibleB -structure, 40
possible set of sentences, 42
possible structure, 41
postulate, meaning, see meaning postu-
late
precisification, 45
and explication, 142–145
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prediction criterion of confirmation,
227, 245
primary statements, 200, 201
principle of confirmability, 329
problem of past failures, 213, 258
projectible term, 180–181, 228
pseudoelementary class, 193, 269
pure structure, 173, 174
quasi-quotation, 4
quasi-true, 200, 202, 205, 206
Ramsey constant, 277, 397–399
reverse, 278, 397–399
Ramsey sentence, 43, 47–52, 59, 165,
194, 206, 232, 394, 397
and abstraction, 77
reverse, 235, 394
Ramsey-Lewis sentence, 49–50
Received View, 85–161, 164–168, 182,
193–194, 197, 206
reducible, 276
approximately, 385
Fodor, 230, 380–384, see F-redu-
cible
Kemeny and Oppenheim, 380, see
K-O-reducible
Nagel, 230, 377–380, see N-redu-
cible
Nickles, 385–386, see L-reducible
reduct, 41
relativized, see relativized reduct
reduction, see reducible
reduction formula, 276
reduction pair, 276
Przełe˛cki, 399, 403
Carnap, 397
general, 397
Martin, 399
reduction sentence, 276, 397
relational system, 238
empirical, 238
formal, 238
relativized reduct, 58, 198, 239, 240
relevance, 302
relevant, 279
replacement thesis, 28
representative sentence, 397
response-dependence theory, 400
robustness, 71–74
scale, 238
scare quotes, 4
Schrödinger equation, 73
science
and philosophy, 64–70
demarcation criteria, 357–359
scope, 4
semantic approach, 183
semantic empiricism, 55–56
Semantic View, 94, 101, 108, 110, 113–
115, 131, 133–134, 136, 138–
140, 158
set theoretic notation, see notation, set
theoretic
similarity type, 4
state-space, see phace space
stronglyB -determined
semantically, 236
syntactically, 242
strongly determined in Ω
semantically, 256
syntactically, 256
strongly invariant, 240
structural realism, 389–390
structure, 4
corresponding to a partial struc-
ture, 204
labelled, see structure
model theoretic, see structure
partial, see partial structure
superfalse, 40
supertrue, 40
supervenience, 384
of sentences, see about subject mat-
terB
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of terms, 384
supplementary sentences, 257
syntactic approach, 183
syntactic isomorphism, 136, 169, 179
syntactical equivalence, 216
term, 4
auxiliary, 18, 41–44
basic, 18, 40–41
vague, 44–46
testability
contrastive, see contrastive testabil-
ity
in Bayesianism, see relevance
relation to testing, 302
theism, 335–336
theoretical sentences, 85
theoretical terms, 85
theory, 190, 197, see model, theoretical
traditional philosophy, 10, 14–16
trans-empirical, 11
translatability challenge, 339–340
modified, 340–342
translatable, 273
true, 40, 46, see quasi-true
analytically, 42
approximately, 202
relative, 261
truth, see true
truth value-like probability assignment,
319
vacuous, 264
observationally, see observation-
ally vacuous
vagueness, 215–216, 255, see term, vague
vagueness set, 45
corresponding to a partial struc-
ture, 201
verifiable
directly, 226
indirectly, 227
semantically, 234
in Ω, 256
syntactically, 233
in Ω, 255
verification by sentences, 233
verification by sets of structures, 256
verification by structures, 234
weaklyB -determined
semantically, 243
syntactic, 245
weakly determined in Ω
semantically, 256
syntactically, 255
worldly extension, 182
worldly interpretation, 182
worldly model, 182
worldly structure, 182, 185
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Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Deze dissertatie bevat drie delen.12 Deel I is een verdediging van kunsttalige
filosofie (een methodologie van filosofie op basis van kunstmatige taal), en een
historische en systematische verdediging van de toepassing van kunsttalige filosofie
op wetenschappelijke theorieën in het logisch empirisme. Deze verdedigingen
steunen de vooronderstellingen van een groot aantal criteria voor empirische
significantie die ik in deel II analyseer, vergelijk en ontwikkel. Op basis van deze
analyse hanteer ik in deel III verschillende criteria om de wetenschappelijke status
van Intelligent Design te beoordelen en verder noties van confirmatie, reductie en
begripsvorming te bediscussiëren.
I. Grondslagen
Grondslagen van de wijsbegeerte
Ik beargumenteer in §2.4 en §2.6 dat kunsttalige filosofie (ook ‘ideaaltalige filosofie’
genoemd) voordelen heeft in vergelijking met de concurrerende methodologieën
van filosofie gebaseerd op intuïties (§2.1), natuurtalige filosofie (§2.2), experimen-
tele filosofie en genaturaliseerde filosofie (§2.5). Kunsttalige filosofie gebruikt de
keuze van taal om filosofische problemen op te lossen; deze keuze determineert
welke zinnen analytisch waar zijn, maar heeft zelf geen feitelijke implicaties, zodat
de resultaten van kunsttalige filosofie analytisch zijn. Alhoewel de keuze van de
taal ook de keuze van de logica met zich mee kan brengen is het voor mijn discussie
voldoende een vaste logica en een vaste basis-woordenschat te veronderstellen,
en te veronderstellen dat alleen de betekenispostulaten van een supplementair-
woordenschat kunnen worden gekozen. In dit geval komt de keuze van een taal
neer op de vorming van begrippen. Ik bediscussieer in §2.8 de semantiek van
begripsvorming zoals ontwikkeld door Przełe˛cki (1969, §§4–6) en beargumenteer
12Ik dank Janneke van Lith voor het verbeteren van mijn Nederlands.
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dat kunsttalige filosofie methodologisch naturalistisch is, omdat de wetenschappen
ook uitgebreid op de keuze van taal berusten (§2.10). Daarom steunt kunstta-
lige filosofie ook veel waargenomen vruchtbare interacties tussen wetenschap en
wetenschapsfilosofie (§2.11). Verder maakt kunsttalige filosofie ook de herinter-
pretatie en productieve gebruik van resultaten van de andere vijf reeds vermelde
methodologieën (§2.7). Als voorbeeld van de toepassing van kunsttalige filosofie
expliciteer ik de begrippen ‘abstractie’ en ‘idealisatie’ (§2.12).
Grondslagen van wetenschapsfilosofie
De “Received View” op wetenschappelijke theorieën van Carnap, Hempel en
Feigl is een toepassing van kunsttalige filosofie op wetenschappelijke theorieën. Ik
beargumenteer dat de sterke kritiek die tot de ondergang van de Received View
leidde op valse veronderstellingen rust. In het bijzonder is de Received View niet
gebaseerd op uitputtende axiomatisering (§3.4) in logica van de eerste orde (§3.3)
en heeft hij in feite vaak dezelfde formalisering van wetenschappelijke theorieën
gebruikt als zijn critici (§3.5). De Received View vereenvoudigt de daadwerkelijke
relatie tussen theorieën en observaties ook niet te sterk, noch introduceert hij
in dit opzicht onnodige complicaties (§3.6). Hij is ook niet vijandig tegen het
gebruik van modellen in wetenschap (§3.7). Voorts heeft de Received View niet
in zijn poging gefaald om het begrip van een theorie nauwkeuriger te maken,
omdat hij niet bedoeld is dit te doen. In tegendeel: Ten eerste was hij bedoeld als
generaliseerbaar kader waarin men specifieke theorieën kan expliciteren (§3.8.2).
Ten tweede verschilt explicatie van precisering (§3.8.1).
In aanvulling op deze historische verdediging beargumenteer ik dat de syn-
tactische benaderingen in het algemeen net zo krachtig zijn als concurrerende
semantische benaderingen (§4.1). In het bijzonder kan de Received View van
Fraassens begrippen van een theorie en van empirische adequaatheid vangen en
veralgemeniseren (§4.2). Hij kan verder de kernbegrippen van de partial structures
benadering op twee verschillende manieren vangen (§4.3).
II. Relaties
Het doel van criteria van empirische significantie is te onderscheiden tussen zinnen
of begrippen die met empirische eisen of toestanden zijn verbonden en diegene die
dat niet zijn. Dergelijke criteria kunnen onderverdeeld worden in criteria voor de
empirische significantie van zinnen en criteria voor de empirische significantie van
begrippen. Langs een andere kant kan men onderscheiden tussen deductieve en
probabilistische criteria, die deductieve respectievelijk probabilistische inferenties
veronderstellen.
Ik laat zien dat alle belangrijke criteria voor zinnen equivalent zijn met falsifi-
eerbaarheid (§6.2), verifieerbaarheid (§6.3), hun disjunctie (§6.6) of superveniëntie
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(§6.5). Op die equivalenties voortbouwend geef ik vergelijkende criteria van em-
pirische significantie (§6.7.1) en geef ik een zeer algemene notie van empirische
eis en empirische feit (§6.8.1), en ontwikkel ik een notie van supplementaire
vooronderstellingen die de problemen van Ayers criterium en zijn opvolgers ver-
mijdt (§6.8.2). Verder laat ik zien dat de meest belangrijke deductieve criteria
voor begrippen equivalent of gelijkaardig zijn aan expliciete definieerbaarheid,
superveniëntie van begrippen (§7.2), reduceerbaarheid (§7.3), of een criterium
dat onafhankelijk door William Rozeboom en door Carnap werd voorgesteld
(§7.4). Gebaseerd op deze resultaten veralgemeniseer ik sommige van deze criteria
tot criteria voor verzamelingen van begrippen (§7.5). Ik beargumenteer dat die
criteria voor begrippen die niet slechts een middel zijn om criteria voor zinnen
opnieuw te formuleren überhaupt niet kunnen worden gebruikt om empirisch
significante zinnen te identificeren. Nochtans kunnen sommige criteria voor be-
grippen gebruikt worden om theoretische concepten van wiskundige concepten
te onderscheiden (§7.6). Ik toon verder aan dat Sobers (probabilistische) criterium
van testbaarheid ontoereikend is volgens zijn eigen voorwaarden van adequaatheid
en beveel in plaats daarvan twee verschillende criteria aan: het relevantie-criterium
van probabilistische significantie, dat het probabilistische analogon van falsifi-
eerbaarheid is, en het Bayesiaanse criterium, het analogon van de disjunctie van
falsifieerbaarheid en verifieerbaarheid (§8).
III. Toepassingen
Ik pas de resultaten van delen I en II op vier verschillende gebieden toe. In een
directe toepassing van deductieve en probabilistische criteria voor zinnen analyseer
ik de structuur van de theorie van Intelligent Design (ID) en laat zien dat, in zijn
meest aannemelijke formuleringen, ID noch falsifieerbaar is noch probabilistisch
relevant. Dit resultaat is een indicatie dat ID geen wetenschap is (§9).
Door de relatie tussen probabilistische criteria van empirische significantie
en het begrip van testbaarheid leidt het falen van likelihoodisme om een crite-
rium van empirische significantie te geven tot een kritiek van likelihoodisme
als een explicatie van confirmatie. Op analoge wijze leidt het succes van het
relevantie-criterium en het Bayesiaanse criterium van empirische significantie
tot het relevantie-criterium van confirmatie en, respectievelijk, het Bayesianisme
zelf (§10). Verder kunnen de deductieve criteria voor zinnen en sommige criteria
voor begrippen gebruikt worden in de explicatie van verschillende begrippen van
reductie (§11).
Tot slot kunnen de criteria van empirische significantie zelf worden gebruikt
om het formalisme van de kunsttalige filosofie te analyseren, te veralgemeniseren
en te verbeteren. Ik geef een overzicht van een dergelijke ontwikkeling en pas
sommige van de resultaten toe op een kwestie van conceptvorming in twee ethische
theorieën (§12).
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